均势、霸权抑或协调?德约视域下的国际体系结构选择
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摘要
国际体系的结构模式问题是国际政治研究中的重点议题。作为兰克之后德国最著名的历史学家之一,路德维希·德约在此议题上为国际关系研究提供了深邃洞见。德约修正了兰克的国际权势斗争机理,聚焦国际求霸行为的多重机制,强调域外大国的独特优势和体系间互动的特殊机理,并将关注视野拓展到全球体系互动之中。在当前国际变迁形势之下,学者对国际体系结构选择问题的关注也重新激活并修正了德约七十年前的思考。在介绍并评述德约理论之路径创新和因果机制的基础上,文章以德约理论框架为切入点,分别讨论了美国对外大战略的转变和中国所面对的大国博弈中的制衡问题,并在当前权势转移与中美竞争背景下试图展现大国协调机制是一种降低国际体系战争风险的可行选择。
The structural form of international system is a focal issue in international political studies.Ludwig Dehio,one of the most famous German historians after Leopold von Ranke,provided profound insights for IR studies.Revising the Rankian rationales on international power struggle,Dehio provided multiple mechanisms on bid for hegemony,which put emphasis on particular advantages of outside powers and special approach of inter-system interaction;moreover,he extended the issue into the interactions within global system.At present,in confront of the international power transition,academic attention on the structure of international system activates and updates Dehio’s thoughts before seventies years.This article reviews innovative approaches and causal mechanism of Dehio’s theoretical framework,which are applied to analyze the change of U S grand strategies and the balancing situation China faced in great-power competition.It aims to show the concert of powers seems to be a feasible mode of decreasing the risk of international systematic war in front to current power transition and Sino-US competition.
The structural form of international system is a focal issue in international political studies.Ludwig Dehio,one of the most famous German historians after Leopold von Ranke,provided profound insights for IR studies.Revising the Rankian rationales on international power struggle,Dehio provided multiple mechanisms on bid for hegemony,which put emphasis on particular advantages of outside powers and special approach of inter-system interaction;moreover,he extended the issue into the interactions within global system.At present,in confront of the international power transition,academic attention on the structure of international system activates and updates Dehio’s thoughts before seventies years.This article reviews innovative approaches and causal mechanism of Dehio’s theoretical framework,which are applied to analyze the change of U S grand strategies and the balancing situation China faced in great-power competition.It aims to show the concert of powers seems to be a feasible mode of decreasing the risk of international systematic war in front to current power transition and Sino-US competition.
引文
(1)关注国际体系之结构形式问题的英文文献,参见Davide Fiammenghi,“The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics:A Neorealist Synthesis”,International Security,Vol.35,No.4,2011,pp.126-154;Jack Donnelly,“The Elements of the Structures of International Systems”,International Organization,Vol.66,No.4,2012,pp.609-643;相关中文文献参见房乐宪:《国际体系结构与国际稳定:理论争论及思考》,载《教学与研究》2006年第6期,第81～87页;江西元:《试析国际体系结构转型:范式界定、特点与趋势》,载《现代国际关系》2007年第10期,第29～34页;庞晓波、黄卫挺:《国际体系结构与国家行为:一个博弈理论模型》,载《东北亚论坛》2010年第3期,第75～81页。
(2)Leopold von Ranke,The Theory and Practice of History,in George G.Iggers ed.,Oxon:Routledge,2011,p.33.
(3)在某种意义上,德国帝国主义的全球扩张及其最终悲剧形成的原因也包括当时德国历史学家所鼓噪的兰克均势思想的拓展运用。参见Winfried Baumgart,“German Imperialism in Historical Perspective”,in Arthur J.Knoll and Lewis H.Gann eds.,Germans in the Tropics:Essays in German Colonial History,New York:Greenwood Press,1987,pp.152-153。
(4)时殷弘:《兰克〈论列强〉回顾与相关的“中国含义”》,载《世界经济与政治》2010年第6期,第51～63页;王日华:《国际关系理论中的历史主义》,载《国际政治科学》2015年第4期,第113～147页。
(5)Ludwig Dehio,Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie:Betrachtungen über ein Grundproblem der neueren Staatengeschichte,Krefeld:Scherpe,1948.
(6)查理斯·普尔曼(Charles Fullman)将《均势抑或霸权》(Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie)德文版翻译成英文版时将此书题目翻译成《脆弱的均势》(The Precarious Balance),时殷弘依据英文版将该书翻译成同名中文版。参见路德维希·德约:《脆弱的平衡:欧洲四个世纪的权势斗争》,时殷弘译,人民出版社2016年版。
(7)具体影响参见时殷弘:《现当代国际关系史(从16世纪到20世纪末)》,中国人民大学出版社2006年版,第52～53页。
(8)Aaron L.Friedberg,“Will Europe’s Past be Asia’s Future?” Survival,Vol.42,No.3,2000,pp.147-160;Richard Ned Lebow and Benjamin Valentino,“Lost in Transition:A Critical Analysis of Power Transition Theory”,International Relations,Vol.23,No.3,2009,pp.389-410;Woosang Kim and Scott Gates,“Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China”,International Area Studies Review,Vol.18,No.3,2015,pp.219-226.
(9)阎学通提出了道义现实主义理论,并将其核心问题界定为“崛起国是如何取代现行世界主导国的地位”。参见阎学通:《世界权力的转移:政治领导与战略竞争》,北京大学出版社2015年版,第3页。
(10)例如G.John Ikenberry,“The Rise of China and the Future of the West:Can the Liberal System Survive?”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.87,No.1,2008,pp.23-37;John J.Mearsheimer,“China’s Unpeaceful Rise”,Current History,Vol.105,No.690,2006,pp.160-162;Graham Allison,“The Thucydides Trap:Are the U.S.and China Headed for War?”,The Atlantic,September 24,2015,https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/。
(11)关于德约与国际体系长周期的论述,参见William R.Thompson,“Dehio,Long Cycles,and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition”,World Politics,Vol.45,No.1,1992,pp.127-152;关于Aaron Zack对德约的评价和理论修正,参见Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,Lanham,Maryland:Lexington Press,2017;关于德约的均势机理和国际体系稳定性及战略风险,参见时殷弘:《制衡的困难——关于均势自动生成论及其重大缺陷》,载《太平洋学报》1998年第4期,第48～58页;吴征宇:《兰克VS.德约:均势现实主义与霸权现实主义》,载《欧洲研究》2007年第2期,第21～32页。
(12)参见时殷弘:《现代国际体系史的一大理解范式和根本主题》,载《史学月刊》2006年第3期,第77～81页;其他相应研究参见时殷弘、石斌:《美国与21世纪世界政治的根本问题》,载《战略与管理》1997年第3期,第1～11页;时殷弘、郝莹:《利奥波德·冯·兰克的国际政治观》,载《欧洲》1998年第4期,第4～10页;时殷弘:《兰克〈论列强〉回顾与相关的“中国含义”》,第51～63页。
(13)吴征宇:《兰克VS.德约:均势现实主义与霸权现实主义》,第21～32页。
(14)根据Google Scholar统计,截至2017年7月,德约之主要著作的德文与英文版被引用达700多次,其中,《二十世纪的德国与世界政治》共被引用198次,《脆弱的平衡》共被引用476次,《德国与世界大战时代》以及《兰克与德国帝国主义》等著作共被引用近50次;但是,相应著作尚未得到国际关系学界的太多青睐。参见https://scholar.google.es/scholar?hl=zh-CN&q=Ludwig+dehio&btnG=&lr=。
(15)David Hume,“Of Balance of Power”,in John A.Vasquez ed.,Classics of International Relations,Englewood Cliffs,N.J.:Prentice-Hall,1990,p.275.
(16)当然,兰克也强调另一个动力,即作为国家法律与社会基础的文化与文明因素,并认为这是区分不同国家和推动国家内部发展的最强有力的动力,参见Leopold von Ranke,The Theory and Practice of History,pp.84,102-104。
(17)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,pp.11-12.
(18)Ludwig Dehio,Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century,trans.by Dieter Pevsner,London:Chatton & Windus,1959,p.42;时殷弘:《兰克〈论列强〉回顾与相关的“中国含义”》,第57页。
(19)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.13.
(20)Ludwig Dehio,Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century, p.65.
(21)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.14.
(22)“孤立大国”是依靠水体保护的国家,其社会环境较为自由、具有海权和贸易野心但缺乏具有影响力的常备军;“域外大国”是指地处国家体系外却依然与其保持互动的国家;“侧翼大国”则是在国家体系中处于体系地理位置边缘区域的国家,它们可能是该体系的成员。根据德约的论述,侧翼大国与孤立大国有的时候是重合的,当体系互动程度提升时,三种大国类型也会产生重合。参见Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,p.12。
(23)吴征宇:《兰克VS.德约:均势现实主义与霸权现实主义》,第26页。
(24)William R.Thompson,“Dehio,Long Cycles,and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition,”pp.127-152.
(25)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.40.
(26)Ibid.,p.42.
(27)Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,p.15.
(28)德约在《兰克与德国帝国主义》(Ranke and Germany Imperialism)一文中指出:“英吉利继承战争”这一概念是马克斯·仑茨借用“西班牙王位继承战争”所创造的词汇,用于形容布尔战争之后的英帝国所面临的多个强大敌人在海陆两方面威胁的危险局面;其好友汉斯·德尔布吕克(Hans Delbrück)也抱有类似看法,他赞同提尔皮茨的风险理论,并且相信德国能够组建对抗英国霸权的大联盟,使英国如拿破仑一样落入被大联盟击败的命运。参见Ludwig Dehio,Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century,pp.44-48。
(29)Ludwig Dehio,Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century,pp.46-47.
(30)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,pp.231-232.
(31)Ludwig Dehio,Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century,p.53.
(32)德约指出,作为两个相互独立又互相影响的双方,海洋体系与大陆体系经历了不平行发展,此时海权已经极为强大。在当代欧洲体系中,海权体系权势总体呈上升趋势,并最终在挫败了拿破仑一世的霸权斗争后彻底压过陆权优势。相关论述参见Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.267;William R.Thompson,“Dehio,Long Cycles,and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition”,pp.127-152。
(33)“国家间体系”(Staatensystem)是德约理论框架中的关键概念,时殷弘将其翻译成“国际体系”,扎克将此翻译成“国家体系”(state system)。参见Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance;Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,p.10;路德维希·德约:《脆弱的平衡:欧洲四个世纪的权势斗争》。
(34)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.6.
(35)Ibid.,p.193.
(36)Ibid.,pp.193,241.
(37)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,pp.130-131,265;Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,p.27.
(38)Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,p.75.
(39)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.117;Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,p.15.
(40)德约将两次世界大战作为全球体系必霸律的例证。参见Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.234。
(41)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.23.
(42)德约在《欧洲体系的消逝》(“The Passing of European System”)一文中强调,欧洲体系被更大范围的亚欧体系包裹,进一步与西半球体系组成全球体系的主要部分。参见Ludwig Dehio,Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century,p.128。
(43)Martin Wight,Power Politics,Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad eds.,Leicester:Leicester University Press,1978,p.180.
(44)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.268.
(45)Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,pp.31-55.
(46)Ibid.,pp.75-86.
(47)德约多次强调陆权和海权的反复争霸、大陆体系与海洋体系的长期对抗,参见Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance。卡尔·施密特(Carl Schmitt)也认为,世界历史就是一部陆权和海权对抗的战争史,参见Carl Schmitt,Land and Sea,trans.by Simona Draghici,Washington,D.C.:Plutarch Press,1997,p.5。
(48)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,pp.266-267.
(49)Ibid.,pp.243-244.
(50)若干相关著作已经译成中文引入国内,参见约翰·加迪斯:《遏制战略:战后美国国家安全政策评析》,时殷弘、李庆四、樊吉社译,世界知识出版社2005年版;约翰·伊肯伯里:《美国无敌:均势的未来》,韩召颖译,北京大学出版社2005年版;罗伯特·阿特:《美国大战略》,郭树勇译,北京大学出版社2005年版;克里斯托弗·莱恩:《和平的幻想:1940年以来的美国大战略》,孙建中译,上海人民出版社2009年版;凯文·纳里泽尼:《大战略的政治经济学》,白云真、傅强译,上海人民出版社2014年版;巴里·波森:《克制:美国大战略的新基础》,曲丹译,社会科学文献出版社2016年版。
(51)Christopher Layne,The Peace of Illusions:American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present,Ithaca,New York:Cornell University,2006,p.159.
(52)Stratfor,“Geopolitical Diary:America’s Indivisible Imperatives”,Stratfor,July 2,2009,https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/geopolitical-diary-americas-indivisible-imperatives.
(53)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,pp.95-96,191-193;吴征宇:《离岸制衡与选择性干预——对二战后美国大战略的理论思考》,载《世界经济与政治》2009年第10期,第33～40页。
(54)David C.Gompert,Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific,Rand Corporation,2013,pp.36-44;田文林:《美中加强合作对美更有利》,载《人民日报》(海外版),2012年9月19日,第1版。
(55)David C.Gompert,Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific,pp.40-41.
(56)Strafor,“The Geopolitics of the United States,Part 1:The Inevitable Empire”,Strafor,July 4,2016,https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/geopolitics-united-states-part-1-inevitable-empire;Strafor,“The Geopolitics of the United States,Part 2:American Identity and the Threats of Tomorrow”,Strafor,August 25,2011,https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/geopolitics-united-states-part-2-american-identity-and-threats-tomorrow.
(57)叶成城:《重新审视地缘政治学:社会科学方法论的视角》,载《世界经济与政治》2015年第5期,第100～124页。
(58)Aaron M.Zack,Ludwig Dehio and International Relations:A Theoretical,Historical and Strategic Analysis,Ph.D.dissertation,Johns Hopkins University,Baltimore,Maryland,2010,p.170;Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,pp.95-97.
(59)Robert J.Art,A Grand Strategy for America,Ithaca:Cornell University Press,2004,pp.161-162.
(60)Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,pp.98-99.
(61)Christopher Layne,“The Waning of U.S.Hegemony-Myth or Reality? A Review Essay”,International Security,Vol.34,No.1,2009,pp.147-172.
(62)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.9;Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,pp.9-10.
(63)“A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)”,April 14,1950,in Foreign Relations of the United States 1950,Vol.1,Washington:United States Government Printing Office,1977,p.245,https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus 1950v01/d85.
(64)George W.Bush,“Inaugural Address”,The American Presidency Project,January 20,2005,http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58745.
(65)Robert J.Art,A Grand Strategy for America,p.123.
(66)张群基本默认东亚地区的域外霸权是美国,认为域外霸权的介入程度会影响到地区国家安全合作进程。参见张群:《东亚区域公共产品供给与中国—东盟合作》,载《太平洋学报》2017年第5期,第44～54页。
(67)Robert J.Art,A Grand Strategy for America,p.122.
(68)Ibid.,p.136.
(69)Christopher Layne,The Peace of Illusions:American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present,pp.126-127.
(70)Christopher Layne,“From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing:America’s Future Grand Strategy”,International Security,Vol.22,No.1,1997,pp.86-124;Aaron M.Zack,“Sovereignty and Grand Strategy:Some Observations on the Rise of China and Decline of the Americans”,Telos,No.181,2017,pp.113-129.
(71)Christopher Layne,The Peace of Illusions:American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present,p.7.
(72)2017年,皮尤研究中心做了一次全球性民意调查,发现中东地区受访者的反美与亲美比例为64∶27,为当今世界上对美国和美国人最缺乏好感的地区。参见Richard Wike,Bruce Stokes,Jacob Poushter and Janell Fetterolf,“The Tarnished American Brand”,Pew Research Center,June 26,2017,http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/06/26/tarnished-american-brand/。
(73)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,pp.142,243-244,261.
(74)Robert J.Art,A Grand Strategy for America,pp.168-170.
(75)John J.Mearsheimer,The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,New York:W.W.Norton & Company,2014;Christopher Layne,The Peace of Illusions:American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present;John Ikenberry and Stephen M.Walt,“Taming American Power:The Global Response to U.S.Primacy”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.85,No.1,2005,p.145;Stephen M.Walt,“Offshore Balancing:An Idea Whose Time has Come”,Foreign Policy,http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/11/02/offshore-balancing-an-idea-whose-time-has-come/.
(76)John Mearsheimer and Stephen M.Walt,“The Case for Offshore Balancing”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.95,No.4,2016,pp.70-83.
(77)Christopher Layne,“From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing:America’s Future Grand Strategy”,pp.86-124.
(78)Christopher Layne,“China’s Challenge to US Hegemony”,Current History,Vol.107,No.705,2008,pp.13-18.
(79)Christopher Layne,The Peace of Illusions:American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present,p.20;巴里·波森:《克制:美国大战略的新基础》,第112～113页。
(80)Brian Rathbun,“A Rose by any other Name:Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism”,Security Studies,Vol.17,No.2,2008,pp.294-321.
(81)吉尔·伦德斯塔德(Geir Lundestad)批评认为,莱恩的研究在视角和方法上过于单一,低估了苏联威胁的严重程度并忽视了西欧国家对美国政策的相互塑造;吴征宇则批评认为,离岸平衡战略未能发现主导型海洋国家阻止大陆强国的真正原因是其在战争时期“能够转变为一支能够并愿意针对欧洲大陆对手进行重大战斗的大陆野战军”。参见Geir Lundestad,“American Grand Strategy since 1940:Political Science and History”,Diplomatic History,Vol.31,No.4,2007,pp.783-786;吴征宇:《地理政治学与美国大战略》,中国法制出版社2009年版,第19页。
(82)对均势自动生成理论的批判,参见时殷弘:《制衡的困难——关于均势自动生成论及其重大缺陷》,第48～58页;吴征宇:《论“均势自动生成”的逻辑机理及内在缺陷》,载《世界经济与政治》2003年第8期,第14～19页。
(83)德约坚持这一前提,不过,他也认为,保持绝对军事优势、主导亚欧大陆区域体系对美国这样的海洋国家而言并非最好的选择。参见Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,pp.80-90。
(84)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.233.
(85)Ibid.,p.268.
(86)Ibid.,pp.250,253.
(87)William R.Thompson,“Dehio,Long Cycles,and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition”,pp.127-152.
(88)关于欧洲体系内争霸战争较少可能性的论述,参见Ludwig Dehio,Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century,pp.124-141;对俄罗斯和日本难以成为区域大国的论述,参见John Mearsheimer and Stephen M.Walt,“The Case for Offshore Balancing”,p.82;Robert Ross,“Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia”,in T.V.Paul,James J.Wirtz,and Michel Fortmann eds.Balance of Power:Theory and Practice in the 21st Century,Stanford,CA:Stanford University Press,2004,pp.267-304。
(89)Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,pp.115-117.
(90)陆伯彬(Robert S.Ross)认为,东亚的政治格局分为大陆和海洋两个体系,中美分别在陆海两方面占有优势,而陆海分离的体系缓解了中美两国在东亚地区的冲突。但是,陆伯彬未能将两大体系放在动态平衡的角度上相融合,低估了德约强调的体系间互动的重要性。韦宗友则认为,应当通过两国协调缓解战略矛盾,促进东亚的“陆海分离型”秩序向“陆海融合型”秩序转变。参见Robert S.Ross,“The Geography of the Peace:East Asia in the Twenty-First Century”,International Security,Vol.23,No.4,1999,pp.81-118;韦宗友:《美国与东亚安全秩序挑战》,载石斌编:《亚太新未来——中外学者论国际关系与地区秩序》,南京大学出版社2016年版,第198～214页。
(91)关于中德崛起类比最近的一些著作,参见Graham Allison,Destined for War,New York:Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company,2017;Aaron L.Friedberg,“Will Europe’s Past be Asia’s Future?”,pp.147-160;Jean-Christophe Defraigne,“Is China on the Verge of a Weltpolitik? A Comparison of the Current Shift in the Balance of Power between China and the West and the Shift between Great Britain and Wilhelmine Germany”,in Kevin Cai ed.,Interpreting China as a Regional and Global Power,London:Palgrave Macmillan,2014,pp.293-323;Aaron Zack,“Some Considerations on the Rise of Germany and the Rise of China”,in Benjamin M.Rowland ed.,Is the West in Decline? MD:The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group,Inc.,2016,pp.19-45。
(92)Aaron Zack,“Some Considerations on the Rise of Germany and the Rise of China”,pp.19-45;梅然:《经济追求、相互依赖与德国在1914年的战争决定》,载《国际政治研究》2013年第2期,第128～153页。
(93)Graham Allison,Destined for War,p.19.
(94)Aaron Zack,“Some Considerations on the Rise of Germany and the Rise of China”,pp.19-45.
(95)Henry Kissinger,Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century,New York:Simon & Schuster,2002,pp.25-26;Aaron L.Friedberg,“Will Europe’s Past be Asia’s Future?”,pp.147-160.
(96)“满足政策”是俾斯麦时期的外交政策之一,其表现为向诸大国保证德国再无扩张野心以避免反德联盟的形成,俾斯麦去职后德国遂抛弃该政策。由于俾斯麦时期的“大陆政策”需要一个灵活的外交环境以孤立法国阻止其复仇,故要以“满足政策”为保证避免英俄对德国扩张的猜忌。参见徐弃郁:《脆弱的崛起:大战略与德意志帝国的命运》,新华出版社2014年版,第36～73,176～182页;Aaron Zack,“Some Considerations on the Rise of Germany and the Rise of China”,p.24.
(97)Aaron Zack,“Some Considerations on the Rise of Germany and the Rise of China”,pp.19-45;徐弃郁:《脆弱的崛起:大战略与德意志帝国的命运》,第76～77页。
(98)Ludwig Dehio,Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century,p.57.
(99)Sean Clark,“In the Dreadnought’s Shadow:Comparing China’s Rise with the Anglo-German Naval Arms Race China’s Tumultuous Rise”,Canadian Naval Review,Vol.7,No.3,2011,pp.4-9.
(100)Suisheng Zhao,“Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited:The Strident Turn”,Journal of Contemporary China,Vol.22,No.82,2013,pp.535-553.
(101)Abanti Bhattacharya,“Chinese Nationalism and China’s Assertive Foreign Policy”,The Journal of East Asian Affairs,Vol.21,No.1,2007,pp.235-262;Jessica Chen Weiss,“Powerful Patriots:Nationalism,Diplomacy,and the Strategic Logic of Anti-foreign Protest in China”,Ph.D.dissertation,University of California,San Diego,2008.
(102)Thomas Nisley,“China’s Rise in a Changing Regional Hierarchy:A Comparison of 21st-Century China to 20th-Century Germany”,The Journal of the Georgia Political Science Association,Vol.1,2014,pp.129-154.
(103)如扎克认为,中国可能如德国一样建立一支强大的蓝水海军以拒止美国对亚洲的干预能力;参见Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,p.117。
(104)Aaron M.Zack,Ludwig Dehio and International Relations:A Theoretical,Historical and Strategic Analysis,p.201.
(105)Aaron L.Friedberg,“Will Europe’s Past be Asia’s Future?”,pp.147-160.
(106)Aaron Zack,“Some Considerations on the Rise of Germany and the Rise of China”,pp.19-45.
(107)Euikon Kim,“Rising China and Turbulent East Asia:Asianization of China?”,Pacific Focus, Vol.29,No.1,2014,pp.1-7.
(108)Aaron Zack,“Some Considerations on the Rise of Germany and the Rise of China,” pp.19-45.
(109)Thomas Nisley,“China’s Rise in a Changing Regional Hierarchy:A Comparison of 21st-Century China to 20th-Century Germany”,pp.129-154.
(110)Aaron Zack,“Some Considerations on the Rise of Germany and the Rise of China”,pp.19-45.
(111)Jean-Christophe Defraigne,“Is China on the Verge of a Weltpolitik? A Comparison of the Current Shift in the Balance of Power between China and the West and the Shift between Great Britain and Wilhelmine Germany”,pp.293-323.
(112)James R.Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara,“History Rhymes:The German Precedent for Chinese Sea Power”,Orbis,Vol.54,No.1,2010,pp.14-34.
(113)Sean Clark,“In the Dreadnought’s Shadow:Comparing China’s Rise with the Anglo-German Naval Arms Race China’s Tumultuous Rise”,pp.4-9.
(114)Aaron Zack,“Some Considerations on the Rise of Germany and the Rise of China”,pp.19-45.
(115)Thomas Nisley,“China’s Rise in a Changing Regional Hierarchy:A Comparison of 21st-Century China to 20th-Century Germany”,pp.129-154.
(116)James R.Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara,“History Rhymes:The German Precedent for Chinese Sea Power”,pp.14-34.
(117)Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,p.70.
(118)Jean-Christophe Defraigne,“Is China on the Verge of a Weltpolitik? A Comparison of the Current Shift in the Balance of Power between China and the West and the Shift between Great Britain and Wilhelmine Germany”,pp.293-323;徐弃郁:《脆弱的崛起:大战略与德意志帝国的命运》,第164～167页。
(119)Aaron M.Zack,Ludwig Dehio and International Relations:A Theoretical,Historical and Strategic Analysis,pp.195-196.
(120)时殷弘:《兰克〈论列强〉回顾与相关的“中国含义”》,第51～63页。
(121)参见Hugh White,“Power Shift:Australia’s Future between Washington and Beijing”,Quarterly Essay,No.39,2010,pp.1-74;G.John Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama,“Between Balance of Power and Community:The Future of Multilateral Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific”,International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,Vol. 2,No.1,2002,pp.69-94;Namrata Goswami,“Power Shifts in East Asia:Balance of Power vs.Liberal Institutionalism”,Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs,Vol.18,No.1,2013,pp.3-31;G.John Ikenberry,“From Hegemony to the Balance of Power:The Rise of China and American Grand Strategy in East Asia”,International Journal of Korean Unification Studies,Vol.23,No.2,2014,pp.41-63;Amitav Acharya,“Power Shift or Paradigm Shift? China’s Rise and Asia’s Emerging Security Order”,International Studies Quarterly,Vol. 58,No.1,2014,pp.158-173。
(122)Bonnie S.Glaser,“China’s Grand Strategy in Asia”,Centre for Strategic and International Studies,March 13,2014,https://www.csis.org/analysis/china%E2%80%99s-grand-strategy-asia.
(123)Henry Kissinger,Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century,pp.25-26;Aaron L.Friedberg,“Will Europe’s Past be Asia’s Future?”,p.112;Thomas Nisley,“China’s Rise in a Changing Regional Hierarchy:A Comparison of 21st-Century China to 20th-Century Germany”,pp.129-154.
(124)Robert S.Ross,“Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China:Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia”,Security Studies,Vol.15,No.3,2006,pp.355-395.
(125)Robert S.Ross,“The Geography of the Peace:East Asia in the Twenty-First Century”,pp.81-118.
(126)Josef Joffe,“‘Bismarck’ or ‘Britain’? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity”,International Security,Vol.19,No.4,1995,pp.94-117.
(127)Christopher Layne,“From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing:America’s Future Grand Strategy”,pp.86-124;Aaron M.Zack,“Sovereignty and Grand Strategy:Some Observations on the Rise of China and Decline of the Americans”,pp.113-129.
(128)然而,在缺乏外部制衡的全球范围内如何构建大国协调的具体问题上,扎克并没有给出明确的建议,实际上,如何构建一个结合国家体系多元性和全球秩序的全球体系恰是避免重蹈争霸覆辙的关键。参见Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,pp.119-126。
(129)Aaron M.Zack,Ludwig Dehio and International Relations:A Theoretical,Historical and Strategic Analysis,pp.155-157.
(130)巴里·波森:《克制:美国大战略的新基础》,第112～113、142～158页。
(131)孙兴杰:《中国“由陆向海”的战略挑战》,载《金融时报》中文网,2013年6月20日,http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001050988 full=y。
(132)姜鹏以时间和区位来划分具有不同威胁感和不同命运的两种崛起国,认为中国应该避免成为其他竞争对手的推责对象。参见姜鹏:《海陆复合型地缘政治大国崛起的“威廉困境”与战略选择》,载《当代亚太》2016年第5期,第66～86页。
(133)张文木:《地缘政治的本质及其中国运用》,载《太平洋学报》2017年第8期,第9、13页。
(134)参见The 21st Century Concert Study Group,A Twenty-First Century Concert of Powers:Promoting Great Power Multilateralism for the Post-Transatlantic Era,Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF),2014;郑先武:《东亚“大国协调”:构建基础与路径选择》,载《世界经济与政治》2013年第5期,第88～113页。
(135)Henry Kissinger,Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century,p.26.
(136)Ludwig Dehio,Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century,p.51.
(137)相关倡议与文章,参见Harald Müller and Carsten Rauch eds.,Great Power Multilateralism and the Prevention of War,London and New York:Routledge,2018;Benjamin Miller,“A ‘New World Order’:From Balancing to Hegemony,Concert or Collective Security?”,International Interactions,Vol.18,No.1,1992,pp.1-33;哈拉尔德·米勒、卡斯滕·劳赫:《管控权力转移:面向21世纪的大国协调机制》,载《国际安全研究》2016年第4期,第36～67页。当然,近年来的国际政治进展(如乌克兰危机等)也显示出大国协调并非易事,参见Sten Rynning,“The False Promise of Continental Concert:Russia,the West and the Necessary Balance of Power”,International Affairs,Vol.91,No.3,2015,pp.539-552。
(138)Patrick Porter,Sharing Power? Prospects for a U.S.Concert-Balance Strategy,The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI),U.S.Army War College,April 2013;Thomas Wright,“The Rise and Fall of the Unipolar Concert”,The Washington Quarterly,Vol.37,No.4,2014,pp.7-24;The National Interest,“We Asked Michael Lind:What should be the Purpose of American Power”,The National Interest,August 27,2015,http://nationalinterest.org/feature/we-asked-michael-lind-what-should-be-the-purpose-american-13709.
(139)郑先武:《大国协调与国际安全治理》,载《世界经济与政治》2010年第5期,第49～65页;Weizhun Mao,“Muddle or March:China and the 21st Century Concert of Powers”,Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional,Vol.57,2014,pp.243-264。
(140)Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,pp.125-127.
(141)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.268.
(142)Graham Allison,Destined for War,p.185
(143)关于大国无战争的机理分析,参见杨原:《大国无战争时代霸权国与崛起国权力竞争的主要机制》,载《当代亚太》2011年第6期,第6～32页。
(144)Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,p.125.
(145)习近平:《决胜全面建成小康社会,夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利——在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告》,新华网,2017年10月27日, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/27/c_1121867529.htm。
(2)Leopold von Ranke,The Theory and Practice of History,in George G.Iggers ed.,Oxon:Routledge,2011,p.33.
(3)在某种意义上,德国帝国主义的全球扩张及其最终悲剧形成的原因也包括当时德国历史学家所鼓噪的兰克均势思想的拓展运用。参见Winfried Baumgart,“German Imperialism in Historical Perspective”,in Arthur J.Knoll and Lewis H.Gann eds.,Germans in the Tropics:Essays in German Colonial History,New York:Greenwood Press,1987,pp.152-153。
(4)时殷弘:《兰克〈论列强〉回顾与相关的“中国含义”》,载《世界经济与政治》2010年第6期,第51～63页;王日华:《国际关系理论中的历史主义》,载《国际政治科学》2015年第4期,第113～147页。
(5)Ludwig Dehio,Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie:Betrachtungen über ein Grundproblem der neueren Staatengeschichte,Krefeld:Scherpe,1948.
(6)查理斯·普尔曼(Charles Fullman)将《均势抑或霸权》(Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie)德文版翻译成英文版时将此书题目翻译成《脆弱的均势》(The Precarious Balance),时殷弘依据英文版将该书翻译成同名中文版。参见路德维希·德约:《脆弱的平衡:欧洲四个世纪的权势斗争》,时殷弘译,人民出版社2016年版。
(7)具体影响参见时殷弘:《现当代国际关系史(从16世纪到20世纪末)》,中国人民大学出版社2006年版,第52～53页。
(8)Aaron L.Friedberg,“Will Europe’s Past be Asia’s Future?” Survival,Vol.42,No.3,2000,pp.147-160;Richard Ned Lebow and Benjamin Valentino,“Lost in Transition:A Critical Analysis of Power Transition Theory”,International Relations,Vol.23,No.3,2009,pp.389-410;Woosang Kim and Scott Gates,“Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China”,International Area Studies Review,Vol.18,No.3,2015,pp.219-226.
(9)阎学通提出了道义现实主义理论,并将其核心问题界定为“崛起国是如何取代现行世界主导国的地位”。参见阎学通:《世界权力的转移:政治领导与战略竞争》,北京大学出版社2015年版,第3页。
(10)例如G.John Ikenberry,“The Rise of China and the Future of the West:Can the Liberal System Survive?”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.87,No.1,2008,pp.23-37;John J.Mearsheimer,“China’s Unpeaceful Rise”,Current History,Vol.105,No.690,2006,pp.160-162;Graham Allison,“The Thucydides Trap:Are the U.S.and China Headed for War?”,The Atlantic,September 24,2015,https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/。
(11)关于德约与国际体系长周期的论述,参见William R.Thompson,“Dehio,Long Cycles,and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition”,World Politics,Vol.45,No.1,1992,pp.127-152;关于Aaron Zack对德约的评价和理论修正,参见Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,Lanham,Maryland:Lexington Press,2017;关于德约的均势机理和国际体系稳定性及战略风险,参见时殷弘:《制衡的困难——关于均势自动生成论及其重大缺陷》,载《太平洋学报》1998年第4期,第48～58页;吴征宇:《兰克VS.德约:均势现实主义与霸权现实主义》,载《欧洲研究》2007年第2期,第21～32页。
(12)参见时殷弘:《现代国际体系史的一大理解范式和根本主题》,载《史学月刊》2006年第3期,第77～81页;其他相应研究参见时殷弘、石斌:《美国与21世纪世界政治的根本问题》,载《战略与管理》1997年第3期,第1～11页;时殷弘、郝莹:《利奥波德·冯·兰克的国际政治观》,载《欧洲》1998年第4期,第4～10页;时殷弘:《兰克〈论列强〉回顾与相关的“中国含义”》,第51～63页。
(13)吴征宇:《兰克VS.德约:均势现实主义与霸权现实主义》,第21～32页。
(14)根据Google Scholar统计,截至2017年7月,德约之主要著作的德文与英文版被引用达700多次,其中,《二十世纪的德国与世界政治》共被引用198次,《脆弱的平衡》共被引用476次,《德国与世界大战时代》以及《兰克与德国帝国主义》等著作共被引用近50次;但是,相应著作尚未得到国际关系学界的太多青睐。参见https://scholar.google.es/scholar?hl=zh-CN&q=Ludwig+dehio&btnG=&lr=。
(15)David Hume,“Of Balance of Power”,in John A.Vasquez ed.,Classics of International Relations,Englewood Cliffs,N.J.:Prentice-Hall,1990,p.275.
(16)当然,兰克也强调另一个动力,即作为国家法律与社会基础的文化与文明因素,并认为这是区分不同国家和推动国家内部发展的最强有力的动力,参见Leopold von Ranke,The Theory and Practice of History,pp.84,102-104。
(17)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,pp.11-12.
(18)Ludwig Dehio,Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century,trans.by Dieter Pevsner,London:Chatton & Windus,1959,p.42;时殷弘:《兰克〈论列强〉回顾与相关的“中国含义”》,第57页。
(19)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.13.
(20)Ludwig Dehio,Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century, p.65.
(21)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.14.
(22)“孤立大国”是依靠水体保护的国家,其社会环境较为自由、具有海权和贸易野心但缺乏具有影响力的常备军;“域外大国”是指地处国家体系外却依然与其保持互动的国家;“侧翼大国”则是在国家体系中处于体系地理位置边缘区域的国家,它们可能是该体系的成员。根据德约的论述,侧翼大国与孤立大国有的时候是重合的,当体系互动程度提升时,三种大国类型也会产生重合。参见Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,p.12。
(23)吴征宇:《兰克VS.德约:均势现实主义与霸权现实主义》,第26页。
(24)William R.Thompson,“Dehio,Long Cycles,and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition,”pp.127-152.
(25)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.40.
(26)Ibid.,p.42.
(27)Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,p.15.
(28)德约在《兰克与德国帝国主义》(Ranke and Germany Imperialism)一文中指出:“英吉利继承战争”这一概念是马克斯·仑茨借用“西班牙王位继承战争”所创造的词汇,用于形容布尔战争之后的英帝国所面临的多个强大敌人在海陆两方面威胁的危险局面;其好友汉斯·德尔布吕克(Hans Delbrück)也抱有类似看法,他赞同提尔皮茨的风险理论,并且相信德国能够组建对抗英国霸权的大联盟,使英国如拿破仑一样落入被大联盟击败的命运。参见Ludwig Dehio,Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century,pp.44-48。
(29)Ludwig Dehio,Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century,pp.46-47.
(30)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,pp.231-232.
(31)Ludwig Dehio,Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century,p.53.
(32)德约指出,作为两个相互独立又互相影响的双方,海洋体系与大陆体系经历了不平行发展,此时海权已经极为强大。在当代欧洲体系中,海权体系权势总体呈上升趋势,并最终在挫败了拿破仑一世的霸权斗争后彻底压过陆权优势。相关论述参见Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.267;William R.Thompson,“Dehio,Long Cycles,and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition”,pp.127-152。
(33)“国家间体系”(Staatensystem)是德约理论框架中的关键概念,时殷弘将其翻译成“国际体系”,扎克将此翻译成“国家体系”(state system)。参见Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance;Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,p.10;路德维希·德约:《脆弱的平衡:欧洲四个世纪的权势斗争》。
(34)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.6.
(35)Ibid.,p.193.
(36)Ibid.,pp.193,241.
(37)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,pp.130-131,265;Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,p.27.
(38)Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,p.75.
(39)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.117;Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,p.15.
(40)德约将两次世界大战作为全球体系必霸律的例证。参见Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.234。
(41)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.23.
(42)德约在《欧洲体系的消逝》(“The Passing of European System”)一文中强调,欧洲体系被更大范围的亚欧体系包裹,进一步与西半球体系组成全球体系的主要部分。参见Ludwig Dehio,Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century,p.128。
(43)Martin Wight,Power Politics,Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad eds.,Leicester:Leicester University Press,1978,p.180.
(44)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.268.
(45)Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,pp.31-55.
(46)Ibid.,pp.75-86.
(47)德约多次强调陆权和海权的反复争霸、大陆体系与海洋体系的长期对抗,参见Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance。卡尔·施密特(Carl Schmitt)也认为,世界历史就是一部陆权和海权对抗的战争史,参见Carl Schmitt,Land and Sea,trans.by Simona Draghici,Washington,D.C.:Plutarch Press,1997,p.5。
(48)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,pp.266-267.
(49)Ibid.,pp.243-244.
(50)若干相关著作已经译成中文引入国内,参见约翰·加迪斯:《遏制战略:战后美国国家安全政策评析》,时殷弘、李庆四、樊吉社译,世界知识出版社2005年版;约翰·伊肯伯里:《美国无敌:均势的未来》,韩召颖译,北京大学出版社2005年版;罗伯特·阿特:《美国大战略》,郭树勇译,北京大学出版社2005年版;克里斯托弗·莱恩:《和平的幻想:1940年以来的美国大战略》,孙建中译,上海人民出版社2009年版;凯文·纳里泽尼:《大战略的政治经济学》,白云真、傅强译,上海人民出版社2014年版;巴里·波森:《克制:美国大战略的新基础》,曲丹译,社会科学文献出版社2016年版。
(51)Christopher Layne,The Peace of Illusions:American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present,Ithaca,New York:Cornell University,2006,p.159.
(52)Stratfor,“Geopolitical Diary:America’s Indivisible Imperatives”,Stratfor,July 2,2009,https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/geopolitical-diary-americas-indivisible-imperatives.
(53)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,pp.95-96,191-193;吴征宇:《离岸制衡与选择性干预——对二战后美国大战略的理论思考》,载《世界经济与政治》2009年第10期,第33～40页。
(54)David C.Gompert,Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific,Rand Corporation,2013,pp.36-44;田文林:《美中加强合作对美更有利》,载《人民日报》(海外版),2012年9月19日,第1版。
(55)David C.Gompert,Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific,pp.40-41.
(56)Strafor,“The Geopolitics of the United States,Part 1:The Inevitable Empire”,Strafor,July 4,2016,https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/geopolitics-united-states-part-1-inevitable-empire;Strafor,“The Geopolitics of the United States,Part 2:American Identity and the Threats of Tomorrow”,Strafor,August 25,2011,https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/geopolitics-united-states-part-2-american-identity-and-threats-tomorrow.
(57)叶成城:《重新审视地缘政治学:社会科学方法论的视角》,载《世界经济与政治》2015年第5期,第100～124页。
(58)Aaron M.Zack,Ludwig Dehio and International Relations:A Theoretical,Historical and Strategic Analysis,Ph.D.dissertation,Johns Hopkins University,Baltimore,Maryland,2010,p.170;Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,pp.95-97.
(59)Robert J.Art,A Grand Strategy for America,Ithaca:Cornell University Press,2004,pp.161-162.
(60)Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,pp.98-99.
(61)Christopher Layne,“The Waning of U.S.Hegemony-Myth or Reality? A Review Essay”,International Security,Vol.34,No.1,2009,pp.147-172.
(62)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.9;Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,pp.9-10.
(63)“A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)”,April 14,1950,in Foreign Relations of the United States 1950,Vol.1,Washington:United States Government Printing Office,1977,p.245,https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus 1950v01/d85.
(64)George W.Bush,“Inaugural Address”,The American Presidency Project,January 20,2005,http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58745.
(65)Robert J.Art,A Grand Strategy for America,p.123.
(66)张群基本默认东亚地区的域外霸权是美国,认为域外霸权的介入程度会影响到地区国家安全合作进程。参见张群:《东亚区域公共产品供给与中国—东盟合作》,载《太平洋学报》2017年第5期,第44～54页。
(67)Robert J.Art,A Grand Strategy for America,p.122.
(68)Ibid.,p.136.
(69)Christopher Layne,The Peace of Illusions:American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present,pp.126-127.
(70)Christopher Layne,“From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing:America’s Future Grand Strategy”,International Security,Vol.22,No.1,1997,pp.86-124;Aaron M.Zack,“Sovereignty and Grand Strategy:Some Observations on the Rise of China and Decline of the Americans”,Telos,No.181,2017,pp.113-129.
(71)Christopher Layne,The Peace of Illusions:American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present,p.7.
(72)2017年,皮尤研究中心做了一次全球性民意调查,发现中东地区受访者的反美与亲美比例为64∶27,为当今世界上对美国和美国人最缺乏好感的地区。参见Richard Wike,Bruce Stokes,Jacob Poushter and Janell Fetterolf,“The Tarnished American Brand”,Pew Research Center,June 26,2017,http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/06/26/tarnished-american-brand/。
(73)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,pp.142,243-244,261.
(74)Robert J.Art,A Grand Strategy for America,pp.168-170.
(75)John J.Mearsheimer,The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,New York:W.W.Norton & Company,2014;Christopher Layne,The Peace of Illusions:American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present;John Ikenberry and Stephen M.Walt,“Taming American Power:The Global Response to U.S.Primacy”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.85,No.1,2005,p.145;Stephen M.Walt,“Offshore Balancing:An Idea Whose Time has Come”,Foreign Policy,http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/11/02/offshore-balancing-an-idea-whose-time-has-come/.
(76)John Mearsheimer and Stephen M.Walt,“The Case for Offshore Balancing”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.95,No.4,2016,pp.70-83.
(77)Christopher Layne,“From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing:America’s Future Grand Strategy”,pp.86-124.
(78)Christopher Layne,“China’s Challenge to US Hegemony”,Current History,Vol.107,No.705,2008,pp.13-18.
(79)Christopher Layne,The Peace of Illusions:American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present,p.20;巴里·波森:《克制:美国大战略的新基础》,第112～113页。
(80)Brian Rathbun,“A Rose by any other Name:Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism”,Security Studies,Vol.17,No.2,2008,pp.294-321.
(81)吉尔·伦德斯塔德(Geir Lundestad)批评认为,莱恩的研究在视角和方法上过于单一,低估了苏联威胁的严重程度并忽视了西欧国家对美国政策的相互塑造;吴征宇则批评认为,离岸平衡战略未能发现主导型海洋国家阻止大陆强国的真正原因是其在战争时期“能够转变为一支能够并愿意针对欧洲大陆对手进行重大战斗的大陆野战军”。参见Geir Lundestad,“American Grand Strategy since 1940:Political Science and History”,Diplomatic History,Vol.31,No.4,2007,pp.783-786;吴征宇:《地理政治学与美国大战略》,中国法制出版社2009年版,第19页。
(82)对均势自动生成理论的批判,参见时殷弘:《制衡的困难——关于均势自动生成论及其重大缺陷》,第48～58页;吴征宇:《论“均势自动生成”的逻辑机理及内在缺陷》,载《世界经济与政治》2003年第8期,第14～19页。
(83)德约坚持这一前提,不过,他也认为,保持绝对军事优势、主导亚欧大陆区域体系对美国这样的海洋国家而言并非最好的选择。参见Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,pp.80-90。
(84)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.233.
(85)Ibid.,p.268.
(86)Ibid.,pp.250,253.
(87)William R.Thompson,“Dehio,Long Cycles,and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition”,pp.127-152.
(88)关于欧洲体系内争霸战争较少可能性的论述,参见Ludwig Dehio,Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century,pp.124-141;对俄罗斯和日本难以成为区域大国的论述,参见John Mearsheimer and Stephen M.Walt,“The Case for Offshore Balancing”,p.82;Robert Ross,“Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia”,in T.V.Paul,James J.Wirtz,and Michel Fortmann eds.Balance of Power:Theory and Practice in the 21st Century,Stanford,CA:Stanford University Press,2004,pp.267-304。
(89)Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,pp.115-117.
(90)陆伯彬(Robert S.Ross)认为,东亚的政治格局分为大陆和海洋两个体系,中美分别在陆海两方面占有优势,而陆海分离的体系缓解了中美两国在东亚地区的冲突。但是,陆伯彬未能将两大体系放在动态平衡的角度上相融合,低估了德约强调的体系间互动的重要性。韦宗友则认为,应当通过两国协调缓解战略矛盾,促进东亚的“陆海分离型”秩序向“陆海融合型”秩序转变。参见Robert S.Ross,“The Geography of the Peace:East Asia in the Twenty-First Century”,International Security,Vol.23,No.4,1999,pp.81-118;韦宗友:《美国与东亚安全秩序挑战》,载石斌编:《亚太新未来——中外学者论国际关系与地区秩序》,南京大学出版社2016年版,第198～214页。
(91)关于中德崛起类比最近的一些著作,参见Graham Allison,Destined for War,New York:Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company,2017;Aaron L.Friedberg,“Will Europe’s Past be Asia’s Future?”,pp.147-160;Jean-Christophe Defraigne,“Is China on the Verge of a Weltpolitik? A Comparison of the Current Shift in the Balance of Power between China and the West and the Shift between Great Britain and Wilhelmine Germany”,in Kevin Cai ed.,Interpreting China as a Regional and Global Power,London:Palgrave Macmillan,2014,pp.293-323;Aaron Zack,“Some Considerations on the Rise of Germany and the Rise of China”,in Benjamin M.Rowland ed.,Is the West in Decline? MD:The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group,Inc.,2016,pp.19-45。
(92)Aaron Zack,“Some Considerations on the Rise of Germany and the Rise of China”,pp.19-45;梅然:《经济追求、相互依赖与德国在1914年的战争决定》,载《国际政治研究》2013年第2期,第128～153页。
(93)Graham Allison,Destined for War,p.19.
(94)Aaron Zack,“Some Considerations on the Rise of Germany and the Rise of China”,pp.19-45.
(95)Henry Kissinger,Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century,New York:Simon & Schuster,2002,pp.25-26;Aaron L.Friedberg,“Will Europe’s Past be Asia’s Future?”,pp.147-160.
(96)“满足政策”是俾斯麦时期的外交政策之一,其表现为向诸大国保证德国再无扩张野心以避免反德联盟的形成,俾斯麦去职后德国遂抛弃该政策。由于俾斯麦时期的“大陆政策”需要一个灵活的外交环境以孤立法国阻止其复仇,故要以“满足政策”为保证避免英俄对德国扩张的猜忌。参见徐弃郁:《脆弱的崛起:大战略与德意志帝国的命运》,新华出版社2014年版,第36～73,176～182页;Aaron Zack,“Some Considerations on the Rise of Germany and the Rise of China”,p.24.
(97)Aaron Zack,“Some Considerations on the Rise of Germany and the Rise of China”,pp.19-45;徐弃郁:《脆弱的崛起:大战略与德意志帝国的命运》,第76～77页。
(98)Ludwig Dehio,Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century,p.57.
(99)Sean Clark,“In the Dreadnought’s Shadow:Comparing China’s Rise with the Anglo-German Naval Arms Race China’s Tumultuous Rise”,Canadian Naval Review,Vol.7,No.3,2011,pp.4-9.
(100)Suisheng Zhao,“Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited:The Strident Turn”,Journal of Contemporary China,Vol.22,No.82,2013,pp.535-553.
(101)Abanti Bhattacharya,“Chinese Nationalism and China’s Assertive Foreign Policy”,The Journal of East Asian Affairs,Vol.21,No.1,2007,pp.235-262;Jessica Chen Weiss,“Powerful Patriots:Nationalism,Diplomacy,and the Strategic Logic of Anti-foreign Protest in China”,Ph.D.dissertation,University of California,San Diego,2008.
(102)Thomas Nisley,“China’s Rise in a Changing Regional Hierarchy:A Comparison of 21st-Century China to 20th-Century Germany”,The Journal of the Georgia Political Science Association,Vol.1,2014,pp.129-154.
(103)如扎克认为,中国可能如德国一样建立一支强大的蓝水海军以拒止美国对亚洲的干预能力;参见Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,p.117。
(104)Aaron M.Zack,Ludwig Dehio and International Relations:A Theoretical,Historical and Strategic Analysis,p.201.
(105)Aaron L.Friedberg,“Will Europe’s Past be Asia’s Future?”,pp.147-160.
(106)Aaron Zack,“Some Considerations on the Rise of Germany and the Rise of China”,pp.19-45.
(107)Euikon Kim,“Rising China and Turbulent East Asia:Asianization of China?”,Pacific Focus, Vol.29,No.1,2014,pp.1-7.
(108)Aaron Zack,“Some Considerations on the Rise of Germany and the Rise of China,” pp.19-45.
(109)Thomas Nisley,“China’s Rise in a Changing Regional Hierarchy:A Comparison of 21st-Century China to 20th-Century Germany”,pp.129-154.
(110)Aaron Zack,“Some Considerations on the Rise of Germany and the Rise of China”,pp.19-45.
(111)Jean-Christophe Defraigne,“Is China on the Verge of a Weltpolitik? A Comparison of the Current Shift in the Balance of Power between China and the West and the Shift between Great Britain and Wilhelmine Germany”,pp.293-323.
(112)James R.Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara,“History Rhymes:The German Precedent for Chinese Sea Power”,Orbis,Vol.54,No.1,2010,pp.14-34.
(113)Sean Clark,“In the Dreadnought’s Shadow:Comparing China’s Rise with the Anglo-German Naval Arms Race China’s Tumultuous Rise”,pp.4-9.
(114)Aaron Zack,“Some Considerations on the Rise of Germany and the Rise of China”,pp.19-45.
(115)Thomas Nisley,“China’s Rise in a Changing Regional Hierarchy:A Comparison of 21st-Century China to 20th-Century Germany”,pp.129-154.
(116)James R.Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara,“History Rhymes:The German Precedent for Chinese Sea Power”,pp.14-34.
(117)Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,p.70.
(118)Jean-Christophe Defraigne,“Is China on the Verge of a Weltpolitik? A Comparison of the Current Shift in the Balance of Power between China and the West and the Shift between Great Britain and Wilhelmine Germany”,pp.293-323;徐弃郁:《脆弱的崛起:大战略与德意志帝国的命运》,第164～167页。
(119)Aaron M.Zack,Ludwig Dehio and International Relations:A Theoretical,Historical and Strategic Analysis,pp.195-196.
(120)时殷弘:《兰克〈论列强〉回顾与相关的“中国含义”》,第51～63页。
(121)参见Hugh White,“Power Shift:Australia’s Future between Washington and Beijing”,Quarterly Essay,No.39,2010,pp.1-74;G.John Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama,“Between Balance of Power and Community:The Future of Multilateral Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific”,International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,Vol. 2,No.1,2002,pp.69-94;Namrata Goswami,“Power Shifts in East Asia:Balance of Power vs.Liberal Institutionalism”,Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs,Vol.18,No.1,2013,pp.3-31;G.John Ikenberry,“From Hegemony to the Balance of Power:The Rise of China and American Grand Strategy in East Asia”,International Journal of Korean Unification Studies,Vol.23,No.2,2014,pp.41-63;Amitav Acharya,“Power Shift or Paradigm Shift? China’s Rise and Asia’s Emerging Security Order”,International Studies Quarterly,Vol. 58,No.1,2014,pp.158-173。
(122)Bonnie S.Glaser,“China’s Grand Strategy in Asia”,Centre for Strategic and International Studies,March 13,2014,https://www.csis.org/analysis/china%E2%80%99s-grand-strategy-asia.
(123)Henry Kissinger,Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century,pp.25-26;Aaron L.Friedberg,“Will Europe’s Past be Asia’s Future?”,p.112;Thomas Nisley,“China’s Rise in a Changing Regional Hierarchy:A Comparison of 21st-Century China to 20th-Century Germany”,pp.129-154.
(124)Robert S.Ross,“Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China:Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia”,Security Studies,Vol.15,No.3,2006,pp.355-395.
(125)Robert S.Ross,“The Geography of the Peace:East Asia in the Twenty-First Century”,pp.81-118.
(126)Josef Joffe,“‘Bismarck’ or ‘Britain’? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity”,International Security,Vol.19,No.4,1995,pp.94-117.
(127)Christopher Layne,“From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing:America’s Future Grand Strategy”,pp.86-124;Aaron M.Zack,“Sovereignty and Grand Strategy:Some Observations on the Rise of China and Decline of the Americans”,pp.113-129.
(128)然而,在缺乏外部制衡的全球范围内如何构建大国协调的具体问题上,扎克并没有给出明确的建议,实际上,如何构建一个结合国家体系多元性和全球秩序的全球体系恰是避免重蹈争霸覆辙的关键。参见Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,pp.119-126。
(129)Aaron M.Zack,Ludwig Dehio and International Relations:A Theoretical,Historical and Strategic Analysis,pp.155-157.
(130)巴里·波森:《克制:美国大战略的新基础》,第112～113、142～158页。
(131)孙兴杰:《中国“由陆向海”的战略挑战》,载《金融时报》中文网,2013年6月20日,http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001050988 full=y。
(132)姜鹏以时间和区位来划分具有不同威胁感和不同命运的两种崛起国,认为中国应该避免成为其他竞争对手的推责对象。参见姜鹏:《海陆复合型地缘政治大国崛起的“威廉困境”与战略选择》,载《当代亚太》2016年第5期,第66～86页。
(133)张文木:《地缘政治的本质及其中国运用》,载《太平洋学报》2017年第8期,第9、13页。
(134)参见The 21st Century Concert Study Group,A Twenty-First Century Concert of Powers:Promoting Great Power Multilateralism for the Post-Transatlantic Era,Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF),2014;郑先武:《东亚“大国协调”:构建基础与路径选择》,载《世界经济与政治》2013年第5期,第88～113页。
(135)Henry Kissinger,Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century,p.26.
(136)Ludwig Dehio,Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century,p.51.
(137)相关倡议与文章,参见Harald Müller and Carsten Rauch eds.,Great Power Multilateralism and the Prevention of War,London and New York:Routledge,2018;Benjamin Miller,“A ‘New World Order’:From Balancing to Hegemony,Concert or Collective Security?”,International Interactions,Vol.18,No.1,1992,pp.1-33;哈拉尔德·米勒、卡斯滕·劳赫:《管控权力转移:面向21世纪的大国协调机制》,载《国际安全研究》2016年第4期,第36～67页。当然,近年来的国际政治进展(如乌克兰危机等)也显示出大国协调并非易事,参见Sten Rynning,“The False Promise of Continental Concert:Russia,the West and the Necessary Balance of Power”,International Affairs,Vol.91,No.3,2015,pp.539-552。
(138)Patrick Porter,Sharing Power? Prospects for a U.S.Concert-Balance Strategy,The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI),U.S.Army War College,April 2013;Thomas Wright,“The Rise and Fall of the Unipolar Concert”,The Washington Quarterly,Vol.37,No.4,2014,pp.7-24;The National Interest,“We Asked Michael Lind:What should be the Purpose of American Power”,The National Interest,August 27,2015,http://nationalinterest.org/feature/we-asked-michael-lind-what-should-be-the-purpose-american-13709.
(139)郑先武:《大国协调与国际安全治理》,载《世界经济与政治》2010年第5期,第49～65页;Weizhun Mao,“Muddle or March:China and the 21st Century Concert of Powers”,Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional,Vol.57,2014,pp.243-264。
(140)Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,pp.125-127.
(141)Ludwig Dehio,The Precarious Balance,p.268.
(142)Graham Allison,Destined for War,p.185
(143)关于大国无战争的机理分析,参见杨原:《大国无战争时代霸权国与崛起国权力竞争的主要机制》,载《当代亚太》2011年第6期,第6～32页。
(144)Aaron M.Zack,Hegemonic War and Grand Strategy,p.125.
(145)习近平:《决胜全面建成小康社会,夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利——在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告》,新华网,2017年10月27日, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/27/c_1121867529.htm。