日本国债:安全资产还是风险潜在?
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摘要
金融危机后全球安全资产减少,使日本国债地位相对改善,成为世界金融市场的避险工具之一。但由于日本长期政府债务净额占GDP之比居高不下,国债信用已经受到损毁,主权信用评级被下调。从日本国内资金循环特征看,日本企业转变为储蓄大户的原因不是企业的盈利增加,而是由于资产负债表的调整压力使投资意愿降低,因此,日本政府只有不断增发国债来弥补筹资主体的缺位;日本国债期限结构的短期化和日益增长的利息负担使其面临的市场利率风险加大;同时,日本中央银行购买国债规模膨胀,不断冲击财政纪律的约束,财政赤字货币化风险隐藏其中。长期来看,日本泡沫经济崩溃后,资产去泡沫化的过程也正是国债泡沫化的过程。在日本财政改革前景未见定论,企业的投资需求尚未恢复的前提下,日本国债的可持续性存在巨大风险。
Global safe assets decrease after financial crisis,which relatively improves Japanese debt position and which becomes one of risk prevention tools in global financial market,because the ratio of Japanese long-term government bonds net amount to GDP is high,however,the national debt credit is damaged,and Japanese sovereign credit rating is down-graded.Based on the feature of Japanese domestic capital circulation,the reason for a Japanese enterprise to become a big depositor is not the increase of enterprise's earnings but is compelled by the pressure of adjusting balance sheet to make investment willing decrease,thus,Japanese Government has to continuously increase national bonds issuance to make up fundraising subject default.The short-term Japanese debt maturity structure and increasing interest burden make its market interest rate risk bigger,meanwhile,the scale of Japanese Central Bank bonds purchase is swelling,which constantly challenges the limitation of financial regulation,as a result,financial deficit monetization risk is hidden in it.From long-run perspective,after Japanese bubble economy burst out,the bubble removal process of Japanese assets is the bubbling process of Japanese debt,thus,the sustainability of Japanese bonds has huge risk under the premise of the uncertainty of Japanese financial reform prospect and the non-recovery of Japanese enterprise investment demand.
Global safe assets decrease after financial crisis,which relatively improves Japanese debt position and which becomes one of risk prevention tools in global financial market,because the ratio of Japanese long-term government bonds net amount to GDP is high,however,the national debt credit is damaged,and Japanese sovereign credit rating is down-graded.Based on the feature of Japanese domestic capital circulation,the reason for a Japanese enterprise to become a big depositor is not the increase of enterprise's earnings but is compelled by the pressure of adjusting balance sheet to make investment willing decrease,thus,Japanese Government has to continuously increase national bonds issuance to make up fundraising subject default.The short-term Japanese debt maturity structure and increasing interest burden make its market interest rate risk bigger,meanwhile,the scale of Japanese Central Bank bonds purchase is swelling,which constantly challenges the limitation of financial regulation,as a result,financial deficit monetization risk is hidden in it.From long-run perspective,after Japanese bubble economy burst out,the bubble removal process of Japanese assets is the bubbling process of Japanese debt,thus,the sustainability of Japanese bonds has huge risk under the premise of the uncertainty of Japanese financial reform prospect and the non-recovery of Japanese enterprise investment demand.
引文
①日本银行调查统计局《资金循环报告》,2012年9月20日公布(http:∥www.boj.or.jp/statistics/sj/sjexp.pdf)。
②日本银行《营业每旬报告》,2012年8月14日公布(http:∥www.boj.or.jp/statistics/boj/other/acmai/release/2012/ac120810.htm/)。
③Fitch Ratings(2012),http:∥www.fitchratings.com/gws/en/sector/overview/sovereigns.
④根据标准普尔评级机构对25个发达国家的统计。资料来源:IMF:Global Financial Stability Report.April,2012:119.
①STANDARD&POOR’S RATINGS SERVICES(S&P),2011(http:∥www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/sovereigns/ratingslist/en/ap?sectorName=null&subSectorCode=39&filter=U)。
④MOODY’S,2011(http:∥www.moodys.com/researchandratings/region/europe-middle-east-africa/004001/4294967174/4294967230/0/0/-/0/-/-/en/global/rr)。
⑤fitchratings(2012),http:∥www.fitchratings.com/gws/en/sector/overview/sovereigns.
①标准普尔评级公司:政治风险,经济结构,经济增长前景,财政灵活性,一般政府债务负担,离岸负债或有负债,货币灵活性,外部流动性,外债负担。穆迪投资者服务公司:经济实力,机构实力,政府的财力,对事件风险的敏感度。惠誉评级公司:宏观经济政策、表现和前景,经济的结构性特征,公共融资,外部融资(国际货币基金组织,2010)。
①日本政府每年在编制预算时,原则上是不能对国债费进行事后调整的,一旦不能按照原有合同还本付息就会出现主权债务违约,而丧失市场信誉的代价极大,今后的筹资将会受到长期制约。因此,日本财务省需要预先试算国债利率变动对财政收支的影响(详见http:∥www.mof.go.jp/budget/topics/outlook/sy2202b.htm)。
③日本银行《营业每旬报告》,2012年8月14日公布(http:∥www.boj.or.jp/statistics/boj/other/acmai/release/2012/ac120810.htm/)。
④日本银行在2001年3月19日为增强宽松货币政策的效果,公布了《变更金融市场调节方式进一步实行宽松的货币政策》,其中第4条为在“增加长期国债的买入额度”的同时“防止滑入滥发国债的境地”,规定了买入国债额度的上限(详见http:∥www.boj.or.jp/announcements/release_2001/k010319b.htm/)。
日本银行,一上,木村,中村,长谷.2012.安全资产的供需与国债稀缺性差价[J].日本银行评论,(1):3.
国际货币基金组织.2012.全球金融稳定报告(第三章:安全资产:金融体系的基石?)[R].2012-04:119.
国际货币基金组织.2010.全球金融稳定报告:主权、融资和系统流动性[M].中译本.北京:中国金融出版社:96.
佐々木雅也.2012.知识资产[J].日本野村证券(5):8-12.
菅野泰夫.2012.金融市场:对冲基金如何再现CaR冲击[R].日本大和综合研究所:3-4.
河村小百合.2012.日本国债期限结构与筹资结构更易受到强烈冲击[J].经济学家(日本周刊),2012-02-13:44-45.
熊野英生.2012.日本银行分析报告——日本银行的银行券原则[R].日本第一生命经济研究所,2012-08-22.
Bank of Japan.2012.Japan’s Flow of Funds Accounts:Main Characteristics and Measures for Enhancement[J].Bank of Japan Review,Apr:2.
②日本银行《营业每旬报告》,2012年8月14日公布(http:∥www.boj.or.jp/statistics/boj/other/acmai/release/2012/ac120810.htm/)。
③Fitch Ratings(2012),http:∥www.fitchratings.com/gws/en/sector/overview/sovereigns.
④根据标准普尔评级机构对25个发达国家的统计。资料来源:IMF:Global Financial Stability Report.April,2012:119.
①STANDARD&POOR’S RATINGS SERVICES(S&P),2011(http:∥www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/sovereigns/ratingslist/en/ap?sectorName=null&subSectorCode=39&filter=U)。
④MOODY’S,2011(http:∥www.moodys.com/researchandratings/region/europe-middle-east-africa/004001/4294967174/4294967230/0/0/-/0/-/-/en/global/rr)。
⑤fitchratings(2012),http:∥www.fitchratings.com/gws/en/sector/overview/sovereigns.
①标准普尔评级公司:政治风险,经济结构,经济增长前景,财政灵活性,一般政府债务负担,离岸负债或有负债,货币灵活性,外部流动性,外债负担。穆迪投资者服务公司:经济实力,机构实力,政府的财力,对事件风险的敏感度。惠誉评级公司:宏观经济政策、表现和前景,经济的结构性特征,公共融资,外部融资(国际货币基金组织,2010)。
①日本政府每年在编制预算时,原则上是不能对国债费进行事后调整的,一旦不能按照原有合同还本付息就会出现主权债务违约,而丧失市场信誉的代价极大,今后的筹资将会受到长期制约。因此,日本财务省需要预先试算国债利率变动对财政收支的影响(详见http:∥www.mof.go.jp/budget/topics/outlook/sy2202b.htm)。
③日本银行《营业每旬报告》,2012年8月14日公布(http:∥www.boj.or.jp/statistics/boj/other/acmai/release/2012/ac120810.htm/)。
④日本银行在2001年3月19日为增强宽松货币政策的效果,公布了《变更金融市场调节方式进一步实行宽松的货币政策》,其中第4条为在“增加长期国债的买入额度”的同时“防止滑入滥发国债的境地”,规定了买入国债额度的上限(详见http:∥www.boj.or.jp/announcements/release_2001/k010319b.htm/)。
日本银行,一上,木村,中村,长谷.2012.安全资产的供需与国债稀缺性差价[J].日本银行评论,(1):3.
国际货币基金组织.2012.全球金融稳定报告(第三章:安全资产:金融体系的基石?)[R].2012-04:119.
国际货币基金组织.2010.全球金融稳定报告:主权、融资和系统流动性[M].中译本.北京:中国金融出版社:96.
佐々木雅也.2012.知识资产[J].日本野村证券(5):8-12.
菅野泰夫.2012.金融市场:对冲基金如何再现CaR冲击[R].日本大和综合研究所:3-4.
河村小百合.2012.日本国债期限结构与筹资结构更易受到强烈冲击[J].经济学家(日本周刊),2012-02-13:44-45.
熊野英生.2012.日本银行分析报告——日本银行的银行券原则[R].日本第一生命经济研究所,2012-08-22.
Bank of Japan.2012.Japan’s Flow of Funds Accounts:Main Characteristics and Measures for Enhancement[J].Bank of Japan Review,Apr:2.