巴基斯坦俾路支分离主义的国际干预探析
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摘要
国际干预是观察巴基斯坦俾路支分离主义发展轨迹的重要视角。巴基斯坦建国前,英国殖民主义政策对于俾路支分离主义的兴起产生了深远影响。巴基斯坦建国后,鉴于俾路支省在地缘政治和区域经济竞争中的重要性,俾路支分离主义受到了印度、阿富汗、美国和伊朗的干预。正是在这些外部力量纷纷介入的背景下,巴俾路支分离主义持续不断。预计未来这种国际干预并不会消解,并将随着地区大国博弈而更加复杂。
International intervention is an important perspective to observe Baloch separatism. British colonial policies used to play a major role in the rise of Baloch separatism before the founding of Pakistan. Later on,the separatist movement was impacted by intervention from India, Afghanistan, the United States and Iran due to considerations on Balochistan's geo-political and geo-economic uniqueness. Such intervention will not evaporate in the future. More complexity will be added due to power games in the region.
International intervention is an important perspective to observe Baloch separatism. British colonial policies used to play a major role in the rise of Baloch separatism before the founding of Pakistan. Later on,the separatist movement was impacted by intervention from India, Afghanistan, the United States and Iran due to considerations on Balochistan's geo-political and geo-economic uniqueness. Such intervention will not evaporate in the future. More complexity will be added due to power games in the region.
引文
(1)Donald Horowitz,Ethnic Groups in Conflict,Berkeley:University of California Press,1985,p.230.
(1)曾祥裕:“巴基斯坦‘俾路支问题’的发展及其前景”,《南亚研究季刊》,2009年第1期,第25页;刘卫国:“巴基斯坦俾路支省经济状况调查报告”,中华人民共国驻卡拉奇总领事馆经济商务室,2007-10-16,http:∥karachi.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztdy/200710/20071005160574.html。
(2)Robert G.Wirsing,“Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of Energy Resources:The Changing Context of Separatism in Pakistan,”Working Paper,Title 17,United States Code,Section 101,April 2008,http:∥www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2008/ssi_wirsing.pdf,p.7.
(3)Ihsan H.Nadiem,Balochistan:Land,History,People,Lahore:Sang-e-Meel Publications,2007,p.19.
(4)Mir Sher Baz Khetran,“Crisis in Balochistan:Challenges and Opportunities,”Strategic Studies,Institute of Strategic Studies,Islamabad,Vol.XXXI,No.1&2,Spring&Summer 2011,p.34.
(5)Abdul Baseer Khan,“Balochistan:Epicenter of Drugs Smuggling and Usage,”Balochistan Point,2015-08-28,http:∥thebalochistanpoint.com/balochistan-epicenter-of-drug-smuggling-and-usage/.
(1)“Drug Smuggling via Gwadar on the Rise:UN Report,”Dawn,2011-07-31,https:∥www.dawn.com/news/648452.
(1)引自《1935年印度政府法》第一章第5条、《内阁使团备忘录》第5条和《蒙巴顿方案》第18条。具体可参阅由英国国家档案局(The National Archives)成立的英国立法文件查阅网站,网址为http:∥www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1935/2/pdfs/ukpga_19350002_en.pdf;习罡华:“英国撤离印度时期的土邦政策---兼析克什米尔问题产生的法律背景”,《南亚研究》,2007年第1期,第39-41页。
(2)Inayatullah Baloch,The Problem of“Greater Baluchistan”:A Study of Baluch Nationalism,Stuttgart:Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden,1987,p.352.
(3)“Balochis of Pakistan:On the Margins of History,”Report of The Foreign Policy Center,London,November 2006,mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/.../Balochis_Pakistan.pdf,p.22.
(4)金兴礼:“论穆斯林联盟的不干涉土邦政策”,《世界民族》,2015年第6期,第12-16页。
(5)“Narendra Modi's Independence Day Speech:PM Throws down Balochistan Gauntlet,”India Express,2016-08-16,http:∥indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/pm-narendra-modi-balochistan-independence-day-congress-pakistan-salman-khurshid-2977554/.
(6)“Govt Airs Video of Indian Spy Admitting Involvement in Balochistan Insurgency,”Dawn,2016-03-31,http:∥www.dawn.com/news/1248669/govt-airs-video-of-indian-spy-admitting-involvement-in-balochistan-insurgency.
(7)Mateen Haider,“RAW Runs Special Cell to Sabotage CPEC,Says Secretary Defence,”Dawn,2016-04-14,https:∥www.dawn.com/news/1251860.
(8)“India,Afghan Agencies Funded Attack on Chinese Consulate,”Dunya News,2018-11-25,https:∥dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/467744-Indian-Afghan-agencies-funded-attack-on-Chinese-consulate.
(1)周明:“论巴基斯坦建国以来对阿富汗政策的演变及其动因”,《南亚研究》,2016年第1期,第50页。
(2)Gregory D.Pipes,“The Baloch-Islamabad Tensions:Problems of National Integration,”Master's Thesis of Naval Postgraduate School,California,March 2010,http:∥www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518534.pdf,p.48.
(3)Selig Harrison,“Baluch Nationalism and Superpower Rivalry,”International Security,Vol.5,No.3,Winter 1980-1981,p.160.
(4)[阿富汗]沙伊斯塔·瓦哈卜、巴里·扬格曼:《阿富汗史》,杨军、马旭俊译,北京:中国大百科全书出版社,2010年,第194页。
(5)“151 Insurgent Camps in Balochistan,Afghanistan Creating Unrest:IG FC,”Express Tribune,2012-06-02,https:∥tribune.com.pk/story/387805/151-insurgent-camps-in-balochistan-afghanistan-creating-unrest-ig-fc/.
(6)“Afghanistan,RAW Patronizing Baloch Separatists:Malik,”The News,2012-08-04,https:∥www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/624238-afghanistan,-raw-patronising-baloch-separatists-malik.
(7)Mateen Haider,“RAW Runs Special Cell to Sabotage CPEC,Says Secretary Defence,”Dawn,2016-04-14,https:∥www.dawn.com/news/1251860;“India,Afghan Agencies Funded Attack on Chinese Consulate,”Dunya News,2018-11-25,https:∥dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/467744-Indian-Afghan-agencies-funded-attack-onChinese-consulate.
(8)Chidanand Rajghatta,“Balochistan Resolution in US Congress Drives Pakistan Crazy,”Times of India,2012-02-18,http:∥timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Balochistan-resolution-in-US-Congress-drivesPakistan-crazy/articleshow/11942550.cms.
(1)Chidanand Rajghatta,“Balochistan Resolution in US Congress Drives Pakistan Crazy,”Times of India,2012-02-18,http:∥timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Balochistan-resolution-in-US-Congress-drivesPakistan-crazy/articleshow/11942550.cms.
(2)Taj Mohammad Breseeg,Baloch Nationalism:Its Origin and Development,Lahore:Royal Book Company,2004,p.339.
(3)Frederic Grare,“Pakistan:The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism,”Carnegie Papers,South Asia Project,No.65,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,January 2006,http:∥carnegieendowment.org/files/CP65.Grare.FINAL.pdf,p.10.
(4)伊朗的另一个关切是美国对真主军的暗中支持。据资料显示,真主军领导人阿卜杜马利克·里基(Abdolmalek Rigi)承认他与美国情报部门确有联系,并曾收到美方10万美元的援助。美方还承诺向真主军提供武器装备,以及一个位于阿富汗境内的训练基地。参见“‘真主旅’惹伊朗革命卫队疑中情局指使”,环球网,2009-10-28,http:∥mil.huanqiu.com/world/2009-10/616095_2.html;“Iran Jundullah Leader Claims US Military Support,”BBC News,2010-02-26,http:∥news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8537567.stm.
(1)[巴基斯坦]里亚兹·穆罕默德·汗:《阿富汗和巴基斯坦:冲突·极端主义·抵制现代性》,曾祥裕、赵超兰、孟雪译,北京:时事出版社,2014年,第213页。
(2)国际南北交通走廊计划将建设从伊阿边境的扎兰季至阿境内的迪拉腊姆的长达218公里的高速公路(也被称为606高速公路,Route 606),与阿富汗的现有城际环线相接后,再至法扎巴德,最终通向塔吉克斯坦,而高速公路的另一端则直通恰巴哈尔港。印度希望将中亚地区的能源输送至恰巴哈尔港,再由该港通过海运转运至印国内。606高速公路的修建已于2005年开始。
(3)笔者认为,阿富汗官方政府不够重视俾路支独立运动的原因,在于运动规模较小。根据贾斯特·伯德克(Just B9deker)的研究,阿富汗俾路支独立运动规模有限,原因在于三点:一是苏联入侵阿富汗期间采取的土地改革、国有化等激进政策,在一定程度上瓦解了原有的俾路支部落结构,削弱了部落首领的影响力;二是俾路支人主要居住于尼姆鲁兹省和赫尔曼德省,占阿富汗总人口的比例较小,独立运动领导人反而采取措施吸引他省的俾路支人(甚至包括土库曼斯坦人)移居于此,以壮大运动声势;三是新移民在融入俾路支社会时又存在诸多心理困难,甚至发生人员冲突,使得统一的俾路支认同的建构过程充满了挑战。相关情况参见Just B9deker,“An Inter-Ethnic Conflict in the Cultural Environment of the Baloch National Movementin Present-day Afghanistan,”Iran&the Caucasus,Vol.13,No.2,2009,pp.360-363.
(1)曾祥裕:“巴基斯坦‘俾路支问题’的发展及其前景”,《南亚研究季刊》,2009年第1期,第25页;刘卫国:“巴基斯坦俾路支省经济状况调查报告”,中华人民共国驻卡拉奇总领事馆经济商务室,2007-10-16,http:∥karachi.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztdy/200710/20071005160574.html。
(2)Robert G.Wirsing,“Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of Energy Resources:The Changing Context of Separatism in Pakistan,”Working Paper,Title 17,United States Code,Section 101,April 2008,http:∥www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2008/ssi_wirsing.pdf,p.7.
(3)Ihsan H.Nadiem,Balochistan:Land,History,People,Lahore:Sang-e-Meel Publications,2007,p.19.
(4)Mir Sher Baz Khetran,“Crisis in Balochistan:Challenges and Opportunities,”Strategic Studies,Institute of Strategic Studies,Islamabad,Vol.XXXI,No.1&2,Spring&Summer 2011,p.34.
(5)Abdul Baseer Khan,“Balochistan:Epicenter of Drugs Smuggling and Usage,”Balochistan Point,2015-08-28,http:∥thebalochistanpoint.com/balochistan-epicenter-of-drug-smuggling-and-usage/.
(1)“Drug Smuggling via Gwadar on the Rise:UN Report,”Dawn,2011-07-31,https:∥www.dawn.com/news/648452.
(1)引自《1935年印度政府法》第一章第5条、《内阁使团备忘录》第5条和《蒙巴顿方案》第18条。具体可参阅由英国国家档案局(The National Archives)成立的英国立法文件查阅网站,网址为http:∥www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1935/2/pdfs/ukpga_19350002_en.pdf;习罡华:“英国撤离印度时期的土邦政策---兼析克什米尔问题产生的法律背景”,《南亚研究》,2007年第1期,第39-41页。
(2)Inayatullah Baloch,The Problem of“Greater Baluchistan”:A Study of Baluch Nationalism,Stuttgart:Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden,1987,p.352.
(3)“Balochis of Pakistan:On the Margins of History,”Report of The Foreign Policy Center,London,November 2006,mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/.../Balochis_Pakistan.pdf,p.22.
(4)金兴礼:“论穆斯林联盟的不干涉土邦政策”,《世界民族》,2015年第6期,第12-16页。
(5)“Narendra Modi's Independence Day Speech:PM Throws down Balochistan Gauntlet,”India Express,2016-08-16,http:∥indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/pm-narendra-modi-balochistan-independence-day-congress-pakistan-salman-khurshid-2977554/.
(6)“Govt Airs Video of Indian Spy Admitting Involvement in Balochistan Insurgency,”Dawn,2016-03-31,http:∥www.dawn.com/news/1248669/govt-airs-video-of-indian-spy-admitting-involvement-in-balochistan-insurgency.
(7)Mateen Haider,“RAW Runs Special Cell to Sabotage CPEC,Says Secretary Defence,”Dawn,2016-04-14,https:∥www.dawn.com/news/1251860.
(8)“India,Afghan Agencies Funded Attack on Chinese Consulate,”Dunya News,2018-11-25,https:∥dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/467744-Indian-Afghan-agencies-funded-attack-on-Chinese-consulate.
(1)周明:“论巴基斯坦建国以来对阿富汗政策的演变及其动因”,《南亚研究》,2016年第1期,第50页。
(2)Gregory D.Pipes,“The Baloch-Islamabad Tensions:Problems of National Integration,”Master's Thesis of Naval Postgraduate School,California,March 2010,http:∥www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518534.pdf,p.48.
(3)Selig Harrison,“Baluch Nationalism and Superpower Rivalry,”International Security,Vol.5,No.3,Winter 1980-1981,p.160.
(4)[阿富汗]沙伊斯塔·瓦哈卜、巴里·扬格曼:《阿富汗史》,杨军、马旭俊译,北京:中国大百科全书出版社,2010年,第194页。
(5)“151 Insurgent Camps in Balochistan,Afghanistan Creating Unrest:IG FC,”Express Tribune,2012-06-02,https:∥tribune.com.pk/story/387805/151-insurgent-camps-in-balochistan-afghanistan-creating-unrest-ig-fc/.
(6)“Afghanistan,RAW Patronizing Baloch Separatists:Malik,”The News,2012-08-04,https:∥www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/624238-afghanistan,-raw-patronising-baloch-separatists-malik.
(7)Mateen Haider,“RAW Runs Special Cell to Sabotage CPEC,Says Secretary Defence,”Dawn,2016-04-14,https:∥www.dawn.com/news/1251860;“India,Afghan Agencies Funded Attack on Chinese Consulate,”Dunya News,2018-11-25,https:∥dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/467744-Indian-Afghan-agencies-funded-attack-onChinese-consulate.
(8)Chidanand Rajghatta,“Balochistan Resolution in US Congress Drives Pakistan Crazy,”Times of India,2012-02-18,http:∥timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Balochistan-resolution-in-US-Congress-drivesPakistan-crazy/articleshow/11942550.cms.
(1)Chidanand Rajghatta,“Balochistan Resolution in US Congress Drives Pakistan Crazy,”Times of India,2012-02-18,http:∥timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Balochistan-resolution-in-US-Congress-drivesPakistan-crazy/articleshow/11942550.cms.
(2)Taj Mohammad Breseeg,Baloch Nationalism:Its Origin and Development,Lahore:Royal Book Company,2004,p.339.
(3)Frederic Grare,“Pakistan:The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism,”Carnegie Papers,South Asia Project,No.65,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,January 2006,http:∥carnegieendowment.org/files/CP65.Grare.FINAL.pdf,p.10.
(4)伊朗的另一个关切是美国对真主军的暗中支持。据资料显示,真主军领导人阿卜杜马利克·里基(Abdolmalek Rigi)承认他与美国情报部门确有联系,并曾收到美方10万美元的援助。美方还承诺向真主军提供武器装备,以及一个位于阿富汗境内的训练基地。参见“‘真主旅’惹伊朗革命卫队疑中情局指使”,环球网,2009-10-28,http:∥mil.huanqiu.com/world/2009-10/616095_2.html;“Iran Jundullah Leader Claims US Military Support,”BBC News,2010-02-26,http:∥news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8537567.stm.
(1)[巴基斯坦]里亚兹·穆罕默德·汗:《阿富汗和巴基斯坦:冲突·极端主义·抵制现代性》,曾祥裕、赵超兰、孟雪译,北京:时事出版社,2014年,第213页。
(2)国际南北交通走廊计划将建设从伊阿边境的扎兰季至阿境内的迪拉腊姆的长达218公里的高速公路(也被称为606高速公路,Route 606),与阿富汗的现有城际环线相接后,再至法扎巴德,最终通向塔吉克斯坦,而高速公路的另一端则直通恰巴哈尔港。印度希望将中亚地区的能源输送至恰巴哈尔港,再由该港通过海运转运至印国内。606高速公路的修建已于2005年开始。
(3)笔者认为,阿富汗官方政府不够重视俾路支独立运动的原因,在于运动规模较小。根据贾斯特·伯德克(Just B9deker)的研究,阿富汗俾路支独立运动规模有限,原因在于三点:一是苏联入侵阿富汗期间采取的土地改革、国有化等激进政策,在一定程度上瓦解了原有的俾路支部落结构,削弱了部落首领的影响力;二是俾路支人主要居住于尼姆鲁兹省和赫尔曼德省,占阿富汗总人口的比例较小,独立运动领导人反而采取措施吸引他省的俾路支人(甚至包括土库曼斯坦人)移居于此,以壮大运动声势;三是新移民在融入俾路支社会时又存在诸多心理困难,甚至发生人员冲突,使得统一的俾路支认同的建构过程充满了挑战。相关情况参见Just B9deker,“An Inter-Ethnic Conflict in the Cultural Environment of the Baloch National Movementin Present-day Afghanistan,”Iran&the Caucasus,Vol.13,No.2,2009,pp.360-363.