清单计价模式下考虑投标人风险态度的投标报价博弈模型
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摘要
博弈论在工程项目中的应用能使投标决策更加科学.然而,很多投标报价博弈模型都是基于投标人风险规避假设的,通常这种假设并不符合实际情况.为了更加贴近实际投标报价情形,有必要考虑各投标人(博弈方)的风险偏好.鉴于此,在清单计价模式下,利用综合评估法,通过引入代表投标人风险态度的风险系数,构建投标报价博弈模型,导出其最优报价的关系方程式及其迭代求解算法,并分析其投标报价策略与风险系数对最优报价的影响.实证分析表明,应用所建立的博弈模型进行投标报价能够提高投标中标率,与现有类似方法的比较分析表明,所提出的投标报价博弈模型具有更贴近实际的优越性,可为实际投标报价决策提供方法支持.
Application of the game theory in construction can make the bidding decision more scientific. However, many existing game-based bidding quotation models are based on the hypothesis of risk averse tenders, which does not conform to the construction condition. To better fit the project bidding reality, it is necessary to consider the bidders'(or players')risk attitude. This paper establishes the bidding quotation game model under the bill of quantities with the comprehensive evaluation method by introducing the risk factor representing the bidders' risk attitude, derives the equations of bidding relation and its iterative algorithm, and analyzes the bidding strategies and effects of bidders' risk coefficients on optimal bidding quotations. Analysis of a real case shows that the implication of the game model in bidding quotation can lead to an improvement in the probability of winning the bid. And the proposed game model has its superiority, which may provide a support of methods for real bidding decision making.
Application of the game theory in construction can make the bidding decision more scientific. However, many existing game-based bidding quotation models are based on the hypothesis of risk averse tenders, which does not conform to the construction condition. To better fit the project bidding reality, it is necessary to consider the bidders'(or players')risk attitude. This paper establishes the bidding quotation game model under the bill of quantities with the comprehensive evaluation method by introducing the risk factor representing the bidders' risk attitude, derives the equations of bidding relation and its iterative algorithm, and analyzes the bidding strategies and effects of bidders' risk coefficients on optimal bidding quotations. Analysis of a real case shows that the implication of the game model in bidding quotation can lead to an improvement in the probability of winning the bid. And the proposed game model has its superiority, which may provide a support of methods for real bidding decision making.
引文
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[2]冯庆华,陈菊红,刘通.基于广义解的双合作博弈收益分配模型[J].控制与决策,2016,31(4):656-660.(Feng Q H,Chen J H,Liu T.Model of profit allocation based on generalized solution in bicooperative game[J].Control and Decision,2016,31(4):656-660.)
[3]李翠,薛惠锋.基于广义解的网络合作博弈收益分配模型[J].控制与决策,2017,32(6):1041-1046.(Li C,Xue H F.Model of profit allocation based on generalized solution in network cooperative game[J].Control and Decision,2017,32(6):1041-1046.)
[4]孙红霞,张强.基于联盟结构的模糊合作博弈的收益分配方案[J].运筹与管理,2010,19(5):84-89.(Sun H X,Zhang Q.Scheme of profit allocation based on fuzzy cooperative game in coalition structure[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2010,19(5):84-89.)
[5]张成堂,周永务.基于博弈论和VMI的收益共享机制协调模型[J].控制与决策,2010,25(1):137-140.(Zhang C T,Zhou Y W.Revenue sharing mechanism coordination model based on game theory and VMI[J].Control and Decision,2010,25(1):137-140.)
[6]Wu Q,Ren H B,Gao W J,et al.Profit allocation analysis among the distributed energy network participants based on game-theory[J].Energy,2017,118:783-794.
[7]Fiala Petr.Profit allocation games in supply chains[J].Central European J of Operations Research,2016,24(2):267-281.
[8]Fu W Q.Profit distribution strategy model in the three-level supply chain based on the cooperative game theory[J].Information Technology J,2014,13(6):1070-1077.
[9]余杭.招标投标通论[M].北京:中国地质出版社,1990:17-21.(Yu H.The general theory of bid invitation and bidding[M].Beijing:China Geological Publishing House,1990:17-21.)
[10]何增勤.工程项目投标策略[M].天津:天津大学出版社,2004:158-160.(He Z Q.Tender strategy of engineering project[M].Tianjin:Tianjin University Press,2004:158-160.)
[11]Au T,Bostleman R L,Parti E.Construction management game-deterministic model[J].J of the Construction Division,1969,95(1):25-38.
[12]郝丽萍,谭庆美,戈勇.基于博弈模型和模糊预测的投标报价策略研究[J].管理工程学报,2002,16(3):94-96.(Hao L P,Tan Q M,Ge Y.Study on strategy making of project offering based on game model and fuzzy forecasting[J].J of Industrial Engineering/Engineering Management,2002,16(3):94-96.)
[13]胡茂生,舒宇.低价中标下的投标报价博弈模型研究[J].南方冶金学院学报,2004,25(4):67-69.(Hu M S,Shu Y.Study on game model of project offering based on winning the bid with low-priced[J].J of Southern Institute of Metallurgy,2004,25(4):67-69.)
[14]黄宏飞,欧国立.博弈论在投标报价决策中的应用[J].北方交通大学学报,2000,24(3):41-43.(Huang H F,Ou G L.Application of game theory on bidding decision analysis[J].J of Northern Jiaotong University,2000,24(3):41-43.)
[15]邢军.现行建筑工程低价中标情况下博弈论在投标报价中的应用[J].上海交通大学学报,2000,41(1):45-47.(Xing J.Application of the game theory in bidding offers under the situation of winning the bidding of construction projects with lower price[J].J of Shanghai Jiaotong University,2000,41(1):45-47.)
[16]Huang Z X.Modeling bidding decision in engineering field with incomplete information:A static game-based approach[J].Advances in Mechanical Engineering,2016,8(1):1-8.
[17]胡静,王世良,尧红刚.几种基于博弈论的施工企业投标报价模型[J].技术经济与管理研究,2004,2:65-67.(Hu J,Wang S L,Yao H G.Several game theory based bidding models of construction enterprises[J].Technoeconomics and Management Research,2004,2:65-67.)
[18]曾宪科,冯玉强.基于非对称投标人的反向多属性英式拍卖模型与最优投标策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2012,32(4):769-775.(Zeng X K,Feng Y Q.Reverse multi-attribute English auction model and optimal bidding strategies based on asymmetric bidders[J].Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice,2012,32(4):769-775.)
[19]周学广,任龙.具有高投标成本的多属性逆向拍卖博弈模型[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(1):134-142.(Zhou X G,Ren L.Game model on multi-attribute reverse auction switch costly Bid[J].Chinese J of Management Science,2016,24(1):134-142.)
[20]何建洪,黄莹.公开招标人偏好的政府工程多属性招投标博弈分析[J].系统工程,2016(2):95-102.(He J H,Huang Y.Research on multi-attribute bidding game of government projects when tenderee’s preference is public[J].Systems Engineering,2016(2):95-102.)
[21]王聪,周利.房地产财富效应与投资者的风险态度[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2016,217(4):39-47.(Wang C,Zhou L.Research on housing wealth effect and investor’s risk attitude[J].J of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,2016,217(4):39-47.)
[22]冯祥锦,黄和亮,杨建州,等.森林经营者风险态度及其度量[J].林业经济问题,2013,33(5):403-408.(Feng X J,Huang H L,Yang J Z,et al.Risk attitude and its measurement of the forestry managers[J].Issues of Forestry Economics,2013,33(5):403-408.)
[23]任郑杰,周锋.E-V效用函数及沪市风险态度度量[J].河南科学,2006,24(4):600-603.(Ren Z J,Zhou F.E-V utility function and it’s application in the shanghai securities market[J].Henan Science,2006,24(4):600-603.)
[24]张宪,王雪青.招标控制价模式下工程项目投标报价博弈模型研究[J].建筑经济,2010,12:66-70.(Zhang X,Wang X Q.Research on game model of engineering project bidding quotation under the model of tender control price[J].Construction Economy,2010,12:66-70.)
[25]陈起俊,梁宝栋.BQ计价模式下工程项目投标报价博弈模型研究[J].科技进步与对策,2012,29(18):62-65.(Chen Q J,Liang B D.Study of game-based bidding quotation model under the bill of quantitie[J].Science and Technology Progress and Policy,2012,29(18):62-65.)
[2]冯庆华,陈菊红,刘通.基于广义解的双合作博弈收益分配模型[J].控制与决策,2016,31(4):656-660.(Feng Q H,Chen J H,Liu T.Model of profit allocation based on generalized solution in bicooperative game[J].Control and Decision,2016,31(4):656-660.)
[3]李翠,薛惠锋.基于广义解的网络合作博弈收益分配模型[J].控制与决策,2017,32(6):1041-1046.(Li C,Xue H F.Model of profit allocation based on generalized solution in network cooperative game[J].Control and Decision,2017,32(6):1041-1046.)
[4]孙红霞,张强.基于联盟结构的模糊合作博弈的收益分配方案[J].运筹与管理,2010,19(5):84-89.(Sun H X,Zhang Q.Scheme of profit allocation based on fuzzy cooperative game in coalition structure[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2010,19(5):84-89.)
[5]张成堂,周永务.基于博弈论和VMI的收益共享机制协调模型[J].控制与决策,2010,25(1):137-140.(Zhang C T,Zhou Y W.Revenue sharing mechanism coordination model based on game theory and VMI[J].Control and Decision,2010,25(1):137-140.)
[6]Wu Q,Ren H B,Gao W J,et al.Profit allocation analysis among the distributed energy network participants based on game-theory[J].Energy,2017,118:783-794.
[7]Fiala Petr.Profit allocation games in supply chains[J].Central European J of Operations Research,2016,24(2):267-281.
[8]Fu W Q.Profit distribution strategy model in the three-level supply chain based on the cooperative game theory[J].Information Technology J,2014,13(6):1070-1077.
[9]余杭.招标投标通论[M].北京:中国地质出版社,1990:17-21.(Yu H.The general theory of bid invitation and bidding[M].Beijing:China Geological Publishing House,1990:17-21.)
[10]何增勤.工程项目投标策略[M].天津:天津大学出版社,2004:158-160.(He Z Q.Tender strategy of engineering project[M].Tianjin:Tianjin University Press,2004:158-160.)
[11]Au T,Bostleman R L,Parti E.Construction management game-deterministic model[J].J of the Construction Division,1969,95(1):25-38.
[12]郝丽萍,谭庆美,戈勇.基于博弈模型和模糊预测的投标报价策略研究[J].管理工程学报,2002,16(3):94-96.(Hao L P,Tan Q M,Ge Y.Study on strategy making of project offering based on game model and fuzzy forecasting[J].J of Industrial Engineering/Engineering Management,2002,16(3):94-96.)
[13]胡茂生,舒宇.低价中标下的投标报价博弈模型研究[J].南方冶金学院学报,2004,25(4):67-69.(Hu M S,Shu Y.Study on game model of project offering based on winning the bid with low-priced[J].J of Southern Institute of Metallurgy,2004,25(4):67-69.)
[14]黄宏飞,欧国立.博弈论在投标报价决策中的应用[J].北方交通大学学报,2000,24(3):41-43.(Huang H F,Ou G L.Application of game theory on bidding decision analysis[J].J of Northern Jiaotong University,2000,24(3):41-43.)
[15]邢军.现行建筑工程低价中标情况下博弈论在投标报价中的应用[J].上海交通大学学报,2000,41(1):45-47.(Xing J.Application of the game theory in bidding offers under the situation of winning the bidding of construction projects with lower price[J].J of Shanghai Jiaotong University,2000,41(1):45-47.)
[16]Huang Z X.Modeling bidding decision in engineering field with incomplete information:A static game-based approach[J].Advances in Mechanical Engineering,2016,8(1):1-8.
[17]胡静,王世良,尧红刚.几种基于博弈论的施工企业投标报价模型[J].技术经济与管理研究,2004,2:65-67.(Hu J,Wang S L,Yao H G.Several game theory based bidding models of construction enterprises[J].Technoeconomics and Management Research,2004,2:65-67.)
[18]曾宪科,冯玉强.基于非对称投标人的反向多属性英式拍卖模型与最优投标策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2012,32(4):769-775.(Zeng X K,Feng Y Q.Reverse multi-attribute English auction model and optimal bidding strategies based on asymmetric bidders[J].Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice,2012,32(4):769-775.)
[19]周学广,任龙.具有高投标成本的多属性逆向拍卖博弈模型[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(1):134-142.(Zhou X G,Ren L.Game model on multi-attribute reverse auction switch costly Bid[J].Chinese J of Management Science,2016,24(1):134-142.)
[20]何建洪,黄莹.公开招标人偏好的政府工程多属性招投标博弈分析[J].系统工程,2016(2):95-102.(He J H,Huang Y.Research on multi-attribute bidding game of government projects when tenderee’s preference is public[J].Systems Engineering,2016(2):95-102.)
[21]王聪,周利.房地产财富效应与投资者的风险态度[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2016,217(4):39-47.(Wang C,Zhou L.Research on housing wealth effect and investor’s risk attitude[J].J of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,2016,217(4):39-47.)
[22]冯祥锦,黄和亮,杨建州,等.森林经营者风险态度及其度量[J].林业经济问题,2013,33(5):403-408.(Feng X J,Huang H L,Yang J Z,et al.Risk attitude and its measurement of the forestry managers[J].Issues of Forestry Economics,2013,33(5):403-408.)
[23]任郑杰,周锋.E-V效用函数及沪市风险态度度量[J].河南科学,2006,24(4):600-603.(Ren Z J,Zhou F.E-V utility function and it’s application in the shanghai securities market[J].Henan Science,2006,24(4):600-603.)
[24]张宪,王雪青.招标控制价模式下工程项目投标报价博弈模型研究[J].建筑经济,2010,12:66-70.(Zhang X,Wang X Q.Research on game model of engineering project bidding quotation under the model of tender control price[J].Construction Economy,2010,12:66-70.)
[25]陈起俊,梁宝栋.BQ计价模式下工程项目投标报价博弈模型研究[J].科技进步与对策,2012,29(18):62-65.(Chen Q J,Liang B D.Study of game-based bidding quotation model under the bill of quantitie[J].Science and Technology Progress and Policy,2012,29(18):62-65.)