国家审计改革对地方国有企业税负的影响研究——以省以下地方审计机关人财物管理改革为背景
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摘要
企业依法纳税问题是社会各界关注的焦点,也是维持财政经济秩序的难点。在国家治理体系中,税收征管审计是维护企业依法纳税的重要制度安排。本文采用双重差分法,以2007-2016年省以下地方国有A股上市公司为研究对象,研究国家审计改革是否有利于加强税收征管审计,进而抑制企业不合理纳税行为。结果发现,审计改革有利于减轻地方国有企业税负,并且通过降低税负提升国有企业价值。进一步研究表明,地区市场经济发展水平和内外部治理环境越差,审计改革的税收治理作用越强。本文的研究结论丰富了现有企业税负的相关研究,并为优化当前国有企业税负问题提供了有益借鉴。
The problem of corporate tax payment in accordance with the law is the focus of all sectors of society and also the difficulty in maintaining financial and economic order. In the national governance system, tax collection and management audit is an important institutional arrangement for maintaining enterprises to pay taxes according to the law. Using difference-in-difference method, and taking 2007-2016 A-share local stateowned enterprises below the provincial level as the research sample, this paper explores whether audit reform is conducive to strengthening tax collection and management audit, thereby inhibiting unreasonable taxation behavior of enterprises. We find that the national audit reform could reduce the tax burden of local state-owned enterprises and thus increase the value of state-owned enterprises. Further research shows that the worse the regional market economy development level and the internal and external governance environment, the stronger the tax governance role of audit reform. The conclusions of this paper enrich the relevant research on corporate tax burden, and provide useful reference for optimizing the tax burden of current state-owned enterprises.
The problem of corporate tax payment in accordance with the law is the focus of all sectors of society and also the difficulty in maintaining financial and economic order. In the national governance system, tax collection and management audit is an important institutional arrangement for maintaining enterprises to pay taxes according to the law. Using difference-in-difference method, and taking 2007-2016 A-share local stateowned enterprises below the provincial level as the research sample, this paper explores whether audit reform is conducive to strengthening tax collection and management audit, thereby inhibiting unreasonable taxation behavior of enterprises. We find that the national audit reform could reduce the tax burden of local state-owned enterprises and thus increase the value of state-owned enterprises. Further research shows that the worse the regional market economy development level and the internal and external governance environment, the stronger the tax governance role of audit reform. The conclusions of this paper enrich the relevant research on corporate tax burden, and provide useful reference for optimizing the tax burden of current state-owned enterprises.
引文
[1]An H.,and T. Zhang. Stock Price Synchronicity,Crash risk,and Institutional Investors[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2013,21:1-15.
[2] Bertrand M.,and S. Mullainathan. Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences[J]. Journal of Political Economy,2003,111(5):1043-1075.
[3] Chow,T.,B. Ke,H. Yuan,and Y. Zhang. What Types of Publicly Listed Firms Evade Taxes? Evidence from China. Available at SSRN:https://ssrn.com/abstract=3160421. 2018.
[4] Desai M. A.,and D. Dharmapala. Corporate Tax Avoidance and High-Powered Incentives[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79(1):145-179.
[5] Desai M. A.,and D. Dharmapala. Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value[J]. The Review of Economics and Statistics,2009,91(3):537-546.
[6] Eshleman J. D.,and P. Guo. Do Big 4 Auditors Provide Higher Audit Quality after Controlling for the Endogenous Choice of Auditor?[J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory,2014,33(4):197-219.
[7]Hanlon M.,and S. Heitzman. A Review of Tax Research[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,50(2-3):127-178.
[8] Hanlon M.,and J. Slemrod. What Does Tax Aggressiveness Signal? Evidence from Stock Price Reactions to News about Tax Shelter Involvement[J]. Journal of Public Economics,2009,93(1-2):126-141.
[9] Liu S.,R. Weng and D. Yang. Natural Disaster,Fiscal Pressure and Tax Avoidance:A Typhoon-Based Study,China Journal of Accounting Studies,2018:1-42.
[10] Wu,L.,Y. Wang,W. Luo,and P. Gillis. State Ownership,Tax Status and Size Effect of Effective Tax Rate in China[J].Accounting&Business Research,2012,42(2):97-114.
[11]陈德球,陈运森,董志勇.政策不确定性、税收征管强度与企业税收规避[J].管理世界,2016(05):151-163.
[12]陈冬,孔墨奇,王红建.投我以桃,报之以李:经济周期与国企避税[J].管理世界,2016(05):46-63.
[13]贾俊雪,应世为.财政分权与企业税收激励——基于地方政府竞争视角的分析[J].中国工业经济,2016(10):23-39.
[14]金智,徐慧,马永强.儒家文化与公司风险承担[J].世界经济,2017,40(11):170-192.
[15]李克强.国企首要职责是实现国有资产保值增值.2016. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-12/01/content_5141420.htm.
[16]李青原,马彬彬.国家审计与社会审计定价:顺风车还是警示灯?——基于我国央企控股上市公司的经验证据[J].经济管理,2017(7):149-162.
[17]刘家义.论国家治理与国家审计[J].中国社会科学,2012(6):60-72.
[18]刘骏,刘峰.财政集权、政府控制与企业税负——来自中国的证据[J].会计研究,2014(01):21-27+94.
[19]刘青山,莫丰齐.国企税负高:或因其多为高资本密集型行业导致[N].企业观察报,2015,http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20150112/131821276747.shtml.
[20]刘行,李小荣.金字塔结构、税收负担与企业价值:基于地方国有企业的证据[J].管理世界,2012(8):91-105.
[21]王在桥.省以下地方审计机关人财物如何统一、科学管理探究[R].湖北省审计厅,2015,http://www.hbaudit.gov.cn/html/2015/0520/38506.shtml.
[22]温忠麟,叶宝娟.中介效应分析:方法和模型发展[J].心理科学进展,2014,22(05):731-745.
[23]杨雄.税收征管法被指遭架空:政府都是按计划指令来征税[N]. 21世纪经济报道,2013,http://business.sohu.com/20130703/n380539384.shtml.
[24]张智.大佬激辩税负:民企明显高于国企[N].华夏时报,2016,http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2016-03-12/doc-ifxqhmvc2345180.shtml.
[25]甄红线,张先治,迟国泰.制度环境、终极控制权对公司绩效的影响——基于代理成本的中介效应检验[J].金融研究,2015(12):162-177.
[26]郑石桥,和秀星,许莉.政府审计处理处罚中的非正式制度:一个制度冲突理论架构[J].会计研究,2011(7):85-91.
(1)如全国人大预算工作委员会法案室原主任俞光远在《税收征管法》修改专家研讨会上指出,“现在我们是依照上级下达的指令性、指标性的任务来征税;而不是按照税法规定的范围和税率,来依法征税”。陈冬等(2016)、Liu et al.(2018)也发现了类似现象。
(1)参见山东省审计厅官方网站“地市活动报道”栏目。
(2)参见审计署官方网站“地方公告及解读”栏目。
(3)“省以下地方国有A股上市公司”仅指由省以下级别政府控制的地方国有上市企业,不包括中央国有企业以及由省政府直接管辖的企业。
(1)参见《中共中央关于全面推进依法治国若干重大问题的决定》。
(2)北京国家会计学院秦荣生教授认为“现行省以下地方审计机关置于地方政府的领导之下,当审计中发现地方利益与国家利益存在冲突时,必然会服从地方利益,执行地方政府的政策,难以依法独立行使审计监督权”。详细内容参见审计署“专家观点”栏目。
(1)如《每日经济新闻》报道,国税总局局长王军在河北调研时发现地方政府存在征收“过头税”的问题,中国钢铁协会有关人士也证实,钢铁企业实缴税费高于应交税费。资料来源:http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20130725/005116231439.shtml。
(1)TREAT和POST分别为基于省份和年份定义的虚拟变量,由于本文同时控制了省份和年度固定效应,故而在模型中将TREAT和POST省略。
[2] Bertrand M.,and S. Mullainathan. Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences[J]. Journal of Political Economy,2003,111(5):1043-1075.
[3] Chow,T.,B. Ke,H. Yuan,and Y. Zhang. What Types of Publicly Listed Firms Evade Taxes? Evidence from China. Available at SSRN:https://ssrn.com/abstract=3160421. 2018.
[4] Desai M. A.,and D. Dharmapala. Corporate Tax Avoidance and High-Powered Incentives[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79(1):145-179.
[5] Desai M. A.,and D. Dharmapala. Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value[J]. The Review of Economics and Statistics,2009,91(3):537-546.
[6] Eshleman J. D.,and P. Guo. Do Big 4 Auditors Provide Higher Audit Quality after Controlling for the Endogenous Choice of Auditor?[J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory,2014,33(4):197-219.
[7]Hanlon M.,and S. Heitzman. A Review of Tax Research[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,50(2-3):127-178.
[8] Hanlon M.,and J. Slemrod. What Does Tax Aggressiveness Signal? Evidence from Stock Price Reactions to News about Tax Shelter Involvement[J]. Journal of Public Economics,2009,93(1-2):126-141.
[9] Liu S.,R. Weng and D. Yang. Natural Disaster,Fiscal Pressure and Tax Avoidance:A Typhoon-Based Study,China Journal of Accounting Studies,2018:1-42.
[10] Wu,L.,Y. Wang,W. Luo,and P. Gillis. State Ownership,Tax Status and Size Effect of Effective Tax Rate in China[J].Accounting&Business Research,2012,42(2):97-114.
[11]陈德球,陈运森,董志勇.政策不确定性、税收征管强度与企业税收规避[J].管理世界,2016(05):151-163.
[12]陈冬,孔墨奇,王红建.投我以桃,报之以李:经济周期与国企避税[J].管理世界,2016(05):46-63.
[13]贾俊雪,应世为.财政分权与企业税收激励——基于地方政府竞争视角的分析[J].中国工业经济,2016(10):23-39.
[14]金智,徐慧,马永强.儒家文化与公司风险承担[J].世界经济,2017,40(11):170-192.
[15]李克强.国企首要职责是实现国有资产保值增值.2016. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-12/01/content_5141420.htm.
[16]李青原,马彬彬.国家审计与社会审计定价:顺风车还是警示灯?——基于我国央企控股上市公司的经验证据[J].经济管理,2017(7):149-162.
[17]刘家义.论国家治理与国家审计[J].中国社会科学,2012(6):60-72.
[18]刘骏,刘峰.财政集权、政府控制与企业税负——来自中国的证据[J].会计研究,2014(01):21-27+94.
[19]刘青山,莫丰齐.国企税负高:或因其多为高资本密集型行业导致[N].企业观察报,2015,http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20150112/131821276747.shtml.
[20]刘行,李小荣.金字塔结构、税收负担与企业价值:基于地方国有企业的证据[J].管理世界,2012(8):91-105.
[21]王在桥.省以下地方审计机关人财物如何统一、科学管理探究[R].湖北省审计厅,2015,http://www.hbaudit.gov.cn/html/2015/0520/38506.shtml.
[22]温忠麟,叶宝娟.中介效应分析:方法和模型发展[J].心理科学进展,2014,22(05):731-745.
[23]杨雄.税收征管法被指遭架空:政府都是按计划指令来征税[N]. 21世纪经济报道,2013,http://business.sohu.com/20130703/n380539384.shtml.
[24]张智.大佬激辩税负:民企明显高于国企[N].华夏时报,2016,http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2016-03-12/doc-ifxqhmvc2345180.shtml.
[25]甄红线,张先治,迟国泰.制度环境、终极控制权对公司绩效的影响——基于代理成本的中介效应检验[J].金融研究,2015(12):162-177.
[26]郑石桥,和秀星,许莉.政府审计处理处罚中的非正式制度:一个制度冲突理论架构[J].会计研究,2011(7):85-91.
(1)如全国人大预算工作委员会法案室原主任俞光远在《税收征管法》修改专家研讨会上指出,“现在我们是依照上级下达的指令性、指标性的任务来征税;而不是按照税法规定的范围和税率,来依法征税”。陈冬等(2016)、Liu et al.(2018)也发现了类似现象。
(1)参见山东省审计厅官方网站“地市活动报道”栏目。
(2)参见审计署官方网站“地方公告及解读”栏目。
(3)“省以下地方国有A股上市公司”仅指由省以下级别政府控制的地方国有上市企业,不包括中央国有企业以及由省政府直接管辖的企业。
(1)参见《中共中央关于全面推进依法治国若干重大问题的决定》。
(2)北京国家会计学院秦荣生教授认为“现行省以下地方审计机关置于地方政府的领导之下,当审计中发现地方利益与国家利益存在冲突时,必然会服从地方利益,执行地方政府的政策,难以依法独立行使审计监督权”。详细内容参见审计署“专家观点”栏目。
(1)如《每日经济新闻》报道,国税总局局长王军在河北调研时发现地方政府存在征收“过头税”的问题,中国钢铁协会有关人士也证实,钢铁企业实缴税费高于应交税费。资料来源:http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20130725/005116231439.shtml。
(1)TREAT和POST分别为基于省份和年份定义的虚拟变量,由于本文同时控制了省份和年度固定效应,故而在模型中将TREAT和POST省略。