基于系统动力学的养老PPP项目政府补偿机制研究
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摘要
科学合理的政府补偿机制是实现养老PPP项目可持续运营的重要保障,补偿机制设计已成为学术界和实践界共同关注的热点问题。在分析政府补偿决策思路和关键影响因素的基础上,基于社会资本利益结构视角,构建政府补偿系统动力学模型,通过模型仿真和敏感性分析,从公众利益、社会资本收益、政府财政支出等方面设计政府补偿机制。结果表明:政府需对项目进行补偿才能使社会资本获得基本投资回报,政府补偿机制设计应综合协调养老机构补偿和价格补偿,以满足政府、社会资本和公众三方利益。
A scientific and reasonable government compensation mechanism is a crucial guarantee for the sustainable operation of pension PPP projects. The design of compensation mechanism has become a hot issue in the academia and practice. Based on the analysis of government compensation decision-making strategies and key influence factors,a government compensation system dynamics model is constructed from the perspective of social capital benefit structure. Through a model simulation and sensitivity analysis,the government compensation mechanism is designed from the aspects of public benefit,social capital return and government fiscal expenditure. The results show that the government needs to compensate the project in order to obtain a basic investment return for the social capital. The design of the government compensation mechanism should comprehensively coordinate with the compensation of the pension institution and price compensation to meet the interests of the government,social capital and the public.
A scientific and reasonable government compensation mechanism is a crucial guarantee for the sustainable operation of pension PPP projects. The design of compensation mechanism has become a hot issue in the academia and practice. Based on the analysis of government compensation decision-making strategies and key influence factors,a government compensation system dynamics model is constructed from the perspective of social capital benefit structure. Through a model simulation and sensitivity analysis,the government compensation mechanism is designed from the aspects of public benefit,social capital return and government fiscal expenditure. The results show that the government needs to compensate the project in order to obtain a basic investment return for the social capital. The design of the government compensation mechanism should comprehensively coordinate with the compensation of the pension institution and price compensation to meet the interests of the government,social capital and the public.
引文
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[16]伍世安,杨青龙.价栺补贴的经济敁应分析[J].经济经纬,2009(5):128-131.
[2]Van Reeven P.Subsidisation of urban public transport and the Mohring Effect[J].Journal of Transport Economics&Policy,2008,42(2):349-359.
[3]Oxley M.Supply-side subsidies for affordable rental housing[J].International Encyclopedia of Housing&Home,2012,81(s1):75-80.
[4]Leung C K Y,Sarp?a S,Yilmaz K.Public housing units vs.housing vouchers:Accessibility,local public goods,and welfare[J].Journal of Housing Economics,2012,21(4):310-321.
[5]Opawole A,Jagboro GO.Compensation mechanisms for minimizing private party risks in concession-based public private partnership contracts[J].International Journal of Building Pathology and Adaptation,2018,36(1):93-120.
[6]陈晓红,郭佩含.基于实物期权的PPP项目政府补偿机制研究[J].软科学,2016,30(6):26-29.
[7]吴孝灵,周晶,彭以忱,等.基于公私博弈的PPP项目政府补偿机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2013(S1):198-204.
[8]高颖,张水波,冯卓.不完全合约下PPP项目的运营期延长决策机制[J].管理科学学报,2014(2):48-57,94.
[9]曹启龙,盛昭瀚,周晶.激励视角下PPP项目补贴方式研究[J].科技管理研究,2016,36(14):228-233.
[10]王卓甫,侯嫚嫚,丁继勇.公益性PPP项目特许期与政府补贴机制设计[J].科技管理研究,2017(18):194-201.
[11]刘峰,袁竞峰,等.基于风险偏好的城市轨道交通PPP项目补偿机制研究[J].项目管理技术,2018,16(8):19-25.
[12]Wibowo A.Valuing guarantees in a BOT infrastructure project[J].Engineering Construction&Architectural Management,2004,11(6):395-403.
[13]Jaebum Jun.Appraisal of combined agreements in BOTproject finance:Focused on minimum revenue guarantee and revenue cap agreements[J].International Journal of Strategic Property Management,2010,14(2):139-155.
[14]王其藩.系统动力学的方法论及其収展展望[J].未来与収展,1984(4):55-58.
[15]向鹏成,蒋飞.基于风险分担的城市轨道PPP项目收益补贴调整模型[J].建筑经济,2016(2):45-50.
[16]伍世安,杨青龙.价栺补贴的经济敁应分析[J].经济经纬,2009(5):128-131.