土地出让市场化能否影响企业退出和资源配置效率?
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摘要
本文利用2003—2007年中国制造业企业数据研究发现,土地出让市场化通过影响企业融资能力、产业集聚与企业创新程度三个机制,显著减少企业退出风险,且土地出让市场化转型还促进了低生产率企业退出市场,导致资源从低生产率企业向高生产率企业转移,降低了高生产率企业的退出风险,实现了资源配置效率的提升。进一步地,土地出让市场化对国有企业退出市场没有任何作用,但显著降低非国有企业的退出风险,并且,在政策不稳定的城市,土地出让市场化对该城市企业退出无明显影响,但能有效减少政策更稳定城市的企业退出概率。
As a basic factor of production, land affects firm productivity and firm behavior. However, large-scale development zones are being built across China, resulting in a large number of scarce land use efficiency, and even waste(Lu, 2017), The prominent problem of land resource misallocation leads to the conflicts between land marketization and firms, which affects the efficiency of the allocation of social resources, which is obviously inconsistent with the new era spirit of paying attention to the quality of development. In fact, the marketization system of urban land transfer has been constantly adjusted with the marketization transformation in China. It realizes the transformation from the unified allocation of planning mode to the system of land transfer with supply and demand, competition and price. According to the calculation of Yang et al.(2016), the proportion of the average urban land transferred area by public auction to the total land transferred increased from 37% in 2003 to 87% in 2010. The allocation mode of land resources is also constantly adjusted, and the reform of land resource marketization is deepened constantly.So far in literature, there is litter attention to study the effect of market reform of land transfer on firm's exit market and resource allocation. This paper attempts to take marketization transformation of land transfer, firm exit and the allocation of resources into an analysis framework. On the one hand, we analysis of land transfer market affects the specific mechanisms of firm exit the market, on the other hand, we will test how land transfer marketization affect the resources between the different productivity firms to improve the efficiency of resource allocation. This paper uses data of Chinese industrial firms from 2003 to 2007 to study the impact of land transfer marketization on firm exit and resource allocation efficiency under the background of continuous promotion of land market reform. The paper finds that: First, the marketization of land transfer significantly reduces the probability of enterprise exiting the market through instrumental variables, difference in difference and changing samples and replacing the measures of land transfer marketization. Second, due to the national nature of state-owned enterprises and the low risk of financing constraint and poor innovation ability of state-owned enterprises, the market-oriented reform of land transfer does not have any effect on the exit of state-owned enterprises from the market, but it significantly reduces the risk of exit of private and foreign enterprises. And, the industrial policies of cities with stable policies tend to be stable and easy to form large-scale industrial clusters, which play the exertion of scale effect and agglomeration effect. So, the marketization of land transfer has no significant effect on the exit of state-owned enterprises in cities with unstable urban policies, but it may effectively reduce the probability of firm exiting in cities with more stable urban policies. Thirdly, the analysis of the influencing mechanism shows that the marketization of land transfer has significantly reduced the risk of firms exit by affecting the three mechanisms of corporate financing capacity, industrial agglomeration and corporate innovation. Finally, the market transformation of land transfer has promoted the exit of low-productivity firms from the markets, this has led to the shift of resources from low-productivity firms to high-productivity firms, reduced the risk of exit from high-productivity firms and improved the efficiency of resource allocation.Based on the research conclusion of this paper, under the current urban land transfer system in China, nation should continue to promote the reform of marketization of land transfer, reduce the land transfer market intervention by local governments, improve share of transfer land by public auction in the urban land transfer. Thus, we should give play to the dual functions of land production factors and financing to stimulate the innovation vitality of enterprises. At the same time, we should maintain the stability and continuity of policies, increase local industrial competitiveness and agglomeration power, improve the production efficiency of enterprises, reduce their market exit risks, and improve the efficiency of resource allocation.
As a basic factor of production, land affects firm productivity and firm behavior. However, large-scale development zones are being built across China, resulting in a large number of scarce land use efficiency, and even waste(Lu, 2017), The prominent problem of land resource misallocation leads to the conflicts between land marketization and firms, which affects the efficiency of the allocation of social resources, which is obviously inconsistent with the new era spirit of paying attention to the quality of development. In fact, the marketization system of urban land transfer has been constantly adjusted with the marketization transformation in China. It realizes the transformation from the unified allocation of planning mode to the system of land transfer with supply and demand, competition and price. According to the calculation of Yang et al.(2016), the proportion of the average urban land transferred area by public auction to the total land transferred increased from 37% in 2003 to 87% in 2010. The allocation mode of land resources is also constantly adjusted, and the reform of land resource marketization is deepened constantly.So far in literature, there is litter attention to study the effect of market reform of land transfer on firm's exit market and resource allocation. This paper attempts to take marketization transformation of land transfer, firm exit and the allocation of resources into an analysis framework. On the one hand, we analysis of land transfer market affects the specific mechanisms of firm exit the market, on the other hand, we will test how land transfer marketization affect the resources between the different productivity firms to improve the efficiency of resource allocation. This paper uses data of Chinese industrial firms from 2003 to 2007 to study the impact of land transfer marketization on firm exit and resource allocation efficiency under the background of continuous promotion of land market reform. The paper finds that: First, the marketization of land transfer significantly reduces the probability of enterprise exiting the market through instrumental variables, difference in difference and changing samples and replacing the measures of land transfer marketization. Second, due to the national nature of state-owned enterprises and the low risk of financing constraint and poor innovation ability of state-owned enterprises, the market-oriented reform of land transfer does not have any effect on the exit of state-owned enterprises from the market, but it significantly reduces the risk of exit of private and foreign enterprises. And, the industrial policies of cities with stable policies tend to be stable and easy to form large-scale industrial clusters, which play the exertion of scale effect and agglomeration effect. So, the marketization of land transfer has no significant effect on the exit of state-owned enterprises in cities with unstable urban policies, but it may effectively reduce the probability of firm exiting in cities with more stable urban policies. Thirdly, the analysis of the influencing mechanism shows that the marketization of land transfer has significantly reduced the risk of firms exit by affecting the three mechanisms of corporate financing capacity, industrial agglomeration and corporate innovation. Finally, the market transformation of land transfer has promoted the exit of low-productivity firms from the markets, this has led to the shift of resources from low-productivity firms to high-productivity firms, reduced the risk of exit from high-productivity firms and improved the efficiency of resource allocation.Based on the research conclusion of this paper, under the current urban land transfer system in China, nation should continue to promote the reform of marketization of land transfer, reduce the land transfer market intervention by local governments, improve share of transfer land by public auction in the urban land transfer. Thus, we should give play to the dual functions of land production factors and financing to stimulate the innovation vitality of enterprises. At the same time, we should maintain the stability and continuity of policies, increase local industrial competitiveness and agglomeration power, improve the production efficiency of enterprises, reduce their market exit risks, and improve the efficiency of resource allocation.
引文
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(1)http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20130830/10563061_0.shtml。
(2)从2011年开始,中国工业企业数据的企业统计范围从以前的主营业务收入500万元以上的企业提高到主营业务收入2000万元以上的企业。
(3)工具变量有效性检验的识别不足检验统计量和弱识别检验统计量是根据线性概率模型计算而来。
(4)根据中国土地价格监测网的数据显示,2000—2017年间,中国工业用地的价格指数从2000年的100增加到2017年的213,价格指数翻了一番。
(5)根据国家统计局数据显示,2000—2007年中国利用外商直接投资从2000年407.15亿美元增加到2007年的747.68亿美元。
(6)本文把盟长、市长、行署专员、州长四类离职都归为市长离职,把盟委书记、市委书记、地委书、州委书记四类离职都归为市委书记离职。
[2]Mao,Q.,and B.Sheng.The Impact of Tariff Reductions on Firm Dynamics and Productivity in China:Does Market-oriented Transition Matter?[J].China Economic Review,2017,45,(9):168-194.
[3]赵爱栋,马贤磊,曲福田.市场化改革能提高中国工业用地利用效率吗?[J].济南:中国人口·资源与环境,2016,(3):118-126.
[4]陶坤玉,张敏,李力行.市场化改革与违法:来自中国土地违法案件的证据[J].天津:南开经济研究,2010,(2):28-43.
[5]张莉,高元骅,徐现祥.政企合谋下的土地出让[J].北京:管理世界,2013,(12):43-51,62.
[6]李力行,黄佩媛,马光荣.土地资源错配与中国工业企业生产率差异[J].北京:管理世界,2016,(8):86-96.
[7]杨继东,赵文哲,刘凯.刺激计划、国企渠道与土地出让[J].北京:经济学(季刊),2016,(3):1225-1252.
[8]雷潇雨,龚六堂.基于土地出让的工业化与城镇化[J].北京:管理世界,2014,(9):29-41.
[9]周飞舟.分税制十年:制度及其影响[J].北京:中国社会科学,2006,(6):100-115,205.
[10]卢洪友,袁光平,陈思霞,卢盛峰.土地财政根源:“竞争冲动”还是“无奈之举”?——来自中国地市的经验证据[J].北京:经济社会体制比较,2011,(1):88-98.
[11]顾乃华,王小霞,陈雄辉.我国土地财政的区域差异与成因——基于省际面板数据的实证研究[J].广州:产经评论,2011,(2):103-112.
[12]Du,J.,J.C.Thill,R.B.Peiser,and C.Feng.Urban Land Market and Land-use Changes in Post-reform China:A Case Study of Beijing[J].Landscape and Urban Planning,2014,124,(4):118-128.
[13]Zhang,X.Q.Urban Land Reform in China[J].Land Use Policy,1997,14,(3):187-199.
[14]王媛.政府干预与地价扭曲——基于全国微观地块数据的分析[J].厦门:中国经济问题,2016,(5):29-41.
[15]徐升艳,陈杰,赵刚.土地出让市场化如何促进经济增长[J].北京:中国工业经济,2018,(3):44-61.
[16]张辽,杨成林.土地市场化改革平抑了房价波动吗——来自中国的经验证据[J].成都:经济学家,2015,(12):34-41.
[17]孙克竞.地方土地财政转型、产业结构优化与土地出让制度变革[J].北京:经济管理,2014,(2):10-22.
[18]简泽,干春晖,余典范.银行部门的市场化、信贷配置与工业重构[J].北京:经济研究,2013,(5):112-127.
[19]马光荣,李力行.金融契约效率、企业退出与资源误置[J].北京:世界经济,2014,(10):77-103.
[20]黎日荣.企业融资约束、退出与资源误配[J].蚌埠:财贸研究,2016,(3):126-137.
[21]臧成伟.市场化有助于提高淘汰落后产能效率吗?——基于企业进入退出与相对生产率差异的分析[J].上海:财经研究,2017,(2):135-146.
[22]李勇刚,罗海艳.土地资源错配阻碍了产业结构升级吗?——来自中国35个大中城市的经验证据[J].上海:财经研究,2017,(9):110-121.
[23]Hsieh,C.T.,and P.J.Klenow.Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2009,124,(4):1403-1448.
[24]Zheng,D.,and M.Shi.Industrial Land Policy,Firm Heterogeneity and Firm Location Choice:Evidence from China[J].Land Use Policy,2018,76,(7):58-67.
[25]刘民权,孙波.商业地价形成机制、房地产泡沫及其治理[J].北京:金融研究,2009,(10):22-37.
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(1)http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20130830/10563061_0.shtml。
(2)从2011年开始,中国工业企业数据的企业统计范围从以前的主营业务收入500万元以上的企业提高到主营业务收入2000万元以上的企业。
(3)工具变量有效性检验的识别不足检验统计量和弱识别检验统计量是根据线性概率模型计算而来。
(4)根据中国土地价格监测网的数据显示,2000—2017年间,中国工业用地的价格指数从2000年的100增加到2017年的213,价格指数翻了一番。
(5)根据国家统计局数据显示,2000—2007年中国利用外商直接投资从2000年407.15亿美元增加到2007年的747.68亿美元。
(6)本文把盟长、市长、行署专员、州长四类离职都归为市长离职,把盟委书记、市委书记、地委书、州委书记四类离职都归为市委书记离职。