财务柔性与企业绩效的动态关系——基于融资约束与代理成本的调节效应分析
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摘要
财务柔性在为企业创造有利机会的同时,也带来了投资不经济、持有成本和协调困难,因此它对企业绩效的影响效应可能是非线性的。基于2006—2016年沪深两市非金融上市公司的数据,本文研究发现,财务柔性与企业绩效之间呈倒U型关系,表现为先增长、后下降的变化趋势。此外,考察融资约束和代理成本对于财务柔性与企业绩效之间关系的调节作用。分析结果显示,融资约束越高,财务柔性对绩效的促进效果越明显;代理成本弱化了财务柔性与企业绩效的曲线关系。进一步的中介效应检验结果表明,财务柔性部分地通过增加投资支出而间接影响企业绩效,投资支出在两者之间起着非线性中介作用。
Previous studies reveal the positive effect of financial flexibility on corporate performance during financial crisis,but neglect its detrimental impact.This paper proposes that financial flexibility fosters favorable investment opportunities,along with investment dis-economies,holding costs and coordination difficulties,so it may have a nonlinear effect on corporate performance.Based on the data of non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Securities Markets from 2006 to 2016,this study indicates that the relationship between financial flexibility and corporate performance is inverted U-shaped,showing a trend of first increase and then decrease.Meanwhile,the moderating effect of financing constraint and agency cost on the relationship between financial flexibility and firm performance are also examined.The results show that high financing constraint strengthens the positive effect of financial flexibility on corporate performance,and the positive and negative effects of financial flexibility become more attenuated when the agency problem is severe.The further indirection analysis results show that financial flexibility partially affects corporate performance through investment expenditure.
Previous studies reveal the positive effect of financial flexibility on corporate performance during financial crisis,but neglect its detrimental impact.This paper proposes that financial flexibility fosters favorable investment opportunities,along with investment dis-economies,holding costs and coordination difficulties,so it may have a nonlinear effect on corporate performance.Based on the data of non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Securities Markets from 2006 to 2016,this study indicates that the relationship between financial flexibility and corporate performance is inverted U-shaped,showing a trend of first increase and then decrease.Meanwhile,the moderating effect of financing constraint and agency cost on the relationship between financial flexibility and firm performance are also examined.The results show that high financing constraint strengthens the positive effect of financial flexibility on corporate performance,and the positive and negative effects of financial flexibility become more attenuated when the agency problem is severe.The further indirection analysis results show that financial flexibility partially affects corporate performance through investment expenditure.
引文
[1]GRAHAM J R.How big are the tax benefits of debt?[J].The Journal of Finance,2000,55(5):1901-1941.
[2]BANCEL F,MITTOO U R.Cross-country determinants of capital structure choice:a survey of European firms[J].Financial Management,2004,33(4):103-132.
[3]BROUNEN D,DE JONG A,KOEDIJK K.Corporate finance in Europe:confronting theory with practice[J].Financial Management,2004,33(4):71-101.
[4]DEANGELO H,DEANGELO L.Capital structure,payout policy,and financial flexibility[Z].Marshall School of Business Working Paper No.FBE 02-06,2007.
[5]GRAHAM J R,HARVEY C R.The theory and practice of corporate finance:evidence from the field[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2001,60(2-3):187-243.
[6]BYOUN S.Financial flexibility and capital structure decision[Z].Baylor University Working paper,2011.
[7]ARSLAN-AYAYDIN O,FLORACKIS C,OZKAN A.Financial flexibility,corporate investment and performance:evidence from financial crises[J].Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,2014,42(2):211-250.
[8]曾爱民,张纯,魏志华.金融危机冲击、财务柔性储备与企业投资行为——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2012(4):107-120.
[9]OPLER T,PINKOWITZ L,STULZ R,et al.The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999,52(1):3-46.
[10]ALMEIDA H,CAMPELLO M,WEISBACH M S.The cash flow sensitivity of cash[J].The Journal of Finance,2004,59(4):1777-1804.
[11]MARCHICA M,MURA R.Financial flexibility,investment ability,and firm value:evidence from firms with spare debt capacity[J].Financial Management,2010,39(4):1339-1365.
[12]ODED J.Payout policy,financial flexibility,and agency costs of free cash flow[Z].Tel Aviv University Working Paper,2017.
[13]GAMBA A,TRIANTIS A.The value of financial flexibility[J].The Journal of Finance,2008,63(5):2263-2296.
[14]陈红兵,连玉君.财务弹性对企业投资水平和投资效率的影响[J].经济管理,2013(10):109-118.
[15]KUSNADI Y.Do corporate governance mechanisms matter for cash holdings and firm value?[J].Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,2011,19(5):554-570.
[16]何瑛,张大伟.管理者特质、负债融资与企业价值[J].会计研究,2015(8):65-72,97.
[17]陆正飞,韩非池.宏观经济政策如何影响公司现金持有的经济效应?——基于产品市场和资本市场两重角度的研究[J].管理世界,2013(6):43-60.
[18]DUCHIN R,OZBAS O,SENSOY B A.Costly external finance,corporate investment,and the subprime mortgage credit crisis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,97(3):418-435.
[19]DENIS D J,SIBILKOV V.Financial constraints,investment,and the value of cash holdings[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(1):247-269.
[20]AIVAZIAN V A,GE Y,QIU J.The impact of leverage on firm investment:Canadian evidence[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2005,11(1-2):277-291.
[21]张会丽,陆正飞.现金分布、公司治理与过度投资——基于我国上市公司及其子公司的现金持有状况的考察[J].管理世界,2012(3):141-150,188.
[22]PINKOWITZ L,STULZ R,WILLIAMSON R.Does the contribution of corporate cash holdings and dividends to firm value depend on governance?A cross-country analysis[J].The Journal of Finance,2006,61(6):2725-2751.
[23]LIU Y,MAUER D C.Corporate cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2011,102(1):183-198.
[24]王亮亮,王跃堂.企业研发投入与资本结构选择——基于非债务税盾视角的分析[J].中国工业经济,2015(11):125-140.
[25]RUDD J M,GREENLEY G E,BEATSON A,et al.Strategic planning and performance:extending the debate[J].Journal of Business Research,2008,61(2):99-108.
[26]CAMPELLO M,GRAHAM J R,HARVEY C R.The real effects of financial constraints:evidence from a financial crisis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,97(3):470-487.
[27]FAULKENDER M,WANG R.Corporate financial policy and the value of cash[J].The Journal of Finance,2006,61(4):1957-1990.
[28]王彦超.融资约束、现金持有与过度投资[J].金融研究,2009(7):121-133.
[29]MALMENDIER U,TATE G.Who makes acquisitions?CEO overconfidence and the market’s reaction[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,89(1):20-43.
[30]DITTMAR A,MAHRT-SMITH J.Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,83(3):599-634.
[31]HARFORD J,KLASA S,MAXWELL W F.Refinancing risk and cash holdings[J].The Journal of Finance,2014,69(3):975-1012.
[32]JENSEN M C.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers[J].The American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[33]RICHARDSON S.Over-investment of free cash flow[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2006,11(2-3):159-189.
[34]姜付秀,张敏,陆正飞,等.管理者过度自信、企业扩张与财务困境[J].经济研究,2009(1):131-143.
[35]CLAESSENS S,DJANKOV S,LANG L H P.The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1-2):81-112.
[36]KAPLAN S N,ZINGALES L.Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful measures of financing constraints?[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1997,112(1):169-215.
[37]魏志华,曾爱民,李博.金融生态环境与企业融资约束——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2014(5):73-80,95.
[38]HADLOCK C J,PIERCE J R.New evidence on measuring financial constraints:moving beyond the KZ index[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(5):1909-1940.
[39]LIND J T,MEHLUM H.With or without U?The appropriate test for a U-shaped relationship[J].Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics,2010,72(1):109-118.
[40]HAANS R F J,PIETERS C,HE Z.Thinking about U:theorizing and testing U-and inverted U-shaped relationships in strategy research[J].Strategic Management Journal,2016,37(7):1177-1195.
[41]ZWIEBEL J.Dynamic capital structure under managerial entrenchment[J].The American Economic Review,1996,86(5):1197-1215.
[42]A PORTA R,LOPEZ-DE-SILANES,SHLEIFER A,et al.Investor protection and corporate valuation[J].The Journal of Finance,2002,57(3):1147-1170.
[43]姜付秀,王运通,田园,等.多个大股东与企业融资约束——基于文本分析的经验证据[J].管理世界,2017(12):61-74.
[44]WESTPHAL J D.Collaboration in the boardroom:behavioral and performance consequences of CEO-board social ties[J].Academy of Management Journal,1999,42(1):7-24.
(1)调节变量影响倒U型或U型关系的效应有两种:拐点的变化和曲线斜率的变化。曲线斜率以及拐点的单独和同时的显著性变化都可作为调节变量发挥作用的依据。
(2)本文分别选取样本数据的50分位数以及三分之二,即67分位数作为融资约束企业的判定阈值。
(3)由于使用包含TobinQ在内的五个指标构建了KZ指数,为避免共线性问题,在检验融资约束的调节作用时,控制变量中不再包含TobinQ。
(4)与管理费用率不同,资产周转率是衡量代理成本的反向指标。资产周转率越高,企业代理成本越低。因此,资产周转率正向调节了财务柔性对企业绩效的影响,即资产周转率越高,财务柔性对企业绩效的积极作用越明显。在高资产周转率的情况下,财务柔性与绩效的倒U型曲线拐点右移,形状更加平缓。
(5)为保证稳健性,分别用KZ1和KZ2按照1∶1、1∶2最近邻匹配法对样本进行配对。
[2]BANCEL F,MITTOO U R.Cross-country determinants of capital structure choice:a survey of European firms[J].Financial Management,2004,33(4):103-132.
[3]BROUNEN D,DE JONG A,KOEDIJK K.Corporate finance in Europe:confronting theory with practice[J].Financial Management,2004,33(4):71-101.
[4]DEANGELO H,DEANGELO L.Capital structure,payout policy,and financial flexibility[Z].Marshall School of Business Working Paper No.FBE 02-06,2007.
[5]GRAHAM J R,HARVEY C R.The theory and practice of corporate finance:evidence from the field[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2001,60(2-3):187-243.
[6]BYOUN S.Financial flexibility and capital structure decision[Z].Baylor University Working paper,2011.
[7]ARSLAN-AYAYDIN O,FLORACKIS C,OZKAN A.Financial flexibility,corporate investment and performance:evidence from financial crises[J].Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,2014,42(2):211-250.
[8]曾爱民,张纯,魏志华.金融危机冲击、财务柔性储备与企业投资行为——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2012(4):107-120.
[9]OPLER T,PINKOWITZ L,STULZ R,et al.The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999,52(1):3-46.
[10]ALMEIDA H,CAMPELLO M,WEISBACH M S.The cash flow sensitivity of cash[J].The Journal of Finance,2004,59(4):1777-1804.
[11]MARCHICA M,MURA R.Financial flexibility,investment ability,and firm value:evidence from firms with spare debt capacity[J].Financial Management,2010,39(4):1339-1365.
[12]ODED J.Payout policy,financial flexibility,and agency costs of free cash flow[Z].Tel Aviv University Working Paper,2017.
[13]GAMBA A,TRIANTIS A.The value of financial flexibility[J].The Journal of Finance,2008,63(5):2263-2296.
[14]陈红兵,连玉君.财务弹性对企业投资水平和投资效率的影响[J].经济管理,2013(10):109-118.
[15]KUSNADI Y.Do corporate governance mechanisms matter for cash holdings and firm value?[J].Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,2011,19(5):554-570.
[16]何瑛,张大伟.管理者特质、负债融资与企业价值[J].会计研究,2015(8):65-72,97.
[17]陆正飞,韩非池.宏观经济政策如何影响公司现金持有的经济效应?——基于产品市场和资本市场两重角度的研究[J].管理世界,2013(6):43-60.
[18]DUCHIN R,OZBAS O,SENSOY B A.Costly external finance,corporate investment,and the subprime mortgage credit crisis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,97(3):418-435.
[19]DENIS D J,SIBILKOV V.Financial constraints,investment,and the value of cash holdings[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(1):247-269.
[20]AIVAZIAN V A,GE Y,QIU J.The impact of leverage on firm investment:Canadian evidence[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2005,11(1-2):277-291.
[21]张会丽,陆正飞.现金分布、公司治理与过度投资——基于我国上市公司及其子公司的现金持有状况的考察[J].管理世界,2012(3):141-150,188.
[22]PINKOWITZ L,STULZ R,WILLIAMSON R.Does the contribution of corporate cash holdings and dividends to firm value depend on governance?A cross-country analysis[J].The Journal of Finance,2006,61(6):2725-2751.
[23]LIU Y,MAUER D C.Corporate cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2011,102(1):183-198.
[24]王亮亮,王跃堂.企业研发投入与资本结构选择——基于非债务税盾视角的分析[J].中国工业经济,2015(11):125-140.
[25]RUDD J M,GREENLEY G E,BEATSON A,et al.Strategic planning and performance:extending the debate[J].Journal of Business Research,2008,61(2):99-108.
[26]CAMPELLO M,GRAHAM J R,HARVEY C R.The real effects of financial constraints:evidence from a financial crisis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,97(3):470-487.
[27]FAULKENDER M,WANG R.Corporate financial policy and the value of cash[J].The Journal of Finance,2006,61(4):1957-1990.
[28]王彦超.融资约束、现金持有与过度投资[J].金融研究,2009(7):121-133.
[29]MALMENDIER U,TATE G.Who makes acquisitions?CEO overconfidence and the market’s reaction[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,89(1):20-43.
[30]DITTMAR A,MAHRT-SMITH J.Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,83(3):599-634.
[31]HARFORD J,KLASA S,MAXWELL W F.Refinancing risk and cash holdings[J].The Journal of Finance,2014,69(3):975-1012.
[32]JENSEN M C.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers[J].The American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[33]RICHARDSON S.Over-investment of free cash flow[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2006,11(2-3):159-189.
[34]姜付秀,张敏,陆正飞,等.管理者过度自信、企业扩张与财务困境[J].经济研究,2009(1):131-143.
[35]CLAESSENS S,DJANKOV S,LANG L H P.The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1-2):81-112.
[36]KAPLAN S N,ZINGALES L.Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful measures of financing constraints?[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1997,112(1):169-215.
[37]魏志华,曾爱民,李博.金融生态环境与企业融资约束——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2014(5):73-80,95.
[38]HADLOCK C J,PIERCE J R.New evidence on measuring financial constraints:moving beyond the KZ index[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(5):1909-1940.
[39]LIND J T,MEHLUM H.With or without U?The appropriate test for a U-shaped relationship[J].Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics,2010,72(1):109-118.
[40]HAANS R F J,PIETERS C,HE Z.Thinking about U:theorizing and testing U-and inverted U-shaped relationships in strategy research[J].Strategic Management Journal,2016,37(7):1177-1195.
[41]ZWIEBEL J.Dynamic capital structure under managerial entrenchment[J].The American Economic Review,1996,86(5):1197-1215.
[42]A PORTA R,LOPEZ-DE-SILANES,SHLEIFER A,et al.Investor protection and corporate valuation[J].The Journal of Finance,2002,57(3):1147-1170.
[43]姜付秀,王运通,田园,等.多个大股东与企业融资约束——基于文本分析的经验证据[J].管理世界,2017(12):61-74.
[44]WESTPHAL J D.Collaboration in the boardroom:behavioral and performance consequences of CEO-board social ties[J].Academy of Management Journal,1999,42(1):7-24.
(1)调节变量影响倒U型或U型关系的效应有两种:拐点的变化和曲线斜率的变化。曲线斜率以及拐点的单独和同时的显著性变化都可作为调节变量发挥作用的依据。
(2)本文分别选取样本数据的50分位数以及三分之二,即67分位数作为融资约束企业的判定阈值。
(3)由于使用包含TobinQ在内的五个指标构建了KZ指数,为避免共线性问题,在检验融资约束的调节作用时,控制变量中不再包含TobinQ。
(4)与管理费用率不同,资产周转率是衡量代理成本的反向指标。资产周转率越高,企业代理成本越低。因此,资产周转率正向调节了财务柔性对企业绩效的影响,即资产周转率越高,财务柔性对企业绩效的积极作用越明显。在高资产周转率的情况下,财务柔性与绩效的倒U型曲线拐点右移,形状更加平缓。
(5)为保证稳健性,分别用KZ1和KZ2按照1∶1、1∶2最近邻匹配法对样本进行配对。