美国不动产抵押权证券化法律问题研究
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摘要
美国理论与实践中的不动产抵押权证券化,其类型主要包括两种:一是住房抵押贷款证券化,肇始于20世纪70年代,为美国经济和解决住房问题作出了巨大贡献;二是商业房地产抵押贷款证券化,比前者出现晚十几年,虽在现金流结构上与前者比较类似,没有显著的不同,但在基础资产的发放、抵押品、偿还贷款期限和现金流的来源上与前者还是存在明显差异的。从1970—2009年的40年间,美国不动产抵押权证券市场得到迅猛发展,但由于不断降低的抵押贷款发放标准、融资杠杆日益被滥用、信用评级机构的"玩忽职守"和投资人"对自己的不负责任",最终爆发了次贷危机。通过2010年的金融改革,美国不动产抵押权证券市场逐渐得以复苏。
The real estate mortgage securitization in American theory and practice mainly includes two types: One is housing mortgage securitization, which began in the 1970 s.They have made great contributions to the American economy and to solving the housing problem. Second is commercial real estate mortgage securitization, which emerged more than a decade later than the former, is similar to the former in terms of cash flow structure with no significant difference.But there are significant differences in underlying asset issuance, collateral, loan maturity and cash flow.During the 40 years from 1970 to 2009, the market for real estate mortgage securities in the United States has developed rapidly, but because of the decreasing mortgage lending standards,financing leverage has been increasingly abused.Credit rating agencies "‘negligence'and investors""irresponsibility for themselves"eventually broke out in the subprime crisis.Through the Wall Street Reform Act and other financial reform measures, the U.S. real estate mortgage securities market gradually recovered.
The real estate mortgage securitization in American theory and practice mainly includes two types: One is housing mortgage securitization, which began in the 1970 s.They have made great contributions to the American economy and to solving the housing problem. Second is commercial real estate mortgage securitization, which emerged more than a decade later than the former, is similar to the former in terms of cash flow structure with no significant difference.But there are significant differences in underlying asset issuance, collateral, loan maturity and cash flow.During the 40 years from 1970 to 2009, the market for real estate mortgage securities in the United States has developed rapidly, but because of the decreasing mortgage lending standards,financing leverage has been increasingly abused.Credit rating agencies "‘negligence'and investors""irresponsibility for themselves"eventually broke out in the subprime crisis.Through the Wall Street Reform Act and other financial reform measures, the U.S. real estate mortgage securities market gradually recovered.
引文
[1]关于不动产抵押权证券化这一概念的界定比较复杂,笔者将另文阐释。
[2]沈炳熙:《资产证券化:中国的实践》,北京大学出版社2008年版。
[3]直到20世纪80年代,商业银行才全面介入不动产抵押贷款业务。
[4]Joseph Hu,Asset Securitization:Theory and Practice,John Wiley&Sons(Asia),2011,p.75.
[5]Gorton,Gary,George Pennacchi,“Banks and Loan Sales:Marketing Non-marketableAssets”,Journal of Monetary Economics,No.3,1995,p.389-411.
[6]Richard Stanton,J Boudoukh,M Richardson,R.Whitelaw,“Pricing Mortgage-Backed Securities in a Multifarious Interest Rate Environment:A Multivariate Density Estimation Approach”,Review of Financial Studies,No.10,1997,p.405-446.
[7]Kindleberger,Charles,Manias,Panics,and Crashes:A History of Financial Crises,New York:Basic Books,1978,p.28.
[8]Edward L.Gleader,Hedi D.Kallal,“Thin Markets,Asymmetric Information and Mortgage-Backed Securities”,Journal of Financial Internationalization,No.6,1997,p.84-86.
[9]Joseph Hu,Asset Securitization:Theory and Practice,John Wiley&Sons(Asia),2011,p.19.
[10]Coker,Don,“Repurchase&Buyback Demands,Representations and Warranties Claims inResidential Mortgage-Backed Securities”,2012.Available via the Internet:www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=24951.
[11]Greenspan,Alan,“Issues for Monetary Policy”,Economic Club of New York,December 19,2002.
[12]Joseph Hu,Asset Securitization:Theory and Practice,John Wiley&Sons(Asia),2011,p.22.
[13]Joseph Hu,Asset Securitization:Theory and Practice,John Wiley&Sons(Asia),2011,p.23.
[14]Schularick,Moritz,Alan M.Taylor,“Credit Booms Gone Bust:Monetary Policy,Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises,1870-2008”,American Economic Review,No.2,2012,p.61-67.
[15]Brunnermeier,Markus,“Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch of 2007-2008”,Journal of Economic Perspectives,No.1,2009,p.77-100.
[16]Mian,Atif,Amir Sufi,“The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion:Evidencefrom the U.S.Mortgage Default Crisis”,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,No.4,2009,p.1449-1489.
[17]DavidAlan Richards,“‘Gradable and Tradable’:The Securitization of Commercial Real Estate Mortgages”,Real Estate,No.16,1987,p.99-108.
[18]Bernanke,Ben,“Fostering Sustainable Home-ownership”,National Community ReinvestmentCoalition Annual Meeting,Washington,D.C.,March 2008.
[19]Rajan,Raghuram,“Has financial development made the world riskier?”Proceedings,Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,Aug.Issue,2005,p.313-369.
[20]Brunnermeier,Markus,“Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch of 2007-2008”,Journal of Economic Perspectives,No.1,2009,p.77-100.
[21]Keys,Benjamin,Tanmoy Mukherjee,Amit Seru,Vikrant Vig,“Did Securitization Leadto Lax Screening?Vidence From Subprime Mortgage Loans”,Journal ofMonetary Economics,No.1,2010,p.78.
[22]IMF,“Global Financial Stability Report”,October,2009.
[23]Joseph Hu,Asset Securitization:Theory and Practice,John Wiley&Sons(Asia),2011,p.342-343.
[24]DavidAlan Richards,“‘Gradable and Tradable’:The Securitization of Commercial Real Estate Mortgages”,Real Estate,No.16,1987,p.99-108.
[25]Gregory A.White,“‘Slicingand Dicing’:A Reviewof Commercial Mortgaged-backed Securitiesand Their Roleina Pension Fund's Investment Portfolio”,Schroder Mortgage Associates,No.1,1994,p.23.
[26]Mian,Atif,Amir Sufi,“The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion:Evidencefrom the U.S.Mortgage Default Crisis”,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,No.4,2009,p.1449-1489.
[27]IMF,“Global Financial Stability Report”,April,2008.
[28]Blinder,Alan,“Six Errors on the Path to the Financial Crisis”,The New York Times,January 24,2009.
[29]United States of America,Federal Bureau of Investigation,“Financial Institution Fraud andFailure Report”(Washington),2004.Available via the Internet:www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/fiff_04.
[30]“Accuracy of Appraisals Is Spotty,Study Says”,New York Times,May 8,2013.
[31]Cohan,William,“How We Got the Crash Wrong”,The Atlantic,No.6,2012,p.53.
[32]Stiglitz,Joseph E.,“Capitalist Fools”,Vanity Fair,No.1,2009,p.34-35.
[2]沈炳熙:《资产证券化:中国的实践》,北京大学出版社2008年版。
[3]直到20世纪80年代,商业银行才全面介入不动产抵押贷款业务。
[4]Joseph Hu,Asset Securitization:Theory and Practice,John Wiley&Sons(Asia),2011,p.75.
[5]Gorton,Gary,George Pennacchi,“Banks and Loan Sales:Marketing Non-marketableAssets”,Journal of Monetary Economics,No.3,1995,p.389-411.
[6]Richard Stanton,J Boudoukh,M Richardson,R.Whitelaw,“Pricing Mortgage-Backed Securities in a Multifarious Interest Rate Environment:A Multivariate Density Estimation Approach”,Review of Financial Studies,No.10,1997,p.405-446.
[7]Kindleberger,Charles,Manias,Panics,and Crashes:A History of Financial Crises,New York:Basic Books,1978,p.28.
[8]Edward L.Gleader,Hedi D.Kallal,“Thin Markets,Asymmetric Information and Mortgage-Backed Securities”,Journal of Financial Internationalization,No.6,1997,p.84-86.
[9]Joseph Hu,Asset Securitization:Theory and Practice,John Wiley&Sons(Asia),2011,p.19.
[10]Coker,Don,“Repurchase&Buyback Demands,Representations and Warranties Claims inResidential Mortgage-Backed Securities”,2012.Available via the Internet:www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=24951.
[11]Greenspan,Alan,“Issues for Monetary Policy”,Economic Club of New York,December 19,2002.
[12]Joseph Hu,Asset Securitization:Theory and Practice,John Wiley&Sons(Asia),2011,p.22.
[13]Joseph Hu,Asset Securitization:Theory and Practice,John Wiley&Sons(Asia),2011,p.23.
[14]Schularick,Moritz,Alan M.Taylor,“Credit Booms Gone Bust:Monetary Policy,Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises,1870-2008”,American Economic Review,No.2,2012,p.61-67.
[15]Brunnermeier,Markus,“Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch of 2007-2008”,Journal of Economic Perspectives,No.1,2009,p.77-100.
[16]Mian,Atif,Amir Sufi,“The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion:Evidencefrom the U.S.Mortgage Default Crisis”,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,No.4,2009,p.1449-1489.
[17]DavidAlan Richards,“‘Gradable and Tradable’:The Securitization of Commercial Real Estate Mortgages”,Real Estate,No.16,1987,p.99-108.
[18]Bernanke,Ben,“Fostering Sustainable Home-ownership”,National Community ReinvestmentCoalition Annual Meeting,Washington,D.C.,March 2008.
[19]Rajan,Raghuram,“Has financial development made the world riskier?”Proceedings,Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,Aug.Issue,2005,p.313-369.
[20]Brunnermeier,Markus,“Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch of 2007-2008”,Journal of Economic Perspectives,No.1,2009,p.77-100.
[21]Keys,Benjamin,Tanmoy Mukherjee,Amit Seru,Vikrant Vig,“Did Securitization Leadto Lax Screening?Vidence From Subprime Mortgage Loans”,Journal ofMonetary Economics,No.1,2010,p.78.
[22]IMF,“Global Financial Stability Report”,October,2009.
[23]Joseph Hu,Asset Securitization:Theory and Practice,John Wiley&Sons(Asia),2011,p.342-343.
[24]DavidAlan Richards,“‘Gradable and Tradable’:The Securitization of Commercial Real Estate Mortgages”,Real Estate,No.16,1987,p.99-108.
[25]Gregory A.White,“‘Slicingand Dicing’:A Reviewof Commercial Mortgaged-backed Securitiesand Their Roleina Pension Fund's Investment Portfolio”,Schroder Mortgage Associates,No.1,1994,p.23.
[26]Mian,Atif,Amir Sufi,“The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion:Evidencefrom the U.S.Mortgage Default Crisis”,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,No.4,2009,p.1449-1489.
[27]IMF,“Global Financial Stability Report”,April,2008.
[28]Blinder,Alan,“Six Errors on the Path to the Financial Crisis”,The New York Times,January 24,2009.
[29]United States of America,Federal Bureau of Investigation,“Financial Institution Fraud andFailure Report”(Washington),2004.Available via the Internet:www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/fiff_04.
[30]“Accuracy of Appraisals Is Spotty,Study Says”,New York Times,May 8,2013.
[31]Cohan,William,“How We Got the Crash Wrong”,The Atlantic,No.6,2012,p.53.
[32]Stiglitz,Joseph E.,“Capitalist Fools”,Vanity Fair,No.1,2009,p.34-35.