互联网募捐模式下的多方动态行为演化分析——基于三方博弈视角
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摘要
[目的 /意义]互联网募捐是"互联网+"时代出现的一种新型慈善捐助模式,但因其匿名性和隐蔽性导致各参与主体间存在着严重的信息不对称现象。[方法 /过程]基于三方动态演化博弈模型,构建募捐主体、互联网募捐平台和捐赠人三方行为主体的互动博弈模型,分析互联网募捐中各方博弈人的策略行为、演化趋势和均衡状态。[结果/结论]采取适当措施控制某些参数值,则募捐主体选择发布真实信息、互联网募捐平台选择不核实信息、捐赠人选择捐助构成博弈的演化稳定策略;多方主体的决策行为共同影响着互联网募捐的健康发展,因此应构建多方行为主体协同作用的社会机制,建立良好的信任体系,共同努力化解互联网募捐的信任危机。
[Purpose/significance] Internet donation is a new type of charitable donation mode emerging in the "Internet+" era. However, due to its anonymity and concealment, there are serious information asymmetry between participating subjects. [Method/process] From the perspective of the three-side dynamic evolutionary game, the paper constructed a game model for three parties involved in internet donation: the donation subject, the internet donation platform and the donor, analyzed the evolution trend of each party's strategy,mutual influence and evolutionary equilibrium. [Results/conclusions] If appropriate measures are taken to control the value of certain parameters, then the donation subject will publish real information, the internet donation platform will not verify the information, and the donor donating will be the evolutionary stable strategy. The decision-making behavior of multi-players affects the healthy development of internet donation,therefore, this paper puts forwards the interaction and coordination mechanism of multi-party cooperation to build social trust, to establish a good trust system and work together to resolve the trust crisis of internet donations.
[Purpose/significance] Internet donation is a new type of charitable donation mode emerging in the "Internet+" era. However, due to its anonymity and concealment, there are serious information asymmetry between participating subjects. [Method/process] From the perspective of the three-side dynamic evolutionary game, the paper constructed a game model for three parties involved in internet donation: the donation subject, the internet donation platform and the donor, analyzed the evolution trend of each party's strategy,mutual influence and evolutionary equilibrium. [Results/conclusions] If appropriate measures are taken to control the value of certain parameters, then the donation subject will publish real information, the internet donation platform will not verify the information, and the donor donating will be the evolutionary stable strategy. The decision-making behavior of multi-players affects the healthy development of internet donation,therefore, this paper puts forwards the interaction and coordination mechanism of multi-party cooperation to build social trust, to establish a good trust system and work together to resolve the trust crisis of internet donations.
引文
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[2]知微事见.罗一笑白血病事件[EB/OL].[2018-10-25].http://ef.zhiwei data.com/#!/event/583e478d712eb4badf2786c9/trend.
[3]BARBER P.Regulation of US charitable solicitations since 1954[J].Voluntas:international journal of voluntary&nonprofit organizations,2012,23(3):737-762.
[4]PHILLIPS S D.Canadian leapfrog:from regulating chari table fundraisingtoco-regulating good governance[J].Voluntas:international journal of voluntary&nonprofit organizations,2012,23(3):808-829.
[5]ONISHI T.Philanthropy and the media[C]//International encyclopedia of civil society.New York:Springer,2010:1181-1186.
[6]汪国华,张晓光.中国网络慈善运作模式比较研究[J].社会科学研究,2014(3):104-110.
[7]李丹,杜晖.网络捐款模式探究[J].价值工程,2010,29(22):251-252.
[8]柯凤华.网络募捐的规范化研究[D].广州:暨南大学,2008.
[9]王藐.我国网络募捐治理初探[D].长春:吉林大学,2015.
[10]汪丹,于立平.网络募捐:时尚背后的困境--以宁波市为例[J].宁波大学学报(人文科学版),2014(4):122-126.
[11]邱习强.我国网络募捐综合监管机制研究[D].济南:山东大学,2017.
[12]田雨.网络募捐平台政府监管存在的问题及对策研究[D].长春:东北师范大学,2018.
[13]李程.网络募捐行政监管初探[D].北京:中国政法大学,2011.
[14]张小玲.公益网络募捐多元监管径路选择:基于政社共治视角[C]//第十二届中国软科学学术年会论文集(上).北京:中国软科学研究会,2016:6.
[15]陈婉璇.论个人网络募捐的法律规制[J].法制博览,2017(1):51-53.
[16]陈婷,曲霏,陈福集.突发事件网络舆情扩散的政府应对仿真描述--基于三方博弈视角[J].图书馆杂志,2017(2):79-86.
[17]民政部.慈善组织互联网公开募捐信息平台基本技术规范[EB/OL].[2018-10-25].http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.org.cn/news-19859.html.
[18]李燕凌,丁莹.网络舆情公共危机治理中社会信任修复研究--基于动物疫情危机演化博弈的实证分析[J].公共管理学报,2017(4):91-101.
[19]HIRSHLEIFER J,COLL J C M.What strategies can support the evolutionary emergence of cooperation?[J].Journal of conflict resolution,1988,32(2):367-398.
[20]陈福集,黄亚驹.基于前景理论的商业化网媒行为监管演化博弈分析[J].现代情报,2017,37(6):3-8.