零售商公平偏好下两周期供应链的信息分享策略研究
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摘要
本文通过建立具有公平偏好行为的零售商和公平中性的制造商组成的两周期供应链动态博弈模型,旨在探讨两周期供应链中具有公平偏好行为的零售商的信息分享策略对制造商和零售商决策的影响。研究表明:(1)零售商的最优策略是两周期均不向制造商分享信息;而对制造商来讲,零售商选择两周期均分享信息策略,制造商可以获得最高的效用;(2)零售商的公平偏好行为对自身有利,单位公平偏好系数对零售商效用的影响大于信息精确度对零售商效用的影响;(3)若零售商向制造商分享信息,则增加信息精确度可以弥补零售商公平偏好行为对制造商带来的损失。
Information sharing strategies of the retailer with fairness preference affect the decision-making of enterprises in the supply chain.Therefore,we establish two-period supply chain dynamic game model which is composed of fairness preference retailer and fair neutral manufacturer to explore the influence of information sharing strategies of the retailer on the decision-making of the manufacturer and the retailer.We find that:(1)the optimal strategy of the retailer is not to share information with the manufacturer in two-period.However,the manufacturer gets the highest utility when the retailer chooses the strategy of sharing information in two-period;(2)the fairness preference is beneficial to the retailer,and the effect of the unit fairness preference coefficient on utility of the retailer is greater than that of the information accuracy on utility of the retailer;(3)when the retailer shares information with the manufacturer,increasing the accuracy of information makes up for the loss of fairness preference to the manufacturer.
Information sharing strategies of the retailer with fairness preference affect the decision-making of enterprises in the supply chain.Therefore,we establish two-period supply chain dynamic game model which is composed of fairness preference retailer and fair neutral manufacturer to explore the influence of information sharing strategies of the retailer on the decision-making of the manufacturer and the retailer.We find that:(1)the optimal strategy of the retailer is not to share information with the manufacturer in two-period.However,the manufacturer gets the highest utility when the retailer chooses the strategy of sharing information in two-period;(2)the fairness preference is beneficial to the retailer,and the effect of the unit fairness preference coefficient on utility of the retailer is greater than that of the information accuracy on utility of the retailer;(3)when the retailer shares information with the manufacturer,increasing the accuracy of information makes up for the loss of fairness preference to the manufacturer.
引文
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[14]邹清明,叶广宇.考虑公平关切的双向双渠道闭环供应链的定价决策[J].系统管理学报,2018,27(2):281～290.
[15]杜建国,窦品品,赵刘威.零售商的风险规避特性和公平偏好对绿色供应链运作的影响[J].工业技术经济,2017,(7):3～9.
[16]张红,黄嘉敏,崔琰琰.考虑政府补贴下具有公平偏好的绿色供应链博弈模型及契约协调研究[J].工业技术经济,2018,37(1):111～121.
[2]Keifer S.Beyond Point of Sale:Leveraging Demand Signals for Forecasting[J].Journal of Business Forecasting,2010,29(2):14～22.
[3]Tversky A,Kahneman D.Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions[J].Journal of Business,1986,59(4):251～248.
[4]Fehr E,Schmidt K M.A Theory of Fairness,Competition,and Cooperation[M].University of Munich,Department of Economics,1999:817～868.
[5]Li L.Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with Horizontal Competition[J].Management Science,2002,48(9):1196～1212.
[6]Ha A Y,Tong S,Zhang H.Sharing Demand Information in Competing Supply Chains with Production Diseconomies[J].Mathematics of Operations Research,2011,57(3):566～581.
[7]聂佳佳.预测信息分享对制造商开通直销渠道的影响[J].管理工程学报,2012,26(2):106～112.
[8]王文宾,丁军飞.零售商信息分享对制造商绿色产品设计的影响研究[J].科技管理研究,2018,38(22):200～207.
[9]罗春林,毛小兵,田歆.网络平台销售模式中的需求信息分享策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(8):149～157.
[10]Huang Y,Wang Z.Information Sharing in a Closed-loop Supply Chain with Technology Licensing[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2017,191:113～127.
[11]杜少甫,杜婵,梁樑,等.考虑公平关切的供应链契约与协调[J].管理科学学报,2010,13(11):41～48.
[12]姚锋敏,滕春贤.公平关切下零售商主导的闭环供应链决策模型[J].控制与决策,2017,32(1):117～123.
[13]王玉燕,李璟.公平关切下基于网络平台销售、回收的E-闭环供应链的主导模式研究[J].中国管理科学,2018,(1):139～151.
[14]邹清明,叶广宇.考虑公平关切的双向双渠道闭环供应链的定价决策[J].系统管理学报,2018,27(2):281～290.
[15]杜建国,窦品品,赵刘威.零售商的风险规避特性和公平偏好对绿色供应链运作的影响[J].工业技术经济,2017,(7):3～9.
[16]张红,黄嘉敏,崔琰琰.考虑政府补贴下具有公平偏好的绿色供应链博弈模型及契约协调研究[J].工业技术经济,2018,37(1):111～121.