全球视角下中国葡萄酒税收政策改革的经济与福利效应——基于可计算局部均衡模型的研究
|
摘要
近年来,对中国葡萄酒行业进行税收政策改革呼声日高,然而没有文献对开放经济条件下其潜在经济影响做深入分析。本文基于可计算局部均衡模型和2016年全球葡萄酒生产与消费现状,重点从行业层面考察中国葡萄酒税收政策改革的经济与福利效应。模拟结果表明:第一,葡萄酒税收政策改革的产出与价格效应明显,中国葡萄酒产量年均将增加16.7%,生产者价格上升9.5%,而消费者价格下降15.6%,内销量增加22.9%。第二,葡萄酒税收政策改革将导致澳大利亚、智利等同中国签署自由贸易协定的国家葡萄酒对华出口量大幅增加,中国葡萄酒行业面临更大的市场竞争。第三,葡萄酒行业进行税收政策改革不仅可提高中国葡萄酒生产者与消费者福利水平,而且社会净福利水平也会增加;其中,葡萄酒消费者福利水平年增加近20.3亿美元,葡萄酒生产者福利水平年增加6.9亿美元,中国社会净福利水平年增加4.7亿美元。本文不仅可为中国葡萄酒税收政策改革提供理论与现实依据,也为专家学者研究产业政策的经济与福利效应提供了一个有力的分析工具。
In recent years, there has been a growing demand for tax reform in China's wine industry. However, very few in-depth analyses can be found on its potential economic and welfare impacts. Using a computable partial equilibrium model and data on the global wine production and consumption in 2016, this article estimates the economic and welfare effects of China's wine tax reform at the industry level from a global perspective. The simulation results show that, first of all, the elimination of consumption tax and the reduction of value-added tax will greatly reduce the tax burden of Chinese wine enterprises, the wine production in China will increase by 16.7% annually, the producer price will increase by 9.5%, while the consumer price will fall by 15.6%, and the domestic sales will increase by 22.9%. The output and price effect of tax reform is obvious. Secondly, the tax reform in the wine industry will lead to a significant increase in wine exports from Australia, Chile and other countries that have signed free trade agreements with China, and the Chinese wine industry will face greater market competition. Thirdly, tax adjustments in the wine industry can not only improve the welfare level of Chinese wine producers and consumers, but also increase the social net welfare level. Chinese consumers will be the biggest beneficiaries and their welfare level will increase by nearly 2.03 billion US dollars annually. The welfare level of Chinese wine producers and the social net welfare level will increase by 690 million US dollars and 470 million US dollars annually, respectively. This study can not only provide theoretical and practical basis for China's wine tax reform, but also provide an analytical tool for experts to study the economic and welfare effects of industrial policies.
In recent years, there has been a growing demand for tax reform in China's wine industry. However, very few in-depth analyses can be found on its potential economic and welfare impacts. Using a computable partial equilibrium model and data on the global wine production and consumption in 2016, this article estimates the economic and welfare effects of China's wine tax reform at the industry level from a global perspective. The simulation results show that, first of all, the elimination of consumption tax and the reduction of value-added tax will greatly reduce the tax burden of Chinese wine enterprises, the wine production in China will increase by 16.7% annually, the producer price will increase by 9.5%, while the consumer price will fall by 15.6%, and the domestic sales will increase by 22.9%. The output and price effect of tax reform is obvious. Secondly, the tax reform in the wine industry will lead to a significant increase in wine exports from Australia, Chile and other countries that have signed free trade agreements with China, and the Chinese wine industry will face greater market competition. Thirdly, tax adjustments in the wine industry can not only improve the welfare level of Chinese wine producers and consumers, but also increase the social net welfare level. Chinese consumers will be the biggest beneficiaries and their welfare level will increase by nearly 2.03 billion US dollars annually. The welfare level of Chinese wine producers and the social net welfare level will increase by 690 million US dollars and 470 million US dollars annually, respectively. This study can not only provide theoretical and practical basis for China's wine tax reform, but also provide an analytical tool for experts to study the economic and welfare effects of industrial policies.
引文
1.陈勇兵、陈小鸿、曹亮、李兵,2014:《中国进口需求弹性的估算》,《世界经济》第2期。
2.陈晓光,2013:《增值税有效税率差异与效率损失--兼议对“营改增”的启示》,《中国社会科学》第8期。
3.曹越、李晶,2016:《“营改增”是否降低了流转税税负:来自中国上市公司的证据》,《财贸经济》第11期。
4.董晓远,2008:《反倾销与产业损害预警评估模型》,北京:社会科学文献出版社。
5.冯宗宪、向洪金,2010:《欧美对华反倾销的经济效应:理论与实证研究》,《世界经济》第3期。
6.高梦蔚,2013:《葡萄酒企业微观税负实证研究--基于A股上市公司面板数据》,西南财经大学。
7.李荣林、鲁晓东,2006:《中日韩自由贸易区的贸易流量和福利效应分析:一个局部均衡的校准方法》,《数量经济技术经济研究》第11期。
8.聂辉华、方明月、李涛,2009:《增值税转型对企业行为和绩效的影响--以东北地区为例》,《管理世界》第5期。
9.裴长洪、杨志勇、田侃、徐振宇《中国农副产品深加工业发展政策研究》,工业与信息化部研究报告,2010年。
10.平新乔、梁爽、郝朝艳,2009:《增值税与营业税的福利效应研究》,《经济研究》第9期。
11.申广军、陈斌开、杨汝岱,2016:《减税能否提振中国经济?--基于中国增值税改革的实证研究》,《经济研究》第1期。
12.向洪金、赖明勇,2012:《我国白羽肉鸡产品反倾销措施的产业救济效果与福利效应研究》,《产业经济研究》,2012年第2期。
13.向洪金、赖明勇,2013:《全球视角下美国对华光伏产品“双反”案的经济效应研究》,《世界经济》第4期。
14.周黎安、陈烨,2005:《中国农村税费改革的政策效果:基于双重差分模型的估计》,《经济研究》第8期。
15.Amir,H.,and J.Asafu-Adjaye,Ducpham,T.2013,“The Impact of the Indonesian Income Tax Reform:A CGEAnalysis”,Economic Modelling,31:492-501.
16.Bagwell,K.,and R.W.Staiger,2012,“The Economics of Trade Agreements in the Linear Cournot Delegation Model”,Journal of International Economics,88(1):32-46.
17.Balistreri,J.,H.Hillberry,and F.Rutherford,2011,“Structural Estimation and Solution of International Trade Models with Heterogeneous Firms”,Journal of International Economics,83(2):95-108.
18.Bown,P.,and A.Crowley,2007,“Trade Deflection and Trade Depression”,Journal of International Economics,72:176-201.
19.Choi,Y.,H.Hirata,and S.Kim,2017,“Tax Reform in Japan:Is it Welfare-enhancing?”Japan and the World Economy,42:12-22.
20.Dixit,A.K,and J.E.Stiglitz,1977,“Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity”,American Economic Review,67:297-308.
21.Francois,J.and H.Hall,1997,“Partial Equilibrium Modeling”,in Francois and Reinert,Ads,Applied Methods for Trade Policy Analysis,Cambridge University Press.
22.Francois,J.and H.Hall,2003,“Global Simulation Analysis of Industry-Level Trade Policy”,Word Bank Mimeo.
23.Francois,J.and H.Hall,2007,“An Extended Global Simulation Model:Analysis of Tariffs&Anti-Dumping Policy Impacts on Prices,Output,Incomes,and Employment”,World Bank Mimeo.
24.Fujiwara,K.,2014,“Pareto-improving tariff-tax reforms under imperfect competition”,International Review of Economics&Finance,31:12-20.
25.Xiang,H.J.,Y.X.Kuang,and C.H.Li,2017,“Impact of the China-Australia FTA on Global Coal Production and Trade”,Journal of Policy Modeling,39:65-78.
26.Keen,M.,and J.E.Ligthart,2005,“Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition”,Review of International Economics,13:385-390.
27.Kim,S.H.and M.A.Kose,2014,“Welfare Implications of Trade Liberalization and Fiscal Reform:a Quantitative Experiment”,Journal of International Economics,92:198-209.
28.Krugman,P.,1980,“Scale Economies,Product Differentiation,and the Pattern of Trade”,The American Economic Review,70(5):950-959.
29.Li Chunding and J.Whalley,2014,“China's Potential Future Growth and Gains from Trade Policy Bargaining:Some Numerical Simulation Results”,Economic Modelling,37:65-78.
30.Nelson,P.,1997,“Economic and Demographic Factors in U.S.Alcohol Demand:A Growth-accounting Analysis”,Empirical Economics,22(1):83-102.
31.Nelson,P.,2013,“Does Heavy Drinking by Adults Respond to Higher Alcohol Prices and Taxes?A Survey and Assessment”,Economic Analysis and Policy,43:265-291.
32.Németh,G.,L.Szabó,and C.Juan-Carlos,2011,“Estimation of Armington Elasticities in a CGEEconomy-energy-environment Model for Europe”,Economic Modelling,28(4):1993-1999.
33.Oczkowski,E.,2014,“Modelling the Demand and Supply Determinants of Australian Wine Grapes”,The Economic Society of Australia,33(1):1-12.
34.Pan,S.,C.Fang,and J.Malaga,2006,“Alcoholic Beverage Consumption in China:A Censored Demand System Approach”,Applied Economics Letters,13(15):975-979.
35.Reinert,A.,and W.Roland-Holst,1992,“Armington Elasticities for United States Manufacturing Sectors”,Journal of Policy Modeling,14(5):631-639.
36.Sousa,J.,2014,“Estimation of Price Elasticities of Demand for Alcohol in the United Kingdom”,HMRC Working Paper.
(1)国际葡萄与葡萄酒组织网站:http://www.oiv.int/。
(1)目前,在农产品销售时,初加工适用10%的税率,深加工适用16%的税率,两者相差6%。
(1)Krugman(1980)和Balistrei et al.(2011)等文献的理论模型共同来源是Dixit and Stiglitz(1977)。Dixit and Stiglitz(1977)开创性地构建了一个垄断竞争模型分析垄断竞争企业的产品多样化问题。
(1)Ψ_(v,r)表示来自r国的产品在v国市场的占有率。
(2)Excel Solver软件下载地址:https://www.solver.com。关于本文相关的GSIM求解过程和模拟结果,有兴趣的读者可以向笔者索取。
(1)联合国贸易数据库网站:http://comtrade.un.org/。
(1)若根据进口量指标,则德国、英国、美国排在2016年中国葡萄酒进口来源前三位;另外,根据进口额,中国香港排在第六位,但考虑到中国香港的葡萄酒进口大部分属于转口贸易,因此没有将其列出。
(1)本文假设其它国家葡萄酒税收政策保持不变,只有中国葡萄酒税收政策调整。
(2)消费税属于流转税范畴,是以消费品的流转额作为征税对象的各种税收的统称。
(1)根据高梦蔚(2013)实证分析的结果,2011年,中国葡萄酒行业的综合税费负担在40%左右。
(2)非歧视原则是世贸组织及其法律制度的一项首要的基本原则:成员国在数量限制、进口配额限制、补贴、国营贸易企业以及国内税收方面应给予进口产品以不低于国内产品的待遇。
(3)2016年,中国葡萄酒进口总额为23.7亿美元,其中小于2升容器的进口瓶装葡萄酒(SITC代码220421)进口总额为22亿美元,而大于2升容器的进口葡萄酒(SITC代码220429)进口额只有1.13亿美元。
(1)根据2015年签署的中澳自由贸易协定,从2016年开始到2017年,澳大利亚对华出口葡萄酒的税率已经从签订协议前的14%下降到了5.6%,从2018年1月1日起将继续下降至2.8%,计划到2019年,澳大利亚葡萄酒对华出口完全实现零关税。
(2)具体来说,葡萄酒产品在HS分类下还可以细分为葡萄汽酒220421,瓶装葡萄酒220421,散装葡萄酒220429,酿酒葡萄汁220430。
(3)关于GSIM模型中供给弹性、需求弹性和替代弹性的定义可以参考Francois and Hall(2003)。
(1)陈勇兵等(2014)估计得到中国食品及饮料的进口需求价格弹性为-1.16。
(2)其余国家中以发展中国家居多,故本文令这些国家的葡萄酒需求弹性等于中国的葡萄酒需求弹性,即为-1.36。
(3)根据GTAP2011,澳大利亚葡萄酒总体供给弹性大约为0.8。
(1)严格来说,中国葡萄酒税收政策变化不仅会对葡萄酒行业产生影响,而且会对白酒以及啤酒市场的供需、消费产生影响。笔者只考察葡萄酒的主要原因是:目前,葡萄酒占中国酒水市场的份额非常有限。根据中国国家统计局的数据,2017年,葡萄酒销售收入在中国酒水销售总额中的占比只有5.4%。因此,葡萄酒税收制度变化对白酒市场和啤酒市场的影响有限。
(1)对德国的出口量增幅为零的原因是,根据表4, 2016年我国葡萄酒对德国的出口额近似为0。
(2)这一点也有些出乎意料,因为根据直观,我国葡萄酒税负下降,国际竞争力应该有所提升,出口应该有所增加。
(3)关于贸易偏转效应的定义可以参考Bown and Crowly(2007)、冯宗宪和向洪金(2010)等文献。
(1)根据现行《增值税暂行条例实施细则》三十五条解释:“农业生产者”包括农业生产单位或个人,“自产农产品”指初级农产品。由于葡萄酒存在加工环节,因此,中国将葡萄酒归类为轻工产品,需要交增值税和消费税。
2.陈晓光,2013:《增值税有效税率差异与效率损失--兼议对“营改增”的启示》,《中国社会科学》第8期。
3.曹越、李晶,2016:《“营改增”是否降低了流转税税负:来自中国上市公司的证据》,《财贸经济》第11期。
4.董晓远,2008:《反倾销与产业损害预警评估模型》,北京:社会科学文献出版社。
5.冯宗宪、向洪金,2010:《欧美对华反倾销的经济效应:理论与实证研究》,《世界经济》第3期。
6.高梦蔚,2013:《葡萄酒企业微观税负实证研究--基于A股上市公司面板数据》,西南财经大学。
7.李荣林、鲁晓东,2006:《中日韩自由贸易区的贸易流量和福利效应分析:一个局部均衡的校准方法》,《数量经济技术经济研究》第11期。
8.聂辉华、方明月、李涛,2009:《增值税转型对企业行为和绩效的影响--以东北地区为例》,《管理世界》第5期。
9.裴长洪、杨志勇、田侃、徐振宇《中国农副产品深加工业发展政策研究》,工业与信息化部研究报告,2010年。
10.平新乔、梁爽、郝朝艳,2009:《增值税与营业税的福利效应研究》,《经济研究》第9期。
11.申广军、陈斌开、杨汝岱,2016:《减税能否提振中国经济?--基于中国增值税改革的实证研究》,《经济研究》第1期。
12.向洪金、赖明勇,2012:《我国白羽肉鸡产品反倾销措施的产业救济效果与福利效应研究》,《产业经济研究》,2012年第2期。
13.向洪金、赖明勇,2013:《全球视角下美国对华光伏产品“双反”案的经济效应研究》,《世界经济》第4期。
14.周黎安、陈烨,2005:《中国农村税费改革的政策效果:基于双重差分模型的估计》,《经济研究》第8期。
15.Amir,H.,and J.Asafu-Adjaye,Ducpham,T.2013,“The Impact of the Indonesian Income Tax Reform:A CGEAnalysis”,Economic Modelling,31:492-501.
16.Bagwell,K.,and R.W.Staiger,2012,“The Economics of Trade Agreements in the Linear Cournot Delegation Model”,Journal of International Economics,88(1):32-46.
17.Balistreri,J.,H.Hillberry,and F.Rutherford,2011,“Structural Estimation and Solution of International Trade Models with Heterogeneous Firms”,Journal of International Economics,83(2):95-108.
18.Bown,P.,and A.Crowley,2007,“Trade Deflection and Trade Depression”,Journal of International Economics,72:176-201.
19.Choi,Y.,H.Hirata,and S.Kim,2017,“Tax Reform in Japan:Is it Welfare-enhancing?”Japan and the World Economy,42:12-22.
20.Dixit,A.K,and J.E.Stiglitz,1977,“Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity”,American Economic Review,67:297-308.
21.Francois,J.and H.Hall,1997,“Partial Equilibrium Modeling”,in Francois and Reinert,Ads,Applied Methods for Trade Policy Analysis,Cambridge University Press.
22.Francois,J.and H.Hall,2003,“Global Simulation Analysis of Industry-Level Trade Policy”,Word Bank Mimeo.
23.Francois,J.and H.Hall,2007,“An Extended Global Simulation Model:Analysis of Tariffs&Anti-Dumping Policy Impacts on Prices,Output,Incomes,and Employment”,World Bank Mimeo.
24.Fujiwara,K.,2014,“Pareto-improving tariff-tax reforms under imperfect competition”,International Review of Economics&Finance,31:12-20.
25.Xiang,H.J.,Y.X.Kuang,and C.H.Li,2017,“Impact of the China-Australia FTA on Global Coal Production and Trade”,Journal of Policy Modeling,39:65-78.
26.Keen,M.,and J.E.Ligthart,2005,“Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition”,Review of International Economics,13:385-390.
27.Kim,S.H.and M.A.Kose,2014,“Welfare Implications of Trade Liberalization and Fiscal Reform:a Quantitative Experiment”,Journal of International Economics,92:198-209.
28.Krugman,P.,1980,“Scale Economies,Product Differentiation,and the Pattern of Trade”,The American Economic Review,70(5):950-959.
29.Li Chunding and J.Whalley,2014,“China's Potential Future Growth and Gains from Trade Policy Bargaining:Some Numerical Simulation Results”,Economic Modelling,37:65-78.
30.Nelson,P.,1997,“Economic and Demographic Factors in U.S.Alcohol Demand:A Growth-accounting Analysis”,Empirical Economics,22(1):83-102.
31.Nelson,P.,2013,“Does Heavy Drinking by Adults Respond to Higher Alcohol Prices and Taxes?A Survey and Assessment”,Economic Analysis and Policy,43:265-291.
32.Németh,G.,L.Szabó,and C.Juan-Carlos,2011,“Estimation of Armington Elasticities in a CGEEconomy-energy-environment Model for Europe”,Economic Modelling,28(4):1993-1999.
33.Oczkowski,E.,2014,“Modelling the Demand and Supply Determinants of Australian Wine Grapes”,The Economic Society of Australia,33(1):1-12.
34.Pan,S.,C.Fang,and J.Malaga,2006,“Alcoholic Beverage Consumption in China:A Censored Demand System Approach”,Applied Economics Letters,13(15):975-979.
35.Reinert,A.,and W.Roland-Holst,1992,“Armington Elasticities for United States Manufacturing Sectors”,Journal of Policy Modeling,14(5):631-639.
36.Sousa,J.,2014,“Estimation of Price Elasticities of Demand for Alcohol in the United Kingdom”,HMRC Working Paper.
(1)国际葡萄与葡萄酒组织网站:http://www.oiv.int/。
(1)目前,在农产品销售时,初加工适用10%的税率,深加工适用16%的税率,两者相差6%。
(1)Krugman(1980)和Balistrei et al.(2011)等文献的理论模型共同来源是Dixit and Stiglitz(1977)。Dixit and Stiglitz(1977)开创性地构建了一个垄断竞争模型分析垄断竞争企业的产品多样化问题。
(1)Ψ_(v,r)表示来自r国的产品在v国市场的占有率。
(2)Excel Solver软件下载地址:https://www.solver.com。关于本文相关的GSIM求解过程和模拟结果,有兴趣的读者可以向笔者索取。
(1)联合国贸易数据库网站:http://comtrade.un.org/。
(1)若根据进口量指标,则德国、英国、美国排在2016年中国葡萄酒进口来源前三位;另外,根据进口额,中国香港排在第六位,但考虑到中国香港的葡萄酒进口大部分属于转口贸易,因此没有将其列出。
(1)本文假设其它国家葡萄酒税收政策保持不变,只有中国葡萄酒税收政策调整。
(2)消费税属于流转税范畴,是以消费品的流转额作为征税对象的各种税收的统称。
(1)根据高梦蔚(2013)实证分析的结果,2011年,中国葡萄酒行业的综合税费负担在40%左右。
(2)非歧视原则是世贸组织及其法律制度的一项首要的基本原则:成员国在数量限制、进口配额限制、补贴、国营贸易企业以及国内税收方面应给予进口产品以不低于国内产品的待遇。
(3)2016年,中国葡萄酒进口总额为23.7亿美元,其中小于2升容器的进口瓶装葡萄酒(SITC代码220421)进口总额为22亿美元,而大于2升容器的进口葡萄酒(SITC代码220429)进口额只有1.13亿美元。
(1)根据2015年签署的中澳自由贸易协定,从2016年开始到2017年,澳大利亚对华出口葡萄酒的税率已经从签订协议前的14%下降到了5.6%,从2018年1月1日起将继续下降至2.8%,计划到2019年,澳大利亚葡萄酒对华出口完全实现零关税。
(2)具体来说,葡萄酒产品在HS分类下还可以细分为葡萄汽酒220421,瓶装葡萄酒220421,散装葡萄酒220429,酿酒葡萄汁220430。
(3)关于GSIM模型中供给弹性、需求弹性和替代弹性的定义可以参考Francois and Hall(2003)。
(1)陈勇兵等(2014)估计得到中国食品及饮料的进口需求价格弹性为-1.16。
(2)其余国家中以发展中国家居多,故本文令这些国家的葡萄酒需求弹性等于中国的葡萄酒需求弹性,即为-1.36。
(3)根据GTAP2011,澳大利亚葡萄酒总体供给弹性大约为0.8。
(1)严格来说,中国葡萄酒税收政策变化不仅会对葡萄酒行业产生影响,而且会对白酒以及啤酒市场的供需、消费产生影响。笔者只考察葡萄酒的主要原因是:目前,葡萄酒占中国酒水市场的份额非常有限。根据中国国家统计局的数据,2017年,葡萄酒销售收入在中国酒水销售总额中的占比只有5.4%。因此,葡萄酒税收制度变化对白酒市场和啤酒市场的影响有限。
(1)对德国的出口量增幅为零的原因是,根据表4, 2016年我国葡萄酒对德国的出口额近似为0。
(2)这一点也有些出乎意料,因为根据直观,我国葡萄酒税负下降,国际竞争力应该有所提升,出口应该有所增加。
(3)关于贸易偏转效应的定义可以参考Bown and Crowly(2007)、冯宗宪和向洪金(2010)等文献。
(1)根据现行《增值税暂行条例实施细则》三十五条解释:“农业生产者”包括农业生产单位或个人,“自产农产品”指初级农产品。由于葡萄酒存在加工环节,因此,中国将葡萄酒归类为轻工产品,需要交增值税和消费税。