特朗普政府对华科技战略及其影响与应对
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摘要
基于对中国国内政策与科技创新进程发展态势的疑虑,特朗普政府已深度调整其对华科技战略。这一调整主要是基于其对中国自主创新进程在安全、秩序和经济领域对美国所产生的所谓负外部性的认知。目前,美国政界对中国高科技产业发展对美国负面影响的认知总体上存在共识,战略研究界的主流认知亦与政界趋同,而商界则相对更关注中国的政策动向、美国政府对华战略对其商业利益的影响。特朗普政府对华科技战略主要包含在相关的安全、经贸投资及外交等领域的政策中,其发展动向凸显了"全政府对华战略"的基调,并折射出美国政商学各界对中美科技关系的认知。特朗普政府的对华科技战略在美国打压中国高科技企业的过程中得到充分体现。这一战略将冲击中美政治与安全关系的稳定基础,削弱中美在全球产业链中的合作关系,并将对中美在全球技术治理等领域的合作前景产生负面影响。对此,中国需继续深化改革开放,构建更具吸引力的营商环境;需管控中美战略竞争,并强化双边沟通与协作;需拓展国际科技产业合作,并扩大中美在技术治理领域的合作空间。
The Trump administration has significantly changed U.S. technology strategy toward China in line with the development of China's national capacity and U.S, domestic politics. This change is based on the perception that China's technological industry and its innovation policy will generate negative externalities detrimental to U.S. interests with respect to security, international order, and economy. On the whole, there is a consensus in the U.S. political circle on the negative impact of China's high-tech industry growth. The predominant perception among strategists is similar to that of the political circle, while the business community pays more attention to China's policy trend and the impact of the U.S. government's China policy on its business interests. The development of the Trump administration's technology strategy toward China, which is manifested in the current security, economic, trade, investment, and foreign policies, highlights a "whole-of-government" approach. The strategy has been on full display in the U.S. government's crackdown on Chinese high-tech companies. The Trump administration's technology strategy will undermine the stable foundation of Sino-U.S. political and security relations, bilateral cooperation in the global industrial chain, and global technology governance. In this context, China should deepen reform and build a more attractive business environment. At the same time, China needs to alleviate Sino-U.S. strategic competition and strengthen bilateral communication and coordination. In addition, China needs to expand Sino-U.S. cooperation in the technology industry and global technology governance.
The Trump administration has significantly changed U.S. technology strategy toward China in line with the development of China's national capacity and U.S, domestic politics. This change is based on the perception that China's technological industry and its innovation policy will generate negative externalities detrimental to U.S. interests with respect to security, international order, and economy. On the whole, there is a consensus in the U.S. political circle on the negative impact of China's high-tech industry growth. The predominant perception among strategists is similar to that of the political circle, while the business community pays more attention to China's policy trend and the impact of the U.S. government's China policy on its business interests. The development of the Trump administration's technology strategy toward China, which is manifested in the current security, economic, trade, investment, and foreign policies, highlights a "whole-of-government" approach. The strategy has been on full display in the U.S. government's crackdown on Chinese high-tech companies. The Trump administration's technology strategy will undermine the stable foundation of Sino-U.S. political and security relations, bilateral cooperation in the global industrial chain, and global technology governance. In this context, China should deepen reform and build a more attractive business environment. At the same time, China needs to alleviate Sino-U.S. strategic competition and strengthen bilateral communication and coordination. In addition, China needs to expand Sino-U.S. cooperation in the technology industry and global technology governance.
引文
(1)美国圣母大学学者安德鲁·肯尼迪(Andrew B.Kennedy)等指出,新兴国家的创新活动可能会对主导国家产生安全外部性(externalities)与秩序外部性。一方面,新兴国家获得具有军事用途的商业技术可能使之与主导国家产生明显的紧张关系,由此对主导国家产生安全负外部性;另一方面,主导国家希望凭借其技术主导地位维持能使之榨取利润的制度,但崛起国家却希望以尽可能低的成本引进技术。因此,崛起国家获取外国技术的行为在某种程度上与主导国家维护的秩序相矛盾,由此产生秩序负外部性。参见:Andrew B.Kennedy and Darren J.Lim,“The Innovation Imperative:Technology and US-China Rivalry in The Twenty-first Century,”International Affairs,Vol.94,No.3,May 2018,pp.558-559。
(2)“Is this the Beginning of a New Cold War?”Asia Society Policy Institute,December 11,2018,https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/beginning-new-cold-war.
(1)Christopher Layne,“The US-Chinese Power Shift and the End of the Pax Americana,”International Affairs,Vol.94,No.1,January 2018,pp.96-97.
(2)Jim Garamone,“New Strategy Encourages Innovation,Better Intel Sharing,”U.S.Department of Defense,January 23,2019,https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1738902/new-strategy-encourages-innovation-better-intel-sharing/.
(3)“Is this the Beginning of a New Cold War?”Asia Society Policy Institute,December 11,2018,https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/beginning-new-cold-war.
(4)“Vice President Mike Pence's Remarks on the Administration's Policy Towards China,”White House,October 4,2018,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/.
(1)“Statement by Dana Deasy(DoD Chief Information Officer)before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities for the House Armed Services Committee,”White House,Dec.11,2018,https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20181211/108795/HHRG-115-AS26-Wstate-DeasyD-20181211.pdf.
(2)Colin Clark,“Our Artificial Intelligence‘Sputnik Moment’is Now:Eric Schmidt&Bob Work,”Breaking Defense,November 1,2017,https://breakingdefense.com/2017/11/our-artificial-intelligence-sputnik-moment-is-now-eric-schmidt-bob-work/.
(3)Peter Beinart,“America Needs an Entirely New Foreign Policy for the Trump Age,”Atlantic,September 16,2018,https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/shield-of-the-republic-a-democratic-foreign-policy-for-the-trump-age/570010/.
(4)David E.Sanger,Julian E.Barnes,Raymond Zhong and Marc Santora,“U.S.Scrambles to Outrun China in New Arms Race,”New York Times,January 27,2019,p.A1.
(1)White House,“National Security Strategy of the United States of America,”December2017,p.25,https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf.
(2)“Vice President Mike Pence's Remarks on the Administration's Policy Towards China,”White House,October 4,2018,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vicepresident-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/.
(3)“President Donald J.Trump is Confronting China’s Unfair Trade Policies,”White House,May 29,2018,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-confronting-chinas-unfair-trade-policies/.
(1)Sintia Radu,“Which Country Owns Data?”U.S.News,February.14,2019,https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2019-02-14/china-overtook-the-us-and-willhold-the-largest-share-of-worlds-data-at-least-by-2025.
(2)Daniel Araya,“Who Will Lead in The Age Of Artificial Intelligence?”Forbes,Jan.1,2019,https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielaraya/2019/01/01/who-will-lead-in-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence/#3e9546776f95.
(3)Steven Weber,“Data,Development,and Growth,”Business and Politics,Vol 19,No.3,2017,p.401.
(4)Chas W.Freeman Jr.,“The United States and China:Game of Superpowers,”Washington Journal of Modern China,Spring 2018,pp.37-39.
(5)“Statement by the President Regarding Trade with China,”White House,June 15,2018,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-trade-china/.
(1)“President Donald J.Trump is Confronting China’s Unfair Trade Policies,”https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-confronting-chinas-unf air-trade-policies/.
(2)Demetri Sevastopulo,“Why Trump’s America is Rethinking Engagement with China,”Financial Times,January 15,2019,https://www.ft.com/content/f882b7c2-1339-11e9-a581-4ff78404524e.
(1)这些政府部门主要包括:一是国务院,国务卿在科学政策领域的观点对政策基调及实施具有关键影响。国务院主要通过其制定和实施的对外政策与措施在科技产业政策中发挥作用。具体而言,国务院管理对外科技合作事务;通过签证监管外国人进入美国学术机构的途径;管理与国外签订的技术许可协议,以及执行军用相关产品的出口管制。二是国防部,其对联邦科技政策的导向具有重要影响;国防部也是联邦政府中最大的研发资助者;其制定的安全与科技战略、规划通过定位中美关系等方式,对中美科技产业关系具有重要影响。三是商务部,其主要通过制定和执行对华贸易政策,以及参与双边贸易谈判等方式影响双边科技产业合作关系;四是教育部,其执行美国的国际教育政策并参与国际科技合作事务,等等。
(1)相关独立机构及委员会主要包括:财政部下属的外资审查委员会(CFIUS),其通过调整投资法规,影响中国企业对美国科技企业的投资进程;工业安全局(BIS),其职责主要是执行出口管制政策,在美国对华出口管制领域发挥重要作用;联邦调查局(FBI),其在涉及科技问题的相关执法业务中发挥重要作用。
(2)Mehnaaz Momen,The Paradox of Citizenship in American Politics:Identity and Reality,New York:Palgrave Macmillan,2018,p.193.
(1)White House,“National Security Strategy of the United States of America,”December2017,p.22.
(1)参见:“H.R.5515-John S.McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year2019,”U.S.Congress,https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5515/text#toc-H4350A53097BD46409287451A50C4F397。
(1)Diane Bartz and Jeffrey Benkoe,“U.S.Senators Press for Huawei to be Excluded from Solar Power Market,”Reuters,February 25,2019,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-huawei-congress/u-s-senators-press-for-huawei-to-be-excluded-from-solar-power-market-idUSKCN1QE1YY.
(2)该法案所规定的代表性的处罚措施包括:这些公司及其代表、继承人、受让人、董事、高级管理人员、雇员、代表或代理人不得直接或间接地以任何方式,参与涉及美国出口法规管辖的任何商品、软件或技术的出口交易;任何人不得代表这些公司从事《出口管理条例》所涉及的产品出口或再出口;任何人不得帮助这些公司通过收购方式拥有、控制任何受到《出口管制条例》管辖的美国出口物品,等等。参见:“H.R.7255-Telecommunications Denial Order Enforcement Act,”The Congress,December 11,2018,pp.2-3,https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr7255/BILLS-115hr7255ih.pdf。
(1)Sanger et al.,“U.S.Scrambles to Outrun China in New Arms Race.”.
(1)Robert O.Work et al.,“White House AI Executive Order and DoD AI Strategy,”Center for a New American Security,February 13,2019,https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/white-house-ai-executive-order-and-dod-ai-strategy.
(1)Dong Jung Kim,“Trading with the Enemy?The Futility of US Commercial Countermeasures Against the Chinese Challenge,”Pacific Review,Vol.30,No.3,2017,pp.298-300.
(1)冯昭奎:《论新科技革命对国际竞争关系的影响》,《国际展望》2018年第5期,第8页。
(2)参见:Michael C.Horowitz et al.,“Strategic Competition in an Era of Artificial Intelligence,”Center for a New American Security,July 2018,p.9,https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/strategic-competition-in-an-era-of-artificial-intelli gence.
(3)Bei-Er Cheok,“Rivals in Arms:Sino-U.S.Cooperation,Problems,and Solutions and Their Impact on the International UAV Industry,”Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies,Vol.25,No.2,2018,p.753.
(1)“The Global Connect Initiative:Accelerating Entrepreneurship and Economic Opportunity by Expanding Internet Access Globally,”U.S.Department of State,January 13,2017,https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rpts/othr/266985.htm.
(2)“H.R.1359:Digital GAP Act,”The U.S.Congress,February 26,2019,https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/hr1359/text.
(1)Samuel Gibbs,“Elon Musk Leads 116 Experts Calling for Outright Ban of Killer Robots,”Guardian,August 20,2017,https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/20/elon-musk-killer-robots-experts-outright-ban-lethal-autonomous-weapons-war.
(2)“Is this the Beginning of a New Cold War?”Asia Society Policy Institute,December 11,2018,https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/beginning-new-cold-war.
(1)Christopher Layne,“The US-Chinese Power Shift and the End of the Pax Americana,”International Affairs,Vol.94,No.1,January 2018,pp.96-97.
(2)Jim Garamone,“New Strategy Encourages Innovation,Better Intel Sharing,”U.S.Department of Defense,January 23,2019,https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1738902/new-strategy-encourages-innovation-better-intel-sharing/.
(3)“Is this the Beginning of a New Cold War?”Asia Society Policy Institute,December 11,2018,https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/beginning-new-cold-war.
(4)“Vice President Mike Pence's Remarks on the Administration's Policy Towards China,”White House,October 4,2018,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/.
(1)“Statement by Dana Deasy(DoD Chief Information Officer)before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities for the House Armed Services Committee,”White House,Dec.11,2018,https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20181211/108795/HHRG-115-AS26-Wstate-DeasyD-20181211.pdf.
(2)Colin Clark,“Our Artificial Intelligence‘Sputnik Moment’is Now:Eric Schmidt&Bob Work,”Breaking Defense,November 1,2017,https://breakingdefense.com/2017/11/our-artificial-intelligence-sputnik-moment-is-now-eric-schmidt-bob-work/.
(3)Peter Beinart,“America Needs an Entirely New Foreign Policy for the Trump Age,”Atlantic,September 16,2018,https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/shield-of-the-republic-a-democratic-foreign-policy-for-the-trump-age/570010/.
(4)David E.Sanger,Julian E.Barnes,Raymond Zhong and Marc Santora,“U.S.Scrambles to Outrun China in New Arms Race,”New York Times,January 27,2019,p.A1.
(1)White House,“National Security Strategy of the United States of America,”December2017,p.25,https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf.
(2)“Vice President Mike Pence's Remarks on the Administration's Policy Towards China,”White House,October 4,2018,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vicepresident-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/.
(3)“President Donald J.Trump is Confronting China’s Unfair Trade Policies,”White House,May 29,2018,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-confronting-chinas-unfair-trade-policies/.
(1)Sintia Radu,“Which Country Owns Data?”U.S.News,February.14,2019,https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2019-02-14/china-overtook-the-us-and-willhold-the-largest-share-of-worlds-data-at-least-by-2025.
(2)Daniel Araya,“Who Will Lead in The Age Of Artificial Intelligence?”Forbes,Jan.1,2019,https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielaraya/2019/01/01/who-will-lead-in-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence/#3e9546776f95.
(3)Steven Weber,“Data,Development,and Growth,”Business and Politics,Vol 19,No.3,2017,p.401.
(4)Chas W.Freeman Jr.,“The United States and China:Game of Superpowers,”Washington Journal of Modern China,Spring 2018,pp.37-39.
(5)“Statement by the President Regarding Trade with China,”White House,June 15,2018,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-trade-china/.
(1)“President Donald J.Trump is Confronting China’s Unfair Trade Policies,”https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-confronting-chinas-unf air-trade-policies/.
(2)Demetri Sevastopulo,“Why Trump’s America is Rethinking Engagement with China,”Financial Times,January 15,2019,https://www.ft.com/content/f882b7c2-1339-11e9-a581-4ff78404524e.
(1)这些政府部门主要包括:一是国务院,国务卿在科学政策领域的观点对政策基调及实施具有关键影响。国务院主要通过其制定和实施的对外政策与措施在科技产业政策中发挥作用。具体而言,国务院管理对外科技合作事务;通过签证监管外国人进入美国学术机构的途径;管理与国外签订的技术许可协议,以及执行军用相关产品的出口管制。二是国防部,其对联邦科技政策的导向具有重要影响;国防部也是联邦政府中最大的研发资助者;其制定的安全与科技战略、规划通过定位中美关系等方式,对中美科技产业关系具有重要影响。三是商务部,其主要通过制定和执行对华贸易政策,以及参与双边贸易谈判等方式影响双边科技产业合作关系;四是教育部,其执行美国的国际教育政策并参与国际科技合作事务,等等。
(1)相关独立机构及委员会主要包括:财政部下属的外资审查委员会(CFIUS),其通过调整投资法规,影响中国企业对美国科技企业的投资进程;工业安全局(BIS),其职责主要是执行出口管制政策,在美国对华出口管制领域发挥重要作用;联邦调查局(FBI),其在涉及科技问题的相关执法业务中发挥重要作用。
(2)Mehnaaz Momen,The Paradox of Citizenship in American Politics:Identity and Reality,New York:Palgrave Macmillan,2018,p.193.
(1)White House,“National Security Strategy of the United States of America,”December2017,p.22.
(1)参见:“H.R.5515-John S.McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year2019,”U.S.Congress,https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5515/text#toc-H4350A53097BD46409287451A50C4F397。
(1)Diane Bartz and Jeffrey Benkoe,“U.S.Senators Press for Huawei to be Excluded from Solar Power Market,”Reuters,February 25,2019,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-huawei-congress/u-s-senators-press-for-huawei-to-be-excluded-from-solar-power-market-idUSKCN1QE1YY.
(2)该法案所规定的代表性的处罚措施包括:这些公司及其代表、继承人、受让人、董事、高级管理人员、雇员、代表或代理人不得直接或间接地以任何方式,参与涉及美国出口法规管辖的任何商品、软件或技术的出口交易;任何人不得代表这些公司从事《出口管理条例》所涉及的产品出口或再出口;任何人不得帮助这些公司通过收购方式拥有、控制任何受到《出口管制条例》管辖的美国出口物品,等等。参见:“H.R.7255-Telecommunications Denial Order Enforcement Act,”The Congress,December 11,2018,pp.2-3,https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr7255/BILLS-115hr7255ih.pdf。
(1)Sanger et al.,“U.S.Scrambles to Outrun China in New Arms Race.”.
(1)Robert O.Work et al.,“White House AI Executive Order and DoD AI Strategy,”Center for a New American Security,February 13,2019,https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/white-house-ai-executive-order-and-dod-ai-strategy.
(1)Dong Jung Kim,“Trading with the Enemy?The Futility of US Commercial Countermeasures Against the Chinese Challenge,”Pacific Review,Vol.30,No.3,2017,pp.298-300.
(1)冯昭奎:《论新科技革命对国际竞争关系的影响》,《国际展望》2018年第5期,第8页。
(2)参见:Michael C.Horowitz et al.,“Strategic Competition in an Era of Artificial Intelligence,”Center for a New American Security,July 2018,p.9,https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/strategic-competition-in-an-era-of-artificial-intelli gence.
(3)Bei-Er Cheok,“Rivals in Arms:Sino-U.S.Cooperation,Problems,and Solutions and Their Impact on the International UAV Industry,”Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies,Vol.25,No.2,2018,p.753.
(1)“The Global Connect Initiative:Accelerating Entrepreneurship and Economic Opportunity by Expanding Internet Access Globally,”U.S.Department of State,January 13,2017,https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rpts/othr/266985.htm.
(2)“H.R.1359:Digital GAP Act,”The U.S.Congress,February 26,2019,https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/hr1359/text.
(1)Samuel Gibbs,“Elon Musk Leads 116 Experts Calling for Outright Ban of Killer Robots,”Guardian,August 20,2017,https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/20/elon-musk-killer-robots-experts-outright-ban-lethal-autonomous-weapons-war.