指数需求下农产品供应链渠道利润的公平分配机制
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摘要
考虑指数需求下的"农批市场+农户"二级农产品供应链,以"农超对接"渠道为例,具有优势或劣势不公平厌恶的渠道成员对渠道定价策略会产生一定影响。基于Stackelberg博弈,分析不同公平参照点对各渠道主体决策的影响,研究表明:(1)仅农批市场具有公平关切时,农批市场会压低农产品收购价格,在一定情况下可以优化供应链双重边际化效应且不改变渠道的公平协调状态;(2)当农户同时具有公平关切时,农户为了追求公平宁愿放弃一部分自身利益,在一定程度上降低"农超对接"渠道的整体利润,使得渠道效率不能达到帕累托最优。
In a two-echelon agri-food supply chain composed of agriculture-supermarkets and farmers,considering the exponential demand,the main channel behavior with fairness concerns will change the pricing strategy of the channel.Based on Stackelberg game,an analysis of the influence of different fairness reference points on decision-making of main channel behaviors,indicate that, when the supermarket has a completely inequity averse which will lower the products purchasing price,the double marginalization of supply chain will be reduced without changing the fair coordination of channel state;and if farmer cooperatives also have fairness concerns,the farmer cooperatives,in pursuit of justice,would rather give up part of their own welfare,which will reduce the overall profits of the supply chain of agriproducts to a certain level,making channel efficiency unable to reach Parato equilibrium.
In a two-echelon agri-food supply chain composed of agriculture-supermarkets and farmers,considering the exponential demand,the main channel behavior with fairness concerns will change the pricing strategy of the channel.Based on Stackelberg game,an analysis of the influence of different fairness reference points on decision-making of main channel behaviors,indicate that, when the supermarket has a completely inequity averse which will lower the products purchasing price,the double marginalization of supply chain will be reduced without changing the fair coordination of channel state;and if farmer cooperatives also have fairness concerns,the farmer cooperatives,in pursuit of justice,would rather give up part of their own welfare,which will reduce the overall profits of the supply chain of agriproducts to a certain level,making channel efficiency unable to reach Parato equilibrium.
引文
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[14]Katok E,Olsen T,Pavlov V.Wholesale pricing under mild and privately known concerns for fairness[J].Production and Operations Management,2014,23(2):285-302.
[15]刑伟,汪寿,赵秋红,等.考虑渠道公平的双渠道供应链均衡策略[J].系统工程理论与实践.2011,31(7):1249-1256.
[16]马立军.具有公平偏好成员的两阶段供应链分析[J].运筹与管理,2011,20(2):37-43.
[17]谭佳音,李波.公平关切对批发价格契约协调效果的影响[J].预测,2013,32(3):65-69.
[18]杜少甫,杜婵,梁樑,等.考虑公平关切的供应链契约与协调[J].管理科学学报,2010,13(11):41-48.
[19]李建斌,刘凤,雷东,等.基于公平参数的供应链柔性合同优化策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(7):1791-1800.
[20]浦徐进,朱秋鹰,曹文彬.供应商公平偏好对零售商主导型供应链均衡策略的影响[J].系统管理学报,2014(6):876-882.
[2]Narasimhan R,Narayanan S,Srinivasan R.An investigation of justice in supply chain relationships and their performance impact[J].Journal of Operation Management.2013,31:236-247.
[3]但斌,陈军.基于价值损耗的生鲜农产品供应链协调[J].中国管理科学,2008,16(5):42-49.
[4]张克勇,侯世旺,周国华.公平关切下闭环供应链定价策略[J].系统管理学报,2013,22(6):841-849.
[5]许民利,沈家静.公平偏好下制造商收益分享与供应商质量投入研究[J].系统管理学报,2014,23(1):30-35.
[6]叶飞,林强,李怡娜.基于CVaR的“公司+农户”型订单农业供应链协调契约机制[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011,31(3):450-460.
[7]叶飞,林强,莫瑞君.基于B-S模型的订单农业供应链协调机制研究[J].管理科学学报,2012,15(1):66-76.
[8]Kahneman D,Tversky A.Prospect theory:An analysis of decision under risk[J].Econometrica,1979,47(2):263-292.
[9]Kahneman D,Tversky A.Advances in prospect theory:Cumulative representation of uncertainty[J].Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,1992,5:297-323.
[10]Cui T H,Raju J S,Zhang Z J.Fairness and channel coordination[J].Management Science,2007,53(8):1303-1314.
[11]Hennet J-C,Mahjoub S.Toward the fair sharing of profit in a supply network formation[J].Int.Journal Production Economics,2010,127:112-120.
[12]Fehr E,Schmidt K M.A theory of fairness,competition and cooperation[J].Quarterly Journal ofEconomics,1999,114(3):817-868.
[13]Ozgun C-D,Chen Youhua,Li Jianbin.Channel coordination under fairness concerns and nonlinear demand[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2010,207:1321-1326.
[14]Katok E,Olsen T,Pavlov V.Wholesale pricing under mild and privately known concerns for fairness[J].Production and Operations Management,2014,23(2):285-302.
[15]刑伟,汪寿,赵秋红,等.考虑渠道公平的双渠道供应链均衡策略[J].系统工程理论与实践.2011,31(7):1249-1256.
[16]马立军.具有公平偏好成员的两阶段供应链分析[J].运筹与管理,2011,20(2):37-43.
[17]谭佳音,李波.公平关切对批发价格契约协调效果的影响[J].预测,2013,32(3):65-69.
[18]杜少甫,杜婵,梁樑,等.考虑公平关切的供应链契约与协调[J].管理科学学报,2010,13(11):41-48.
[19]李建斌,刘凤,雷东,等.基于公平参数的供应链柔性合同优化策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(7):1791-1800.
[20]浦徐进,朱秋鹰,曹文彬.供应商公平偏好对零售商主导型供应链均衡策略的影响[J].系统管理学报,2014(6):876-882.