区域经济发展不平衡与土地违法:基于地方政府经济增长激励的视角
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摘要
研究目的:探究地方政府经济增长激励背景下,区域经济发展不平衡对土地违法行为的影响。研究方法:基于经济和社会科学领域有关发展不平衡及其影响效应的理论观点,结合中国特定的地方政府经济增长激励机制,以及土地利用与管理实际,探讨区域经济发展不平衡对土地违法行为的影响机理,并通过构建计量经济模型进行相应的实证检验。研究结果:区域内部经济发展差异的扩大确实会导致更多土地违法案件的产生和违法用地规模的增加;另外,在不同经济发展地区,区域内部经济发展差异变化对土地违法的具体影响有所不同。发达地区内部经济发展差异的扩大对土地违法的影响主要表现在违法面积上,而欠发达地区内部经济发展差异的扩大对土地违法的影响则主要表现在违法案件数上。研究结论:区域经济发展不平衡是导致土地违法行为的重要因素之一,促进和实现地区间的均衡发展有助于减少土地违法现象。
The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of imbalanced development of regional economy on illegal land use, from the perspective of economic growth incentive on local governments. The methods employed are that based on the relevant theories about imbalanced development and its influences in the research area of economic and social sciences, we firstly explored the influencing mechanism of China's imbalanced development of regional economy on illegal land use in theory, connecting the current situation of land use and management and the special economic growth incentive on China's local governments. Then, we developed an econometric model to test the effects of imbalanced development of regional economy on illegal land use, using the statistical data of 23 provinces in China from 2000 to2015. The results show that enlarging difference of regional economic development indeed results in more illegal land use cases and areas. Furthermore, in the regions with different development level, the effects of imbalanced development of regional economy on illegal land use are different. Specifically, enlarging difference of regional economic development indeed results in more illegal land use areas in developed regions and cases in undeveloped regions. The conclusions of this paper also draws some useful implications for Chinese government to effectively control and govern illegal land use behaviors. We believe that promoting and realizing balanced development of regional economy is beneficial to decrease illegal land use.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of imbalanced development of regional economy on illegal land use, from the perspective of economic growth incentive on local governments. The methods employed are that based on the relevant theories about imbalanced development and its influences in the research area of economic and social sciences, we firstly explored the influencing mechanism of China's imbalanced development of regional economy on illegal land use in theory, connecting the current situation of land use and management and the special economic growth incentive on China's local governments. Then, we developed an econometric model to test the effects of imbalanced development of regional economy on illegal land use, using the statistical data of 23 provinces in China from 2000 to2015. The results show that enlarging difference of regional economic development indeed results in more illegal land use cases and areas. Furthermore, in the regions with different development level, the effects of imbalanced development of regional economy on illegal land use are different. Specifically, enlarging difference of regional economic development indeed results in more illegal land use areas in developed regions and cases in undeveloped regions. The conclusions of this paper also draws some useful implications for Chinese government to effectively control and govern illegal land use behaviors. We believe that promoting and realizing balanced development of regional economy is beneficial to decrease illegal land use.
引文
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[4]梁若冰.财政分权下的晋升激励、部门利益与土地违法[J].经济学(季刊),2009,9(1):283-306.
[5]WANG Y M,SCOTT S.Illegal farmland conversion in China’s urban periphery:local regime and national transitions[J].Urban Geography,2008,29(4):327-347.
[6]谭术魁,饶映雪,戴德艺.地方政府土地违法治理政策的仿真研究[J].中国土地科学,2013,27(4):53-59.
[7]龙开胜,陈利根.中国土地违法现象的影响因素分析--基于1999年-2008年省际面板数据[J].资源科学,2011,33(6):1171-1177.
[8]陈志刚,王青.经济增长、市场化改革与土地违法[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2013,23(8):48-54.
[9]陆汝成,黄贤金.中国省域违法占用耕地的空间效应[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2011,21(11):86-91.
[10]饶映雪,谭术魁,罗迈.地方政府土地违法的传染效应分析[J].管理世界,2012(8):180-181.
[11]张莉,徐现祥,王贤彬.地方官员合谋与土地违法[J].世界经济,2011(3):72-88.
[12]李隆伟,杨蔚宁,郭沛.制度约束、部门利益与土地违法[J].华南理工大学学报(社会科学版),2015,17(5):9-17.
[13]周黎安.转型中的地方政府:官员激励与治理(第二版)[M].上海:格致出版社(上海三联书店、上海人民出版社),2017:162-174.
[14]理查德·威尔金森,凯特·皮克特.不平等的痛苦:收入差距如何导致社会问题[M].北京:新华出版社,2010:32-44.
[15]斯蒂芬·E.巴坎.犯罪学:社会学的理解(第四版)[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2011:5.
[16]周黎安,李宏彬,陈烨.相对绩效考核:中国地方官员晋升机制的一项经验研究[J].经济学报,2005,1(1):83-96.
[17]ZHONG T Y,HUANG X J,YE L F,et al.The impacts on illegal farmland conversion of adopting remote sensing technology for land inspection in China[J].Sustainability,2014,6:4426-4451.
[18]国家统计局.中国统计年鉴2000-2016[M].北京:中国统计出版社,2001-2017.
[19]国家统计局.中国城市统计年鉴2000-2016[M].北京:中国统计出版社,2001-2017.
[20]PEARCE D W.Macmillan Dictionary of Modern Economics(Fourth Edition)[M].London:Macmillan,1992:172.