代理·治理:大型体育场馆PPP模式的理论析辨
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摘要
采用文献法和调查法探讨我国大型体育场馆PPP策指向。委托-代理理论假设条件是利益不一致和信息不对称,核心是委托人设计一套激励约束相容机制来应对道德风险和逆向选择问题。然而,我国大型体育场馆PPP模式面临政府部门错位干预与缺乏激励并存、市场主体越位经营与缺乏约束同在,甚至两者的利益交换常常发生在合约之外,导致委托-代理理论无法解释我国大型体育场馆PPP任何人都不可能事前预见所有的情况,也不可能把所有的条款都写入契约,所以合作方后期再谈判是常态,关键是如何分割剩余权利以及采用哪种激励方式。显然,我国大型体育场馆签订的合同文本具备不完全性。然而,后期再谈判中政府部门拥有绝对优势,导致剩余控制权与剩余索取权配置失衡,以致经营大型体育场馆利润微薄;政府部门奉行高能激励,导致经营者无需为过错买单,以致过度开发大型体育场馆。因此,大型体育场馆PPP模式合作方需立足于治理理念,以法治为基、以公平为本、以协商为要应对大型体育场馆后期再谈判中权利失衡问题,以政府购买的方式引导市场主体提供公共服务,以评价转向的方式引领政府部门职能转型。
This paper focuses on the theoretical base of public-private partnership mode of large sports venues by literature review and survey method. It aims to lay a solid theoretical foundation and clarify the policy orientation for the prosperous public-private partnership mode of large sports venues. Preconditions for Agent-management theory are inconsistency in interests and information asymmetry,the main thrust is that the client will propose a set of excitation and control mechanism to deal with and moral hazards and adverse selection. In our public-private partnership mode there are the coexistence of dislocation interference of government and lack of excitation mechanism,offside operation and lack of regulation,sometimes the interests exchange are beyond the contracts,which fail to employ the public-private partnership mode into our management of large sports venues. The original intention of incomplete contract theory is its incompleteness. Nobody can foresee the future completely;We still cannot take everything into contract. So it is very common for renegotiation,the key point is how to clarify individual rights and which excitation mechanism should be taken. It is obvious that the contracts signed on our large sports venues are not complete. In later renegotiation the government takes the very advantage which leads to imbalance between residual control rights and residual claim,it appears the low-margin business in the operation of large sports venues;the government takes high-power incentive,resulting in over-construction of large sports venues. So the publicprivate partnership mode of large sports venues should base on the idea of governance,using the rule of law,justice and negotiation to solve the imbalance in renegotiation,directing marketto serve the public bymeansofgovernmentpurchases,guiding functionaltransition ofgovernmentthrough assessment.
This paper focuses on the theoretical base of public-private partnership mode of large sports venues by literature review and survey method. It aims to lay a solid theoretical foundation and clarify the policy orientation for the prosperous public-private partnership mode of large sports venues. Preconditions for Agent-management theory are inconsistency in interests and information asymmetry,the main thrust is that the client will propose a set of excitation and control mechanism to deal with and moral hazards and adverse selection. In our public-private partnership mode there are the coexistence of dislocation interference of government and lack of excitation mechanism,offside operation and lack of regulation,sometimes the interests exchange are beyond the contracts,which fail to employ the public-private partnership mode into our management of large sports venues. The original intention of incomplete contract theory is its incompleteness. Nobody can foresee the future completely;We still cannot take everything into contract. So it is very common for renegotiation,the key point is how to clarify individual rights and which excitation mechanism should be taken. It is obvious that the contracts signed on our large sports venues are not complete. In later renegotiation the government takes the very advantage which leads to imbalance between residual control rights and residual claim,it appears the low-margin business in the operation of large sports venues;the government takes high-power incentive,resulting in over-construction of large sports venues. So the publicprivate partnership mode of large sports venues should base on the idea of governance,using the rule of law,justice and negotiation to solve the imbalance in renegotiation,directing marketto serve the public bymeansofgovernmentpurchases,guiding functionaltransition ofgovernmentthrough assessment.
引文
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[6]郑志强,陶长琪,彭莉,等.我国城市大型体育公共设施供给问题研究:基于非对称信息委托代理模型的分析[J].北京体育大学学报,2012,35(7):1-5.
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[11]陈元欣,王健.体育场馆不同运营模式的税收筹划研究[J].天津体育学院学报,2013,28(5):208-212.
[12]董红刚,易剑东.大型体育场馆的建设逻辑及其出路[J].天津体育学院学报,2014,29(5):394-398.
[13] NORTH D C.A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics[J].The Journal of Theoretical Politics,1990,2(4):355-367.
[14] GROSSMAN S,HART O.The costs and benefits of ownership:A theory of vertical and lateral integration[J].Political Economy,1986,94(1):691-719.
[15] HART O,JOHN M.Property rights and nature of the firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(6):1119-1158.
[16] ISAAC R M,WALKER J.Communication and Free-riding Behavior:The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism[J].Economic Inquiry,1998(26):585-608.
[17] TIMOTHY N C,FEISAL U K. A Laboratory Study of Voluntary Public Goods Provision with Imperfect Monitoring and Communication[J].Journal of Development Economics,1999,958(2):533-552.
[18]屈胜国,屈萍,谢琳,等.公私合作伙伴关系模式在我国公共体育场馆市场化改革中的应用:以广州体育馆为例[J].武汉体育学院学报,2014,48(8):37-43.
[19]雷厉,肖淑红,付群,等.我国大型体育场馆运营管理:模式选择与路径安排[J].北京体育大学学报,2013,36(10):10-15.
[20]徐细雄.参照点契约理论:不完全契约理论的行为与实验拓展[J].外国经济与管理,2012(11):52-60.
[21]李学.不完全契约、交易费用与治理绩效:兼论公共服务的市场化供给模式[J].中国行政管理,2009,25(1):12-16.
[2] WILLIAMSON O E. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism:Firms,Markets,Relational Contracting[M].New York:Free Press,1985:121.
[3]埃克里·弗鲁博顿,鲁道夫·芮切特.新制度经济学:一个交易费用分析范式[M].姜建强,罗长远,译.上海:上海人民出版社,2006:31.
[4]肖淑红,付群,雷厉.大型体育场馆融资模式分类及特征研究[J].北京体育大学学报,2012,35(6):14-18.
[5]杨瑞龙,聂辉华.不完全契约理论:一个综述[J].经济研究,2006(2):12-16.
[6]郑志强,陶长琪,彭莉,等.我国城市大型体育公共设施供给问题研究:基于非对称信息委托代理模型的分析[J].北京体育大学学报,2012,35(7):1-5.
[7] FOSLER R S,BERGER R.Public-private partnership:An opportunity for urban communities[J].Committee Eco Develop,1982,106(3):122-138.
[8] LI M.A tripartite approach to sports facility financing[J].Sport Market Q,1994,3(4):31-45.
[9] SWINDELL D,ROSENTRAUB M S.Who benefits from the presence of professional sports teams?The implications for public funding of stadiums and arenas[J].Public Administra Rev,2007,58:145-155.
[10]聂辉华.新制度经济学中不完全契约理论的分歧与融合:以威廉姆斯和哈特为代表的两种进路[J].中国人民大学学报,2005,18(1):81-87.
[11]陈元欣,王健.体育场馆不同运营模式的税收筹划研究[J].天津体育学院学报,2013,28(5):208-212.
[12]董红刚,易剑东.大型体育场馆的建设逻辑及其出路[J].天津体育学院学报,2014,29(5):394-398.
[13] NORTH D C.A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics[J].The Journal of Theoretical Politics,1990,2(4):355-367.
[14] GROSSMAN S,HART O.The costs and benefits of ownership:A theory of vertical and lateral integration[J].Political Economy,1986,94(1):691-719.
[15] HART O,JOHN M.Property rights and nature of the firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(6):1119-1158.
[16] ISAAC R M,WALKER J.Communication and Free-riding Behavior:The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism[J].Economic Inquiry,1998(26):585-608.
[17] TIMOTHY N C,FEISAL U K. A Laboratory Study of Voluntary Public Goods Provision with Imperfect Monitoring and Communication[J].Journal of Development Economics,1999,958(2):533-552.
[18]屈胜国,屈萍,谢琳,等.公私合作伙伴关系模式在我国公共体育场馆市场化改革中的应用:以广州体育馆为例[J].武汉体育学院学报,2014,48(8):37-43.
[19]雷厉,肖淑红,付群,等.我国大型体育场馆运营管理:模式选择与路径安排[J].北京体育大学学报,2013,36(10):10-15.
[20]徐细雄.参照点契约理论:不完全契约理论的行为与实验拓展[J].外国经济与管理,2012(11):52-60.
[21]李学.不完全契约、交易费用与治理绩效:兼论公共服务的市场化供给模式[J].中国行政管理,2009,25(1):12-16.