企业合规刑事化的发展及启示
摘要
作为预防、发现和制止企业内部违法犯罪行为的内控机制,企业合规计划在回应刑法监管的过程中,不断以刑法为参照对象,借鉴、引入了诸多刑法理念与规则,逐渐呈现出"刑事化"的发展趋势。在经济全球化与法律全球化并融发展的背景下,企业合规"刑事化"成为全球企业合规制度发展的重要趋势和立法方向。许多国家和国际组织为在本区域内推广企业合规,在立法和司法实践中积极推动建立以刑法理念与规则为导向、以威慑为基础的企业合规制度。鉴于刑法强制效力和刑罚威慑效应对企业合规的巨大推动作用,在我国推进企业合规的构建实施过程中,可以尝试将企业合规引入刑事立法,通过刑事法的理论与实践牵引,推动企业合规制度的构建和实施。
引文
(1)U.S.SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL(U.S.S.G)ch.8.(2008).
(1)Geoffrey Parsons Miller,The Law of Governance,Risk Management,and Compliance,Wolters Kluwer.2015,p.139.
(2)Harvey L.Pitt&Karl A.Groskaufmanis,“Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability:A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct”,in 78 Georgetown Law Journal,(1990),p.1571.
(3)肖远企:“合规管理模式的变迁路径及其启示”,载《银行家》2006年第9期,第34页。
(1)JED S.RAKOFF&JONATHAN S.SACK,FEDERAL CORPORATE SENTENCING:COMPLIANCE ANDMITIGATION§5.02[1][a](10 th ed.2012).
(2)Harvey L.Pitt&Karl A.Groskaufmanis,“Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability:A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct”,in 78 Georgetown Law Journal,(1990),p.1580.
(3)H.R.Rep.No.95-640,at5.
(4)H.R.Rep.No.95-640,at4.
(5)15 U.S.C.§78dd-1(for issuers/发行人);§78dd-2(for domestic concerns/国内企业);§78dd-3(for“any person”/任何人)。FCPA的反贿赂条款规定:禁止直接或间接地向外国官员,外国政党、政党官员或候选人支付或提供支付金钱或任何有价值的物品;禁止为了影响任何官方行为或者决定,引诱任何非法行为或确保不正当利益,或为了获得或维持业务,或是将业务介绍他人。
(6)15 U.S.C.§78 m(b)(2)(B).FCPA的会计条款要求发行人保存财务记录,要求实施企业内部控制,禁止企业与个人故意伪造发行人的账簿与记录,禁止规避或者未能实施发行人的内控制度。
(1)15 U.S.C§§78 dd-2(g)(1)(A),78 dd-3(e)(1)(A),78 ff(c)(1)(A).
(2)15 U.S.C§§78 dd-2(g)(2)(A),78 dd-3(e)(2)(A),78 ff(c)(2)(A).
(3)18 U.S.C§3571(d)(2012);See South Unino v.United States,132 S.Ct2344,2350-51&n.4(2012).
(1)U.S.SENTENCE GUIDELINES MANUAL§8 B2.1(a)(2004).
(2)U.S.SENTENCE GUIDELINES MANUAL§8 C2.1(b)(2010).
(3)U.S.SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§8 A1.2(k)(1)(2001).
(4)Andrew Brien,Regulating Virtue:Formulating,Engendering and Enforcing Corporate Ethical Codes,in 15(1)Business&Professional Ethics Journal(1996),p.21.
(5)U.S.SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§8 A1.2(k)(4)(2001).
(1)U.S.SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§8 A1.2(k)(5)(2001).
(2)U.S.SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§8 A1.2(k)(2)(2001).
(3)U.S.SENTENCE GUIDELINES MANUAL§8 C2.5(f)(2010).
(4)U.S.S.G.ch.8,introductory cmt.
(5)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 C2.5.这些因素包括:企业“参与或者容忍犯罪活动”的程度;一切“类似不当行为”的前科;违反司法命令、禁制令、缓刑条件;妨害司法公正;使用“预防和发现违法行为的有效程序”;以及“自我报告、合作、责任承担”的情况。
(1)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 DI.I(a)(3).
(2)U.S.SENTENCING COMM’N,FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§§8 D1.1-1.5(1992).很难给“企业缓刑”这种制裁下一个简明扼要的定义。从最基本的意义上讲,企业缓刑,指这样一个时期---某企业必须满足(法院指定的)特定条件,并保障法院知晓企业的合规实施情况。而这些条件可能包括恢复原状、社区服务、某种补救措施、不利公开,或者针对企业组织及决策的强制性内部改革。
(3)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 A1.2 cmL 3(k)(7)(i)-(iii).
(4)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 D1.4(cXl).
(5)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 D1.4(cX2)-(3).
(6)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 D1.2.
(7)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 DI.4(b)(2),(c)(3).
(8)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 DI.4(bX3),(c)(4).
(1)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 D1.5&cmt.
(2)[美]菲利普·韦勒:“有效的合规计划与企业刑事诉讼”,万方译,载《财经法学》2018年第3期,第144页。
(1)I,Sir William Blackstone,COMMENTARISES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 455(1765).
(2)Khanna V S,“Corporate Criminal Liability:What Purpose Does it Serve”,in 109 Harvard Law Review(1996),p.1481.
(3)New York Central R.Co.v.United States,212 U.S.481(1909).212 U.S.481(1909).
(4)Gabriel Markoff,Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty:Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century,in 15 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law(2012),p.797.
(5)Pamela H.Bucy,Corporate Ethos:A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability,in 75 Minnesota Law Review(1991),p.1102.
(6)Pamela H.Bucy,“Corporate Ethos:A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability”,in 75 Minnesota Law Review(1991),p.1102.
(1)United States v.Hilton Hotel Corp.,467 F.2 d 1004(9 th Cir.1972).
(2)Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen.Eric H.Holder,Jr.to All Component Heads and U.S.Attorneys(June 16,1999).
(3)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 A1.2 cmL 3(k)(7)(i)-(iii).
(1)1999 Holder Memo,supra note 108,at Section VII.B.
(2)Christopher A.Wray and Robert K.Hur,Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World:The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice,in 43 American Criminal Law Review(2006),p.1100.
(3)BRANDON L.GARRETT,Deferred Prosecution Agreements:Too Big To Jail and the Potential of Judicial O-versight Combined with Congressional Legislation,55(2014).
(4)Sean J.Griffith,Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance,in 57 Social Science Electronic Publishing(2016),p.2088.
(1)Melissa Aguilar,DPA-NPA Tally Marks Decade’s Second Highest,COMPLIANCE WEEK(Jan.20,2011),http://www.complianceweek.com/dpa-npa-tallymarks-decades-second-highest/printarticle/193990/.
(2)Stephen M.Cutler,Director of Enforcement,U.S.Sec.and Exch.Comm’n,Remarks Before the Directors’Education Institute at Duke University(Mar.18,2005),available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl spch031805 smc.htm.
(3)U.S.Dept.of Justice,U.S Attorneys’Manual tit.9,§9-28.300(2008).
(1)JED S.RAKOFF&JONATHAN S.SACK,FEDERAL CORPORATE SENTENCING:COMPLIANCE ANDMITIGATION§5.02[1][f](10 th ed.2012).
(2)Id,§5.02[1][f].
(3)Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,Pub.L.No.107-204,§302(a)(4),116 Stat.745,777(2002).
(4)18 U.S.C.§1350(c)(Supp.2009).
(5)Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,Pub.L.No.107-204§404,116 Stat.745,789(2002).
(6)See e.g.,Press Release,Sec.&Exch.Comm’n,SEC Penalizes Investment Advisers for Compliance Failures(Nov.28,2011),https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-248.htm.
(1)U.S.SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§8 B2.1 cmt.background(2014).
(2)Jennifer G.Chawla,“Criminal Accountability and Wall Street Executives:Why the Criminal Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act Fall Short”,in 44 Seton Hall Law Review(2014),p.937.
(3)Compliance Procedures and Practices,17 C.F.R.§275.206(4)-7(2012).
(4)TIFFANY M.JOSLYN,CRIMINAL PROVISIONS IN THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM&CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 2-6(2010),http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/criminalprovisions-in-the-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-consumer-protection-act.
(1)王君祥著:《英国反贿赂法》,中国方正出版社2014年版,第60页。
(2)Georgie Farrant and Naomita Royan|Australia:Whistleblowing and Foreign Bribery Bills introduced into Senate.https://globalcompliancenews.com/australia-whistleblowing-and-foreign-bribery-bills-senate-20171212/.
(1)文姬:“单位犯罪中罚金刑罪刑均衡立法实证研究”,载《中国刑事法杂志》2018年第1期,第55页。
(1)崔玮:“刑事司法中的社会参与:主体、模式及完善进路”,载《中国刑事法杂志》2018年第6期,第130页。
(2)Gordon Bourjaily,“DPA DOA:How and Why Congress Should Bar the Use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements in Corporate Criminal Prosecution”,in 52 Harvard Journal On Legislation(2015),p.543.
(1)Geoffrey Parsons Miller,The Law of Governance,Risk Management,and Compliance,Wolters Kluwer.2015,p.139.
(2)Harvey L.Pitt&Karl A.Groskaufmanis,“Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability:A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct”,in 78 Georgetown Law Journal,(1990),p.1571.
(3)肖远企:“合规管理模式的变迁路径及其启示”,载《银行家》2006年第9期,第34页。
(1)JED S.RAKOFF&JONATHAN S.SACK,FEDERAL CORPORATE SENTENCING:COMPLIANCE ANDMITIGATION§5.02[1][a](10 th ed.2012).
(2)Harvey L.Pitt&Karl A.Groskaufmanis,“Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability:A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct”,in 78 Georgetown Law Journal,(1990),p.1580.
(3)H.R.Rep.No.95-640,at5.
(4)H.R.Rep.No.95-640,at4.
(5)15 U.S.C.§78dd-1(for issuers/发行人);§78dd-2(for domestic concerns/国内企业);§78dd-3(for“any person”/任何人)。FCPA的反贿赂条款规定:禁止直接或间接地向外国官员,外国政党、政党官员或候选人支付或提供支付金钱或任何有价值的物品;禁止为了影响任何官方行为或者决定,引诱任何非法行为或确保不正当利益,或为了获得或维持业务,或是将业务介绍他人。
(6)15 U.S.C.§78 m(b)(2)(B).FCPA的会计条款要求发行人保存财务记录,要求实施企业内部控制,禁止企业与个人故意伪造发行人的账簿与记录,禁止规避或者未能实施发行人的内控制度。
(1)15 U.S.C§§78 dd-2(g)(1)(A),78 dd-3(e)(1)(A),78 ff(c)(1)(A).
(2)15 U.S.C§§78 dd-2(g)(2)(A),78 dd-3(e)(2)(A),78 ff(c)(2)(A).
(3)18 U.S.C§3571(d)(2012);See South Unino v.United States,132 S.Ct2344,2350-51&n.4(2012).
(1)U.S.SENTENCE GUIDELINES MANUAL§8 B2.1(a)(2004).
(2)U.S.SENTENCE GUIDELINES MANUAL§8 C2.1(b)(2010).
(3)U.S.SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§8 A1.2(k)(1)(2001).
(4)Andrew Brien,Regulating Virtue:Formulating,Engendering and Enforcing Corporate Ethical Codes,in 15(1)Business&Professional Ethics Journal(1996),p.21.
(5)U.S.SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§8 A1.2(k)(4)(2001).
(1)U.S.SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§8 A1.2(k)(5)(2001).
(2)U.S.SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§8 A1.2(k)(2)(2001).
(3)U.S.SENTENCE GUIDELINES MANUAL§8 C2.5(f)(2010).
(4)U.S.S.G.ch.8,introductory cmt.
(5)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 C2.5.这些因素包括:企业“参与或者容忍犯罪活动”的程度;一切“类似不当行为”的前科;违反司法命令、禁制令、缓刑条件;妨害司法公正;使用“预防和发现违法行为的有效程序”;以及“自我报告、合作、责任承担”的情况。
(1)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 DI.I(a)(3).
(2)U.S.SENTENCING COMM’N,FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§§8 D1.1-1.5(1992).很难给“企业缓刑”这种制裁下一个简明扼要的定义。从最基本的意义上讲,企业缓刑,指这样一个时期---某企业必须满足(法院指定的)特定条件,并保障法院知晓企业的合规实施情况。而这些条件可能包括恢复原状、社区服务、某种补救措施、不利公开,或者针对企业组织及决策的强制性内部改革。
(3)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 A1.2 cmL 3(k)(7)(i)-(iii).
(4)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 D1.4(cXl).
(5)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 D1.4(cX2)-(3).
(6)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 D1.2.
(7)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 DI.4(b)(2),(c)(3).
(8)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 DI.4(bX3),(c)(4).
(1)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 D1.5&cmt.
(2)[美]菲利普·韦勒:“有效的合规计划与企业刑事诉讼”,万方译,载《财经法学》2018年第3期,第144页。
(1)I,Sir William Blackstone,COMMENTARISES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 455(1765).
(2)Khanna V S,“Corporate Criminal Liability:What Purpose Does it Serve”,in 109 Harvard Law Review(1996),p.1481.
(3)New York Central R.Co.v.United States,212 U.S.481(1909).212 U.S.481(1909).
(4)Gabriel Markoff,Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty:Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century,in 15 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law(2012),p.797.
(5)Pamela H.Bucy,Corporate Ethos:A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability,in 75 Minnesota Law Review(1991),p.1102.
(6)Pamela H.Bucy,“Corporate Ethos:A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability”,in 75 Minnesota Law Review(1991),p.1102.
(1)United States v.Hilton Hotel Corp.,467 F.2 d 1004(9 th Cir.1972).
(2)Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen.Eric H.Holder,Jr.to All Component Heads and U.S.Attorneys(June 16,1999).
(3)U.S.S.G.,supra note 4,§8 A1.2 cmL 3(k)(7)(i)-(iii).
(1)1999 Holder Memo,supra note 108,at Section VII.B.
(2)Christopher A.Wray and Robert K.Hur,Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World:The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice,in 43 American Criminal Law Review(2006),p.1100.
(3)BRANDON L.GARRETT,Deferred Prosecution Agreements:Too Big To Jail and the Potential of Judicial O-versight Combined with Congressional Legislation,55(2014).
(4)Sean J.Griffith,Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance,in 57 Social Science Electronic Publishing(2016),p.2088.
(1)Melissa Aguilar,DPA-NPA Tally Marks Decade’s Second Highest,COMPLIANCE WEEK(Jan.20,2011),http://www.complianceweek.com/dpa-npa-tallymarks-decades-second-highest/printarticle/193990/.
(2)Stephen M.Cutler,Director of Enforcement,U.S.Sec.and Exch.Comm’n,Remarks Before the Directors’Education Institute at Duke University(Mar.18,2005),available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl spch031805 smc.htm.
(3)U.S.Dept.of Justice,U.S Attorneys’Manual tit.9,§9-28.300(2008).
(1)JED S.RAKOFF&JONATHAN S.SACK,FEDERAL CORPORATE SENTENCING:COMPLIANCE ANDMITIGATION§5.02[1][f](10 th ed.2012).
(2)Id,§5.02[1][f].
(3)Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,Pub.L.No.107-204,§302(a)(4),116 Stat.745,777(2002).
(4)18 U.S.C.§1350(c)(Supp.2009).
(5)Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,Pub.L.No.107-204§404,116 Stat.745,789(2002).
(6)See e.g.,Press Release,Sec.&Exch.Comm’n,SEC Penalizes Investment Advisers for Compliance Failures(Nov.28,2011),https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-248.htm.
(1)U.S.SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§8 B2.1 cmt.background(2014).
(2)Jennifer G.Chawla,“Criminal Accountability and Wall Street Executives:Why the Criminal Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act Fall Short”,in 44 Seton Hall Law Review(2014),p.937.
(3)Compliance Procedures and Practices,17 C.F.R.§275.206(4)-7(2012).
(4)TIFFANY M.JOSLYN,CRIMINAL PROVISIONS IN THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM&CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 2-6(2010),http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/criminalprovisions-in-the-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-consumer-protection-act.
(1)王君祥著:《英国反贿赂法》,中国方正出版社2014年版,第60页。
(2)Georgie Farrant and Naomita Royan|Australia:Whistleblowing and Foreign Bribery Bills introduced into Senate.https://globalcompliancenews.com/australia-whistleblowing-and-foreign-bribery-bills-senate-20171212/.
(1)文姬:“单位犯罪中罚金刑罪刑均衡立法实证研究”,载《中国刑事法杂志》2018年第1期,第55页。
(1)崔玮:“刑事司法中的社会参与:主体、模式及完善进路”,载《中国刑事法杂志》2018年第6期,第130页。
(2)Gordon Bourjaily,“DPA DOA:How and Why Congress Should Bar the Use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements in Corporate Criminal Prosecution”,in 52 Harvard Journal On Legislation(2015),p.543.