摘要
本文采用世界经济自由度指数和世界银行的世界发展指标,选取2002—2008年面板数据对就业保护的理论假说和经验分析进行了相应的验证。实证结果表明,就业保护提高了失业率,女性和青年受就业保护制度的影响程度更大;就业保护子指标对失业率的影响与理论估计一致,但显著性较低。其中,雇佣/解雇管制越低,失业率越低;法定解雇成本越高,失业率越低;服兵役时间越长,失业率越高;最低工资、集体协商、工时管制与失业率之间没有显著关系。就业保护问题的研究有助于改进我国的劳动立法,改善女性、青年的就业机会,提高就业率,发挥法律的增进市场效率的作用,为完善劳动力市场的运行机制提供理论支持。
This paper applied the EFW index and the WDI data from 2002 to 2008 to make empirical analysis of employment protection.This paper found the employment protection increased the total unemployment rate,especially women and youth unemployment rate.The sub-indicators of employment protection effect were coincided with the theoretical estimations,but significantly lower.There were three indicators: hiring/firing regulations,mandated dismissal costs and conscription had significant effects on women and youth.This research on labor contract law would provide theoretical support to improve the employment opportunities of women and young,raise the employment rate,enhance market efficiency,and improve the operation mechanism of the labor market theory supported.
引文
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