配电放开政策下增量配电业务多方投资主体利益分析
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摘要
长期以来,中国的配电网只能由电网企业投资运营,配电网建设滞后于输变电网发展步伐。历史欠账造成的低水平配电网已经成为电力供给的瓶颈,也严重制约了电力系统的升级和新技术的应用。增量配电投资业务放开,成为本轮电力体制改革最受关注的环节之一。有序放开配电网业务将打破垄断、改变部分地区配电网建设缓慢的现状,并使包括民企在内的各类社会资本充分参与,分享改革红利。但由于增量配电业务投资存在多方主体,政策背后的利益博弈激烈,从执行过程来看,各主体之间的利益矛盾逐渐暴露。因此,分析增量配电业务各投资主体利益,并解决其中的利益矛盾对于探索社会资本投资配电业务的有效途径,促进增量配电政策的顺畅实施很有必要。论文采用利益分析框架,指出目前各投资主体之间存在的利益矛盾并找出导致政策执行不畅的影响因素,最后分别对政府相关部门、国家电网公司、社会资本企业三方主体提出了完善我国增量配电政策的对策建议。
For a long time,China's power distribution network can only be invested and operated by power grid enterprises. China ' s power distribution network lags behind the pace of transmission grid development. The low-level distribution network caused by historical debts has become the bottleneck of power supply,and also severely restricted the upgrading of power systems and the application of new technologies. The release of incremental distribution investment business is one of the most concerned aspects during the power market reform. The orderly openning-up of the distribution network business will break the monopoly and change the current status of distribution network construction in some areas. The full participation of various types of social capital,including private enterprises,will be made to share the reform dividends. However,the interest game behind the polices is fierce because of many entities in the incremental power distribution business investment,and the interest conflicts among these entities are gradually exposed during the implementation of these polices. Therefore,it is necessary to analyze the interests of various investment entities and solve their interest conflicts in the incremental distribution network business,which is conductive to explore effective ways for social capital to invest in distribution network business,and promote the smooth implementation of the relevant policies. The paper points out the intetest confilts among the current stakeholders and finds out the influence factors for poor implementation from the view of benefit analysis. Finally,the countermeasures and suggestions are proposed to improve China's incremental power distribution policy respectively for the three main bodies of relevant government departments,State Grid Corporation and social capital enterprises.
For a long time,China's power distribution network can only be invested and operated by power grid enterprises. China ' s power distribution network lags behind the pace of transmission grid development. The low-level distribution network caused by historical debts has become the bottleneck of power supply,and also severely restricted the upgrading of power systems and the application of new technologies. The release of incremental distribution investment business is one of the most concerned aspects during the power market reform. The orderly openning-up of the distribution network business will break the monopoly and change the current status of distribution network construction in some areas. The full participation of various types of social capital,including private enterprises,will be made to share the reform dividends. However,the interest game behind the polices is fierce because of many entities in the incremental power distribution business investment,and the interest conflicts among these entities are gradually exposed during the implementation of these polices. Therefore,it is necessary to analyze the interests of various investment entities and solve their interest conflicts in the incremental distribution network business,which is conductive to explore effective ways for social capital to invest in distribution network business,and promote the smooth implementation of the relevant policies. The paper points out the intetest confilts among the current stakeholders and finds out the influence factors for poor implementation from the view of benefit analysis. Finally,the countermeasures and suggestions are proposed to improve China's incremental power distribution policy respectively for the three main bodies of relevant government departments,State Grid Corporation and social capital enterprises.
引文
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[11]王文嫣.增量配电首批试点或不允许电网绝对控股[N].上海证券报,2017-09-07(007).
[2]马倩,王琛,李扬,王喆,周磊.增量配电业务放开下电网企业投资风险分析[J].电力建设,2017(9):139-144.
[3]曾惠娟,刘雪松,陈巍巍.增量配电投资放开迷雾几许[J].国家电网,2017(3):58-63.
[4]晓宇.首批增量配电业务改革试点项目确定[J].经济研究参考,2017(12):27-28.
[5]陈庆云.公共政策分析[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2006.
[6]张晨.售电放开政策下电力交易多方主体利益分析模型研究[D].北京:华北电力大学,2016.
[7]王文嫣.电改切出增量配电蛋糕国网公司有心抢食[N].上海证券报,2016-12-06(007).
[8]侯佳,吴志力,崔凯.放开增量配电投资业务关键问题研究综述[J].电力建设,2017(9):127-131.
[9]徐晓文.构建我国自然垄断产业的特许投标制度体系[D].成都:西南财经大学,2005.
[10]张立刚,叶凯,王彦强.混合所有制改革形势下增量配电公司组建策略[J].中国电力企业管理,2017(7):58-59.
[11]王文嫣.增量配电首批试点或不允许电网绝对控股[N].上海证券报,2017-09-07(007).