市场需求信息不对称下的保兑仓融资风险控制策略
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摘要
信息不对称风险广泛存在于保兑仓融资过程当中,本文运用Stackelberg博弈模型刻画融资系统成员关系,运用动态规划优化分析方法求解对应博弈均衡策略。总结出需求信息不对称的三种表现形式:信息造假,信息优势及信息隐匿,分析各类信息不对称情形对融资系统所造成影响,并相应提出实现信息显示功能的契约甄别机制。研究表明:零售商可从信息不对称中获取巨大信息优势,但对其他成员造成损害,其中信息隐匿对生产商损害程度更高;二部定价机制可实现信息甄别,但生产商须为之付出信息租金,造成效率损失;而合理参数设定下的二部定价加回购机制有助于进一步改进融资系统及各成员收益,甚至达到次协调状态,最终实现融资成员收益的帕累托改进。本研究对于控制供应链融资中的信息风险、改善融资效率提供了理论依据及决策参考。
Information asymmetry risk widely exists in the process of confirmed warehouse financing. This paper depicts relationship of the financing system members by using the Stackelberg game model,and uses dynamic programming and other optimization methods to solve the corresponding equilibrium decision. Three kinds of demand information asymmetry situations—information fraud,information superiority,and information hiding are summarized. We also analyze the impact of different information asymmetry cases on the financing system,and further put forward the screening contract mechanism to achieve the information display. The results show that:Retailers can get high advantage from the information asymmetry,which also brings damage to the other financing participants. Information hiding does higher damage to the manufacturer. The two-part tariff contract can realize information screening,but the manufacturer has to pay information rent for it,which causes efficiency loss of the financing system. The two-part tariff with repurchase mechanism under reasonable parameter setting helps to further improve the interest of the financing system,even can reach the secondary coordination state,and realizes Pareto improvement of the financing system members. This paper provides the theoretical reference and decision basis for controlling information risk and improving financing efficiency of the supply chain finance.
Information asymmetry risk widely exists in the process of confirmed warehouse financing. This paper depicts relationship of the financing system members by using the Stackelberg game model,and uses dynamic programming and other optimization methods to solve the corresponding equilibrium decision. Three kinds of demand information asymmetry situations—information fraud,information superiority,and information hiding are summarized. We also analyze the impact of different information asymmetry cases on the financing system,and further put forward the screening contract mechanism to achieve the information display. The results show that:Retailers can get high advantage from the information asymmetry,which also brings damage to the other financing participants. Information hiding does higher damage to the manufacturer. The two-part tariff contract can realize information screening,but the manufacturer has to pay information rent for it,which causes efficiency loss of the financing system. The two-part tariff with repurchase mechanism under reasonable parameter setting helps to further improve the interest of the financing system,even can reach the secondary coordination state,and realizes Pareto improvement of the financing system members. This paper provides the theoretical reference and decision basis for controlling information risk and improving financing efficiency of the supply chain finance.
引文
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[16] Babich V,Li H,Ritchken P. Contracting with asymmetric demand information in supply chains[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2012,217(2):333-341.
[2] Zhang Q,Dong M,Luo J,et al. Supply chain coordination with trade credit and quantity discount incorporating default risk[J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2014,153(4):352-360.
[3] Kouvelis P,Zhao W. Financing the newsvendor:supplier vs. bank, and the structure of optimal trade credit contracts[J]. Operations Research,2012,60(3):566-580.
[4] Kouvelis P,Zhao W. Supply chain contract design under financial constraints and bankruptcy costs[J]. Management Science,2016,62(8):2341-2357.
[5] Jing B,Chen X,Cai G. Equilibrium financing in a distribution channel with capital constraint[J].Production&Operations Management,2012,21(6):1090-1101.
[6] Cai G,Chen X,Xiao Z. The roles of bank and trade credits:theoretical analysis and empirical evidence[J].Production&Operations Management,2014,23(4):583-598.
[7] Chen X. A model of trade credit in a capital-constrained distribution channel[J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2015,159(1):347-357.
[8]张义刚,唐小我.供应链融资中的制造商最优策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(6):1434-1440.
[9]吴英晶,李勇建.供应商回购承诺下的销售商存货质押融资决策[J].运筹与管理,2015,24(3):60-67.
[10]林强,李苗.保兑仓融资模式下收益共享契约的参数设计[J].系统科学与数学,2013,33(4):430-444.
[11] Yan N,Sun B,Zhang H,Liu C. A partial credit guarantee contract in a capital-constrained supply chain:financing equilibrium and coordinating strategy[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2016,173(1):122-133.
[12] Luo J,Zhang Q. Trade credit:a new mechanism to coordinate supply chain[J]. Operations Research Letters,2012,40(5):278-384.
[13]窦亚芹,朱金福.非对称信息下供应链融资优化决策研究[J].管理评论,2012,24(9):170-176.
[14]于辉,刘鹏飞,孙彩虹.信息可信与贷款利率确定问题的供应链鲁棒模型分析[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(8):64-71.
[15]刘克宁,宋华明.市场价格信息不对称的银企融资决策[J].控制与决策,2016,31(4):647-655.
[16] Babich V,Li H,Ritchken P. Contracting with asymmetric demand information in supply chains[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2012,217(2):333-341.