基于古诺模型与斯塔尔伯格模型的寡头垄断市场分析——以我国家电连锁企业为案例
摘要
本文通过双寡头及多头竞争中的古诺模型和斯塔尔伯格模型的比较,阐释了在寡头垄断市场中,厂商选择同时设定产量(同时博弈)还是产量领导(序贯博弈),对寡头利润会产生影响。另外寡头市场中企业数量的多少也会对厂商利润产生影响。并运用古诺均衡和斯塔尔伯格均衡讨论我国家电连锁企业发展现状及改进方向。
引文
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[2]Dowrick S.Von Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly:Choosing roles[J].Rand Journal of Economics,1986,17(2):251-260.
[3]Muceller D.Firstmover advantages and path dependence[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,1997,15(6):827-850.
[4]Vander Werf P,Mahon J.Meta-analysis of the impact of research methods on findings of first-mover advantage[J].Management Science,1997,43(11):1510-1519.
[5]Haan M,Marks H.Stackelberg and Cournot competition under equilibrium limit pricing[J].Journal of Economic Studies,1996,23(5/6):110-127.
[6]Okuguchi K.Cournot and Stackelberg duopolies revisited[J].The Japanese Economic Review,1999,50(3):363-367.
[7]Rassenti S,Reynolds S,Smith V,Szidarovszky F.Adaptation and convergence of behavior in repeated experimental Cournot games[J].Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,2000,41(2):117-146.
[8]Matsumura T.Cournot dupoly with multi-period competition:Inventory as a coordination device[J].Australian Economic Papers,1999,38(3):189-202.
[9]Huck S,Muller W,Normann H T.Stackelberg beats Cournot:On collusion and efficiency in experimental markets[J].The Economic Journal,2001,111(10):749-765.
[10]Huck S,Muller W,Normann H T.To commit or not to commit:Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets[J].Gamesand Economic Behavior,2002,38(2):240-264.
[11]Sherali H,Soyster A,Murphy F.Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibria:Characterization and computations[J].Operation Research,1983,31(2):253-276
[12]Sherali H.A multiple leader Stackelberg model and analysis[J].Operation Research,1984,32(2):390-404.
[13]Daughety A F.Beneficial concentration[J].American Economic Review,1990,80:1231-1237.
[14]Wolf D,Smeers Y.A stochastic version of a Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibrium model[J].Management Science,1997,43(2):190-197.