论恐怖主义网络
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摘要
恐怖主义领域研究最新发展是:越来越多的人认识到侧重于群体内社会进程的分析框架,在提高我们对恐怖主义集团内部动态的理解方面非常有效。许多研究恐怖主义的学者已经开始研究恐怖主义团体出现和运作的方式以及成员角色和概况之间的关系。而对网络之于理解恐怖主义团体之间关系的潜在贡献以及影响政治对恐怖主义的反应的因素的关注较少。通过解释网络如何增进对恐怖主义集团竞争、合作、合并或分裂的理解以及恐怖主义应对工作中的困境来解决这些鸿沟,这些困境主要涉及各级政府和机构在国际和国家层面的协调与合作。
A recent development in the field of terrorism studies is the growing understanding that analytical frameworks that focus on in-group social processes are highly effective in improving our understanding of the inner dynamics of terrorist groups. Many students of terrorism have begun to challenge some fundamental conventions regarding the way terrorist groups emerge and operate and the relations between members' roles and profiles. Less attention has been given to the potential contribution of network science to understanding the relations between terrorist groups,as well as the factors shaping polities' responses to terrorism. This chapter fills these gaps by explaining how network science can increase understanding of how terrorist groups compete,cooperate,and merge or split,as well as the dilemmas involved in responses to terrorism,which mostly involve coordination and cooperation on the international and national levels among various levels of government and agencies.
A recent development in the field of terrorism studies is the growing understanding that analytical frameworks that focus on in-group social processes are highly effective in improving our understanding of the inner dynamics of terrorist groups. Many students of terrorism have begun to challenge some fundamental conventions regarding the way terrorist groups emerge and operate and the relations between members' roles and profiles. Less attention has been given to the potential contribution of network science to understanding the relations between terrorist groups,as well as the factors shaping polities' responses to terrorism. This chapter fills these gaps by explaining how network science can increase understanding of how terrorist groups compete,cooperate,and merge or split,as well as the dilemmas involved in responses to terrorism,which mostly involve coordination and cooperation on the international and national levels among various levels of government and agencies.
引文
(2)Regular,A.(2003).“Hebron’s Playing,and Plotting Field.”Haaretz Daily,May 3. http://www. haaretz. com/print-edition/news/hebron-s-playing-and-plotting-field-1. 89861(Hebrew).
(3)Pedahzur,A.,and Perliger,A.(2006).“The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks—A Social Network Perspective.”Social Forces 84(4):1983-2004.
(1)Carley,M. K.,Diesner,K.,Reminga,J.,and Tsevetovat,M.(2006).“Towards an Interoperable Dynamic of Network Analysis Toolkit.”Decisions Support System 43(4):1324-1347.Qin,J.,Xu,J. J.,Hu,D.,Sageman,M.,and Chen,H.(2005).“Analyzing Terrorist Networks:A Case Study of the Global Salafi Jihad Network.”Intelligence and Security Informatics 3495:287-304.Brams,J. S.,Mutlu,H.,and Ramirez,S. L.(2006).“Influence in Terrorist Networks:From Undirected to Directed Graphs.”Studies in Conflict&Terrorism 29(7):703-718.Koschade,S.(2006).“A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah:The Applications to Counterterrorism and Intelligence.”Studies in Conflict&Terrorism 29(6):559-575.Asal,V.,and Rethemeyer,R. K.(2008).“The Nature of the Beast:Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks.”Journal of Politics 70:437-449.Helfstein,S.,and Wright,D.(2011).“Covert or Convenient? Evolution of Terror Attack Networks,”Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(5):785-813.Perliger,A.,and Pedahzur,A.(2011).“Social Network Analysis in the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence.”PS:Political Science and Politics 44(1):45-50.Sageman,M.(2011). Leaderless Jihad:Terror Networks in The Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press.
(2)为了说明这一点,美国国务院的外国恐怖组织(foreign terrorist organizations)从2013年开始列出伊朗支持真主党、哈马斯、巴勒斯坦伊斯兰圣战组织和解放巴勒斯坦总指挥人民阵线的情况。见http://www. state. gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224826. htm。
(1)Hoffman,B.(1999).“Terrorism Trends and Prospects.”In Countering the New Terrorism,edited by I. Lesser,pp. 7-38. Santa Monica,CA:RAND.Laqueur,W.(1999). The New Terrorism. Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. New York:Oxford University Press.Kurz,A.(2003)“New Terrorism:New Challenges,Old Dilemmas.”Strategic Assessment 6. http://www. inss. org. il/uploadImages/systemFiles/New%20 Terrorism%20 New%20 Challenges%20 Old%20 Dilemmas. pdf.
(2)Arquilla,J.,and Ronfeld,D.(1999). Networks and Netwar,the Future of Terror,Crime,and Militancy. Washington,DC:Rand Corporation.Jones,D.,Smith,L. R. M.,and Wedding,M.(2003).“Looking for the Pattern:Al Qaeda in South East Asia—The Genealogy of a Terror Network.”Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26(6):443-457.Mishal,S.(2003).“The Pragmatic Dimension of the Palestinian Hamas:A Network Perspective.”Armed Forces and Society 29(4):569-589.McAllister,B.(2004).“Al Qaeda and the Innovative Firm:Demythologizing the Network,”Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27:297-319.Sageman,M.(2011). Leaderless Jihad:Terror Networks in The Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press.Stohl,C.,and Stohl,M.(2007).“Networks of Terror:Theoretical Assumptions and Pragmatic Consequences.”Communication Theory 17(2):93-124.
(3)Krebs,E. V.(2002).“Mapping Network of Terrorist Cells,”Connections 24:43-52.Rodríguez,J.(2005).“The March 11 th Terrorist Network:In Its Weakness Lies Its Strength.”Paper presented at XXV International Sunbelt Conference,Los Angeles,February 16-20.Carley,M. K.,Diesner,K.,Reminga,J.,and Tsevetovat,M.(2006).“Towards an Interoperable Dynamic of Network Analysis Toolkit.”Decisions Support System 43(4):1324-1347.Koschade,S.(2006).“A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah:The Applications to Counterterrorism and Intelligence.”Studies in Conflict&Terrorism 29(6):559-575.
(1)Pedahzur,A.,and Perliger,A.(2006).“The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks-A Social Network Perspective.”Social Forces 84(4):1983-2004.Helfstein,S.,and Wright,D.(2011).“Covert or Convenient?Evolution of Terror Attack Networks,”Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(5):785-813.
(2)Carley,K.,Dombroski,M.,Tsvetovat,M.,Reminga,J.,and Kamneva,N.(2003).“Destabilizing Dynamic Covert Networks.”In Proceedings of the 8 th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium,Washington,DC:National Defense War College.http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/publications/papers/a2 c2_carley_2003_destabilizing.pdf.Helfstein,S.,and Wright,D.(2011).“Covert or Convenient?Evolution of Terror Attack Networks,”Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(5):785-813.Cale,H.,and Horgan,J.(2012).“Methodological Triangulation in the Analysis of Terrorist Networks.”Studies in Conflict&Terrorism 35(2):182-192.Perliger,A.(2014).“Terrorist Networks’Productivity and Durability-A Comparative Multi-level Analysis.”Perspectives on Terrorism 8(4):36-52.
(3)Tsvetovat,M.,and Carley,M.K.(2005).“Structural Knowledge and Success of Anti-Terrorist Activity:The Downside of Structural Equivalence.”Journal of Social Structure 6.http://repository.cmu.edu/isr/43/.Carley,M.K.,Diesner,K.,Reminga,J.,and Tsevetovat,M.(2006).“Towards an Interoperable Dynamic of Network Analysis Toolkit.”Decisions Support System 43(4):1324-1347.Jackson,A.B.(2006).“Groups,Networks,or Movements:A Command-and-Control-Driven Approach to Classifying Terrorist Organizations and Its Application to Al Qaeda.”Studies in Conflict&Terrorism 29(3):241-262.
(4)Pedahzur,A.,and Perliger,A.(2006).“The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks-A Social Network Perspective.”Social Forces 84(4):1983-2004.Helfstein,S.,and Wright,D.(2011).“Covert or Convenient?Evolution of Terror Attack Networks,”Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(5):785-813.
(5)Perliger,A.,and Pedahzur,A.(2014).“Political Violence and Counter-Culture Communities-An Alternative Outlook on Religious Terrorism,”Political Studies,10.doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12182.
(1)主要是来自金融领域,可参见http://icsr.info/projects/western-foreign-fighters-syria/上的国王学院ICSR相关数据集.
(2)Diesner,J.,and Carley,M.K.(2008).“Conditional Random Fields for Entity Extraction and Ontological Text Coding.”Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory,14(3):248-262.
(3)Jackson,A.B.(2006).“Groups,Networks,or Movements:A Command-and-Control-Driven Approach to Classifying Terrorist Organizations and Its Application to Al Qaeda.”Studies in Conflict&Terrorism 29(3):241-262.
(4)Rodríguez,J.(2005).“The March 11th Terrorist Network:In Its Weakness Lies Its Strength.”Paper presented at XXVInternational Sunbelt Conference,Los Angeles,February 16-20.Perliger,A.,and Pedahzur,A.(2014).“Political Violence and Counter-Culture Communities-An Alternative Outlook on Religious Terrorism,”Political Studies,10.doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12182.
(5)Porter,Geoff.(2015).“What to Make of the Bay`a in North Africa?”CTC Sentinel 8(3).https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/what-to-make-of-the-baya-in-north-africa.
(6)Porter,Geoff.(2015).“What to Make of the Bay`a in North Africa?”CTC Sentinel 8(3).https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/what-to-make-of-the-baya-in-north-africa.
(7)Zenn,J.(2015).“A Biography of Boko Haram and the Bay`a to al-Baghdadi.”CTC Sentinel 8(3).https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/pledging-baya-a-benefit-or-burden-to-the-islamic-state.
(1)Moghadam,A.(2015).“Terrorist Affiliations in Context:A Typology of Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation.”CTC Sentinel 8(3).https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/terrorist-affiliations-in-context-a-typology-of-terrorist-inter-group-cooperation.
(2)Harik,P.J.(2004).Hezbollah:The Changing Face of Terrorism.London:Tauris.
(3)Coughlin,C.(2015).“Iran Is Intensifying Efforts to Support Hamas in Gaza.”The Telegraph,April 4.http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/11515603/Iran-is-intensifying-efforts-to-support-Hamas-in-Gaza.html.
(1)Cafiero,G.,and Certo,P.(2014).“Hamas and Hezbollah Agree to Disagree on Syria.”Atlantic Council,January 30 http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/hamas-and-hezbollah-agree-to-disagree-on-syria.
(2)各种报道支持这一说法,主要是在阿拉伯媒体,黎巴嫩的al-Mustaqbal和泛阿拉伯新闻媒体Asharq al-Awsat等报纸上。沙特驻美国大使也证实了这一点,见http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/news/724391。
(3)Momatz,R.(2012).“Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Accused in Israeli Embassy Bombing:Report.”ABC News,July 30.http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/irans-revolutionary-guard-accused-israeli-embassy-bombing-report/story?id=16888481.
(4)Savage,C.,and Shane,S.(2011).“Iranians Accused of a Plot to Kill Saudies’US Envoy.”New York Times,October11.http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/us/us-accuses-iranians-of-plotting-to-kill-saudi-envoy.html?_r=0.
(5)感谢美国军事学院反恐中心的丹·米尔顿博士分享了ISIS效忠网络的数据。
(1)Milton,D.,and Al-Ubaydi,M.(2015).“Pledging Bay`a:A Benefit or a Burden to the Islamic State?”CTC Sentinel 8 (3).https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/march-2015-baya-special-issue.
(2)Perliger,A.(2013).Challengers from the Sidelines,Understanding the American Violent Far Right.West Point,NY:Combating Terrorism Center.
(3)Laszlo-Barabasi,A.,and Bonabeau,E.(2003).“Scale-Free Networks.”Scientific American 288(5):60-69.
(4)Perliger,A.(2013).Challengers from the Sidelines,Understanding the American Violent Far Right.West Point,NY:Combating Terrorism Center.
(1)Perliger A.,Pedahzur,A.,and Zalmanovitch,Y.(2005).“The Defensive Dimension of the Battle against Terrorism-An Analysis of Management of Terror Incidents in Jerusalem.”Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 13(2):79-91.
(2)Perliger A.,Pedahzur,A.,and Zalmanovitch,Y.(2005).“The Defensive Dimension of the Battle against Terrorism-An Analysis of Management of Terror Incidents in Jerusalem.”Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 13(2):79-91.
(3)Perliger A.,Pedahzur,A.,and Zalmanovitch,Y.(2005).“The Defensive Dimension of the Battle against Terrorism-An Analysis of Management of Terror Incidents in Jerusalem.”Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 13(2):79-91.
(4)Perliger A.,Pedahzur,A.,and Zalmanovitch,Y.(2005).“The Defensive Dimension of the Battle against Terrorism-An Analysis of Management of Terror Incidents in Jerusalem.”Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 13(2):79-91.
(1)Wilkinson,P.(2000).Terrorism Versus Democracy:The Liberal State Response.New York:Routledge.Schmid,P.A.(1992).“Terrorism and Democracy.”Terrorism and Political Violence 4(4):14-15.Chalk,P.(1998).“The Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy.”Australian Journal of Politics and History44(3):373-388.Cerlinsten,D.R.,and Schmid,A.(1992).“Western Response to Terrorism:A Twenty Five Year Balance Sheet.”Terrorism and Political Violence 4(4):307-340.Groenewold,K.(1992).“The German Federal Republic’s Response and Civil Liberties.”Terrorism and Political Violence 4(4):136-150.
(2)Katzenstein,J.P.(2003).“Same War-Different Views:Germany,Japan,and Counterterrorism.”International Organization 57(4):731-760.Omelicheva,Y.M.(2007).“Combating Terrorism in Central Asia:Explaining Differences in States’Responses to Terror.”Terrorism and Political Violence 19(3):369-393.Perliger,A.(2012).“How Democracies Respond to Terrorism:Regime Characteristics,Symbolic Power,and Counter-Terrorism.”Security Studies 21(3):490-528.
(3)Bowen,D.(2000).“Something Must Be Done-Military Intervention.”Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 23(1):1-19.Hafez,M.M.,and Hatfield,M.J.(2006).“Do Targeted Assassinations Work?A Multivariate Analysis of Israel’s Controversial Tactic during Al-Aqsa Uprising.”Studies in Conflict&Terrorism 29(4):359-382.Hoyt,D.T.(2004).“Military Force.”In Attacking Terrorism,edited by J.M.Ludes and A.K.Cronin,pp.162-185.Washington,DC:Georgetown University Press.
(3)Pedahzur,A.,and Perliger,A.(2006).“The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks—A Social Network Perspective.”Social Forces 84(4):1983-2004.
(1)Carley,M. K.,Diesner,K.,Reminga,J.,and Tsevetovat,M.(2006).“Towards an Interoperable Dynamic of Network Analysis Toolkit.”Decisions Support System 43(4):1324-1347.Qin,J.,Xu,J. J.,Hu,D.,Sageman,M.,and Chen,H.(2005).“Analyzing Terrorist Networks:A Case Study of the Global Salafi Jihad Network.”Intelligence and Security Informatics 3495:287-304.Brams,J. S.,Mutlu,H.,and Ramirez,S. L.(2006).“Influence in Terrorist Networks:From Undirected to Directed Graphs.”Studies in Conflict&Terrorism 29(7):703-718.Koschade,S.(2006).“A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah:The Applications to Counterterrorism and Intelligence.”Studies in Conflict&Terrorism 29(6):559-575.Asal,V.,and Rethemeyer,R. K.(2008).“The Nature of the Beast:Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks.”Journal of Politics 70:437-449.Helfstein,S.,and Wright,D.(2011).“Covert or Convenient? Evolution of Terror Attack Networks,”Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(5):785-813.Perliger,A.,and Pedahzur,A.(2011).“Social Network Analysis in the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence.”PS:Political Science and Politics 44(1):45-50.Sageman,M.(2011). Leaderless Jihad:Terror Networks in The Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press.
(2)为了说明这一点,美国国务院的外国恐怖组织(foreign terrorist organizations)从2013年开始列出伊朗支持真主党、哈马斯、巴勒斯坦伊斯兰圣战组织和解放巴勒斯坦总指挥人民阵线的情况。见http://www. state. gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224826. htm。
(1)Hoffman,B.(1999).“Terrorism Trends and Prospects.”In Countering the New Terrorism,edited by I. Lesser,pp. 7-38. Santa Monica,CA:RAND.Laqueur,W.(1999). The New Terrorism. Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. New York:Oxford University Press.Kurz,A.(2003)“New Terrorism:New Challenges,Old Dilemmas.”Strategic Assessment 6. http://www. inss. org. il/uploadImages/systemFiles/New%20 Terrorism%20 New%20 Challenges%20 Old%20 Dilemmas. pdf.
(2)Arquilla,J.,and Ronfeld,D.(1999). Networks and Netwar,the Future of Terror,Crime,and Militancy. Washington,DC:Rand Corporation.Jones,D.,Smith,L. R. M.,and Wedding,M.(2003).“Looking for the Pattern:Al Qaeda in South East Asia—The Genealogy of a Terror Network.”Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26(6):443-457.Mishal,S.(2003).“The Pragmatic Dimension of the Palestinian Hamas:A Network Perspective.”Armed Forces and Society 29(4):569-589.McAllister,B.(2004).“Al Qaeda and the Innovative Firm:Demythologizing the Network,”Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27:297-319.Sageman,M.(2011). Leaderless Jihad:Terror Networks in The Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press.Stohl,C.,and Stohl,M.(2007).“Networks of Terror:Theoretical Assumptions and Pragmatic Consequences.”Communication Theory 17(2):93-124.
(3)Krebs,E. V.(2002).“Mapping Network of Terrorist Cells,”Connections 24:43-52.Rodríguez,J.(2005).“The March 11 th Terrorist Network:In Its Weakness Lies Its Strength.”Paper presented at XXV International Sunbelt Conference,Los Angeles,February 16-20.Carley,M. K.,Diesner,K.,Reminga,J.,and Tsevetovat,M.(2006).“Towards an Interoperable Dynamic of Network Analysis Toolkit.”Decisions Support System 43(4):1324-1347.Koschade,S.(2006).“A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah:The Applications to Counterterrorism and Intelligence.”Studies in Conflict&Terrorism 29(6):559-575.
(1)Pedahzur,A.,and Perliger,A.(2006).“The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks-A Social Network Perspective.”Social Forces 84(4):1983-2004.Helfstein,S.,and Wright,D.(2011).“Covert or Convenient?Evolution of Terror Attack Networks,”Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(5):785-813.
(2)Carley,K.,Dombroski,M.,Tsvetovat,M.,Reminga,J.,and Kamneva,N.(2003).“Destabilizing Dynamic Covert Networks.”In Proceedings of the 8 th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium,Washington,DC:National Defense War College.http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/publications/papers/a2 c2_carley_2003_destabilizing.pdf.Helfstein,S.,and Wright,D.(2011).“Covert or Convenient?Evolution of Terror Attack Networks,”Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(5):785-813.Cale,H.,and Horgan,J.(2012).“Methodological Triangulation in the Analysis of Terrorist Networks.”Studies in Conflict&Terrorism 35(2):182-192.Perliger,A.(2014).“Terrorist Networks’Productivity and Durability-A Comparative Multi-level Analysis.”Perspectives on Terrorism 8(4):36-52.
(3)Tsvetovat,M.,and Carley,M.K.(2005).“Structural Knowledge and Success of Anti-Terrorist Activity:The Downside of Structural Equivalence.”Journal of Social Structure 6.http://repository.cmu.edu/isr/43/.Carley,M.K.,Diesner,K.,Reminga,J.,and Tsevetovat,M.(2006).“Towards an Interoperable Dynamic of Network Analysis Toolkit.”Decisions Support System 43(4):1324-1347.Jackson,A.B.(2006).“Groups,Networks,or Movements:A Command-and-Control-Driven Approach to Classifying Terrorist Organizations and Its Application to Al Qaeda.”Studies in Conflict&Terrorism 29(3):241-262.
(4)Pedahzur,A.,and Perliger,A.(2006).“The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks-A Social Network Perspective.”Social Forces 84(4):1983-2004.Helfstein,S.,and Wright,D.(2011).“Covert or Convenient?Evolution of Terror Attack Networks,”Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(5):785-813.
(5)Perliger,A.,and Pedahzur,A.(2014).“Political Violence and Counter-Culture Communities-An Alternative Outlook on Religious Terrorism,”Political Studies,10.doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12182.
(1)主要是来自金融领域,可参见http://icsr.info/projects/western-foreign-fighters-syria/上的国王学院ICSR相关数据集.
(2)Diesner,J.,and Carley,M.K.(2008).“Conditional Random Fields for Entity Extraction and Ontological Text Coding.”Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory,14(3):248-262.
(3)Jackson,A.B.(2006).“Groups,Networks,or Movements:A Command-and-Control-Driven Approach to Classifying Terrorist Organizations and Its Application to Al Qaeda.”Studies in Conflict&Terrorism 29(3):241-262.
(4)Rodríguez,J.(2005).“The March 11th Terrorist Network:In Its Weakness Lies Its Strength.”Paper presented at XXVInternational Sunbelt Conference,Los Angeles,February 16-20.Perliger,A.,and Pedahzur,A.(2014).“Political Violence and Counter-Culture Communities-An Alternative Outlook on Religious Terrorism,”Political Studies,10.doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12182.
(5)Porter,Geoff.(2015).“What to Make of the Bay`a in North Africa?”CTC Sentinel 8(3).https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/what-to-make-of-the-baya-in-north-africa.
(6)Porter,Geoff.(2015).“What to Make of the Bay`a in North Africa?”CTC Sentinel 8(3).https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/what-to-make-of-the-baya-in-north-africa.
(7)Zenn,J.(2015).“A Biography of Boko Haram and the Bay`a to al-Baghdadi.”CTC Sentinel 8(3).https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/pledging-baya-a-benefit-or-burden-to-the-islamic-state.
(1)Moghadam,A.(2015).“Terrorist Affiliations in Context:A Typology of Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation.”CTC Sentinel 8(3).https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/terrorist-affiliations-in-context-a-typology-of-terrorist-inter-group-cooperation.
(2)Harik,P.J.(2004).Hezbollah:The Changing Face of Terrorism.London:Tauris.
(3)Coughlin,C.(2015).“Iran Is Intensifying Efforts to Support Hamas in Gaza.”The Telegraph,April 4.http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/11515603/Iran-is-intensifying-efforts-to-support-Hamas-in-Gaza.html.
(1)Cafiero,G.,and Certo,P.(2014).“Hamas and Hezbollah Agree to Disagree on Syria.”Atlantic Council,January 30 http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/hamas-and-hezbollah-agree-to-disagree-on-syria.
(2)各种报道支持这一说法,主要是在阿拉伯媒体,黎巴嫩的al-Mustaqbal和泛阿拉伯新闻媒体Asharq al-Awsat等报纸上。沙特驻美国大使也证实了这一点,见http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/news/724391。
(3)Momatz,R.(2012).“Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Accused in Israeli Embassy Bombing:Report.”ABC News,July 30.http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/irans-revolutionary-guard-accused-israeli-embassy-bombing-report/story?id=16888481.
(4)Savage,C.,and Shane,S.(2011).“Iranians Accused of a Plot to Kill Saudies’US Envoy.”New York Times,October11.http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/us/us-accuses-iranians-of-plotting-to-kill-saudi-envoy.html?_r=0.
(5)感谢美国军事学院反恐中心的丹·米尔顿博士分享了ISIS效忠网络的数据。
(1)Milton,D.,and Al-Ubaydi,M.(2015).“Pledging Bay`a:A Benefit or a Burden to the Islamic State?”CTC Sentinel 8 (3).https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/march-2015-baya-special-issue.
(2)Perliger,A.(2013).Challengers from the Sidelines,Understanding the American Violent Far Right.West Point,NY:Combating Terrorism Center.
(3)Laszlo-Barabasi,A.,and Bonabeau,E.(2003).“Scale-Free Networks.”Scientific American 288(5):60-69.
(4)Perliger,A.(2013).Challengers from the Sidelines,Understanding the American Violent Far Right.West Point,NY:Combating Terrorism Center.
(1)Perliger A.,Pedahzur,A.,and Zalmanovitch,Y.(2005).“The Defensive Dimension of the Battle against Terrorism-An Analysis of Management of Terror Incidents in Jerusalem.”Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 13(2):79-91.
(2)Perliger A.,Pedahzur,A.,and Zalmanovitch,Y.(2005).“The Defensive Dimension of the Battle against Terrorism-An Analysis of Management of Terror Incidents in Jerusalem.”Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 13(2):79-91.
(3)Perliger A.,Pedahzur,A.,and Zalmanovitch,Y.(2005).“The Defensive Dimension of the Battle against Terrorism-An Analysis of Management of Terror Incidents in Jerusalem.”Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 13(2):79-91.
(4)Perliger A.,Pedahzur,A.,and Zalmanovitch,Y.(2005).“The Defensive Dimension of the Battle against Terrorism-An Analysis of Management of Terror Incidents in Jerusalem.”Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 13(2):79-91.
(1)Wilkinson,P.(2000).Terrorism Versus Democracy:The Liberal State Response.New York:Routledge.Schmid,P.A.(1992).“Terrorism and Democracy.”Terrorism and Political Violence 4(4):14-15.Chalk,P.(1998).“The Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy.”Australian Journal of Politics and History44(3):373-388.Cerlinsten,D.R.,and Schmid,A.(1992).“Western Response to Terrorism:A Twenty Five Year Balance Sheet.”Terrorism and Political Violence 4(4):307-340.Groenewold,K.(1992).“The German Federal Republic’s Response and Civil Liberties.”Terrorism and Political Violence 4(4):136-150.
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