计及输电约束的发电商主辅市场联合竞价策略
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摘要
随着新一轮电改的进行,电能市场和辅助服务市场的建设也提上了日程。由于电能和备用的特殊耦合关系,电能和备用市场的联合竞价与出清是下一步的发展方向。基于线性供应函数和统一市场出清模型,考虑输电线路阻塞,提出了发电商在电能与备用联合市场中的最优竞价策略。发电商在电能和备用联合市场上的最优竞价是一个双层优化问题,上层采用粒子群算法搜寻解空间,下层采用路径跟踪内点法进行市场出清。采用IEEE 30节点网络对发电商竞价策略进行了仿真分析,结果表明:该方法能有效求解发电商在联合市场上的最优策略;同时输电阻塞的存在会使得发电商行使市场力以牟取暴利,进行合理的阻塞管理和提高用户需求弹性是抑制发电商市场力的有效措施。
With the new round of electric reform in progress, the construction of electricity market and ancillary service market have also been put on the agenda. Due to the special coupling of energy and reserve, joint bidding and clearing of the energy and the reserve market is the next step. Based on the linear supply function and the unified market clearing model, and considering the transmission line congestion, this paper explores the optimal bidding strategy of generators in the energy and reserve market. The optimum bidding in energy and reserve market of suppliers adopts double-layer optimization, the upper layer uses PSO for solution space seeking while the lower layer uses interior path-following method for market clearing. Finally, IEEE30 node network is applied to simulate the bidding strategy of power suppliers, and the results show that the proposed method can solve the optimal strategy on the joint market. Besides, the existence of transmission congestion will enable power suppliers to use market power to obtain profiteers. Therefore, reasonable congestion management and consumer demand flexibility improvement are effective measures for suppressing market power of power suppliers.
With the new round of electric reform in progress, the construction of electricity market and ancillary service market have also been put on the agenda. Due to the special coupling of energy and reserve, joint bidding and clearing of the energy and the reserve market is the next step. Based on the linear supply function and the unified market clearing model, and considering the transmission line congestion, this paper explores the optimal bidding strategy of generators in the energy and reserve market. The optimum bidding in energy and reserve market of suppliers adopts double-layer optimization, the upper layer uses PSO for solution space seeking while the lower layer uses interior path-following method for market clearing. Finally, IEEE30 node network is applied to simulate the bidding strategy of power suppliers, and the results show that the proposed method can solve the optimal strategy on the joint market. Besides, the existence of transmission congestion will enable power suppliers to use market power to obtain profiteers. Therefore, reasonable congestion management and consumer demand flexibility improvement are effective measures for suppressing market power of power suppliers.
引文
[1]山西省人民政府.山西省人民政府办公厅关于转发山西能监办山西省电力辅助服务市场化建设试点方案的通知[EB/OL].(2017-8-21)[2018-06-25].http://www.shanxi.gov.cn/xxgk/zfgb/2017nzfgb_17000/201718d18q_/szfbgtwj/201709/t20170929_337721.shtml
[2]浙江省人民政府.浙江省电力体制改革综合试点方案[EB/OL].(2017-9-24)[2018-06-25].http://www.zj.gov.cn/art/2017/10/10/art_12460_294525.html
[3]马豫超,侯志俭,蒋传文,等.基于粒子群算法求解电力市场发电商最优供给函数模型[J].电力系统自动化,2006,30(2):45-50.
[4]杨建林,严正.求解计及输电约束的线性供给函数均衡模型的分支定界方法[J].中国电机工程学报,2010,30(13):94-100.
[5]陶春华,马光文,涂扬举,等.主电力市场和旋转备用市场联合竞价策略[J].电力系统及其自动化学报,2006,18(6):10-12.
[6]张海峰.考虑风电的电力市场发电商竞标博弈模型[J].电子测量与仪器学报,2016,38(11):1701-1708.
[7]DAY C J,HOBBS B F,PANG J S.Oligopolistic competition in power networks:a conjectured supply function ap proach[J].IEEE Power Engineering Review,2002,22(5):68-68.
[8]袁智强,侯志俭,宋依群,等.发电商不同策略的供应函数均衡分析[J].电力系统及其自动化学报,2004,16(5):32-35.
[9]XIAN W,YUZENG L,SHAOHUA Z.Oligopolistic equilibrium analysis for electricity markets:a nonlinear complementarity approach[J].IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,2004,19(3):1348-1355.
[10]HAGHIGHAT H,SEIFI H,KIAN A R.Gaming analysis in joint energy and spinning reserve markets[J].IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,1932,22(4):2074-2085.
[11]魏永生,王晓楠,李婷妹.电力市场的输电阻塞管理模型[J].浙江电力,2005,24(4):14-16.
[12]唐猛.售电公司客户风险等级评估方法研究[J].浙江电力,2018,37(9):73-78.
[13]周自强,颜拥,文福拴.均值-LPM模型在发电商资产组合中的应用[J].浙江电力,2018,37(1):1-7.
[14]郭建壮,王皑,李宏杰.基于售电侧改革下电网企业市场开拓路径选择[J].山西电力,2017(6):9-12.
[15]田宏心,李朝阳,张振高,等.配电竞争环境下国外配网投资决策及其对中国的启示[J].电网与清洁能源,2017,33(11):24-31.
[16]王良缘.基于粒子群优化的年度合同电量降维分解模型[J].电网与清洁能源,2017,33(11):63-69.
[17]王万军,袁汉杰,李更丰,等.省级电力交易实践中的若干问题研究[J].电网与清洁能源,2017,33(8):38-43.
[18]李敏,王洪奎.国内外电力体制改革研究[J].电网与清洁能源,2017,33(8):44-48.
[19]贺大伟.市场监管方式体系化创新的经济法思考[J].渤海大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2017,39(3):54-58.
[20]王维超,薛宇,李更丰,等.电力能效统筹的市场交易体系及保障机制研究[J].电网与清洁能源,2017,33(2):1-7.
[2]浙江省人民政府.浙江省电力体制改革综合试点方案[EB/OL].(2017-9-24)[2018-06-25].http://www.zj.gov.cn/art/2017/10/10/art_12460_294525.html
[3]马豫超,侯志俭,蒋传文,等.基于粒子群算法求解电力市场发电商最优供给函数模型[J].电力系统自动化,2006,30(2):45-50.
[4]杨建林,严正.求解计及输电约束的线性供给函数均衡模型的分支定界方法[J].中国电机工程学报,2010,30(13):94-100.
[5]陶春华,马光文,涂扬举,等.主电力市场和旋转备用市场联合竞价策略[J].电力系统及其自动化学报,2006,18(6):10-12.
[6]张海峰.考虑风电的电力市场发电商竞标博弈模型[J].电子测量与仪器学报,2016,38(11):1701-1708.
[7]DAY C J,HOBBS B F,PANG J S.Oligopolistic competition in power networks:a conjectured supply function ap proach[J].IEEE Power Engineering Review,2002,22(5):68-68.
[8]袁智强,侯志俭,宋依群,等.发电商不同策略的供应函数均衡分析[J].电力系统及其自动化学报,2004,16(5):32-35.
[9]XIAN W,YUZENG L,SHAOHUA Z.Oligopolistic equilibrium analysis for electricity markets:a nonlinear complementarity approach[J].IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,2004,19(3):1348-1355.
[10]HAGHIGHAT H,SEIFI H,KIAN A R.Gaming analysis in joint energy and spinning reserve markets[J].IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,1932,22(4):2074-2085.
[11]魏永生,王晓楠,李婷妹.电力市场的输电阻塞管理模型[J].浙江电力,2005,24(4):14-16.
[12]唐猛.售电公司客户风险等级评估方法研究[J].浙江电力,2018,37(9):73-78.
[13]周自强,颜拥,文福拴.均值-LPM模型在发电商资产组合中的应用[J].浙江电力,2018,37(1):1-7.
[14]郭建壮,王皑,李宏杰.基于售电侧改革下电网企业市场开拓路径选择[J].山西电力,2017(6):9-12.
[15]田宏心,李朝阳,张振高,等.配电竞争环境下国外配网投资决策及其对中国的启示[J].电网与清洁能源,2017,33(11):24-31.
[16]王良缘.基于粒子群优化的年度合同电量降维分解模型[J].电网与清洁能源,2017,33(11):63-69.
[17]王万军,袁汉杰,李更丰,等.省级电力交易实践中的若干问题研究[J].电网与清洁能源,2017,33(8):38-43.
[18]李敏,王洪奎.国内外电力体制改革研究[J].电网与清洁能源,2017,33(8):44-48.
[19]贺大伟.市场监管方式体系化创新的经济法思考[J].渤海大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2017,39(3):54-58.
[20]王维超,薛宇,李更丰,等.电力能效统筹的市场交易体系及保障机制研究[J].电网与清洁能源,2017,33(2):1-7.