农地整理后期管护制度绩效研究:影响路径及中介效应分析
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摘要
基于湖北省4个地区的568份农户调研数据,借鉴SCP范式构建了"制度结构-管护行为-制度绩效"研究框架,采用结构方程模型分析了农地整理后期管护制度绩效的影响路径,并利用中介效应模型测度了制度结构对其绩效的影响效应,试图为管护制度的完善和制度绩效的提升提供一定的理论依据。研究表明:(1)利用结构方程模型和线性回归模型验证了SCP范式的有效性,制度结构不仅直接作用于制度绩效,也可通过管护行为间接作用于制度绩效,且间接作用大于直接作用。(2)制度结构中,非正式制度类变量贡献更大;管护行为中,角色内行为类变量路径系数更高。影响声誉、破坏劝阻、主体选择等测量变量对制度结构、管护行为、制度绩效的总效应最大,效应值分别为0. 56、0. 79、0. 84。(3)管护文件覆盖区域与管护合同签订区域及全部实证区域中管护行为的中介效应均显著,且管护合同签订区域管护行为的中介效应高于管护文件覆盖区域。因此,建议重视非正式制度的激励与约束作用,逐步引导村民形成积极参与管护的惯例;加大管护基础工作的执行力度,尤其是对项目设施破坏行为进行及时劝阻,避免"破窗效应";引入市场机制,推进管护主体选择方式多元化。
This paper analyzes the influence path and effect of institutional performance of supervision and maintenance for rural land consolidation project by borrowing structure-conduct-performance paradigm,based on 568 questionnaires in Hubei province. It aims to provide the useful support for the perfection of the institution and improvement of institutional performance. Methodically,structural equation model and mediating effects model are employed. The main results are as follows. Firstly,the proposed SCP model is verified. The institutional structure could not only affect institutional performance directly but also indirectly through the supervision and maintenance behavior,and the indirect effect is greater than the direct one. Secondly,contributions of the informal institution variables are greater in the institutional structure,while the path coefficients of in-role behaviors variables are higher in supervision and maintenance behavior. Furthermore,reputation influence,destruction-discourage,subject selection play the most important roles in the institutional structure, supervision and maintenance behavior,institutional performance respectively,with the effect values of 0. 56,0. 79 and 0. 84. Lastly,the mediating effect of supervision and maintenance behavior is significant in the studied areas,including document area and contract area. Moreover,the mediating effects of contract area is higher than the document area. In conclusion,we should pay more attention to the incentive and restraint function of informal institution,and guide the villagers to form the tradition of actively participating in supervision and maintenance gradually. Thus,the enforcement of infrastructure of supervision and maintenance should be strengthened, especially preventing destruction of facilities timely to avoid the "broken window effect ". Also,the market mechanism should be introduced to promote the diversification of subject selection procedure.
This paper analyzes the influence path and effect of institutional performance of supervision and maintenance for rural land consolidation project by borrowing structure-conduct-performance paradigm,based on 568 questionnaires in Hubei province. It aims to provide the useful support for the perfection of the institution and improvement of institutional performance. Methodically,structural equation model and mediating effects model are employed. The main results are as follows. Firstly,the proposed SCP model is verified. The institutional structure could not only affect institutional performance directly but also indirectly through the supervision and maintenance behavior,and the indirect effect is greater than the direct one. Secondly,contributions of the informal institution variables are greater in the institutional structure,while the path coefficients of in-role behaviors variables are higher in supervision and maintenance behavior. Furthermore,reputation influence,destruction-discourage,subject selection play the most important roles in the institutional structure, supervision and maintenance behavior,institutional performance respectively,with the effect values of 0. 56,0. 79 and 0. 84. Lastly,the mediating effect of supervision and maintenance behavior is significant in the studied areas,including document area and contract area. Moreover,the mediating effects of contract area is higher than the document area. In conclusion,we should pay more attention to the incentive and restraint function of informal institution,and guide the villagers to form the tradition of actively participating in supervision and maintenance gradually. Thus,the enforcement of infrastructure of supervision and maintenance should be strengthened, especially preventing destruction of facilities timely to avoid the "broken window effect ". Also,the market mechanism should be introduced to promote the diversification of subject selection procedure.
引文
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[7]刘洁,祁春节,陈新华.制度结构对农民专业合作社绩效的影响——基于江西省72家农民专业合作社的实证分析[J].经济经纬,2016,33(2):36-41.LIU J,QI C J,CHEN X H. The influence of system structure on farmers professional cooperative’s performance——based on the empirical study of 72 cooperatives in Jiangxi province[J].Economic Survey,2016,33(2):36-41.
[8]罗必良.新制度经济学[M].太原:山西经济出版社,2005.LUO B L. New institutional economics[M]. Taiyuan:Shanxi Economics Press,2005.
[9]赵微.基于制度构成理论的农地整理建后管护的农民愿意研究[J].中国土地科学,2015,29(9):89-96.ZHAO W. Farmers’willingness of supervising and maintaining land consolidation based on institution structure theory[J]. China Land Science,2015,29(9):89-96.
[10] NORTH D C. Economic performance through time[J]. The American Economic Review,1994,84(3):359-368.
[11]王文贵.互动与耦合:非正式制度与经济发展[M].北京:中国社会科学出版,2007.WANG W G. Interaction and coupling:informal institution and economic development[M]. Beijing:China Social Science Press,2007.
[12] ROTUNDO M,SACKETT P R. The relative importance of task,citizenship,and counterproductive performance to global ratings of job performance:A policy-capturing approach[J]. Journal of Applied Psychology,2002,87(1):66-80.
[13] VISWESVARAN C,ONES D S. Perspectives on models of job performance[J]. International Journal of Selection and Assessment,2000,8(4):216-226.
[14] FARH J L,EARLEY P C,LIN S C. Impetus for action:A cultural analysis of justice and organizational citizenship behavior in Chinese society[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1997,42(3):421-441.
[15]吴明隆.结构方程模型——AMOS的操作与应用[M].重庆:重庆大学出版社,2010.WU M L. Structural equation modeling——operation and application of AMOS[M]. Chongqing:Chongqing University Press,2010.
[16]赵微,吴诗嫚.“结构-行为-绩效”框架下农地整理的管护绩效研究[J].长江流域资源与环境,2016,25(2):249-256.ZHAO W,WU S M. Performance analysis of supervision and maintenance of rural land consolidation:A theoretical framework of structure-conduct-performance[J]. Resources and Environment in the Yangtze Basin,2016,25(2):249-256.
[17]赵微,杨钢桥,李金玉,等.基于OLS和分位数回归的农地整理管护绩效研究[J].中国土地科学,2016,30(8):72-80.ZHAO W,YANG G Q,LI J Y,et al. Performance of supervision and maintenance after ownership transfer of rural land consolidation based on OLS and quantile regression[J]. China Land Science,2016,30(8):72-80.
[18]温忠麟,叶宝娟.中介效应分析:方法和模型发展[J].心理科学进展,2014,22(5):731-745.WEN Z L,YE B J. Analyses of mediating effects:the development of methods and models[J]. Advances in Psychological Science,2014,22(5):731-745.
[2]任奎,周生路,姚俊,等.南京市土地征用制度实施绩效评价研究初探[J].农业技术经济,2008,(1):72-78.REN K,ZHOU S L,YAO J,et al. Study on performance evaluation of land requisition system in Nanjing[J]. Journal of Agrotechnical Economics,2008(1):72-78.
[3]瞿忠琼,濮励杰.城市土地供给制度绩效评价指标体系研究——以南京市为例[J].中国土地科学,2006,20(1):45-49.QU Z Q,PU L J. Study on indicators for evaluation of performance of urban land supply system in China——taking Nanjing as example[J]. China Land Science,2006,20(1):45-49.
[4]张应良,王钊.农村公共产品供给的制度绩效:一个分析框架[J].改革,2008(11):141-146.ZHANG Y L,WANG Z. Performance of rural public products supplying system:an framework analysis[J]. Reform,2008(11):141-146.
[5]何一鸣,罗必良.产权管制、制度行为与经济绩效——来自中国农业经济体制转轨的证据(1958-2005年)[J].中国农村经济,2010,(10):4-15.HE Y M,LUO B L. Property right regulation,system behavior and economic performance,evidence from China agricultural economic system[J]. Chinese Rural Economy,2010(10):4-15.
[6]张耀辉,卜国琴,卢云峰.市场交易制度与市场绩效关系的实验经济学研究——对SCP分析范式的修正[J].中国工业经济,2005,(12):34-40.ZHANG Y H,BU G Q,LU Y F. A study on the relationship between market trading institutions and market performance based on experimental economics——a modification of SCP model[J]. China Industrial Economy,2005(12):34-40.
[7]刘洁,祁春节,陈新华.制度结构对农民专业合作社绩效的影响——基于江西省72家农民专业合作社的实证分析[J].经济经纬,2016,33(2):36-41.LIU J,QI C J,CHEN X H. The influence of system structure on farmers professional cooperative’s performance——based on the empirical study of 72 cooperatives in Jiangxi province[J].Economic Survey,2016,33(2):36-41.
[8]罗必良.新制度经济学[M].太原:山西经济出版社,2005.LUO B L. New institutional economics[M]. Taiyuan:Shanxi Economics Press,2005.
[9]赵微.基于制度构成理论的农地整理建后管护的农民愿意研究[J].中国土地科学,2015,29(9):89-96.ZHAO W. Farmers’willingness of supervising and maintaining land consolidation based on institution structure theory[J]. China Land Science,2015,29(9):89-96.
[10] NORTH D C. Economic performance through time[J]. The American Economic Review,1994,84(3):359-368.
[11]王文贵.互动与耦合:非正式制度与经济发展[M].北京:中国社会科学出版,2007.WANG W G. Interaction and coupling:informal institution and economic development[M]. Beijing:China Social Science Press,2007.
[12] ROTUNDO M,SACKETT P R. The relative importance of task,citizenship,and counterproductive performance to global ratings of job performance:A policy-capturing approach[J]. Journal of Applied Psychology,2002,87(1):66-80.
[13] VISWESVARAN C,ONES D S. Perspectives on models of job performance[J]. International Journal of Selection and Assessment,2000,8(4):216-226.
[14] FARH J L,EARLEY P C,LIN S C. Impetus for action:A cultural analysis of justice and organizational citizenship behavior in Chinese society[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1997,42(3):421-441.
[15]吴明隆.结构方程模型——AMOS的操作与应用[M].重庆:重庆大学出版社,2010.WU M L. Structural equation modeling——operation and application of AMOS[M]. Chongqing:Chongqing University Press,2010.
[16]赵微,吴诗嫚.“结构-行为-绩效”框架下农地整理的管护绩效研究[J].长江流域资源与环境,2016,25(2):249-256.ZHAO W,WU S M. Performance analysis of supervision and maintenance of rural land consolidation:A theoretical framework of structure-conduct-performance[J]. Resources and Environment in the Yangtze Basin,2016,25(2):249-256.
[17]赵微,杨钢桥,李金玉,等.基于OLS和分位数回归的农地整理管护绩效研究[J].中国土地科学,2016,30(8):72-80.ZHAO W,YANG G Q,LI J Y,et al. Performance of supervision and maintenance after ownership transfer of rural land consolidation based on OLS and quantile regression[J]. China Land Science,2016,30(8):72-80.
[18]温忠麟,叶宝娟.中介效应分析:方法和模型发展[J].心理科学进展,2014,22(5):731-745.WEN Z L,YE B J. Analyses of mediating effects:the development of methods and models[J]. Advances in Psychological Science,2014,22(5):731-745.