融资约束、高管薪酬与企业绩效
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摘要
本文以国有A股上市公司为研究对象,分析融资约束情境下高管薪酬与企业绩效的相关性。研究结论表明:融资约束对高管薪酬与企业绩效的相关性具有显著影响;高融资约束的企业,高管薪酬与企业绩效具有显著的正相关性,低融资约束的企业,高管薪酬与企业绩效的相关性不显著;另外,融资约束对高管薪酬与企业绩效相关性的影响随行业的不同也有所不同。
The studies have found that the correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance is affected by a lot of situational factors. Financing constraints will affect corporate performance by restricting enterprise principal-agent behavior,which is the important situational factor affecting the correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance. This paper's research object is the state-owned listed companies and the paper will analyze the correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance when facing financing constraints. The results show:Firstly,the financing constraints have a significant influence on correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance. Secondly,the correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance is significant positive when the enterprise in high financing constraints,but when the enterprise in low financing constraints,the correlation is not significant. In addition,when the enterprises belong to different industries,the affects of financing constraints on correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance is different.
The studies have found that the correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance is affected by a lot of situational factors. Financing constraints will affect corporate performance by restricting enterprise principal-agent behavior,which is the important situational factor affecting the correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance. This paper's research object is the state-owned listed companies and the paper will analyze the correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance when facing financing constraints. The results show:Firstly,the financing constraints have a significant influence on correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance. Secondly,the correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance is significant positive when the enterprise in high financing constraints,but when the enterprise in low financing constraints,the correlation is not significant. In addition,when the enterprises belong to different industries,the affects of financing constraints on correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance is different.
引文
[1]况学文、施臻懿、何恩良:《中国上市公司融资约束指数设计与评价》,《山西财经大学学报》2010年第32期。
[2]施文:《融资约束对我国上市公司投资的影响研究》,2013年东华大学硕士学位论文。
[3]杜兴强、王丽华:《高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究》,《会计研究》2007年第1期。
[4]卢慧芳、吴华晶:《融资约束对管理层薪酬激励机制的影响》,《上海经济研究》2013年第2期。
[5]卢斌、曹启龙、刘燕:《融资约束、市场竞争与资本结构动态调整——基于产业异质性的研究》,《产业经济研究》2014年第3期。
[6]晏艳阳、乔嗣佳、苑莹:《高管薪酬激励效果——基于投资-现金流敏感度的分析》,《中国工业经济》2015年第6期。
[7]李科、徐龙炳:《融资约束、债务能力与公司业绩》,《经济研究》2011年第5期。
[8]黄莉、陈美林:《混合所有制改革研究——基于融资约束的视角》,《商业经济研究》2016年第7期。
[9]张长征、黄德春:《企业规模、控制人性质与企业融资约束关系研究》,《经济经纬》2012年第4期。
[10]Michael Firth,Peter M.Y.,Fungi Olives M.Corporate Performance and CEO Compensation in China.Journal of Corporate Finance,2006.
[11]Denis D J,Sibilkov V.Financial Constraints,Investment,and the Value of Cash Holdings.Review of Financial Studies,2010.
[2]施文:《融资约束对我国上市公司投资的影响研究》,2013年东华大学硕士学位论文。
[3]杜兴强、王丽华:《高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究》,《会计研究》2007年第1期。
[4]卢慧芳、吴华晶:《融资约束对管理层薪酬激励机制的影响》,《上海经济研究》2013年第2期。
[5]卢斌、曹启龙、刘燕:《融资约束、市场竞争与资本结构动态调整——基于产业异质性的研究》,《产业经济研究》2014年第3期。
[6]晏艳阳、乔嗣佳、苑莹:《高管薪酬激励效果——基于投资-现金流敏感度的分析》,《中国工业经济》2015年第6期。
[7]李科、徐龙炳:《融资约束、债务能力与公司业绩》,《经济研究》2011年第5期。
[8]黄莉、陈美林:《混合所有制改革研究——基于融资约束的视角》,《商业经济研究》2016年第7期。
[9]张长征、黄德春:《企业规模、控制人性质与企业融资约束关系研究》,《经济经纬》2012年第4期。
[10]Michael Firth,Peter M.Y.,Fungi Olives M.Corporate Performance and CEO Compensation in China.Journal of Corporate Finance,2006.
[11]Denis D J,Sibilkov V.Financial Constraints,Investment,and the Value of Cash Holdings.Review of Financial Studies,2010.