知识观念转变下盖梯尔问题的消解
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摘要
解决盖梯尔问题的尝试普遍存在难以克服的困难与争论,与此同时,出现了一些消解盖梯尔问题的方案。作为一种新颖的、当代哲学实践转向后的知识观念,"地方性知识"有丰富的意涵,为我们提供了一种审度知识的视野与一条消解盖梯尔问题的途径。具体而言,通过论述"地方性知识"观念的基本主张及与之密切相关的杜威知行学说、后期维特根斯坦哲学、科学实践哲学及默会认识论的重要洞见,来解释为何知识的完美典范并不存在及为何知识的完备定义并不可能,进而阐明盖梯尔问题对传统知识定义的诘难本质上是在"无的放矢",理解知识的最佳策略应是转向具体的实践。
Attempts to solve the Gettier Problem have always suffered from insurmountable difficulties and disputes. At the same time, there exist some programs to eliminate the Gettier Problem. As a new concept of knowledge after the turn of contemporary philosophy, "local knowledge" with rich implications offers a perspective to examine knowledge and a way to dissolve the Gettier Problem. Specifically, by discussing the basic ideas of "local knowledge" and those closely related theories, such as Dewey's theory of knowing and doing, later Wittgenstein's philosophy, philosophy of scientific practice, and tacit epistemology, this paper explains why the perfect model of knowledge does not exist and why the exact definition of knowledge is not possible, and further clarifies that the Gettier Problem's criticism of the definition of traditional knowledge is essentially "pointless" and that the best way of understanding knowledge is practice.
Attempts to solve the Gettier Problem have always suffered from insurmountable difficulties and disputes. At the same time, there exist some programs to eliminate the Gettier Problem. As a new concept of knowledge after the turn of contemporary philosophy, "local knowledge" with rich implications offers a perspective to examine knowledge and a way to dissolve the Gettier Problem. Specifically, by discussing the basic ideas of "local knowledge" and those closely related theories, such as Dewey's theory of knowing and doing, later Wittgenstein's philosophy, philosophy of scientific practice, and tacit epistemology, this paper explains why the perfect model of knowledge does not exist and why the exact definition of knowledge is not possible, and further clarifies that the Gettier Problem's criticism of the definition of traditional knowledge is essentially "pointless" and that the best way of understanding knowledge is practice.
引文
[1] 陈晓平.盖梯尔问题及其“解决”[J].科学技术哲学研究,2013(5):1-4.
[2] 李锋锋.被忽略的认知运气:论葛梯尔问题的实质与德性知识论[J].北京社会科学,2015(8):105-112.
[3] HETHERINGTON S.Gettier Problems[EB/OL].[2018-11-28].https://www.baidu.com/link?url=CnzDhTfgDy5geyL3InvHZPR5XQwxOtbJA73kY48zIkQTwH7L_pT7Iz jDLbZ68dc1&wd=&eqid=9ea60aed00020d390000000 25bc3e0.
[4] GETTIER E L.Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?[J]Analysis,1963(6):121-123.
[5] 陈真.盖梯尔问题的来龙去脉[J].哲学研究,2005(11):41-48.
[6] POLLOCK J,CRUZ J.Contemporary Theories of Knowledge[M].Lanham:2nd ed.Rowman &Littlefield,1999:14.
[7] FLORIDI L.On the Logical Unsolvability of the Gettier Problem[J].Synthese,2004(1):61-79.
[8] MIZRAHI M.Why Gettier Cases Are Misleading[J].Logos &Episteme,2016 (1):31-44.
[9] MIZRAHI M.Why Gettier Cases Are Still Misleading:A Reply to Atkins[J].Logos& Episteme,2017(1):129-139.
[10] 郭金杰.葛梯尔问题的问题[J].科学技术哲学研究,2009(4):46-50.
[11] 杨国荣.“盖梯尔问题”的问题[J].哲学动态,2014(5):47-49.
[12] 吴彤.两种“地方性知识”:兼评吉尔兹和劳斯的观点[J].自然辩证法研究,2007(11):87-94.
[13] 盛晓明.地方性知识的构造[J].哲学研究,2000(12):36-44.
[14] 劳斯.知识与权力:走向科学的政治哲学[M].盛晓明,等,译.北京:北京大学出版社,2004.
[15] 吴彤.再论两种地方性知识:现代科学与本土自然知识地方性本性的差异[J].自然辩证法研究,2014(8):51-57.
[16] 郁振华.当代英美认识论的困境及出路:基于默会知识维度[J].中国社会科学,2018(7):22-40.
[17] ROUSE J.The narrative reconstruction of science[J].Inquiry,1990(2):179-196.
[18] DAVID R.The Interpretive Turn:Philosophy,Science,Culture[M].Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1991:23.
[19] POLANYI M.Knowing and Being[M].Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1969:144.
[20] 郭贵春.语境的边界及其意义[J].哲学研究,2009(2):94-100.
[21] 杜威.确定性的寻求:关于知行关系的研究[M].傅统先,译.上海:上海人民出版社,2005.
[22] 韩林合.维特根斯坦论“语言游戏”和“生活形式”[J].北京大学学报(哲社版),1996(1):108-115.
[23] TURNER S.The Social Theory of Practices[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1994:1.
[24] 雒自新.得到辩护的真信念是知识吗?[N].中国社会科学报,2013-06-10(A06).
① 对盖梯尔问题的解答及其争论,当代颇具声名的认识论专家Stephen Hetherington在“因特网哲学百科”(Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)中有详细的述介,具体参见参考文献[3] 。
② Stephen Hetherington论述了两条消解盖梯尔问题的进路,这两条进路主要针对的是盖梯尔提出的两个反例。一条被称作“竞争直觉”(competing intuitions):“对其进行消解的一个方法就是否认和弱化几乎所有的认识论者都声称在解释盖梯尔案例时受到了指导的平常直觉(usual intuition)。”另一条则是为人熟知的“幸运地知道方案”(knowing luckily proposal)。相关的具体论述可参见参考文献[3]。
(1)在Luciano Floridi的论文中,“tripartite account”指“justified true belief”。
(2)在翻译“representation”时,中文有两种方式,一种翻译为“表征”,一种翻译为“表象”。为了让引文与本文在使用“representation”时一致,笔者在引文中加入了“(象)”,特此说明。
(3)这里的“情境”和“语境”都是对英文“context”的中译,引文中的“(情)”为笔者所加,特此说明。
[2] 李锋锋.被忽略的认知运气:论葛梯尔问题的实质与德性知识论[J].北京社会科学,2015(8):105-112.
[3] HETHERINGTON S.Gettier Problems[EB/OL].[2018-11-28].https://www.baidu.com/link?url=CnzDhTfgDy5geyL3InvHZPR5XQwxOtbJA73kY48zIkQTwH7L_pT7Iz jDLbZ68dc1&wd=&eqid=9ea60aed00020d390000000 25bc3e0.
[4] GETTIER E L.Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?[J]Analysis,1963(6):121-123.
[5] 陈真.盖梯尔问题的来龙去脉[J].哲学研究,2005(11):41-48.
[6] POLLOCK J,CRUZ J.Contemporary Theories of Knowledge[M].Lanham:2nd ed.Rowman &Littlefield,1999:14.
[7] FLORIDI L.On the Logical Unsolvability of the Gettier Problem[J].Synthese,2004(1):61-79.
[8] MIZRAHI M.Why Gettier Cases Are Misleading[J].Logos &Episteme,2016 (1):31-44.
[9] MIZRAHI M.Why Gettier Cases Are Still Misleading:A Reply to Atkins[J].Logos& Episteme,2017(1):129-139.
[10] 郭金杰.葛梯尔问题的问题[J].科学技术哲学研究,2009(4):46-50.
[11] 杨国荣.“盖梯尔问题”的问题[J].哲学动态,2014(5):47-49.
[12] 吴彤.两种“地方性知识”:兼评吉尔兹和劳斯的观点[J].自然辩证法研究,2007(11):87-94.
[13] 盛晓明.地方性知识的构造[J].哲学研究,2000(12):36-44.
[14] 劳斯.知识与权力:走向科学的政治哲学[M].盛晓明,等,译.北京:北京大学出版社,2004.
[15] 吴彤.再论两种地方性知识:现代科学与本土自然知识地方性本性的差异[J].自然辩证法研究,2014(8):51-57.
[16] 郁振华.当代英美认识论的困境及出路:基于默会知识维度[J].中国社会科学,2018(7):22-40.
[17] ROUSE J.The narrative reconstruction of science[J].Inquiry,1990(2):179-196.
[18] DAVID R.The Interpretive Turn:Philosophy,Science,Culture[M].Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1991:23.
[19] POLANYI M.Knowing and Being[M].Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1969:144.
[20] 郭贵春.语境的边界及其意义[J].哲学研究,2009(2):94-100.
[21] 杜威.确定性的寻求:关于知行关系的研究[M].傅统先,译.上海:上海人民出版社,2005.
[22] 韩林合.维特根斯坦论“语言游戏”和“生活形式”[J].北京大学学报(哲社版),1996(1):108-115.
[23] TURNER S.The Social Theory of Practices[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1994:1.
[24] 雒自新.得到辩护的真信念是知识吗?[N].中国社会科学报,2013-06-10(A06).
① 对盖梯尔问题的解答及其争论,当代颇具声名的认识论专家Stephen Hetherington在“因特网哲学百科”(Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)中有详细的述介,具体参见参考文献[3] 。
② Stephen Hetherington论述了两条消解盖梯尔问题的进路,这两条进路主要针对的是盖梯尔提出的两个反例。一条被称作“竞争直觉”(competing intuitions):“对其进行消解的一个方法就是否认和弱化几乎所有的认识论者都声称在解释盖梯尔案例时受到了指导的平常直觉(usual intuition)。”另一条则是为人熟知的“幸运地知道方案”(knowing luckily proposal)。相关的具体论述可参见参考文献[3]。
(1)在Luciano Floridi的论文中,“tripartite account”指“justified true belief”。
(2)在翻译“representation”时,中文有两种方式,一种翻译为“表征”,一种翻译为“表象”。为了让引文与本文在使用“representation”时一致,笔者在引文中加入了“(象)”,特此说明。
(3)这里的“情境”和“语境”都是对英文“context”的中译,引文中的“(情)”为笔者所加,特此说明。