乡村振兴战略背景下我国连片特困区农产品流通治理研究
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摘要
在乡村振兴战略背景下,解决区域性整体贫困是推动脱贫攻坚与乡村振兴有机结合相互促进的优先任务,连片特困区的脱贫攻坚战必须结合各地区的资源禀赋和独特的历史文化形成特色农业产业集群。为培育连片特困区未来经济高质量发展的内生动力和建立避免返贫稳定脱贫的长效机制,本文认为连片特困区的农产品流通治理应突破原有的"政府—市场"与"市场—企业"的二分法,推理至"政府—市场—企业"的治理边界。针对我国14个连片特困区县均特产的三种类别即特产相似区、特产综合区和特产多元区,与批发市场型、契约型、平台网络型农产品流通渠道模式进行了匹配研究,并根据不同特困区域类型所面临的农产品渠道治理核心问题探讨了政府、市场与企业的治理边界。
Under the background of the strategy of rural revitalization,solving the overall regional poverty is the priority task of organically combining poverty alleviation and rural revitalization.The fight against poverty in contiguous poverty-stricken areas must combine the resource endowment and unique historical culture of each region to form characteristic agricultural industrial clusters. In order to cultivate the endogenous driving force for the future high-quality economic development of contiguous poverty-stricken areas and establish a long-term mechanism to avoid and stabilize poverty alleviation. This paper thinks that the circulation governance of agricultural products in contiguous poor areas should break through the original "government-market"and "market-enterprise"dichotomy,deduce to the governance boundary of "government-market-enterprise". According to the categories of specialty products of three counties in 14 contiguous poor areas in China,it is the similar area of specialty,the complex area of specialty and the diversified area of specialty. The pattern of wholesale market,contract and platform network distribution channels of agricultural products has been matched with these three types,and according to the different channels of agricultural products governance core problem facing most needy area type discusses the governance of the government,market and enterprise boundary.
Under the background of the strategy of rural revitalization,solving the overall regional poverty is the priority task of organically combining poverty alleviation and rural revitalization.The fight against poverty in contiguous poverty-stricken areas must combine the resource endowment and unique historical culture of each region to form characteristic agricultural industrial clusters. In order to cultivate the endogenous driving force for the future high-quality economic development of contiguous poverty-stricken areas and establish a long-term mechanism to avoid and stabilize poverty alleviation. This paper thinks that the circulation governance of agricultural products in contiguous poor areas should break through the original "government-market"and "market-enterprise"dichotomy,deduce to the governance boundary of "government-market-enterprise". According to the categories of specialty products of three counties in 14 contiguous poor areas in China,it is the similar area of specialty,the complex area of specialty and the diversified area of specialty. The pattern of wholesale market,contract and platform network distribution channels of agricultural products has been matched with these three types,and according to the different channels of agricultural products governance core problem facing most needy area type discusses the governance of the government,market and enterprise boundary.
引文
(1)中共中央、国务院:《乡村振兴战略规划(2018-2022年)》,2018年9月。
(2)江小娟等:《服务经济-理论演进与产业分析》,人民出版社2014年版。
(3)Kumar R.R.and Husain N.Marketing Efficiency and price Spread in Marketing of Grain:a Study of Hamirpur District,U.P.,India Journal of Agricultural Economics,2002(7):390.
(4)Bain J.S.Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration:A-merican Manufacturing 1936-1940,Quarterly Journal of Economics,1951,65(3):293-325.
(5)Stern L.W.Reve T.Distribution Channels as Political Economies:A Framework for Comparative Analysis,Journal of Marketing,1980,44(3):52-64.
(6)Chahal S.S.,Singh S and Sandhu J.S.Price Spreads and Marketing Efficiency of Inland Fish in Punjab:A Temporal Analysis,India Journal of Agricultural Economics,2004(7):487-498.
(7)Bucklin L P.A Theory of Distribution Channel Structure,Institute of Business and Economic Research,1966.
(8)Heide,J.B..Interorganazational Governance in Marketing Channels,Journal of Marketing,1994,58(1):71-85.
(9)Williamson,O.E.The Mechanisms of Governance,New York and Oxford:Oxford University Press,1996.
(10)黄梦思、孙剑:《复合治理“挤出效应”对农产品营销渠道绩效的影响---以“农业龙头企业+农户”模式为例》,《中国农村经济》2016年第4期。
(11)Makadok,R.,Coff,R.,Both Market and Hierarchy:An Incentive-system Theory of Hybrid Governance Forms,Academy of Management Review,2009,34(2):297-319.
(12)庄贵军:《基于渠道组织形式的渠道治理策略选择:渠道治理的一个新视角》,《南开管理评论》2012年第6期。
(13)胡晗、司亚飞、王立剑:《产业扶贫政策对贫困户生计策略和收入的影响---来自陕西省的经验证据》,《中国农村经济》2018年第1期。
(14)周燕,政府的合约性质及其经济治理-基于中国地方政府若干实践的交易费用考察,《管理世界》2017年第8期。
(15)罗必良:《市场、企业和政府:功能边界与作用范围-基于交易费用经济学的考察》,《学术研究》2000年第7期。
(16)“新制度经济学”是威廉姆森上世纪八十年代中期(1985s)提出来的,引自张五常《经济解释》(2015年版)。
(17)国务院扶贫办开发领导小组办公室:《国家扶贫开发工作重点县名单》与《全国连片特困地区分县名单》2012年3月19日。
(18)欧阳小迅、黄福华:《我国农产品流通效率的度量及其决定因素:2000-2009》,《农业技术经济》2011年第2期。
(19)(20)张曙光:《产权、合约与农业发展---评〈罗必良自选集〉》,《经济研究》2016年第11期。
(21)夏健明、陈元志:《实物期权理论评述》,《上海金融学院学报》2005年第1期。
(22)Apicella,Coren L.,Eduardo M.Azevedo,Nicholas A.Christakis,and James H.Fowler.“Evolutionary Origins of the Endowment Effect:Evidence from Hunter-Gatherers:Dataset”,American Economic Review,2014,104(6):1793-1805.
(23)张五常:《经济解释》,中信出版社2015年版,第803页。
(24)张德勇:《论农产品批发市场的公益性---基于公共财政视角》,《中国流通经济》2014年第7期。
(25)罗必良:《公共领域、模糊产权与政府的产权模糊化倾向》,《改革》2005年第7期。
(26)宋则:《精准扶贫要依靠农产品市场精准调控制度创新》,《经济参考报》2017年11月2日。
(2)江小娟等:《服务经济-理论演进与产业分析》,人民出版社2014年版。
(3)Kumar R.R.and Husain N.Marketing Efficiency and price Spread in Marketing of Grain:a Study of Hamirpur District,U.P.,India Journal of Agricultural Economics,2002(7):390.
(4)Bain J.S.Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration:A-merican Manufacturing 1936-1940,Quarterly Journal of Economics,1951,65(3):293-325.
(5)Stern L.W.Reve T.Distribution Channels as Political Economies:A Framework for Comparative Analysis,Journal of Marketing,1980,44(3):52-64.
(6)Chahal S.S.,Singh S and Sandhu J.S.Price Spreads and Marketing Efficiency of Inland Fish in Punjab:A Temporal Analysis,India Journal of Agricultural Economics,2004(7):487-498.
(7)Bucklin L P.A Theory of Distribution Channel Structure,Institute of Business and Economic Research,1966.
(8)Heide,J.B..Interorganazational Governance in Marketing Channels,Journal of Marketing,1994,58(1):71-85.
(9)Williamson,O.E.The Mechanisms of Governance,New York and Oxford:Oxford University Press,1996.
(10)黄梦思、孙剑:《复合治理“挤出效应”对农产品营销渠道绩效的影响---以“农业龙头企业+农户”模式为例》,《中国农村经济》2016年第4期。
(11)Makadok,R.,Coff,R.,Both Market and Hierarchy:An Incentive-system Theory of Hybrid Governance Forms,Academy of Management Review,2009,34(2):297-319.
(12)庄贵军:《基于渠道组织形式的渠道治理策略选择:渠道治理的一个新视角》,《南开管理评论》2012年第6期。
(13)胡晗、司亚飞、王立剑:《产业扶贫政策对贫困户生计策略和收入的影响---来自陕西省的经验证据》,《中国农村经济》2018年第1期。
(14)周燕,政府的合约性质及其经济治理-基于中国地方政府若干实践的交易费用考察,《管理世界》2017年第8期。
(15)罗必良:《市场、企业和政府:功能边界与作用范围-基于交易费用经济学的考察》,《学术研究》2000年第7期。
(16)“新制度经济学”是威廉姆森上世纪八十年代中期(1985s)提出来的,引自张五常《经济解释》(2015年版)。
(17)国务院扶贫办开发领导小组办公室:《国家扶贫开发工作重点县名单》与《全国连片特困地区分县名单》2012年3月19日。
(18)欧阳小迅、黄福华:《我国农产品流通效率的度量及其决定因素:2000-2009》,《农业技术经济》2011年第2期。
(19)(20)张曙光:《产权、合约与农业发展---评〈罗必良自选集〉》,《经济研究》2016年第11期。
(21)夏健明、陈元志:《实物期权理论评述》,《上海金融学院学报》2005年第1期。
(22)Apicella,Coren L.,Eduardo M.Azevedo,Nicholas A.Christakis,and James H.Fowler.“Evolutionary Origins of the Endowment Effect:Evidence from Hunter-Gatherers:Dataset”,American Economic Review,2014,104(6):1793-1805.
(23)张五常:《经济解释》,中信出版社2015年版,第803页。
(24)张德勇:《论农产品批发市场的公益性---基于公共财政视角》,《中国流通经济》2014年第7期。
(25)罗必良:《公共领域、模糊产权与政府的产权模糊化倾向》,《改革》2005年第7期。
(26)宋则:《精准扶贫要依靠农产品市场精准调控制度创新》,《经济参考报》2017年11月2日。