中美竞争格局下的中韩、美韩关系走向与韩国的选择
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摘要
特朗普政府上台后采取"美国优先"政策,固执坚持孤立主义理念,为实现本国利益最大化,不仅对盟友痛下狠手,而且把中国定义为"修正主义国家"和"竞争对手",全方位扩大中美矛盾与摩擦,中美竞争格局凸显。中美是朝鲜半岛局势变化最大的外部影响因素,对半岛发展方向与命运起到重要作用。韩国作为美国的盟友和中国的战略合作伙伴,中美竞争日益激烈的态势使韩国明显感受到了压力。一方面,韩国难以摆脱对美国的安全依赖,另一方面也难以放弃与中国的政治经济合作,不愿意成为美国遏制中国的"前沿阵地"。文在寅政府执行的一系列政策措施及其良好成果增强了韩国作为中等强国发挥其外交自主性与灵活性,掌握自己国家命运的信心。在中美竞争格局下,韩国只有对东亚地缘政治、地缘经济格局的变化做出准确判断,对中美竞争结果做出合理预期,结合自身实力发展,才可能摆脱选择困境,做出正确的外交决策。
The Trump administration has adopted the policy of "America first" and persisted to the concept of isolationism. In order to maximize its own interests,it has not only inflicted severe pain on its Allies,but also defined China as a "revisionist country" and a "competitor". It has expanded the conflicts and frictions between China and the United States in an all-round way. China and the United States are the biggest external factors influencing the situation on the Korean peninsula and play an important role in the development direction and destiny of the peninsula. As an ally of the United States and a strategic partner of China,Republic of Korea is clearly feeling the pressure from the increasingly fierce competition between China and the United States. On the one hand,it is difficult for ROK to get rid of its security dependence on the United States. On the other hand,it is also difficult for ROK to give up its political and economic cooperation with China,and it does not want to be the "frontier position" for the United States to contain China. A series of policy measures implemented by the Moon Jae-in government and its good results have strengthened the confidence of ROK,as a medium power,to exert its diplomatic autonomy and flexibility and control its own destiny. Under the competition pattern between China and the United States,ROK can only get rid of the dilemma of choice and make correct diplomatic decisions by accurately judging the changes of geopolitical and geoeconomic patterns in East Asia,reasonably anticipating the competition results between China and the United States,and combining its own strength development.
The Trump administration has adopted the policy of "America first" and persisted to the concept of isolationism. In order to maximize its own interests,it has not only inflicted severe pain on its Allies,but also defined China as a "revisionist country" and a "competitor". It has expanded the conflicts and frictions between China and the United States in an all-round way. China and the United States are the biggest external factors influencing the situation on the Korean peninsula and play an important role in the development direction and destiny of the peninsula. As an ally of the United States and a strategic partner of China,Republic of Korea is clearly feeling the pressure from the increasingly fierce competition between China and the United States. On the one hand,it is difficult for ROK to get rid of its security dependence on the United States. On the other hand,it is also difficult for ROK to give up its political and economic cooperation with China,and it does not want to be the "frontier position" for the United States to contain China. A series of policy measures implemented by the Moon Jae-in government and its good results have strengthened the confidence of ROK,as a medium power,to exert its diplomatic autonomy and flexibility and control its own destiny. Under the competition pattern between China and the United States,ROK can only get rid of the dilemma of choice and make correct diplomatic decisions by accurately judging the changes of geopolitical and geoeconomic patterns in East Asia,reasonably anticipating the competition results between China and the United States,and combining its own strength development.
引文
[1]国际舆论关注中美贸易共识“休战”能否变成“停战”[EB/OL].环球时报,http://world.huanqiu.com/ex?clusive/2018-12/13720740.html,2018-12-05.
[2]布热津斯基.大棋局:美国的首要地位及其地缘战略[M].上海世纪出版集团,2007:44-45,45,153.
[3]凌胜利.双重困境与动态平衡——中美亚太主导权竞争与美国亚太盟国的战略选择[J].世界经济与政治,2018(3):71-72.
[4] IMF. Regional Economic Outlook:Asia Pacific[EB/OL].2018-10-11,https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/APAC/Issues/2018/10/05/areo1012.中美贸易战韩IT企业首当其冲[EB/OL].〔韩〕中央日报,2018-10-13,https://chinese.joins.com/gb/article.aspx?art_id=184084&category=001002.
[5] Glenn H.Snyder. The Security Dilemma In Alliance Politics[J].World Politics.1984(4):461-495.
[6] Scott A. Snyder. South Korea at the Crossroads--Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers[M].Co?lumbia University Press,2018:25.
[7]毕颖达.调整中的美韩同盟:发展历程、强化动因及其挑战[J].美国研究,2018(1):83-102.
[8]〔韩〕郑德龟.在美中之间苦恼的韩国外交安保——通过“联美和中”解决[M].首尔:每日经济新闻社,2011;〔韩〕具本学.韩美同盟与韩中战略伙伴关系的协调[J].〔韩〕新亚洲,2015(4):135-160.
[9]张慧智,王箫轲.中韩关系二十年:成就与问题[J].现代国际关系,2013(1):20-27.
[10]戴维来.中等国家崛起与国际关系的新变局[M].中央编译出版社,2017:149-150,48-71.
[11]张琏瑰.朝鲜半岛的统一与中国[J].当代亚太,2004(5):35.
[12]张文木.战后世界政治格局的三次变动与历史质变“临界点”的出现”[J].世界社会主义研究,2017(1):70-81.
[13]吴心伯.论亚太大变局[J].世界经济与政治,2017(6):35.
[14]朴槿惠与奥巴马会谈,韩美同盟提升为全球伙伴关系[EB/OL].中国日报网,2013-05-08,http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzx/2013-05/08/content_16484433.htm.
[15] Huong Le Thu. PacNet#43-Three Traps in Building the Indo-Pacific Narrative Thus Far[EB/OL].CSIS,2018-06-22,https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-43-three-traps-building-indo-pacific-narrative-thus-far.
[16]甘睿淼.中韩经贸合作现状与贸易便利化实证分析[J].哈尔滨商业大学学报,2017(2):37-44.
[17][韩]朴炳先.力量竞争时代东亚权力结构展望与韩国的应对[J].国家战略,2018(2):68-98.
[18] Michael J. Mazarr.We Need a New International Order. Here's Why[EB/OL].2018-06-25,https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/06/we-need-a-new-international-order-heres-why.html.
[19]樊吉社.中美关系:竞争会否滑向对抗[J].战略决策研究,.2018(2):16-17.
[20]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.战略远见——美国与全球权力危机[M].洪漫译.北京:新华出版社,2012.
[21]中国技术革新已无法阻止[EB/OL].日经商贸,2018-07-23.
[22]刘军.国内政治、对外关系及其相互影响[J].国际论坛,2010(2):23.
[23] Putnam,Robert D. Diplomacy and Demestic Politics:The Logic of Two-Level Games[J].International Organi?zation.1988:434.
[24] Lobell Steven.The Challenge of Hegemony:Grand Strategy,Trade and Domestic Politics[M].The University ofMichigan Press.2003.
[25]青瓦台.文在寅总统,战时作战指挥权、驻韩美军再部署等问题将通过密切协商尽快解决[EB/OL].〔韩〕亚洲经济,2018-11-01,http://view.asiae.co.kr/news/view.htm?idxno=2018110811494844984.
[26]“修昔底德陷阱”提出者:中美关系需破传统、填空白[EB/OL].澎湃新闻网,2018-04-03,https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2057065.
[27]刘胜湘,蒋家敏.中美关系视域下的韩国角色论析[J].太平洋学报,2018(3):28-38.
[28]文在寅访问平壤,朝韩发布《平壤共同宣言》的同时,双方国防部长签署了《关于落实板门店宣言中军事领域共识的协议》[EB/OL].〔韩〕每日新闻,2018-09-19,http://www.m-i.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=454649.
(1)特朗普上台后,一是重新对国家利益进行定义,指出国家利益在于美国的安全、繁荣和自由民主制度,国际治理、他国安全和利益不是美国要关心的事务。二是所有注意力要集中于国内,以保证美国安全和繁荣。三是减少海外义务,只介入那些与美国安全和繁荣相关的事务,并按照国家利益确定美国的政策。上台不久,他即退出TPP和巴黎气候变化协议;减少对包括联合国等国际组织的经费援助;跟有关国家重谈已签署的自贸易区协定。参见滕建群.论特朗普政府战略重心转移[J].当代世界,2018(3):35。
(1)2017年,尽管受到萨德问题的影响,中韩贸易总额高达2803.6亿美元,同比增长10.3%;远高于韩美贸易额(1193.5亿美元)和韩日贸易额(819.6亿美元)的总和。中国商务部《国别贸易报告—韩国》2017年、2018年。
(1)文在寅总统在2018年9月7日出席东方经济论坛时首次提出“九桥战略规划”,该规划旨在加强韩俄九大领域(汽油、铁路、港湾、电力、北极航道、造船、就业、农业、水产)合作,实现互利双赢。参见李海瓒第四次东方经济论坛的基调演讲.韩俄应在九桥基础上发掘新合作领域[EB/OL].2018-09-12,http://news1.kr/articles/?3424693.
(1)韩国收回战时作战指挥权需要满足三个条件:能稳定移交战时作战指挥权的朝鲜半岛及区域内安全环境;战时作战指挥权移交之后,韩军具备主导韩美联合防卫力量的核心军事能力,而美国提供可持续的补充力量;韩军具备在局部挑衅和全面战争初期阶段应对朝鲜核与导弹威胁的能力,而美国提供延伸威慑手段和战斗力装备。
[2]布热津斯基.大棋局:美国的首要地位及其地缘战略[M].上海世纪出版集团,2007:44-45,45,153.
[3]凌胜利.双重困境与动态平衡——中美亚太主导权竞争与美国亚太盟国的战略选择[J].世界经济与政治,2018(3):71-72.
[4] IMF. Regional Economic Outlook:Asia Pacific[EB/OL].2018-10-11,https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/APAC/Issues/2018/10/05/areo1012.中美贸易战韩IT企业首当其冲[EB/OL].〔韩〕中央日报,2018-10-13,https://chinese.joins.com/gb/article.aspx?art_id=184084&category=001002.
[5] Glenn H.Snyder. The Security Dilemma In Alliance Politics[J].World Politics.1984(4):461-495.
[6] Scott A. Snyder. South Korea at the Crossroads--Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers[M].Co?lumbia University Press,2018:25.
[7]毕颖达.调整中的美韩同盟:发展历程、强化动因及其挑战[J].美国研究,2018(1):83-102.
[8]〔韩〕郑德龟.在美中之间苦恼的韩国外交安保——通过“联美和中”解决[M].首尔:每日经济新闻社,2011;〔韩〕具本学.韩美同盟与韩中战略伙伴关系的协调[J].〔韩〕新亚洲,2015(4):135-160.
[9]张慧智,王箫轲.中韩关系二十年:成就与问题[J].现代国际关系,2013(1):20-27.
[10]戴维来.中等国家崛起与国际关系的新变局[M].中央编译出版社,2017:149-150,48-71.
[11]张琏瑰.朝鲜半岛的统一与中国[J].当代亚太,2004(5):35.
[12]张文木.战后世界政治格局的三次变动与历史质变“临界点”的出现”[J].世界社会主义研究,2017(1):70-81.
[13]吴心伯.论亚太大变局[J].世界经济与政治,2017(6):35.
[14]朴槿惠与奥巴马会谈,韩美同盟提升为全球伙伴关系[EB/OL].中国日报网,2013-05-08,http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzx/2013-05/08/content_16484433.htm.
[15] Huong Le Thu. PacNet#43-Three Traps in Building the Indo-Pacific Narrative Thus Far[EB/OL].CSIS,2018-06-22,https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-43-three-traps-building-indo-pacific-narrative-thus-far.
[16]甘睿淼.中韩经贸合作现状与贸易便利化实证分析[J].哈尔滨商业大学学报,2017(2):37-44.
[17][韩]朴炳先.力量竞争时代东亚权力结构展望与韩国的应对[J].国家战略,2018(2):68-98.
[18] Michael J. Mazarr.We Need a New International Order. Here's Why[EB/OL].2018-06-25,https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/06/we-need-a-new-international-order-heres-why.html.
[19]樊吉社.中美关系:竞争会否滑向对抗[J].战略决策研究,.2018(2):16-17.
[20]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.战略远见——美国与全球权力危机[M].洪漫译.北京:新华出版社,2012.
[21]中国技术革新已无法阻止[EB/OL].日经商贸,2018-07-23.
[22]刘军.国内政治、对外关系及其相互影响[J].国际论坛,2010(2):23.
[23] Putnam,Robert D. Diplomacy and Demestic Politics:The Logic of Two-Level Games[J].International Organi?zation.1988:434.
[24] Lobell Steven.The Challenge of Hegemony:Grand Strategy,Trade and Domestic Politics[M].The University ofMichigan Press.2003.
[25]青瓦台.文在寅总统,战时作战指挥权、驻韩美军再部署等问题将通过密切协商尽快解决[EB/OL].〔韩〕亚洲经济,2018-11-01,http://view.asiae.co.kr/news/view.htm?idxno=2018110811494844984.
[26]“修昔底德陷阱”提出者:中美关系需破传统、填空白[EB/OL].澎湃新闻网,2018-04-03,https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2057065.
[27]刘胜湘,蒋家敏.中美关系视域下的韩国角色论析[J].太平洋学报,2018(3):28-38.
[28]文在寅访问平壤,朝韩发布《平壤共同宣言》的同时,双方国防部长签署了《关于落实板门店宣言中军事领域共识的协议》[EB/OL].〔韩〕每日新闻,2018-09-19,http://www.m-i.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=454649.
(1)特朗普上台后,一是重新对国家利益进行定义,指出国家利益在于美国的安全、繁荣和自由民主制度,国际治理、他国安全和利益不是美国要关心的事务。二是所有注意力要集中于国内,以保证美国安全和繁荣。三是减少海外义务,只介入那些与美国安全和繁荣相关的事务,并按照国家利益确定美国的政策。上台不久,他即退出TPP和巴黎气候变化协议;减少对包括联合国等国际组织的经费援助;跟有关国家重谈已签署的自贸易区协定。参见滕建群.论特朗普政府战略重心转移[J].当代世界,2018(3):35。
(1)2017年,尽管受到萨德问题的影响,中韩贸易总额高达2803.6亿美元,同比增长10.3%;远高于韩美贸易额(1193.5亿美元)和韩日贸易额(819.6亿美元)的总和。中国商务部《国别贸易报告—韩国》2017年、2018年。
(1)文在寅总统在2018年9月7日出席东方经济论坛时首次提出“九桥战略规划”,该规划旨在加强韩俄九大领域(汽油、铁路、港湾、电力、北极航道、造船、就业、农业、水产)合作,实现互利双赢。参见李海瓒第四次东方经济论坛的基调演讲.韩俄应在九桥基础上发掘新合作领域[EB/OL].2018-09-12,http://news1.kr/articles/?3424693.
(1)韩国收回战时作战指挥权需要满足三个条件:能稳定移交战时作战指挥权的朝鲜半岛及区域内安全环境;战时作战指挥权移交之后,韩军具备主导韩美联合防卫力量的核心军事能力,而美国提供可持续的补充力量;韩军具备在局部挑衅和全面战争初期阶段应对朝鲜核与导弹威胁的能力,而美国提供延伸威慑手段和战斗力装备。