第三方支付机构洗钱风险的评估方法研究
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摘要
随着我国第三方支付业务的飞速发展,其面临的洗钱风险越来越隐蔽、复杂、突出,传统评估方法也应尽快改进;固有风险高的机构,如果内部控制得力,风险反而会低;固有风险低的机构,如果内部控制低效,风险也会升高。因此,对第三方支付机构洗钱风险的评估,既要关注固有风险,也要考虑内部控制风险,更要关注未被控制的剩余风险。同时,各级风险指标的赋权要克服专家调查法可能存在的过于主观等不足,而应结合熵权法等客观赋值法进行综合赋权,以实现主观与客观、定性与定量相结合。据此,本文给出评估第三方支付机构洗钱风险的一种新方法。
With the rapid development of third-party payment in China,money laundering risk has become more and more hidden, complicated and prominent,thus the traditional evaluation methods should be improved as soon as possible. As for the institutions with high inherent risk,if their internal control is effective,the risk will be low. While quite the reverse is true for the institutions with low inherent risk. Therefore,the assessment of money laundering risk in third-party payment institutions should not only focus on the inherent risks, but also consider the internal control risks and the residual risks that are not controlled. Meanwhile,the empowerment of risk indicators at all levels need to overcome some shortages of Delphi method. For instance,sometimes it may be too subjective,so it should be combined with some objective methods—entropy weight method,for example,to reduce the subjectivity of Delphi method during the evaluating process, thereby achieving the combination of not only subjective and objective, but also qualitative and quantitative methods. Accordingly,this paper presents a new method to evaluate the money laundering risk in third-party payment institutions.
With the rapid development of third-party payment in China,money laundering risk has become more and more hidden, complicated and prominent,thus the traditional evaluation methods should be improved as soon as possible. As for the institutions with high inherent risk,if their internal control is effective,the risk will be low. While quite the reverse is true for the institutions with low inherent risk. Therefore,the assessment of money laundering risk in third-party payment institutions should not only focus on the inherent risks, but also consider the internal control risks and the residual risks that are not controlled. Meanwhile,the empowerment of risk indicators at all levels need to overcome some shortages of Delphi method. For instance,sometimes it may be too subjective,so it should be combined with some objective methods—entropy weight method,for example,to reduce the subjectivity of Delphi method during the evaluating process, thereby achieving the combination of not only subjective and objective, but also qualitative and quantitative methods. Accordingly,this paper presents a new method to evaluate the money laundering risk in third-party payment institutions.
引文
[1]Financial Action Task Force(FATF). 2007. Guid-ance on the risk-based approach to combating money laun-dering and terroristfinancing[R],http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/High%20Level%20Princi-ples%20and%20Procedures.pdf.
[2]Sainah R C. 2015. The effect of anti money launder-ing risk assessment on the financial performance of commer-cial banks in Kenya[D].THE UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI.
[3]Philippsohn S. 2001. Money laundering on the Inter-net. Computer&Security,(20).
[4]Cindori S. 2013. Money laundering:correlation be-tween risk assessment and suspicious transactions. FinancialTheory&Practice,37(2).
[5]Basel Committeeon Banking Supervision(BCBS).2014. Sound management of risks related to money launder-ing and financing of terrorism[R].https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs275.pdf.
[6]Issaoui,Fakhri and WASSIM,TOUILI and HAS-SEN,TOUMI. 2016. The effects of money laundering(ML)on growth:application to the gulf countries.Interna-tional Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism(IJCWT),7(1).
[7]Yusarina M.,Zuraidah M., Haniff M., Paul A.2015. Money laundering risk:from the bankers’and regula-tors perspectives[J].Procedia Economics&Finance,28.
[8]The Wolfsberg Group. 2015. Frequently asked ques-tions on risk assessments for money laundering,Sanctionsand Bribery&Corruption[R].http://www.wolfsberg-princi-ples.com/pdf/faq/Wolfsberg-Risk-Assessment-FAQs-2015.pdf.
[9]丁佳,封思贤.网上支付机构洗钱风险监管的国际经验及启示[J].南方金融,2017,(8).
[10]兰立宏.国际视域下网络洗钱犯罪防控策略研究[M].北京:中国人民公安大学出版社,2016.
[11]高增安.金融机构基于风险的反洗钱机制探讨[J].证券市场导报,2007,(10).
[12]孙婧雯.洗钱风险的构成及其管理框架构建[J].当代经济科学,2014,36(4).
[13]童文俊.金融机构洗钱风险评估监管体系构建研究[J].金融与经济,2013,(2).
[14]彭韶兵,周婧.银行业反洗钱内部控制效率评价指数研究[J].国际金融研究,2013,(1).
[15]王怡靓.基于国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的反洗钱机制建设研究[J].金融发展研究,2018,(9).
[16]吴朝平.第三方在线支付业务的洗钱风险及反洗钱监管研究[J].南方金融,2012,(10).
[17]于春敏,周艳军.互联网金融时代反洗钱防御体系的构建[J].财经科学,2014,(11).
[18]乐毅.对第三方支付跨境业务的监管[J].中国金融,2011,(4).
[19]王军华.博弈论视角下第三方支付机构与商业银行的关系[J].财会月刊,2017,(20).
[20]周婧.银行反洗钱内部控制效率评价体系研究[D].西南财经大学2013年博士研究生论文.
[21]叶文辉.大数据征信机构的运作模式及监管对策——以阿里巴巴芝麻信用为例[J].新金融,2015,(7).
[22]何逢标.综合评价方法MATLAB实现[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2010.
(1)数据来源:《2017年支付体系运行总体情况》,中国人民银行网站(www.pbc.gov.cn)。
(2)根据我国的《反洗钱法》,洗钱是指通过各种方式掩饰、隐瞒毒品犯罪、黑社会性质的组织犯罪、恐怖活动犯罪、走私犯罪、贪污贿赂犯罪、破坏金融管理秩序犯罪、金融诈骗犯罪等犯罪所得及其收益的来源和性质的活动。
(3)如是否采取非面对面交易等,因为这种支付业务都是使用电子货币进行的非面对面交易。
(4)2017年7月,韶关市公安局经侦部门破获利用沉睡银行账户进行的地下钱庄案,涉案金额200多亿元。
(5)2017年1月,厦门市公安机关查获案件中不法分子将诈骗所得资金在第三方支付账户和银行账户之间多次转移模糊资金来源并最终在境外将赃款取现。
[2]Sainah R C. 2015. The effect of anti money launder-ing risk assessment on the financial performance of commer-cial banks in Kenya[D].THE UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI.
[3]Philippsohn S. 2001. Money laundering on the Inter-net. Computer&Security,(20).
[4]Cindori S. 2013. Money laundering:correlation be-tween risk assessment and suspicious transactions. FinancialTheory&Practice,37(2).
[5]Basel Committeeon Banking Supervision(BCBS).2014. Sound management of risks related to money launder-ing and financing of terrorism[R].https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs275.pdf.
[6]Issaoui,Fakhri and WASSIM,TOUILI and HAS-SEN,TOUMI. 2016. The effects of money laundering(ML)on growth:application to the gulf countries.Interna-tional Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism(IJCWT),7(1).
[7]Yusarina M.,Zuraidah M., Haniff M., Paul A.2015. Money laundering risk:from the bankers’and regula-tors perspectives[J].Procedia Economics&Finance,28.
[8]The Wolfsberg Group. 2015. Frequently asked ques-tions on risk assessments for money laundering,Sanctionsand Bribery&Corruption[R].http://www.wolfsberg-princi-ples.com/pdf/faq/Wolfsberg-Risk-Assessment-FAQs-2015.pdf.
[9]丁佳,封思贤.网上支付机构洗钱风险监管的国际经验及启示[J].南方金融,2017,(8).
[10]兰立宏.国际视域下网络洗钱犯罪防控策略研究[M].北京:中国人民公安大学出版社,2016.
[11]高增安.金融机构基于风险的反洗钱机制探讨[J].证券市场导报,2007,(10).
[12]孙婧雯.洗钱风险的构成及其管理框架构建[J].当代经济科学,2014,36(4).
[13]童文俊.金融机构洗钱风险评估监管体系构建研究[J].金融与经济,2013,(2).
[14]彭韶兵,周婧.银行业反洗钱内部控制效率评价指数研究[J].国际金融研究,2013,(1).
[15]王怡靓.基于国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的反洗钱机制建设研究[J].金融发展研究,2018,(9).
[16]吴朝平.第三方在线支付业务的洗钱风险及反洗钱监管研究[J].南方金融,2012,(10).
[17]于春敏,周艳军.互联网金融时代反洗钱防御体系的构建[J].财经科学,2014,(11).
[18]乐毅.对第三方支付跨境业务的监管[J].中国金融,2011,(4).
[19]王军华.博弈论视角下第三方支付机构与商业银行的关系[J].财会月刊,2017,(20).
[20]周婧.银行反洗钱内部控制效率评价体系研究[D].西南财经大学2013年博士研究生论文.
[21]叶文辉.大数据征信机构的运作模式及监管对策——以阿里巴巴芝麻信用为例[J].新金融,2015,(7).
[22]何逢标.综合评价方法MATLAB实现[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2010.
(1)数据来源:《2017年支付体系运行总体情况》,中国人民银行网站(www.pbc.gov.cn)。
(2)根据我国的《反洗钱法》,洗钱是指通过各种方式掩饰、隐瞒毒品犯罪、黑社会性质的组织犯罪、恐怖活动犯罪、走私犯罪、贪污贿赂犯罪、破坏金融管理秩序犯罪、金融诈骗犯罪等犯罪所得及其收益的来源和性质的活动。
(3)如是否采取非面对面交易等,因为这种支付业务都是使用电子货币进行的非面对面交易。
(4)2017年7月,韶关市公安局经侦部门破获利用沉睡银行账户进行的地下钱庄案,涉案金额200多亿元。
(5)2017年1月,厦门市公安机关查获案件中不法分子将诈骗所得资金在第三方支付账户和银行账户之间多次转移模糊资金来源并最终在境外将赃款取现。