非国有股东治理与国企分红——兼论混合所有制改革
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摘要
国有企业缺乏有效的分工动机已成为国企改革中一直未能有效克服的顽疾,而国企混合所有制改革对公司的治理绩效的提升无疑会起到积极的作用,其中能否改善公司的财务政策、提升公司的分红动机?本文以2008-2014年的国有上市公司数据为样本,利用手工收集的非国有股东持股比例和委派高管人员比例,检验非国有股东治理对国企分红的影响及作用机制。结果表明,非国有股东治理能够显著地提升国企分红的倾向和水平,该结论在控制了内生性后依然成立;同时非国有股东治理对国企分红的提升效应是通过降低国有企业内部代理成本实现的。进一步研究还表明,良好的法律环境和竞争性行业特征能够对上述影响产生正向的调节作用。本文的研究从非国有股东治理的角度,为混合所有制改革的经济效果提供了一定的证据支持。
Lack of effective motivation for division of labor in state-owned enterprises has become a persistent problem that has not been effectively overcome in the reform of state-owned enterprises. Mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises will undoubtedly play a positive role in improving corporate governance performance,which can improve the company's financial policy and enhance the company's dividend motivation? Based on the data of state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2014,this paper examines the impact and mechanism of non-state-owned shareholders' governance on dividends of state-owned enterprises by using the proportion of non-state-owned shareholders and the proportion of senior executives from non-state-owned shareholders collected by hand. The results show that the non-state-owned shareholder governance can significantly improve the tendency and level of dividends of state-owned enterprises,and this conclusion is still established after controlling endogeneity; at the same time,the effect of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the dividend of state-owned enterprises is realized by reducing the internal agency costs of stateowned enterprises. In addition,further research has shown that a good legal environment and competitive industry characteristics can positively regulate these effects. The research of this paper provides some evidence support for the economic effects of mixed ownership reform from the perspective of non-state-owned shareholders' governance.
Lack of effective motivation for division of labor in state-owned enterprises has become a persistent problem that has not been effectively overcome in the reform of state-owned enterprises. Mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises will undoubtedly play a positive role in improving corporate governance performance,which can improve the company's financial policy and enhance the company's dividend motivation? Based on the data of state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2014,this paper examines the impact and mechanism of non-state-owned shareholders' governance on dividends of state-owned enterprises by using the proportion of non-state-owned shareholders and the proportion of senior executives from non-state-owned shareholders collected by hand. The results show that the non-state-owned shareholder governance can significantly improve the tendency and level of dividends of state-owned enterprises,and this conclusion is still established after controlling endogeneity; at the same time,the effect of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the dividend of state-owned enterprises is realized by reducing the internal agency costs of stateowned enterprises. In addition,further research has shown that a good legal environment and competitive industry characteristics can positively regulate these effects. The research of this paper provides some evidence support for the economic effects of mixed ownership reform from the perspective of non-state-owned shareholders' governance.
引文
[1]卢锐,柳建华,许宁.内部控制、产权与高管薪酬业绩敏感性[J].会计研究,2011(10):42-48.
[2]张荣刚,刘小玄.国有企业的债务困境及其原因——湖北钢丝厂的案例调查[J].经济研究,1996(2):59-60.
[3]平新乔,范瑛,郝朝艳.中国国有企业代理成本的实证分析[J].经济研究,2003(11):42-53.
[4]罗宏,黄文华.国企分红、在职消费与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2008,180(9):139-148.
[5] Shleifer A,Vishny R W. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(3):461-488.
[6]李文贵,余明桂.民营化企业的股权结构与企业创新[J].管理世界,2015(4):112-125.
[7] Jensen C,Meckling H. Theory of the firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Cost and ownership struture[J].1976.
[8] Xu L. Types of large shareholders,corporate governance,and firm performance:evidence from China's listed companies[J]. Hong Kong Polytechnic University,2004.
[9] Laffont J J,Tirole J. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation[J].Mit Press Books,1993,1(428).
[10]逯东,孙岩,周玮,等.地方政府政绩诉求、政府控制权与公司价值研究[J].经济研究,2014(1):56-69.
[11]冯锐,李胜兰.法律环境差异对上市公司价值的影响研究——基于中国《证券法》的分析[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2015,68(2):74-79.
[12] Silanes F L D,La Porta R,Shleifer A,et al. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance[M]. 2000.
[13] Dyck A,Zingales L. Private Benefits of Control:An International Comparison[J].Journal of Finance,2004,59(2):537-600.
[14] Burgstahler D,Hail L,Leuz C. The Importance of Reporting Incentives:[J].2006.
[15]夏立军,郭建展,陆铭.企业家的“政由己出”——民营IPO公司创始人管理、市场环境与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2012(9):132-141.
[16] Chang E C,Wong S M L. Governance with multiple objectives:Evidence from top executive turnover in China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2009,15(2):230-244.
[17] Almeida H,Campello M,Weisbach M S. The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash[J].Journal of Finance,2004,59(4):1777-1804.
[18]李寿喜.产权、代理成本和代理效率[J].经济研究,2007(1):102-113.
[19]卢峰,姚洋.金融压抑下的法治、金融发展和经济增长[J].中国社会科学,2004(1):42-55.
[20] Brockman P,Unlu E. Dividend policy,creditor rights,and the agency costs of debt☆[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,92(2):276-299.
[21]王国俊,王跃堂,韩雪,等.差异化现金分红监管政策有效吗?——基于公司治理的视角[J].会计研究,2017(7):48-54.
[22]陈立泰,林川.董事会特征与现金股利分配倾向[J].管理世界,2011(10):178-179.
[23]谢军.股利政策、第一大股东和公司成长性:自由现金流理论还是掏空理论[J].会计研究,2006(4):53-59.
[24]周翼翔.股权结构与公司绩效:基于动态内生性视角的经验证据[J].经济管理,2012(1):71-82.
[25] Fan J P H,Wong T J,Zhang T. Institutions and Organizational Structure:The Case of State-Owned Corporate Pyramids[J].Journal of Law Economics&Organization,2013,29(6):1217-1252.
[26]黄继承,朱冰,向东.法律环境与资本结构动态调整[J].管理世界,2014(5):142-156.
[27]王运通,姜付秀.多个大股东能否降低公司债务融资成本[J].世界经济,2017,40(10):119-143.
[28]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数.各省区市场化相对进程2016年度报告[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2016.
[29]岳希明,李实,史泰丽.垄断行业高收入问题探讨[J].中国社会科学,2010(3):77-93.
[30]焦健,刘银国,张琛,等.国企分红、过度投资与企业绩效——基于沪深两市国有控股上市公司的面板数据分析[J].经济与管理研究,2014(4):104-112.
(1)手工收集的过程如下:首先从CSMAR数据库获取了上市公司前十大股东数据以及上市公司董监高兼任信息数据;其次,根据前十大股东的名称通过Wind的“中国企业库”获取该股东是否为“国资委实际控股”,若是则认定其为国有股,否则为非国有股,从而确定了前十大股东非国有股的持股比例;再次,通过“兼任单位是否为股东”,筛选出在股东单位兼任的上市公司董监高人员,视为股东委派人员;最后,若股东单位不属于国资委实际控股单位,则其委派的董监高为非国有股东委派董监高。
[2]张荣刚,刘小玄.国有企业的债务困境及其原因——湖北钢丝厂的案例调查[J].经济研究,1996(2):59-60.
[3]平新乔,范瑛,郝朝艳.中国国有企业代理成本的实证分析[J].经济研究,2003(11):42-53.
[4]罗宏,黄文华.国企分红、在职消费与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2008,180(9):139-148.
[5] Shleifer A,Vishny R W. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(3):461-488.
[6]李文贵,余明桂.民营化企业的股权结构与企业创新[J].管理世界,2015(4):112-125.
[7] Jensen C,Meckling H. Theory of the firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Cost and ownership struture[J].1976.
[8] Xu L. Types of large shareholders,corporate governance,and firm performance:evidence from China's listed companies[J]. Hong Kong Polytechnic University,2004.
[9] Laffont J J,Tirole J. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation[J].Mit Press Books,1993,1(428).
[10]逯东,孙岩,周玮,等.地方政府政绩诉求、政府控制权与公司价值研究[J].经济研究,2014(1):56-69.
[11]冯锐,李胜兰.法律环境差异对上市公司价值的影响研究——基于中国《证券法》的分析[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2015,68(2):74-79.
[12] Silanes F L D,La Porta R,Shleifer A,et al. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance[M]. 2000.
[13] Dyck A,Zingales L. Private Benefits of Control:An International Comparison[J].Journal of Finance,2004,59(2):537-600.
[14] Burgstahler D,Hail L,Leuz C. The Importance of Reporting Incentives:[J].2006.
[15]夏立军,郭建展,陆铭.企业家的“政由己出”——民营IPO公司创始人管理、市场环境与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2012(9):132-141.
[16] Chang E C,Wong S M L. Governance with multiple objectives:Evidence from top executive turnover in China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2009,15(2):230-244.
[17] Almeida H,Campello M,Weisbach M S. The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash[J].Journal of Finance,2004,59(4):1777-1804.
[18]李寿喜.产权、代理成本和代理效率[J].经济研究,2007(1):102-113.
[19]卢峰,姚洋.金融压抑下的法治、金融发展和经济增长[J].中国社会科学,2004(1):42-55.
[20] Brockman P,Unlu E. Dividend policy,creditor rights,and the agency costs of debt☆[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,92(2):276-299.
[21]王国俊,王跃堂,韩雪,等.差异化现金分红监管政策有效吗?——基于公司治理的视角[J].会计研究,2017(7):48-54.
[22]陈立泰,林川.董事会特征与现金股利分配倾向[J].管理世界,2011(10):178-179.
[23]谢军.股利政策、第一大股东和公司成长性:自由现金流理论还是掏空理论[J].会计研究,2006(4):53-59.
[24]周翼翔.股权结构与公司绩效:基于动态内生性视角的经验证据[J].经济管理,2012(1):71-82.
[25] Fan J P H,Wong T J,Zhang T. Institutions and Organizational Structure:The Case of State-Owned Corporate Pyramids[J].Journal of Law Economics&Organization,2013,29(6):1217-1252.
[26]黄继承,朱冰,向东.法律环境与资本结构动态调整[J].管理世界,2014(5):142-156.
[27]王运通,姜付秀.多个大股东能否降低公司债务融资成本[J].世界经济,2017,40(10):119-143.
[28]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数.各省区市场化相对进程2016年度报告[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2016.
[29]岳希明,李实,史泰丽.垄断行业高收入问题探讨[J].中国社会科学,2010(3):77-93.
[30]焦健,刘银国,张琛,等.国企分红、过度投资与企业绩效——基于沪深两市国有控股上市公司的面板数据分析[J].经济与管理研究,2014(4):104-112.
(1)手工收集的过程如下:首先从CSMAR数据库获取了上市公司前十大股东数据以及上市公司董监高兼任信息数据;其次,根据前十大股东的名称通过Wind的“中国企业库”获取该股东是否为“国资委实际控股”,若是则认定其为国有股,否则为非国有股,从而确定了前十大股东非国有股的持股比例;再次,通过“兼任单位是否为股东”,筛选出在股东单位兼任的上市公司董监高人员,视为股东委派人员;最后,若股东单位不属于国资委实际控股单位,则其委派的董监高为非国有股东委派董监高。