融资约束对管理层薪酬激励机制的影响——来自上市公司的实证研究
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摘要
融资约束是现代企业发展的一个重要指标,与股东利益有着重要的直接关系。公司股东往往会根据融资约束的大小对管理层薪酬激励机制进行调整。因此研究两者之间的关系,从中发现国内上市公司薪酬激励机制的特点,分析与发达国家之间的差别就显得非常重要。本文以2004-2006年沪深两市上市公司的混合数据为样本,分别采用利息保障倍数和Whited&Wu Index两种衡量融资约束程度的方法,讨论和检验了管理层总薪酬的激励情况与融资约束程度间的关系。结果发现两者间存在显著的负相关关系。这说明目前国内上市公司多数还处于给予管理层一般薪酬、公司股票等中短期激励,普遍没有建立国外同行所采用的股权激励等长效机制来促使管理层改善融资环境。与现有文献不同的是,本文还深入分析了持股与一般薪酬各自对管理层的激励和融资约束程度之间的关系。结果表明融资约束程度对持股激励的负向影响要显著大于一般薪酬这种方式。从中看出一般薪酬(这种报酬方式)对管理层的激励程度相对比较低,因此与融资约束大小之间的关系也就非常微弱。
Financial constraint is an important index for the development of a company,which is directly related to stockholders' interests.Usually the executives' compensation incentive mechanism is usually adjusted with the degree of company's financial constraint.It is interesting and important to explore the relationship between them and investigate the difference on the incentive mechanism between the domestic listed companies and their foreign counterparts.In this paper,we use the pooling data of domestic companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2004 to 2006 and adopt interest coverage ratio and Whited & Wu index to measure companies' financial constraint degrees.The empirical research mainly concentrate on the effects of financial constraint on executive total compensations' pay-performance sensitivities,and we found a significant negative relationship between them,showing that executives in domestic companies with higher degree of financial constraint would be given less compensation incentives,which illustrates that the compensations in most of listed companies only focus on short-term or mid-term effect.In this paper,we make further analysis by decomposing total compensations into two parts: flow compensations and the change in the value of stock holdings.What we found is that financial constraint has a significant larger negative influence on pay-performance sensitivity of stock compensations comparing to salary compensations.The reason may mainly lay on salary compensations' weak incentive effect itself.
Financial constraint is an important index for the development of a company,which is directly related to stockholders' interests.Usually the executives' compensation incentive mechanism is usually adjusted with the degree of company's financial constraint.It is interesting and important to explore the relationship between them and investigate the difference on the incentive mechanism between the domestic listed companies and their foreign counterparts.In this paper,we use the pooling data of domestic companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2004 to 2006 and adopt interest coverage ratio and Whited & Wu index to measure companies' financial constraint degrees.The empirical research mainly concentrate on the effects of financial constraint on executive total compensations' pay-performance sensitivities,and we found a significant negative relationship between them,showing that executives in domestic companies with higher degree of financial constraint would be given less compensation incentives,which illustrates that the compensations in most of listed companies only focus on short-term or mid-term effect.In this paper,we make further analysis by decomposing total compensations into two parts: flow compensations and the change in the value of stock holdings.What we found is that financial constraint has a significant larger negative influence on pay-performance sensitivity of stock compensations comparing to salary compensations.The reason may mainly lay on salary compensations' weak incentive effect itself.
引文
1.李金、李仕明、严整,2007:《融资约束与现金-现金流敏感度—来自国内A股上市公司的经验证据》,《管理评论》第3期,第53-57页.
2.连玉君、程建,2007:《投资-现金流敏感性:融资约束还是代理成本?》,《财经研究》第2期,第37-46页.
3.魏锋、刘星,2004:《融资约束、不确定性对公司投资行为的影响》,《经济科学》第2期,第35-43页.
4.赵剑锋、尹航,2006:《沪市公司内部融资约束、现金流与投资行为分析》,《生产力研究》第8期,第66-68页.
5.章晓霞、吴冲锋,2006:《融资约束影响我国上市公司的现金持有政策吗—来自现金-现金流敏感度的分析》,《管理评论》第10期,第59-62页.
6.Clifford W.Smith,Jr.and Ross L.Watts,1992,"The investment opportunity set and corporate financing,divi-dend,and compensation policies",Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.32,P263-292.
7.George P.Baker and Brian J.Hall,2001,"CEO Incentives and Firm Size",working paper,Harvard BusinessSchool.
8.Heitor Almeida,Murillo Campello and Michael S.Weisbach,2004,"The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash",Journal ofFinance,Vol.59,P1777-1804.
9.Hernan Ortiz-Molina,2004,"Does Capital Structure Matter in Setting CEO Pay?",Working paper,the Universityof British Columbia.
10.Li Jin,2002,"CEO compensation,Diversification and Incentives",Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.66,P29-63.
11.Owen Lamont,Christopher Polk and Jesús Saá-Requejo,2001,"Financial Constraints and Stock Returns",TheReview of Financial Studies,Vol.4,P529-554.
12.Rong Wang,2006,“Executive incentives and financial constraint”,working paper,Mason School of Business,Col-lege of William and Mary.
13.Robert A.Korajczyk and Amnon Levy,2003,"Capital Structure Choice:Macroeconomic Conditions and FinancialConstraints",Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.68,P75-109.
14.Steven M.Fazzari;R.Glenn Hubbard;Bruce C.Petersen;Alan S.Blinder;James M.Poterba,1988,"Finan-cing Constraints and Corporate Investment",Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,No.1,P141-206.
15.Steven N.Kaplan;Luigi Zingales,1997,"Do Investment-Cash Flow Senstivities Provide Useful Measures of Fi-nancing Constraints?",The Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.112,No.1.Feb.,P169-215.
16.Toni M.Whited,1992,"Debt,Liquidity Constraints,and Corporate Investment:Evidence from Panel Data",TheJournal of Finance,Vol.47,No.4.Sep.,P1425-1460.
17.Toni M.Whited and Guojun Wu,2006,"Financial Constraints Risk",The Review of Financial Studies,Vol.19,P531-559.
2.连玉君、程建,2007:《投资-现金流敏感性:融资约束还是代理成本?》,《财经研究》第2期,第37-46页.
3.魏锋、刘星,2004:《融资约束、不确定性对公司投资行为的影响》,《经济科学》第2期,第35-43页.
4.赵剑锋、尹航,2006:《沪市公司内部融资约束、现金流与投资行为分析》,《生产力研究》第8期,第66-68页.
5.章晓霞、吴冲锋,2006:《融资约束影响我国上市公司的现金持有政策吗—来自现金-现金流敏感度的分析》,《管理评论》第10期,第59-62页.
6.Clifford W.Smith,Jr.and Ross L.Watts,1992,"The investment opportunity set and corporate financing,divi-dend,and compensation policies",Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.32,P263-292.
7.George P.Baker and Brian J.Hall,2001,"CEO Incentives and Firm Size",working paper,Harvard BusinessSchool.
8.Heitor Almeida,Murillo Campello and Michael S.Weisbach,2004,"The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash",Journal ofFinance,Vol.59,P1777-1804.
9.Hernan Ortiz-Molina,2004,"Does Capital Structure Matter in Setting CEO Pay?",Working paper,the Universityof British Columbia.
10.Li Jin,2002,"CEO compensation,Diversification and Incentives",Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.66,P29-63.
11.Owen Lamont,Christopher Polk and Jesús Saá-Requejo,2001,"Financial Constraints and Stock Returns",TheReview of Financial Studies,Vol.4,P529-554.
12.Rong Wang,2006,“Executive incentives and financial constraint”,working paper,Mason School of Business,Col-lege of William and Mary.
13.Robert A.Korajczyk and Amnon Levy,2003,"Capital Structure Choice:Macroeconomic Conditions and FinancialConstraints",Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.68,P75-109.
14.Steven M.Fazzari;R.Glenn Hubbard;Bruce C.Petersen;Alan S.Blinder;James M.Poterba,1988,"Finan-cing Constraints and Corporate Investment",Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,No.1,P141-206.
15.Steven N.Kaplan;Luigi Zingales,1997,"Do Investment-Cash Flow Senstivities Provide Useful Measures of Fi-nancing Constraints?",The Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.112,No.1.Feb.,P169-215.
16.Toni M.Whited,1992,"Debt,Liquidity Constraints,and Corporate Investment:Evidence from Panel Data",TheJournal of Finance,Vol.47,No.4.Sep.,P1425-1460.
17.Toni M.Whited and Guojun Wu,2006,"Financial Constraints Risk",The Review of Financial Studies,Vol.19,P531-559.