股权和控制权配置:从对等到非对等的逻辑——基于央属混合所有制上市公司的实证研究
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摘要
针对混合所有制企业改革中企业控制权安排的难题,利用我国央属具有混合所有制性质的上市公司数据,在控制行业分类的前提下,通过研究股权结构和董事会结构与企业绩效的关系,论证了股权和控制权非对等配置的逻辑合理性。研究发现,降低前五大股东中国有股占比有利于提高企业绩效,但过多提高非国有股占比不会提高企业绩效;提高非国有董事占比有利于提高企业绩效,但过多减少国有董事占比不会提高企业绩效;相比于股权结构,董事会结构对企业绩效的影响更大。在上述研究基础上,进一步探索了国有股占比和非国有股占比的最优区间,并提出了在不改变国有控股地位的前提下,解决混合所有制改革困局的设想和建议。
The reform of China's mixed ownership enterprises is on the horns of a dilemma:on the one hand,the stateowned shareholders still occupy the dominant position of control rights,which weakens the ability of heterogeneous shareholders to participate in corporate business;on the other hand,the one-share-one-vote rule results in corporate control subject to ownership and thus,the reform of mixed ownership enterprises is difficult to go deeply.Under this circumstance,how to arrange corporate control rights in order to make mixed ownership reform deepen and improve corporate performance?There are two approaches about arrangements of control rights:one is the logic of equivalence,which argues that the arrangement of control rights should be consistent with equity structure,abiding by the role of one-share-one-vote.The other is the logic of non-equivalence,which argues that the arrangement of control rights can be separated from equity structure and need not to abide by the rule of one-share-one-vote.Most scholars,e.g.,Grossman&Hart(1986),Hart&Moore(1990),Harris&Raviv(1989),follow the first approach.Some other scholars,e.g.,Choi(2015),based on the practice of non-equivalent allocation between equity and control,rethink the logic of equivalence and put forward the idea of non-equivalent allocation between equity and control.But,for a company with both state-owned shares and nonstate-owned shares,how to arrange control rights can it improve corporate performance?In other words,is it essential for mixed ownership enterprises to follow the role of one-share-one-vote?To solve this problem,we should demonstrate with sufficient empirical data that how and in what degree the allocation of equity and control affects corporate performance.By using the data of corporate performance,equity structure and board structure in all listed companies under SASAC,State Council,and by controlling the industry classification,this paper investigates the correlation of equity structure,board structure and firm performance.In order to avoid the endogenous issue raised by Demsetz&Lehn(1985)as well as Davidson&Rowe(2004),we use the data that one year lag of equity structure and board structure.The study finds that:(a)reducing the proportion of the first five largest state-owned shares is conducive to improving firm performance,but increasing the proportion of the first five largest non-state-owned shares too many is not conducive to improving firm performance;(b)increasing the proportion of state-owned directors is conducive to improving firm performance,but reducing the proportion of state-owned directors too many is not conducive to improving firm performance.And compared with equity structure,the board structure has a greater effect on firm performance.Based on the above,the paper explores the best range of the proportion of state-owned and non-state-owned shares,and proposes approaches and suggestions about the reform of mixed-ownership enterprise through transfer or sharing of control rights,under the premise of unchanging the controlling status of state-owned shares.The main contributions of this paper are as follows:First,it scrupulously founded true attributes of shareholders and directors by judging the actual controller of the company;second,it examined the correlation between equity structure,board structure and firm performance,tested the different effects of equity and control on firm performance,and demonstrated the logical rationality of non-equivalent allocation between equity and control;third,it preliminarily explored the optimal interval proportion of the top five state-owned shareholders and non-state-owned shareholders,and provided a quantitative basis for deepening mixed ownership enterprises reform;last,it put forward some countermeasures and suggestions for the reform of mixed ownership enterprises.
The reform of China's mixed ownership enterprises is on the horns of a dilemma:on the one hand,the stateowned shareholders still occupy the dominant position of control rights,which weakens the ability of heterogeneous shareholders to participate in corporate business;on the other hand,the one-share-one-vote rule results in corporate control subject to ownership and thus,the reform of mixed ownership enterprises is difficult to go deeply.Under this circumstance,how to arrange corporate control rights in order to make mixed ownership reform deepen and improve corporate performance?There are two approaches about arrangements of control rights:one is the logic of equivalence,which argues that the arrangement of control rights should be consistent with equity structure,abiding by the role of one-share-one-vote.The other is the logic of non-equivalence,which argues that the arrangement of control rights can be separated from equity structure and need not to abide by the rule of one-share-one-vote.Most scholars,e.g.,Grossman&Hart(1986),Hart&Moore(1990),Harris&Raviv(1989),follow the first approach.Some other scholars,e.g.,Choi(2015),based on the practice of non-equivalent allocation between equity and control,rethink the logic of equivalence and put forward the idea of non-equivalent allocation between equity and control.But,for a company with both state-owned shares and nonstate-owned shares,how to arrange control rights can it improve corporate performance?In other words,is it essential for mixed ownership enterprises to follow the role of one-share-one-vote?To solve this problem,we should demonstrate with sufficient empirical data that how and in what degree the allocation of equity and control affects corporate performance.By using the data of corporate performance,equity structure and board structure in all listed companies under SASAC,State Council,and by controlling the industry classification,this paper investigates the correlation of equity structure,board structure and firm performance.In order to avoid the endogenous issue raised by Demsetz&Lehn(1985)as well as Davidson&Rowe(2004),we use the data that one year lag of equity structure and board structure.The study finds that:(a)reducing the proportion of the first five largest state-owned shares is conducive to improving firm performance,but increasing the proportion of the first five largest non-state-owned shares too many is not conducive to improving firm performance;(b)increasing the proportion of state-owned directors is conducive to improving firm performance,but reducing the proportion of state-owned directors too many is not conducive to improving firm performance.And compared with equity structure,the board structure has a greater effect on firm performance.Based on the above,the paper explores the best range of the proportion of state-owned and non-state-owned shares,and proposes approaches and suggestions about the reform of mixed-ownership enterprise through transfer or sharing of control rights,under the premise of unchanging the controlling status of state-owned shares.The main contributions of this paper are as follows:First,it scrupulously founded true attributes of shareholders and directors by judging the actual controller of the company;second,it examined the correlation between equity structure,board structure and firm performance,tested the different effects of equity and control on firm performance,and demonstrated the logical rationality of non-equivalent allocation between equity and control;third,it preliminarily explored the optimal interval proportion of the top five state-owned shareholders and non-state-owned shareholders,and provided a quantitative basis for deepening mixed ownership enterprises reform;last,it put forward some countermeasures and suggestions for the reform of mixed ownership enterprises.
引文
曹廷求、杨秀丽、孙宇光,2007:《股权结构与公司绩效:度量方法和内生性》,《经济研究》第10期。
陈德萍、陈永圣,2011:《股权集中度、股权制衡度与公司绩效关系研究——2007-2009年中小企业板块的实证检验》,《会计研究》第1期。
郝阳、龚六堂,2017:《国有、民营混合参股与公司绩效改进》,《经济研究》第3期。
李海英、李双海、毕晓方,2017:《双重股权结构下的中小投资者利益保护——基于Facebook收购WhatsA pp的案例研究》,《中国工业经济》第1期。
李建标、王高阳、李帅琦、殷西乐,2016:《混合所有制改革中国有和非国有资本的行为博弈》,《中国工业经济》第6期。
李维安、李汉军,2006:《股权结构、高管持股与公司绩效——来自民营上市公司的证据》,《南开管理评论》第5期。
林莞娟、王辉、韩涛,2016:《股权分置改革对国有控股比例以及企业绩效影响的研究》,《金融研究》第1期。
刘汉民,2002:《所有制、制度环境与公司治理效率》,《经济研究》第6期。
刘汉民、郝英奇、易余胤、杨纯玲,2006:《基于复杂系统的公司治理》,《中国工业经济》第2期。
刘汉民、康丽群,2013:《公司治理的路径演化和路径选择》,《中国工业经济》第12期。
刘芍佳、孙霈、刘乃全,2003:《终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效》,《经济研究》第4期。
刘小玄、李寿喜,2007:《转轨过程中混合股权公司的相对效率——中国电子电器制造业2000-2004经验数据分析》,《世界经济文汇》第1期。
陆正飞、胡诗阳,2015:《股东-经理代理冲突与非执行董事的治理作用——来自中国A股市场的经验证据》,《管理世界》第1期。
曲亮、谢在阳、郝云宏、李维安,2016:《国有企业董事会权力配置模式研究——基于二元权利耦合演进的视角》,《中国工业经济》第8期。
孙永祥、黄祖辉,1999:《上市公司的股权结构与绩效》,《经济研究》第12期。
王甄、胡军,2016:《控制权转让、产权性质与公司绩效》,《经济研究》第4期。
武常岐、张林,2014:《国企改革中的所有权和控制权及企业绩效》,《北京大学学报》第5期。
徐莉萍、陈工孟、辛宇,2005:《控制权转移、产权改革及经营绩效之改进》,《管理世界》第3期。
徐莉萍、辛宇、陈工孟,2006:《股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响》,《经济研究》第1期。
杨记军、逯东、杨丹,2010:《国有企业的政府控制权转让研究》,《经济研究》第2期。
叶康涛、祝继高、陆正飞,2011:《独立董事的独立性:基于董事会投票的证据》,《经济研究》第1期。
殷军、皮建材、杨德才,2016:《国有企业混合所有制的内在机制和最优比例研究》,《南开经济研究》第1期。
于东智、池国华,2004:《董事会规模、稳定性与公司绩效:理论与经验分析》,《经济研究》第4期。
于东智,2004:《董事会与公司治理》,清华大学出版社。
张维迎,1995:《企业的企业家-契约理论》,上海人民出版社。
张维迎,1996:《所有制、治理结构及委托-代理关系-兼评崔之元和周其仁的一些观点》,《经济研究》第9期。
郑志刚、邹宇、崔丽,2016:《合伙人制度与创业团队控制权安排模式选择——基于阿里巴巴的案例研究》,《中国工业经济》第10期。
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Berle,A.A.,and G.C.Means,1932,“The Modern Corporation and Private Property”Harcourt,Brace,&World,New York.
Catherine,C.,and R.Aidan,1985,“Elements of A Theory of Mixed Enterprise”,Scottish Journal of Political Economy,32(1),82-94.
Cho,M.H.,1998,“Ownership Structure,Investment,and the Corporate Value:An Empirical Analysis”,Journal of Financial Economics,47,103-121.
Claessens,S.,S.Djankov,J.Fan,and L.Lang,2002,“Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings”,The Journal of Finance,11,2741-2771.
Coles,J.L.,N.D.Daniel,and L.Naveen,2008,“Boards:Does One Size Fit All?”,Journal of Financial Economics,87,329-356.
Coles,J.L.,M.L.Lemmon,and J.F.Meschke,2012,“Structural Models and Endogeneity in Corporate Finance:the Link between Managerial Ownership and Corporate Performance”,Journal of Financial Economics,103,149-168.
Davidson,W.,And W.Rowe,2004,“Intertemporal Endogeneity in Board Composition and Financial Performance”,Corporate Ownership and Control,1(4),49-60.
Demsetz,H.,1983,“The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm”,Journal of Law and Economics,26,375-390.
Demsetz,H.,and K.Lehn,1985,“The Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences”,Journal of Political Economy,93,1155-1177.
Demsetz,H.,and V.Belen,2001,“Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance”,Journal of Corporate Finance,7,209-233.
DiM aggio,P.J.,and W.W.Powell,1983,“The Iron Cage Revisited:Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields”,American Sociological Review,48,147-160.
Easterbrook,F.H.,and D.R.Fischel,1991,“The Economic Structure of Corporate Law”,Cambridge:Harvard University Press.
Fama,E.F.,1980,“Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm”,The Journal of Political Economy,88(2),288-307.
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(1)企业代理问题是指在企业合约关系中,拥有信息优势的代理人偏离委托人目标追求自身利益最大化,包括道德风险和逆向选择。威廉姆森将其称为机会主义,不过机会主义行为还包括说谎、欺骗和偷盗等(Williamson,1993)。
(1)企业价值为每年现金流的贴现值,EV=∑nt=0πt/(1+rt)t,πt=TRt-TCt,如果n→∞,则EV=π/r,π、r均为期望值;一般情况下(破产清算除外),债权持有者难以对企业正常经营及决策产生影响,且其回报固定,因此,可以把企业价值视为股东价值。
(2)此处所说的社会产出有别于国民经济统计中的社会产出,是指企业为实现社会目标而从事的生产或服务的产出,如吸纳就业人员、稳定物价等。
(1)适度是指根据公司的具体情况,结合国有股占比和第一大股东持股的最优区间酌情降低。
陈德萍、陈永圣,2011:《股权集中度、股权制衡度与公司绩效关系研究——2007-2009年中小企业板块的实证检验》,《会计研究》第1期。
郝阳、龚六堂,2017:《国有、民营混合参股与公司绩效改进》,《经济研究》第3期。
李海英、李双海、毕晓方,2017:《双重股权结构下的中小投资者利益保护——基于Facebook收购WhatsA pp的案例研究》,《中国工业经济》第1期。
李建标、王高阳、李帅琦、殷西乐,2016:《混合所有制改革中国有和非国有资本的行为博弈》,《中国工业经济》第6期。
李维安、李汉军,2006:《股权结构、高管持股与公司绩效——来自民营上市公司的证据》,《南开管理评论》第5期。
林莞娟、王辉、韩涛,2016:《股权分置改革对国有控股比例以及企业绩效影响的研究》,《金融研究》第1期。
刘汉民,2002:《所有制、制度环境与公司治理效率》,《经济研究》第6期。
刘汉民、郝英奇、易余胤、杨纯玲,2006:《基于复杂系统的公司治理》,《中国工业经济》第2期。
刘汉民、康丽群,2013:《公司治理的路径演化和路径选择》,《中国工业经济》第12期。
刘芍佳、孙霈、刘乃全,2003:《终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效》,《经济研究》第4期。
刘小玄、李寿喜,2007:《转轨过程中混合股权公司的相对效率——中国电子电器制造业2000-2004经验数据分析》,《世界经济文汇》第1期。
陆正飞、胡诗阳,2015:《股东-经理代理冲突与非执行董事的治理作用——来自中国A股市场的经验证据》,《管理世界》第1期。
曲亮、谢在阳、郝云宏、李维安,2016:《国有企业董事会权力配置模式研究——基于二元权利耦合演进的视角》,《中国工业经济》第8期。
孙永祥、黄祖辉,1999:《上市公司的股权结构与绩效》,《经济研究》第12期。
王甄、胡军,2016:《控制权转让、产权性质与公司绩效》,《经济研究》第4期。
武常岐、张林,2014:《国企改革中的所有权和控制权及企业绩效》,《北京大学学报》第5期。
徐莉萍、陈工孟、辛宇,2005:《控制权转移、产权改革及经营绩效之改进》,《管理世界》第3期。
徐莉萍、辛宇、陈工孟,2006:《股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响》,《经济研究》第1期。
杨记军、逯东、杨丹,2010:《国有企业的政府控制权转让研究》,《经济研究》第2期。
叶康涛、祝继高、陆正飞,2011:《独立董事的独立性:基于董事会投票的证据》,《经济研究》第1期。
殷军、皮建材、杨德才,2016:《国有企业混合所有制的内在机制和最优比例研究》,《南开经济研究》第1期。
于东智、池国华,2004:《董事会规模、稳定性与公司绩效:理论与经验分析》,《经济研究》第4期。
于东智,2004:《董事会与公司治理》,清华大学出版社。
张维迎,1995:《企业的企业家-契约理论》,上海人民出版社。
张维迎,1996:《所有制、治理结构及委托-代理关系-兼评崔之元和周其仁的一些观点》,《经济研究》第9期。
郑志刚、邹宇、崔丽,2016:《合伙人制度与创业团队控制权安排模式选择——基于阿里巴巴的案例研究》,《中国工业经济》第10期。
Aghion,P.,and P.Bolton,1992,“An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting”,Review of Economic Studies,52,647-663.
Berle,A.A.,and G.C.Means,1932,“The Modern Corporation and Private Property”Harcourt,Brace,&World,New York.
Catherine,C.,and R.Aidan,1985,“Elements of A Theory of Mixed Enterprise”,Scottish Journal of Political Economy,32(1),82-94.
Cho,M.H.,1998,“Ownership Structure,Investment,and the Corporate Value:An Empirical Analysis”,Journal of Financial Economics,47,103-121.
Claessens,S.,S.Djankov,J.Fan,and L.Lang,2002,“Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings”,The Journal of Finance,11,2741-2771.
Coles,J.L.,N.D.Daniel,and L.Naveen,2008,“Boards:Does One Size Fit All?”,Journal of Financial Economics,87,329-356.
Coles,J.L.,M.L.Lemmon,and J.F.Meschke,2012,“Structural Models and Endogeneity in Corporate Finance:the Link between Managerial Ownership and Corporate Performance”,Journal of Financial Economics,103,149-168.
Davidson,W.,And W.Rowe,2004,“Intertemporal Endogeneity in Board Composition and Financial Performance”,Corporate Ownership and Control,1(4),49-60.
Demsetz,H.,1983,“The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm”,Journal of Law and Economics,26,375-390.
Demsetz,H.,and K.Lehn,1985,“The Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences”,Journal of Political Economy,93,1155-1177.
Demsetz,H.,and V.Belen,2001,“Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance”,Journal of Corporate Finance,7,209-233.
DiM aggio,P.J.,and W.W.Powell,1983,“The Iron Cage Revisited:Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields”,American Sociological Review,48,147-160.
Easterbrook,F.H.,and D.R.Fischel,1991,“The Economic Structure of Corporate Law”,Cambridge:Harvard University Press.
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(1)企业代理问题是指在企业合约关系中,拥有信息优势的代理人偏离委托人目标追求自身利益最大化,包括道德风险和逆向选择。威廉姆森将其称为机会主义,不过机会主义行为还包括说谎、欺骗和偷盗等(Williamson,1993)。
(1)企业价值为每年现金流的贴现值,EV=∑nt=0πt/(1+rt)t,πt=TRt-TCt,如果n→∞,则EV=π/r,π、r均为期望值;一般情况下(破产清算除外),债权持有者难以对企业正常经营及决策产生影响,且其回报固定,因此,可以把企业价值视为股东价值。
(2)此处所说的社会产出有别于国民经济统计中的社会产出,是指企业为实现社会目标而从事的生产或服务的产出,如吸纳就业人员、稳定物价等。
(1)适度是指根据公司的具体情况,结合国有股占比和第一大股东持股的最优区间酌情降低。