非对称减排技术水平下企业减排投资策略及合同设计
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摘要
针对政府引导企业减排问题,考虑企业的减排技术水平与减排资金投入均为企业私有信息的双重信息不对称问题,将政府向企业的支付考虑为一个排放量的线性函数,构建了政府和企业间的斯坦伯格博弈模型探讨企业减排激励合同的设计。求解模型并分析最优激励合同,并与减排技术水平对称时的情形做了比较。结果表明:当政府不确定企业的减排技术水平时,政府的期望收益和激励强度下降,而拥有私有信息的企业的减排资金投入降低收益却增加,说明政府获取企业的减排技术水平的信息,有利于改进激励策略,为政府引导企业积极减排提供了决策支持。
In view of the government's guidance on emission reduction, considering the fact that a company's emission reduction technology and emission reduction capital investment are the dual information asymmetry of the company's private information, and taking the government's payment to the enterprise as a linear function of emissions, a Stackelberg game model is developed in this paper with the help of a linear function of the total emission to design the emission reduction contract and regulate incentive payments from the government to the enterprise. Furthermore, the corresponding optimal contract is analyzed and compared with the symmetric technology. The results show that when the government is uncertain about the enterprise's technology of emission reduction, its expected profit and incentive intensity decreases, the enterprise with private information is hence able to obtain higher payments while investing less in emission reduction. These comparison results imply that by obtaining an enterprise's technology and emission reduction information, the government can improve the incentive strategy which can provide the appropriate decision support for the government to stimulate the enterprise's emission reduction.
In view of the government's guidance on emission reduction, considering the fact that a company's emission reduction technology and emission reduction capital investment are the dual information asymmetry of the company's private information, and taking the government's payment to the enterprise as a linear function of emissions, a Stackelberg game model is developed in this paper with the help of a linear function of the total emission to design the emission reduction contract and regulate incentive payments from the government to the enterprise. Furthermore, the corresponding optimal contract is analyzed and compared with the symmetric technology. The results show that when the government is uncertain about the enterprise's technology of emission reduction, its expected profit and incentive intensity decreases, the enterprise with private information is hence able to obtain higher payments while investing less in emission reduction. These comparison results imply that by obtaining an enterprise's technology and emission reduction information, the government can improve the incentive strategy which can provide the appropriate decision support for the government to stimulate the enterprise's emission reduction.
引文
[1] 楼高翔, 张洁琼, 范体军, 等. 非对称信息下供应链减排投资策略及激励机制[J]. 管理科学学报, 2016, 19(2): 42-52.
[2] 何大义, 陈小玲, 许加强. 限额交易减排政策对企业生产策略的影响[J]. 系统管理学报, 2016, 25(2): 302-307.
[3] 杨磊, 郑晨诗, 纪静娜. 碳信息不对称下的供应链谎报决策与协调研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(4): 111-120.
[4] 侯玉梅, 朱俊娟. 非对称信息下政府对企业节能减排激励机制研究[J]. 生态经济, 2015, 31(1): 96-101.
[5] 张国兴, 张绪涛, 程素杰, 等. 节能减排补贴政策下的企业与政府信号博弈模型[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013, 21(4): 129-136.
[6] 方国昌, 田立新, 傅敏. 政府调控对碳税的演化影响[J]. 系统工程学报, 2014, 29(5): 612-618.
[7] 李长胜, 范英, 朱磊. 基于两阶段博弈模型的钢铁行业碳强度减排机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2012, 20(2): 93-101.
[8] 王明喜, 鲍勤, 汤铃, 等. 碳排放约束下的企业最优减排投资行为[J]. 管理科学学报, 2015, 18(6): 41-57.
[9] 黄帝, 陈剑, 周泓. 配额-交易机制下动态批量生产和减排投资策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(4): 129-137.
[10] 杨亚琴, 邱菀华, 何大义. 强制减排机制下政府与企业之间的博弈分析[J]. 系统工程, 2012, 30(2): 110-114.
[11] 朱庆华, 王一雷, 田一辉. 基于系统动力学的地方政府与制造企业碳减排演化博弈分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2014, 23(3): 71-82.
[12] 杨涛, 李随成. 基于清洁发展机制的碳减排投资机制设计研究[J]. 预测, 2015, 34(4): 76-80.
[13] 邹伟进, 裴宏伟, 王进. 基于委托代理模型的企业环境行为研究[J]. 中国人口资源与环境, 2014, 24(3): 51-54.
[14] 杜建国, 崔乾坤, 张靖泉. 双重信息不对称下企业污染减排激励契约研究[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2015, 33(12): 87-93.
[15] Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives[J]. Econometrica, 1987, 55(2): 303-328.
[16] 张维迎. 博弈论与信息经济学[M]. 上海: 上海人民出版社, 2004.
[17] Chen Y J, Shum S, Xiao W Q. Should an OEM retain component procurement when the CM produces competing products? [J]. Production and Operations Management, 2012, 21(5): 907-922.
[18] Lau H S, Lau H L. Manufacturer's pricing strategy and return policy for a single-period commodity [J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 1999, 116(2): 291-304
[19] Li Q, Li B, Chen P, et al. Dual-channel supply chain decisions under asymmetric information with a risk-averse retailer[J]. Annals of Operations Research, 2015, 228 (2): 1-25.
[20] 王虹, 孙玉玲, 周晶. 制造商信息私有条件下的双渠道供应链定价决策[J]. 运筹与管理, 2013, 22(6): 117-122.
[21] Xu X, Meng Z, Shen R, et al. Optimal decisions for the loss-averse newsvendor problem under CVaR[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 164(6): 146-159.
[22] Arya A, Mittendorf B. Supply chain consequences of subsidies for corporate social responsibility[J]. Production & Operations Management, 2014, 24(8): 1346-1357.
[23] Lee C Y, Yang R. Compensation plan for competing salespersons under asymmetric information[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2013, 227(3): 570-580.
[2] 何大义, 陈小玲, 许加强. 限额交易减排政策对企业生产策略的影响[J]. 系统管理学报, 2016, 25(2): 302-307.
[3] 杨磊, 郑晨诗, 纪静娜. 碳信息不对称下的供应链谎报决策与协调研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(4): 111-120.
[4] 侯玉梅, 朱俊娟. 非对称信息下政府对企业节能减排激励机制研究[J]. 生态经济, 2015, 31(1): 96-101.
[5] 张国兴, 张绪涛, 程素杰, 等. 节能减排补贴政策下的企业与政府信号博弈模型[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013, 21(4): 129-136.
[6] 方国昌, 田立新, 傅敏. 政府调控对碳税的演化影响[J]. 系统工程学报, 2014, 29(5): 612-618.
[7] 李长胜, 范英, 朱磊. 基于两阶段博弈模型的钢铁行业碳强度减排机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2012, 20(2): 93-101.
[8] 王明喜, 鲍勤, 汤铃, 等. 碳排放约束下的企业最优减排投资行为[J]. 管理科学学报, 2015, 18(6): 41-57.
[9] 黄帝, 陈剑, 周泓. 配额-交易机制下动态批量生产和减排投资策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(4): 129-137.
[10] 杨亚琴, 邱菀华, 何大义. 强制减排机制下政府与企业之间的博弈分析[J]. 系统工程, 2012, 30(2): 110-114.
[11] 朱庆华, 王一雷, 田一辉. 基于系统动力学的地方政府与制造企业碳减排演化博弈分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2014, 23(3): 71-82.
[12] 杨涛, 李随成. 基于清洁发展机制的碳减排投资机制设计研究[J]. 预测, 2015, 34(4): 76-80.
[13] 邹伟进, 裴宏伟, 王进. 基于委托代理模型的企业环境行为研究[J]. 中国人口资源与环境, 2014, 24(3): 51-54.
[14] 杜建国, 崔乾坤, 张靖泉. 双重信息不对称下企业污染减排激励契约研究[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2015, 33(12): 87-93.
[15] Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives[J]. Econometrica, 1987, 55(2): 303-328.
[16] 张维迎. 博弈论与信息经济学[M]. 上海: 上海人民出版社, 2004.
[17] Chen Y J, Shum S, Xiao W Q. Should an OEM retain component procurement when the CM produces competing products? [J]. Production and Operations Management, 2012, 21(5): 907-922.
[18] Lau H S, Lau H L. Manufacturer's pricing strategy and return policy for a single-period commodity [J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 1999, 116(2): 291-304
[19] Li Q, Li B, Chen P, et al. Dual-channel supply chain decisions under asymmetric information with a risk-averse retailer[J]. Annals of Operations Research, 2015, 228 (2): 1-25.
[20] 王虹, 孙玉玲, 周晶. 制造商信息私有条件下的双渠道供应链定价决策[J]. 运筹与管理, 2013, 22(6): 117-122.
[21] Xu X, Meng Z, Shen R, et al. Optimal decisions for the loss-averse newsvendor problem under CVaR[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 164(6): 146-159.
[22] Arya A, Mittendorf B. Supply chain consequences of subsidies for corporate social responsibility[J]. Production & Operations Management, 2014, 24(8): 1346-1357.
[23] Lee C Y, Yang R. Compensation plan for competing salespersons under asymmetric information[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2013, 227(3): 570-580.