高管薪酬激励、资本结构动态调整与企业绩效
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摘要
以我国2010—2017年沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究了高管薪酬激励对资本结构调整与企业绩效的影响,并分别验证资本结构调整速度、偏离程度是否在高管薪酬激励与企业绩效二者之间的关系中发挥了中介效应。研究发现,高管薪酬激励会显著促进资本结构调整及企业绩效提升,资本结构调整发挥了中介效应。区分企业负债水平研究发现,这种作用在过度负债的企业更为显著;进一步研究发现,高管薪酬激励在非国有企业、国有企业、央企下属公司均有体现。
Using the samples of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares listed companies from 2010 to 2017, this paper empirically investigated the impact of executive compensation incentive on the dynamic adjustment of capital structure and firm performance, then examined whether capital structure adjustment speed or its diverge degree had played an intermediary role in the relationship between executive compensation incentive and firm performance. The results show that executive compensation incentive has a significantly promoting effect on both capital structure adjustment and firm performance, and capital structure adjustment plays a mediation role.The research of differentiating firm debt level reflects that, above effect is more significant in firm with excessive debt. Further empirical research has found that, the effect of executive compensation incentive has been observed in private enterprises, state-owned enterprises and the subordinate enterprises of central enterprises.
Using the samples of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares listed companies from 2010 to 2017, this paper empirically investigated the impact of executive compensation incentive on the dynamic adjustment of capital structure and firm performance, then examined whether capital structure adjustment speed or its diverge degree had played an intermediary role in the relationship between executive compensation incentive and firm performance. The results show that executive compensation incentive has a significantly promoting effect on both capital structure adjustment and firm performance, and capital structure adjustment plays a mediation role.The research of differentiating firm debt level reflects that, above effect is more significant in firm with excessive debt. Further empirical research has found that, the effect of executive compensation incentive has been observed in private enterprises, state-owned enterprises and the subordinate enterprises of central enterprises.
引文
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[5]吕长江,张海平.股权激励计划对公司投资行为的影响[J].管理世界,2011(11):118-126.
[6]谢德仁,陈云森.业绩型股权激励、行权业绩条件与股东财富增长[J].金融研究,2010(12):99-114.
[7]盛明泉,张春强,王烨.高管股权激励与资本结构动态调整[J].会计研究,2016(2):44-50.
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[14]张亮亮,黄国良.管理者超额薪酬与资本结构动态调整[J].财贸研究,2013,24(5):148-156.
[15]盛明泉,戚昊辰.高管薪酬差距与资本结构动态调整研究[J].商业经济与管理,2014(12):32-38.
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[17]Faulkender, M. Flannery, M. Hankins, K. Cash flows and leverage adjustments[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2012,103(3):632-646.
[18]黄继承,阚铄,朱冰,等.经理薪酬激励与资本结构动态调整[J].管理世界,2016(11):156-171.
[19]Jensen, M. and Murphy, K. Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives[J]. The Journal of Political Economy, 1990,2(198):225-264.
[20]Hartzell, J. and Starks, L. Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation[J]. Journal of Finance, 2003, 58(6):2351-2374.
[21]Kevin, J. CEO Compensation and Company Performance[J]. Business and Economics Journal, 2011(31):1-8.
[22]魏明海,卢锐.管理层风险报酬的有效性分析[J].当代财经,2004(3):98-101.
[23]周兆生.中国上市公司总经理激励的实证研究[J].改革,2003(3):50-57.
[24]张燕红.高管薪酬激励对企业绩效的影响[J].经济问题,2016(6):116-120.
[25]Titman, S. Tsyplakov, S. A Dynamic Model of Optimal Capital Structure[J]. Review of Finance, 2007(3):401-451.
[26]Rajan, R. and Zingales, L. What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data[J]. Journal of Finance, 1995, 50(5):1421-1460.
[27]陆正飞,辛宇.上市公司资本结构主要影响因素之实证研究[J].会计研究,1998(8):34-37.
[28]吕长江,韩慧博.上市公司资本结构特点的实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2001,4(5):26-29.
[29]王娟,杨凤林.上市公司筹资结构的实证研究[J].经济理论与经济管理,1998(6):23-28.
[30]张涛,郭潇.高管薪酬契约与融资约束研究———基于我国沪深A股上市公司的经验数据[J].经济与管理评论,2018(1):96-107.
[31]朱德胜,张伟.高管薪酬激励对股权代理成本影响的实证研究[J].经济与管理评论,2017(1):68-74.
[32]Baron, R. and Kenny, D. The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research:conceptual, strategic,and statistical considerations[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1986, 51(6):1173-1182.
[33]郝东洋,王静,张天西.内部控制效率、资本结构动态调整与公司价值[J].山西财经大学学报,2015,37(12):38-50.
[34]L觟觟f, H. Dynamic Optimal Capital Structure and Technical Change[J]. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 2004(4):449-468.
[35]Flannery, M. Rangan, K. Partial Adjustment toward Target Capital Structures[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2006(3):469-506.
[2]Brennan, M. and Schwartz, E. Corporate Income Taxes, Valuation, and the Problem of Optimal Capital Structure[J]. Journal of Business, 1978, 51(1):103-114.
[3]Fischer, E. Heinkel, R. Zechner, J. Dynamic Capital Structure Choice:Theory and Tests[J]. Journal of Finance, 1989, 44(1):19-40.
[4]姜付秀,黄继承.市场化进程与资本结构动态调整[J].管理世界,2011(3):124-134.
[5]吕长江,张海平.股权激励计划对公司投资行为的影响[J].管理世界,2011(11):118-126.
[6]谢德仁,陈云森.业绩型股权激励、行权业绩条件与股东财富增长[J].金融研究,2010(12):99-114.
[7]盛明泉,张春强,王烨.高管股权激励与资本结构动态调整[J].会计研究,2016(2):44-50.
[8]Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 1976(4):305-360.
[9]Aghion, p. and Bolton, P. The financial structure of the firm and the problem of control[J]. European Economic Review,1989, 33(2):286-293.
[10]John, T. and John, K. Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure[J]. Journal of Finance, 1993, 48(3):949-974.
[11]彭璧玉.我国上市公司高管人员薪酬水平与公司治理关系的实证研究[J].山东社会科学,2006(1):118-122.
[12]Berger, P. Ofek, E. and Yermack, D. Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions[J]. Journal of Finance,1997, 52(4):1411-1438.
[13]Core, J. Holthausen, R. and Larcker, D. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2004, 51(2):141-152.
[14]张亮亮,黄国良.管理者超额薪酬与资本结构动态调整[J].财贸研究,2013,24(5):148-156.
[15]盛明泉,戚昊辰.高管薪酬差距与资本结构动态调整研究[J].商业经济与管理,2014(12):32-38.
[16]Byoun, S. How and When Do Firms Adjust Their Capital Structures toward Targets[J]. Journal of Finance, 2008(6):3069-3096.
[17]Faulkender, M. Flannery, M. Hankins, K. Cash flows and leverage adjustments[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2012,103(3):632-646.
[18]黄继承,阚铄,朱冰,等.经理薪酬激励与资本结构动态调整[J].管理世界,2016(11):156-171.
[19]Jensen, M. and Murphy, K. Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives[J]. The Journal of Political Economy, 1990,2(198):225-264.
[20]Hartzell, J. and Starks, L. Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation[J]. Journal of Finance, 2003, 58(6):2351-2374.
[21]Kevin, J. CEO Compensation and Company Performance[J]. Business and Economics Journal, 2011(31):1-8.
[22]魏明海,卢锐.管理层风险报酬的有效性分析[J].当代财经,2004(3):98-101.
[23]周兆生.中国上市公司总经理激励的实证研究[J].改革,2003(3):50-57.
[24]张燕红.高管薪酬激励对企业绩效的影响[J].经济问题,2016(6):116-120.
[25]Titman, S. Tsyplakov, S. A Dynamic Model of Optimal Capital Structure[J]. Review of Finance, 2007(3):401-451.
[26]Rajan, R. and Zingales, L. What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data[J]. Journal of Finance, 1995, 50(5):1421-1460.
[27]陆正飞,辛宇.上市公司资本结构主要影响因素之实证研究[J].会计研究,1998(8):34-37.
[28]吕长江,韩慧博.上市公司资本结构特点的实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2001,4(5):26-29.
[29]王娟,杨凤林.上市公司筹资结构的实证研究[J].经济理论与经济管理,1998(6):23-28.
[30]张涛,郭潇.高管薪酬契约与融资约束研究———基于我国沪深A股上市公司的经验数据[J].经济与管理评论,2018(1):96-107.
[31]朱德胜,张伟.高管薪酬激励对股权代理成本影响的实证研究[J].经济与管理评论,2017(1):68-74.
[32]Baron, R. and Kenny, D. The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research:conceptual, strategic,and statistical considerations[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1986, 51(6):1173-1182.
[33]郝东洋,王静,张天西.内部控制效率、资本结构动态调整与公司价值[J].山西财经大学学报,2015,37(12):38-50.
[34]L觟觟f, H. Dynamic Optimal Capital Structure and Technical Change[J]. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 2004(4):449-468.
[35]Flannery, M. Rangan, K. Partial Adjustment toward Target Capital Structures[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2006(3):469-506.