标准必要专利权人滥用市场支配地位的反垄断问题研究——以高通案为例
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摘要
标准必要专利在标准与专利的整合中应运而生并提升了知识经济效能。但是,专利标准化的同时也扩大了专利权人在相关市场的支配力,很容易产生专利权滥用行为,如不公平高价许可、不合理搭售、无正当理由要求反向许可等。以标准必要专利权人滥用市场支配地位为切入点,以高通案为例,分析标准必要专利权人滥用市场支配地位的反垄断问题,针对反垄断法体系,从立法与执法两个方面提出政策建议,为涉及标准必要专利的反垄断行政执法和反垄断诉讼提供借鉴。
Stand essential patents(SEP)are born in the process of standard and patent integration, and SEP enhances the performance of knowledge integration. However, the patent standardization expands the power of patentee in the relevant market,and it is prone to the abuse of rights raised by the patentee. This paper analyzes the definition of the relevant market, dominant position in the market and abuses of market dominance. Due to the late start, China has an incomplete anti-monopoly system, of which relevant concepts about patent are not accurate, analysis of the relevant market are not comprehensive and the standard calculation of penalty is also deficient. In addition, due to the lack of professional law enforcement officials, China's anti-monopoly law enforcement has been limited. Through the analysis of the above problems, this paper puts forward some suggestions on the improvement of China's anti-monopoly law system from two aspects of legislation and enforcement.
Stand essential patents(SEP)are born in the process of standard and patent integration, and SEP enhances the performance of knowledge integration. However, the patent standardization expands the power of patentee in the relevant market,and it is prone to the abuse of rights raised by the patentee. This paper analyzes the definition of the relevant market, dominant position in the market and abuses of market dominance. Due to the late start, China has an incomplete anti-monopoly system, of which relevant concepts about patent are not accurate, analysis of the relevant market are not comprehensive and the standard calculation of penalty is also deficient. In addition, due to the lack of professional law enforcement officials, China's anti-monopoly law enforcement has been limited. Through the analysis of the above problems, this paper puts forward some suggestions on the improvement of China's anti-monopoly law system from two aspects of legislation and enforcement.
引文
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[2] KOKOULINA, OLGA. How much is enough: standard-essential patents and abuse[J].Tulane Journal of Technology and Intellcetual Property,2016(19):89-110.
[3] GALLI D N. The frand defense up to Huawei/ZTE[J]. Bocconi Legal Papers,2016(7):155-202.
[4] 赵启衫.标准必要专利合理许可费的司法确定问题研宄[J].知识产权,2017(7):10-23.
[5] 邹亚.标准必要专利研究综述[J].管理观察,2017(22):50-51,54.
[6] 朱文慧. 标准必要专利权人滥用市场支配地位的判断-兼评华为诉美国交互数字公司上诉案[J].电子知识产权,2014(9):37-43.
[7] 李煜. 标准必要专利联营的反垄断法规制[J].竞争政策研究,2017(3):90-97.
[8] 王渊,赵世桥.标准必要专利禁令救济滥用的反垄断法规制研究[J].科技管理研究,2016(36):136-141.
[9] 王晓晔. 标准必要专利反垄断诉讼问题研究[J].中国法学,2015(6):217-238.
[10] 杨紫烜. 经济法[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2010:214-239.
[11] 谢冠斌,焦姗.滥用标准必要专利行为反垄断执法里程碑:高通案评述[J].中国价格监管与反垄断,2015(3):16-18.
[12] 李燕华.各国在必要专利的禁令救济中对反垄断法的适用[J].法制与社会,2014(2):97-98.
[13] 付圆媛,牛爽,郝政宇.如何利用反垄断制度应对标准必要专利权的滥用[A].中华全国专利代理人协会.2014年中华全国专利代理人协会年会[C].北京:知识产权出版社,2014.
[14] 王徽,李晓郛.欧盟法“标准必要专利”侵权与反垄断强制许可抗辩——以“华为诉中兴”案为研究的切入点[J].国际经济法学刊,2015(22):241-259.
[15] 赵杰,陈中利.知识产权行政管理部门在知识产权纠纷仲裁解决机制中的作用[J].商事仲裁,2015(1):1-22.
[16] 桂超超.我国反价格垄断基层执法队伍建设研究广州市为例[D].兰州:兰州大学,2015.
[17] 张兵.论反垄断法视野中的消费者权益保护——兼谈我国反垄断民事诉讼制度的完善[D].开封:河南大学,2014.
[18] 任俊媛.反垄断法下知识产权相关市场的界定——以技术标准下的相关市场为例[D].北京:北京理工大学,2015.