企业外包关系风险来源及控制对策
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  • 作者:贾景姿 ; 宋华 ; 曾鸣
  • 关键词:代理理论 ; 外包关系 ; 关系风险 ; 风险控制
  • 中文刊名:JYGU
  • 英文刊名:Management and Administration
  • 机构:华北电力大学;中国人民大学商学院;
  • 出版日期:2019-04-15
  • 出版单位:经营与管理
  • 年:2019
  • 期:No.418
  • 基金:海南省自然科学基金〈批准号:717106〉
  • 语种:中文;
  • 页:JYGU201904036
  • 页数:4
  • CN:04
  • ISSN:12-1034/F
  • 分类号:117-120
摘要
外包在经济领域内已成为一种越来越普遍的外部资源获取手段,因此如何管理外包中的特定关系风险、促进外包成功,成为当前研究的重点。基于代理理论,阐述外包关系风险的形成来源,分析外包关系风险的四种控制模式及其适用条件和相互之间的关系,为企业在不同状况下控制外包关系风险,提出应对策略建议。
        
引文
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