投融资期限错配:制度缺陷还是管理者非理性
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摘要
利用2010～2016年沪深交易所全部A股上市公司数据,实证检验了制度缺陷和管理者非理性对投融资期限错配的影响。研究表明,制度缺陷和管理者非理性(包括过度自信和羊群行为)均加剧了期限错配,但两者对不同类型企业的影响不同,制度缺陷主要影响高融资约束企业的期限错配,管理者非理性主要影响低融资约束企业的期限错配。进一步研究表明,直接融资市场的完善能有效缓解由制度缺陷所导致的期限错配,市场化程度的提高能显著抑制由管理者过度自信引发的期限错配,而管理层权利的约束能有效遏制期限错配羊群行为。经过内生性处理及稳健性检验,结果依然保持不变。据此,建议秉承分类治理的思路,改善金融制度环境,适当降低直接融资门槛,抑制管理者非理性行为,解决期限错配问题。
Using the data of all A-share listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2010 to 2016,this study empirically tests the effect of institutional deficiencies and managerial irrationality on the maturity mismatch between investing and financing.The study finds that institutional deficiencies and managerial irrationality(including overconfidence and herd behavior) exacerbate maturity mismatch,but their effect on different types of enterprises is different.Institutional deficiencies affect mainly the maturity mismatch of companies with higher financing constraints.In contrast,managerial irrationality influences mainly enterprises with lower financing constraints.Further analysis suggests that improvements in direct financing markets can effectively alleviate the maturity mismatch caused by institutional deficiencies,the increase of marketization can significantly suppress maturity mismatch caused by managerial overconfidence,and the restraint of management rights can effectively contain the herd behavior of maturity mismatch.The results remain unchanged after endogeneity treatment and robustness testing.Based on these results,the paper recommends that classification governance should be upheld,the financial system environment should be improved,the threshold of direct financing should be appropriately lowered,irrational managerial behavior should be suppressed,and the problem of the maturity mismatch should be solved.
Using the data of all A-share listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2010 to 2016,this study empirically tests the effect of institutional deficiencies and managerial irrationality on the maturity mismatch between investing and financing.The study finds that institutional deficiencies and managerial irrationality(including overconfidence and herd behavior) exacerbate maturity mismatch,but their effect on different types of enterprises is different.Institutional deficiencies affect mainly the maturity mismatch of companies with higher financing constraints.In contrast,managerial irrationality influences mainly enterprises with lower financing constraints.Further analysis suggests that improvements in direct financing markets can effectively alleviate the maturity mismatch caused by institutional deficiencies,the increase of marketization can significantly suppress maturity mismatch caused by managerial overconfidence,and the restraint of management rights can effectively contain the herd behavior of maturity mismatch.The results remain unchanged after endogeneity treatment and robustness testing.Based on these results,the paper recommends that classification governance should be upheld,the financial system environment should be improved,the threshold of direct financing should be appropriately lowered,irrational managerial behavior should be suppressed,and the problem of the maturity mismatch should be solved.
引文
[1] 白云霞,丘穆青,李伟.投融资期限错配及其制度解释——来自中美两国金融市场的比较[J].中国工业经济,2016(7).
[2] 钟凯,程小可,张伟华.货币政策适度水平与企业“短贷长投”之谜[J].管理世界,2016(3).
[3] Richard W.,2016.Optimism,Attribution and Corporate Investment Policy.PHD diss.Arizona State University.
[4] 陆岷峰,季子钊.关于企业期限错配的机理和财务危机的研究[J].宁夏大学学报(人文社会科学版),2017(3).
[5] 李莉,关宇航,顾春霞.治理监督机制对中国上市公司过度投资行为的影响研究——论代理理论的适用性[J].管理评论,2014(5).
[6] Ben-David I.,Graham J.and Harvey C.,2013.Managerial Miscalibration.Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.128:1547-1584.
[7] Malmendier U.and Tate G.,2005.CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment.Journal of Finance.,No.6:2661～2700.
[8] Ahmad R ,and Habib Y.,2018.Overconfident Managers and External Financing Choice:Evidence from Pakistan.Social Science Electronic Publishing,No.1:1-11.
[9] Bustamante M.C.,and Frésard L.,2017.Does Firm Investment Respond to Peers′ Investment.Social Science Electronic Publishing,No.1:1-42.
[10] Leary M.T.,and Roberts M.R.,2014.Do Peer Firms Affect Corporate Financial Policy?.The Journal of Finance,Vol.69 ,No.1:139-178.
[11] 刘银国,焦健,张琛.股利政策、自由现金流与过度投资——基于公司治理机制的考察[J].南开管理评论,2015(4).
[12] 孙铮,刘凤委,李增泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构[J].经济研究,2005(5).
[13] 权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010(11).
[14] Lin J.Y.,Sun A.,and Jiang Y.,2013.Endowment,Industrial Structure and Appropriate Financial Structure:A New Structural Economics Perspective.Journal of Economic Policy Reform,Vol.16,No.2:109-122.
[15] 张金昌,杨国丽,周亚平.流动资金需求测算方法研究[J].中国工业经济,2016(5).
[16] Hadlock C.J.,and Pierce J.R.,2010.New Evidence on Measuring Financial Constraints:Moving Beyond the KZ Index.Review of Financial Studies,Vol.23,No.5:1909-1940.
[17] Kaplan S.,and Zingales L.,1997.Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful measures of financing constraints?.Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.112,No.1:169-215.
[18] Lin Y.,Hu S.and Chen.,2008.Testing Pecking Order Prediction from the Viewpoint of Managerial Optimism.Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,Vol.16,No.1-2:160-181.
[19] Hribar P.and Yang H.,2006.CEO Overconfidence,Management Earning Forecasts,and Earnings Management.Working Paper.
[20] 王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2017.
[21] 张璇,刘贝贝,汪婷,李春涛.信贷寻租、融资约束与企业创新[J].经济研究,2017(5).
(1)受篇幅所限,稳健性检验结果未列出,读者如有需要,可向作者索取。
[2] 钟凯,程小可,张伟华.货币政策适度水平与企业“短贷长投”之谜[J].管理世界,2016(3).
[3] Richard W.,2016.Optimism,Attribution and Corporate Investment Policy.PHD diss.Arizona State University.
[4] 陆岷峰,季子钊.关于企业期限错配的机理和财务危机的研究[J].宁夏大学学报(人文社会科学版),2017(3).
[5] 李莉,关宇航,顾春霞.治理监督机制对中国上市公司过度投资行为的影响研究——论代理理论的适用性[J].管理评论,2014(5).
[6] Ben-David I.,Graham J.and Harvey C.,2013.Managerial Miscalibration.Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.128:1547-1584.
[7] Malmendier U.and Tate G.,2005.CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment.Journal of Finance.,No.6:2661～2700.
[8] Ahmad R ,and Habib Y.,2018.Overconfident Managers and External Financing Choice:Evidence from Pakistan.Social Science Electronic Publishing,No.1:1-11.
[9] Bustamante M.C.,and Frésard L.,2017.Does Firm Investment Respond to Peers′ Investment.Social Science Electronic Publishing,No.1:1-42.
[10] Leary M.T.,and Roberts M.R.,2014.Do Peer Firms Affect Corporate Financial Policy?.The Journal of Finance,Vol.69 ,No.1:139-178.
[11] 刘银国,焦健,张琛.股利政策、自由现金流与过度投资——基于公司治理机制的考察[J].南开管理评论,2015(4).
[12] 孙铮,刘凤委,李增泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构[J].经济研究,2005(5).
[13] 权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010(11).
[14] Lin J.Y.,Sun A.,and Jiang Y.,2013.Endowment,Industrial Structure and Appropriate Financial Structure:A New Structural Economics Perspective.Journal of Economic Policy Reform,Vol.16,No.2:109-122.
[15] 张金昌,杨国丽,周亚平.流动资金需求测算方法研究[J].中国工业经济,2016(5).
[16] Hadlock C.J.,and Pierce J.R.,2010.New Evidence on Measuring Financial Constraints:Moving Beyond the KZ Index.Review of Financial Studies,Vol.23,No.5:1909-1940.
[17] Kaplan S.,and Zingales L.,1997.Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful measures of financing constraints?.Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.112,No.1:169-215.
[18] Lin Y.,Hu S.and Chen.,2008.Testing Pecking Order Prediction from the Viewpoint of Managerial Optimism.Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,Vol.16,No.1-2:160-181.
[19] Hribar P.and Yang H.,2006.CEO Overconfidence,Management Earning Forecasts,and Earnings Management.Working Paper.
[20] 王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2017.
[21] 张璇,刘贝贝,汪婷,李春涛.信贷寻租、融资约束与企业创新[J].经济研究,2017(5).
(1)受篇幅所限,稳健性检验结果未列出,读者如有需要,可向作者索取。