审计师妥协与底线思维——以股票期权激励为研究契机
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摘要
以2007—2015年我国A股上市公司股票期权激励计划发布为契机进行研究,发现审计师会利用底线思维进行决策,其底线是客户的财务操纵诉讼风险,即在股权激励计划发布前一年,审计师倾向于向财务操纵诉讼风险低的客户妥协,表现为收取异常高的审计费用。进一步的研究表明,只有经济重要性程度高的客户才会触发审计师决策的底线思维。这一研究有助于明晰审计师面临公司管理层压力时的决策思路,揭示出客户动机是影响审计收费的因素,故可以利用股权激励公司的监管。
Taking the planned announcement of stock option incentives in ChineseA-share listed companies from 2007 to 2015 as the research opportunity, we find that auditors usually use the bottom-line thinking to make a strategic decision, where the bottom line is clients' litigation risk of financial manipulation. That is, auditors are inclined to compromise on clients with lower risk of financial manipulation in the previous year before the planned announcement, when auditors would accept abnormally higher audit fees.Further research reveals that, auditors' bottom line thinking is only related to the clients with higher economic importance. The research helps to understand auditor's strategic approach when facing management pressure,and states that clients' motivation can definitely affect audit fees, which can be used to supervise companies.
Taking the planned announcement of stock option incentives in ChineseA-share listed companies from 2007 to 2015 as the research opportunity, we find that auditors usually use the bottom-line thinking to make a strategic decision, where the bottom line is clients' litigation risk of financial manipulation. That is, auditors are inclined to compromise on clients with lower risk of financial manipulation in the previous year before the planned announcement, when auditors would accept abnormally higher audit fees.Further research reveals that, auditors' bottom line thinking is only related to the clients with higher economic importance. The research helps to understand auditor's strategic approach when facing management pressure,and states that clients' motivation can definitely affect audit fees, which can be used to supervise companies.
引文
[1]周亚东.底线思维:习近平治国理政的重要方法之一[J].理论视野,2017(2):23-26.
[2]Francis J R,Michas P N,Seaver S E.Does Audit Market Concentration Harm the Quality of Audited Earnings? Evidence from Audit Markets in 42 Countries[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2013,30(1):325-355.
[3]夏冬林,林震昃.我国审计市场的竞争状况分析[J].会计研究,2003(3):40-46.
[4]刘启亮,李蕙,赵超,等.媒体负面报道、诉讼风险与审计费用[J].会计研究,2014(6):81-88,97.
[5]Mcanally M L,Srivastava A,Weaver C D.Executive Stock Options,Missed Earnings Targets,and Earnings Management[J].The Accounting Review,2008,83(1):185-216.
[6]肖淑芳,张晨宇,张超,等.股权激励计划公告前的盈余管理——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2009(4):113-119,127.
[7]Mohliver A. How Misconduct Spreads:Auditors’Role in the Diffusion of Stock-Option Backdating[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,2018,forthcoming.
[8]陈宋生,曹圆圆.股权激励下的审计意见购买[J].审计研究,2018(1):59-67.
[9]DuCharme L L,Malatesta P H,Sefcik S E.Earnings Management,Stock Issues,and Shareholder Lawsuits[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2004,71(1):27.
[10]Gong G,Louis H,Sun A X.Earnings Management,Lawsuits,and Stock-for-Stock Acquirers’Market Performance[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2008,46(1):62-77.
[11]Heninger W G.The Association between Auditor Litigation and Abnormal Accruals[J].The Accounting Review,2001,76(1):111-126.
[12]Chauvin K W,Shenoy C.Stock Price Decreases Prior to Executive Stock Option Grants[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2001,7(1):53-76.
[13]Denis D J,Hanouna P,Sarin A.Is There a Dark Side to Incentive Compensation[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(3):467-488.
[14]Efendi J,Srivastava A,Swanson E P.Why Do Corporate Managers Misstate Financial Statements? The Role of Option Compensation and Other Factors[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,85(3):667-708.
[15]Bergstresser D,Philippon T.CEO Incentives and Earnings Management[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(3):511-529.
[16]Davidson W N,Jiraporn P,Dadalt P.Causes and Consequences of Audit Shopping:An Analysis of Auditor Opinions,Earnings Management,and Auditor Changes[J].Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics,2006,45(1/2):69-87.
[17]伍利娜,王春飞,陆正飞.企业集团审计师变更与审计意见购买[J].审计研究,2013(1):70-78.
[18]Lennox C.Do Companies Successfully Engage in Opinion-Shopping? Evidence from the UK[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2000,29(3):321-337.
[19]李青原,赵艳秉.企业财务重述后审计意见购买的实证研究[J].审计研究,2014(5):101-107.
[20]Li C.Does Client Importance Affect Auditor Independence at the Office Level? Empirical Evidence from Going-Concern Opinions[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2009,26(1):201-230.
[21]唐跃军.审计收费、审计委员会与意见购买——来自2004—2005年中国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2007(4):114-128.
[22]杨和雄.A股上市公司审计意见购买研究[J].审计与经济研究,2009(1):40-45.
[23]Johnstone K M.Client-Acceptance Decisions:Simultaneous Effects of Client Business Risk,Audit Risk,Auditor Business Risk,and Risk Adaptation[J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice and Theory,2000,19(1):1-25.
[24]Krishnan Jayanthi,Krishnan J.Litigation Risk and Auditor Resignations[J].The Accounting Review,1997,72(4):539-560.
[25]He X,Pittman J,Rui O.Reputational Implications for Partners after a Major Audit Failure:Evidence from China[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2016,138(4):703-722.
[26]Simunic D A.Auditing,Consulting,and Auditor Independence[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1984,22(2):679-702.
[27]Hossain S,Monroe G,Wilson M,et al.The Effect of Networked Clients'Economic Importance on Audit Quality[J]. Auditing:A Journal of Practice and Theory,2016,35(4):79-103.
[28]Chi W,Douthett E B,Lisic L L.Client Importance and Audit Partner Independence[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2012,31(3):320-336.
[29]方军雄,洪剑峭.异常审计收费与审计质量的损害——来自中国审计市场的证据[J].中国会计评论,2008(4):425-442.
[30]陈杰平,苏锡嘉,吴溪.异常审计收费与不利审计结果的改善[J].中国会计与财务研究,2005(4):1-54.
[31]Dechow P M,Sloan R G.Detecting Earnings Management[J].The Accounting Review,1995,70(2):193-225.
[32]Simunic D A.The Pricing of Audit Services:Theory and Evidence[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1980,18(1):161-190.
[33]Ghosh A,Tang C Y.Assessing Financial Reporting Quality of Family Firms:The Auditors Perspective[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2015,60(1):95-116.
[34]Huang T C,Chang H,Chiou J R.Audit Market Concentration,Audit Fees,and Audit Quality:Evidence from China[J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice and Theory,2016,35(2):121-145.
(1)资料来源于http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0213/c64094-29075534.html。
(2)引自中国人民大学马克思主义学院教授陶文昭答记者问,详见http://www.dtdjzx.gov.cn/staticPage/djhzzgzxcw/focus/20170213/527641.html。
(3)资料来源于http://www.capitalweek.com.cn/2013-02-22/1591935473.html。
(4)《上市公司股权激励管理办法》(试行)规定:“上市公司股票期权薪酬的行权价格不应低于下列价格较高者:(一)股权激励计划草案摘要公布前一个交易日的公司标的股票收盘价;(二)股权激励计划草案摘要公布前30个交易日内的公司标的股票平均收盘价。”
(5)美国上市公司股票期权的行权价格取决于标的股票授予日前的价格。
(6)Simunic(1980)[32]认为,资产是影响审计费用的主要因素。中国注册会计师协会以及地方物价部门制定的审计收费法规也要求会计师事务所以客户的资产作为收费的依据。
[2]Francis J R,Michas P N,Seaver S E.Does Audit Market Concentration Harm the Quality of Audited Earnings? Evidence from Audit Markets in 42 Countries[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2013,30(1):325-355.
[3]夏冬林,林震昃.我国审计市场的竞争状况分析[J].会计研究,2003(3):40-46.
[4]刘启亮,李蕙,赵超,等.媒体负面报道、诉讼风险与审计费用[J].会计研究,2014(6):81-88,97.
[5]Mcanally M L,Srivastava A,Weaver C D.Executive Stock Options,Missed Earnings Targets,and Earnings Management[J].The Accounting Review,2008,83(1):185-216.
[6]肖淑芳,张晨宇,张超,等.股权激励计划公告前的盈余管理——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2009(4):113-119,127.
[7]Mohliver A. How Misconduct Spreads:Auditors’Role in the Diffusion of Stock-Option Backdating[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,2018,forthcoming.
[8]陈宋生,曹圆圆.股权激励下的审计意见购买[J].审计研究,2018(1):59-67.
[9]DuCharme L L,Malatesta P H,Sefcik S E.Earnings Management,Stock Issues,and Shareholder Lawsuits[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2004,71(1):27.
[10]Gong G,Louis H,Sun A X.Earnings Management,Lawsuits,and Stock-for-Stock Acquirers’Market Performance[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2008,46(1):62-77.
[11]Heninger W G.The Association between Auditor Litigation and Abnormal Accruals[J].The Accounting Review,2001,76(1):111-126.
[12]Chauvin K W,Shenoy C.Stock Price Decreases Prior to Executive Stock Option Grants[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2001,7(1):53-76.
[13]Denis D J,Hanouna P,Sarin A.Is There a Dark Side to Incentive Compensation[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(3):467-488.
[14]Efendi J,Srivastava A,Swanson E P.Why Do Corporate Managers Misstate Financial Statements? The Role of Option Compensation and Other Factors[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,85(3):667-708.
[15]Bergstresser D,Philippon T.CEO Incentives and Earnings Management[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(3):511-529.
[16]Davidson W N,Jiraporn P,Dadalt P.Causes and Consequences of Audit Shopping:An Analysis of Auditor Opinions,Earnings Management,and Auditor Changes[J].Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics,2006,45(1/2):69-87.
[17]伍利娜,王春飞,陆正飞.企业集团审计师变更与审计意见购买[J].审计研究,2013(1):70-78.
[18]Lennox C.Do Companies Successfully Engage in Opinion-Shopping? Evidence from the UK[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2000,29(3):321-337.
[19]李青原,赵艳秉.企业财务重述后审计意见购买的实证研究[J].审计研究,2014(5):101-107.
[20]Li C.Does Client Importance Affect Auditor Independence at the Office Level? Empirical Evidence from Going-Concern Opinions[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2009,26(1):201-230.
[21]唐跃军.审计收费、审计委员会与意见购买——来自2004—2005年中国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2007(4):114-128.
[22]杨和雄.A股上市公司审计意见购买研究[J].审计与经济研究,2009(1):40-45.
[23]Johnstone K M.Client-Acceptance Decisions:Simultaneous Effects of Client Business Risk,Audit Risk,Auditor Business Risk,and Risk Adaptation[J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice and Theory,2000,19(1):1-25.
[24]Krishnan Jayanthi,Krishnan J.Litigation Risk and Auditor Resignations[J].The Accounting Review,1997,72(4):539-560.
[25]He X,Pittman J,Rui O.Reputational Implications for Partners after a Major Audit Failure:Evidence from China[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2016,138(4):703-722.
[26]Simunic D A.Auditing,Consulting,and Auditor Independence[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1984,22(2):679-702.
[27]Hossain S,Monroe G,Wilson M,et al.The Effect of Networked Clients'Economic Importance on Audit Quality[J]. Auditing:A Journal of Practice and Theory,2016,35(4):79-103.
[28]Chi W,Douthett E B,Lisic L L.Client Importance and Audit Partner Independence[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2012,31(3):320-336.
[29]方军雄,洪剑峭.异常审计收费与审计质量的损害——来自中国审计市场的证据[J].中国会计评论,2008(4):425-442.
[30]陈杰平,苏锡嘉,吴溪.异常审计收费与不利审计结果的改善[J].中国会计与财务研究,2005(4):1-54.
[31]Dechow P M,Sloan R G.Detecting Earnings Management[J].The Accounting Review,1995,70(2):193-225.
[32]Simunic D A.The Pricing of Audit Services:Theory and Evidence[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1980,18(1):161-190.
[33]Ghosh A,Tang C Y.Assessing Financial Reporting Quality of Family Firms:The Auditors Perspective[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2015,60(1):95-116.
[34]Huang T C,Chang H,Chiou J R.Audit Market Concentration,Audit Fees,and Audit Quality:Evidence from China[J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice and Theory,2016,35(2):121-145.
(1)资料来源于http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0213/c64094-29075534.html。
(2)引自中国人民大学马克思主义学院教授陶文昭答记者问,详见http://www.dtdjzx.gov.cn/staticPage/djhzzgzxcw/focus/20170213/527641.html。
(3)资料来源于http://www.capitalweek.com.cn/2013-02-22/1591935473.html。
(4)《上市公司股权激励管理办法》(试行)规定:“上市公司股票期权薪酬的行权价格不应低于下列价格较高者:(一)股权激励计划草案摘要公布前一个交易日的公司标的股票收盘价;(二)股权激励计划草案摘要公布前30个交易日内的公司标的股票平均收盘价。”
(5)美国上市公司股票期权的行权价格取决于标的股票授予日前的价格。
(6)Simunic(1980)[32]认为,资产是影响审计费用的主要因素。中国注册会计师协会以及地方物价部门制定的审计收费法规也要求会计师事务所以客户的资产作为收费的依据。