中国地区间税收竞争及其影响因素研究——来自动态空间杜宾模型的经验证据
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摘要
中国地区间以竞相税收优惠为竞争手段进行招商引资,制造税收"洼地",影响公平竞争和市场统一。本文研究中国地区间税收竞争行为及其影响因素,基于不对称税收竞争理论,构建动态空间杜宾模型,提出并检验本文的理论假设。研究得出的主要结论如下:地理相邻的地区间税负具有正的空间相关性,并在多数地区间形成税负"逐底"的恶性竞争;经济相近的地区间税收竞争更激烈,阻碍资源有效整合;人口规模增长、工业化发展和对外开放水平的提高有助于促进地区保持高税负,缓解"逐底竞争"。为建设区域性中心城市在缓解竞争方面提供经验证据,中心城市带动地区人口流入、工业化发展和促进对外开放的同时,拉开地区经济发展层次,有利于税收竞争缓解和资源有效配置。
The motivation of regional tax preferential policies is to attract investment,which will lead to the formation of tax depression,and affecting fair competition and market unity. This paper studies the tax competition behavior and its influencing factors in China based on the theory of asymmetric tax competition. It puts forward a theoretical hypothesis and tests it by constructing a Dynamic Spatial Durbin Model. Conclusions are as follows: The inter-regional tax burden has a positive spatial correlation,and forms a"vicious"tax competition; The regional tax competition is becoming more intense,and it is not easy to achieve effective regional integration; The increase of population scale,the development of industrialization and the improvement of the level of opening to the outside world help to motivate the region to maintain a high tax burden and ease the"down to bottom"of tax burden. This study also provides empirical evidence for the construction of regional key cities to ease competition. At the same time when the key cities drive the population inflow,industrialization development and opening to the outside world,the level of the regional economic development is conducive to the mitigation of tax competition and the effective allocation of resources.
The motivation of regional tax preferential policies is to attract investment,which will lead to the formation of tax depression,and affecting fair competition and market unity. This paper studies the tax competition behavior and its influencing factors in China based on the theory of asymmetric tax competition. It puts forward a theoretical hypothesis and tests it by constructing a Dynamic Spatial Durbin Model. Conclusions are as follows: The inter-regional tax burden has a positive spatial correlation,and forms a"vicious"tax competition; The regional tax competition is becoming more intense,and it is not easy to achieve effective regional integration; The increase of population scale,the development of industrialization and the improvement of the level of opening to the outside world help to motivate the region to maintain a high tax burden and ease the"down to bottom"of tax burden. This study also provides empirical evidence for the construction of regional key cities to ease competition. At the same time when the key cities drive the population inflow,industrialization development and opening to the outside world,the level of the regional economic development is conducive to the mitigation of tax competition and the effective allocation of resources.
引文
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[7]谢乔昕,宋良荣.中国式分权、经济影响力与研发投入[J].科学学研究,2015,(12):1797-1804.
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[12]姜海宁,谷人旭.边界区域整合理论研究综述[J].工业技术经济,2010,(3):118-123.
[13]孙晓华,郭旭.工业集聚效应的来源:劳动还是资本[J].中国工业经济,2015,(11):78-93.
[14]Krugman P. Increasing Returns and Economic Geography[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1991,99(3):483-499.
[15]毛其淋,盛斌.对外经济开放、区域市场整合与全要素生产率[J].经济学(季刊),2011,(1):181-210.
[16]付文林,耿强.税收竞争、经济集聚与地区投资行为[J].经济学,2011,(4):1329-1348.
[17]陈工,洪礼阳.省级政府非税收入竞争的强度比较与分析——基于财政分权的视角[J].财贸经济,2014,(4):5-13.
[18]王凤荣,苗妙.税收竞争、区域环境与资本跨区流动——基于企业异地并购视角的实证研究[J].经济研究,2015,(2):16-30.
[19]Case A C.,Rosen H S.,Jr J R H. Budget Spillovers and Fiscal Policy Interdependence:Evidence from the States[J]. Journal of Public Economics,1993,52(3):285-307.
[20]郭杰,李涛.中国地方政府间税收竞争研究——基于中国省级面板数据的经验证据[J].管理世界,2009,(11):54-64,73.
(1)此处的“邻居”指的是空间上设定的空间权重下的概念,不局限于传统的地理相邻,还包括经济权重下的经济水平相近的地区之间。
(1)另外使用非农业GDP/总GDP衡量工业化水平进行稳健性检验,检验结果没有显著变化。
[2]Wilson J. D. A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition[J]. Journal of Urban Economics,1986,19(3):296-315.
[3]Elschner C.,Vanborren W. European Union:Effective Corporate Income Tax Rates in an Enlarged European Union[J]. Bulletin for International Taxation,2010,64(11):577-584.
[4]Bucovetsky S. Asymmetric Tax Competition[J]. Journal of Urban Economics,1991,30(2):167-181.
[5]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007,(7):36-50.
[6]Bucovetsky S. An Index of Capital Tax Competition[J]. International Tax and Public Finance,2009,16(6),727-752.
[7]谢乔昕,宋良荣.中国式分权、经济影响力与研发投入[J].科学学研究,2015,(12):1797-1804.
[8]Mintz J.,Tulkens H. Commodity Tax Competition between Member States of a Federation:Equilibrium and Efficiency[J]. Journal of Public Economics,1986,29(2):133-172.
[9]Wildasin D. E. Nash Equilibria in Models of Fiscal Competition[J]. Journal of Public Economics,1988,35(2),229-240.
[10]沈坤荣,付文林.税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效[J].经济研究,2006,(6):16-26.
[11]Anselin L.,Bera A. K.,Florax R.,Yoon M. J. Simple Diagnostic Tests for Spatial Dependence[J]. Regional Science and Urban Economics,1996,26(1):77-104.
[12]姜海宁,谷人旭.边界区域整合理论研究综述[J].工业技术经济,2010,(3):118-123.
[13]孙晓华,郭旭.工业集聚效应的来源:劳动还是资本[J].中国工业经济,2015,(11):78-93.
[14]Krugman P. Increasing Returns and Economic Geography[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1991,99(3):483-499.
[15]毛其淋,盛斌.对外经济开放、区域市场整合与全要素生产率[J].经济学(季刊),2011,(1):181-210.
[16]付文林,耿强.税收竞争、经济集聚与地区投资行为[J].经济学,2011,(4):1329-1348.
[17]陈工,洪礼阳.省级政府非税收入竞争的强度比较与分析——基于财政分权的视角[J].财贸经济,2014,(4):5-13.
[18]王凤荣,苗妙.税收竞争、区域环境与资本跨区流动——基于企业异地并购视角的实证研究[J].经济研究,2015,(2):16-30.
[19]Case A C.,Rosen H S.,Jr J R H. Budget Spillovers and Fiscal Policy Interdependence:Evidence from the States[J]. Journal of Public Economics,1993,52(3):285-307.
[20]郭杰,李涛.中国地方政府间税收竞争研究——基于中国省级面板数据的经验证据[J].管理世界,2009,(11):54-64,73.
(1)此处的“邻居”指的是空间上设定的空间权重下的概念,不局限于传统的地理相邻,还包括经济权重下的经济水平相近的地区之间。
(1)另外使用非农业GDP/总GDP衡量工业化水平进行稳健性检验,检验结果没有显著变化。