高管权力、媒体关注与高管私有收益——基于我国A股上市公司的经验证据
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摘要
本文以2012-2016年我国A股上市公司为样本,检验高管权力、媒体关注与高管私有收益之间的关系。研究发现,高管权力与高管私有收益显著正相关,媒体关注能够显著抑制高管权力对高管私有收益的正向作用。进一步研究发现,国企高管更偏好非货币性私有收益,非国企高管更偏好货币性私有收益;央企高管更偏好非货币性私有收益,地方国企高管更偏好货币性私有收益。此外,媒体关注能够显著抑制央企高管权力对高管私有收益的正向作用,但不能显著抑制地方国企高管权力对高管私有收益的正向作用。
Based on China's A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2016,this paper investigates the relationship between executive power,media attention,and executive private benefits. The study finds that executive power is significantly positively related to executive private benefits. Media attention can significantly curb the positive effect of executive power on executive private benefits. Further research found that SOE executives prefer non-monetary private benefits,non-SOE executives prefer monetary private benefits,central SOE executives prefer non-monetary private benefits,and local SOE executives prefer monetary private benefits. In addition,media attention can significantly inhibit the positive effects of executive power of central SOEs on executive private benefits,but it can not significantly curb the positive effect of local SOE executives' power on executive private benefits.
Based on China's A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2016,this paper investigates the relationship between executive power,media attention,and executive private benefits. The study finds that executive power is significantly positively related to executive private benefits. Media attention can significantly curb the positive effect of executive power on executive private benefits. Further research found that SOE executives prefer non-monetary private benefits,non-SOE executives prefer monetary private benefits,central SOE executives prefer non-monetary private benefits,and local SOE executives prefer monetary private benefits. In addition,media attention can significantly inhibit the positive effects of executive power of central SOEs on executive private benefits,but it can not significantly curb the positive effect of local SOE executives' power on executive private benefits.
引文
[1]Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,(4):305-360.
[2]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010,(11):73-87.
[3]陈仕华,姜广省,李维安,王春林.国有企业纪委的治理参与能否抑制高管私有收益?[J].经济研究,2014,(10):139-151.
[4]张洽,袁天荣.CEO权力、私有收益与并购动因---基于我国上市公司的实证研究[J].财经研究,2013,(4):101-110.
[5]赵刚,梁上坤,王卫星.超募融资、管理层权力与私有收益---基于IPO市场的经验证据[J].会计研究,2017,(4):31-37.
[6]陈志武.媒体、法律与市场[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社,2005.
[7]罗进辉.媒体报道的公司治理作用---双重代理成本视角[J].金融研究,2012,(10):153-166.
[8]李培功,沈艺峰.媒体的公司治理作用:中国的经验证据[J].经济研究,2010,(4):14-27.
[9]Dyck A,Volchkova N,Zingales L.The Corporate Governance Role of the Media:Evidence from Russia[J].The Journal of Finance,2008,(3):1093-1135.
[10]Fang L,Peress J.Media Coverage and the Cross-section of Stock Returns[J].The Journal of Finance,2009,(5):2023-2052.
[11]杨德明,赵璨.媒体监督、媒体治理与高管薪酬[J].经济研究,2012,(6):116-126.
[12]李培功,沈艺峰.经理薪酬、轰动报道与媒体的公司治理作用[J].管理科学学报,2013,(10):63-80.
[13]薛健,汝毅,窦超.“惩一”能否“儆百”?---曝光机制对高管超额在职消费的威慑效应探究[J].会计研究,2017,(5):68-74.
[14]De Angelo H,De Angelo L,Skinner D J.Reversal of Fortune Dividend Signaling and the Disappearance of Sustained Earnings Growth[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1996,(3):341-371.
[15]Core J E,Guay W,Larcker D F.The Power of the Pen and Executive Compensation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,(1):1-25.
[16]Liu B,McConnell J J.The Role of the Media in Corporate Governance:Do the Media Influence Managers'Capital Allocation Decisions?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2013,(1):1-17.
[17]徐细雄,刘星.放权改革、薪酬管制与企业高管腐败[J].管理世界,2013,(3):119-132.
[18]Liu B,McConnell J J,Xu W.The Power of the Pen Reconsidered:The Media,CEO Human Capital,and Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2017,(76):175-188.
[19]Han Kim E,Lu Y.Is Chief Executive Officer Power Bad?[J].Asia‐Pacific Journal of Financial Studies,2011,(4):495-516.
[20]王烨,叶玲,盛明泉.管理层权力、机会主义动机与股权激励计划设计[J].会计研究,2012,(10):35-41.
[21]卢锐,魏明海,黎文靖.管理层权力、在职消费与产权效率---来自中国上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2008,(5):85-92.
[22]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值---来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005,(5):40-51.
[23]夏纪军,张晏.控制权与激励的冲突---兼对股权激励有效性的实证分析[J].经济研究,2008,(3):87-98.
[24]潘红波,夏新平,余明桂.政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J].经济研究,2008,(4):41-52.
[25]林毅夫,李志赟.政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束[J].经济研究,2004,(2):17-27.
[26]唐雪松,周晓苏,马如静.政府干预、GDP增长与地方国企过度投资[J].金融研究,2010,(8):99-112.
[27]薛云奎,白云霞.国家所有权、冗余雇员与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2008,(10):96-105.
[28]Nguyen B D.Is More News Good News?Media Coverage of CEOs,Firm Value,and Rent Extraction[J].Quarterly Journal of Finance,2015,(4):1-38.
[29]逯东,付鹏,杨丹.媒体类型、媒体关注与上市公司内部控制质量[J].会计研究,2015,(4):78-85.
[30]Firth M,Fung P M Y,Rui O M.Corporate Performance and CEO Compensation in China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,(4):693-714.
[31]Luo W,Zhang Y,Zhu N.Bank Ownership and Executive Perquisites:New Evidence from An Emerging Market[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,(2):352-370.
[32]梁上坤.媒体关注、信息环境与公司费用粘性[J].中国工业经济,2017,(2):154-173.
[33]郑志刚,丁冬,汪昌云.媒体的负面报道、经理人声誉与企业业绩改善---来自我国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2011,(12):163-176.
[34]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005,(2):92-101.
(1)这8大财经报纸分别为《中国证券报》《证券日报》《证券时报》《上海证券报》《中国经营报》《经济观察报》《21世纪经济报道》《第一财经日报》.
(2)值得注意的是,权小锋等(2010)把我国划分为东部、中部、西部三个经济区域,以此,引入两个虚拟变量.鉴于国家统计局进行城镇职工平均工资统计时,把我国划分为东部、中部、西部、东北四个经济区域.因此,为了更好度量预期正常高管薪酬水平,本文在模型(1)中,引入了三个虚拟变量,分别是东(East)、中(Mid)、西(West).
[2]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010,(11):73-87.
[3]陈仕华,姜广省,李维安,王春林.国有企业纪委的治理参与能否抑制高管私有收益?[J].经济研究,2014,(10):139-151.
[4]张洽,袁天荣.CEO权力、私有收益与并购动因---基于我国上市公司的实证研究[J].财经研究,2013,(4):101-110.
[5]赵刚,梁上坤,王卫星.超募融资、管理层权力与私有收益---基于IPO市场的经验证据[J].会计研究,2017,(4):31-37.
[6]陈志武.媒体、法律与市场[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社,2005.
[7]罗进辉.媒体报道的公司治理作用---双重代理成本视角[J].金融研究,2012,(10):153-166.
[8]李培功,沈艺峰.媒体的公司治理作用:中国的经验证据[J].经济研究,2010,(4):14-27.
[9]Dyck A,Volchkova N,Zingales L.The Corporate Governance Role of the Media:Evidence from Russia[J].The Journal of Finance,2008,(3):1093-1135.
[10]Fang L,Peress J.Media Coverage and the Cross-section of Stock Returns[J].The Journal of Finance,2009,(5):2023-2052.
[11]杨德明,赵璨.媒体监督、媒体治理与高管薪酬[J].经济研究,2012,(6):116-126.
[12]李培功,沈艺峰.经理薪酬、轰动报道与媒体的公司治理作用[J].管理科学学报,2013,(10):63-80.
[13]薛健,汝毅,窦超.“惩一”能否“儆百”?---曝光机制对高管超额在职消费的威慑效应探究[J].会计研究,2017,(5):68-74.
[14]De Angelo H,De Angelo L,Skinner D J.Reversal of Fortune Dividend Signaling and the Disappearance of Sustained Earnings Growth[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1996,(3):341-371.
[15]Core J E,Guay W,Larcker D F.The Power of the Pen and Executive Compensation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,(1):1-25.
[16]Liu B,McConnell J J.The Role of the Media in Corporate Governance:Do the Media Influence Managers'Capital Allocation Decisions?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2013,(1):1-17.
[17]徐细雄,刘星.放权改革、薪酬管制与企业高管腐败[J].管理世界,2013,(3):119-132.
[18]Liu B,McConnell J J,Xu W.The Power of the Pen Reconsidered:The Media,CEO Human Capital,and Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2017,(76):175-188.
[19]Han Kim E,Lu Y.Is Chief Executive Officer Power Bad?[J].Asia‐Pacific Journal of Financial Studies,2011,(4):495-516.
[20]王烨,叶玲,盛明泉.管理层权力、机会主义动机与股权激励计划设计[J].会计研究,2012,(10):35-41.
[21]卢锐,魏明海,黎文靖.管理层权力、在职消费与产权效率---来自中国上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2008,(5):85-92.
[22]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值---来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005,(5):40-51.
[23]夏纪军,张晏.控制权与激励的冲突---兼对股权激励有效性的实证分析[J].经济研究,2008,(3):87-98.
[24]潘红波,夏新平,余明桂.政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J].经济研究,2008,(4):41-52.
[25]林毅夫,李志赟.政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束[J].经济研究,2004,(2):17-27.
[26]唐雪松,周晓苏,马如静.政府干预、GDP增长与地方国企过度投资[J].金融研究,2010,(8):99-112.
[27]薛云奎,白云霞.国家所有权、冗余雇员与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2008,(10):96-105.
[28]Nguyen B D.Is More News Good News?Media Coverage of CEOs,Firm Value,and Rent Extraction[J].Quarterly Journal of Finance,2015,(4):1-38.
[29]逯东,付鹏,杨丹.媒体类型、媒体关注与上市公司内部控制质量[J].会计研究,2015,(4):78-85.
[30]Firth M,Fung P M Y,Rui O M.Corporate Performance and CEO Compensation in China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,(4):693-714.
[31]Luo W,Zhang Y,Zhu N.Bank Ownership and Executive Perquisites:New Evidence from An Emerging Market[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,(2):352-370.
[32]梁上坤.媒体关注、信息环境与公司费用粘性[J].中国工业经济,2017,(2):154-173.
[33]郑志刚,丁冬,汪昌云.媒体的负面报道、经理人声誉与企业业绩改善---来自我国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2011,(12):163-176.
[34]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005,(2):92-101.
(1)这8大财经报纸分别为《中国证券报》《证券日报》《证券时报》《上海证券报》《中国经营报》《经济观察报》《21世纪经济报道》《第一财经日报》.
(2)值得注意的是,权小锋等(2010)把我国划分为东部、中部、西部三个经济区域,以此,引入两个虚拟变量.鉴于国家统计局进行城镇职工平均工资统计时,把我国划分为东部、中部、西部、东北四个经济区域.因此,为了更好度量预期正常高管薪酬水平,本文在模型(1)中,引入了三个虚拟变量,分别是东(East)、中(Mid)、西(West).