我国食品安全责任强制保险制度的法律构建
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摘要
食品安全责任强制保险对分担食品生产经营者食品安全风险,及时为消费者损失提供救济具有重要作用,对食品安全的有效治理具有重要意义。分析我国食品生产经营企业结构特征,可以发现阻碍我国食品安全责任强制保险法律构建的两个主要原因:一是占据食品安全生产经营主体结构中80%以上数量的小微经营者,基于成本与收益的考虑,根本不愿意投保食品安全责任强制保险;二是承保机构基于食品安全事故中巨额赔付的风险,也对食品安全责任强制保险持消极态度。食品生产经营中的政府监管失灵和市场自我调整失灵是造成食品安全责任强制保险制度建设的主要障碍。为了有效发挥食品安全责任保险的功能,必须推进实施食品安全责任强制保险,以法律制度的形式来约束不同主体,从市场和政府两个方面来完善相关制度。
Food security compulsory liability insurance plays an important role for the food business operators and producers to share the safety risk. It is of great significance for offering timely relief for the consumers and for dealing with the food security. By analyzing China's structural characteristic of food-producing enterprises, we can find that there are two main reasons that hinder the legal construction of food security compulsory liability insurance. One reason is that eighty percent of food business operators and producers are small and micro-operators. In view of cost and benefit, they are unwilling to cover the food security compulsory liability insurance. The other reason is that the insurance company holds a negative attitude towards the food security compulsory liability insurance because of the risk of huge compensation claims in the food security accident. The inadequate supervision of the government and the failure of market regulation in food production are two main obstacles for the system construction of food security compulsory liability insurance. In order to make full use of food security liability insurance, we should implement the food security compulsory liability insurance so that laws and regulations can be used to restrain the different parties concerning food security.
Food security compulsory liability insurance plays an important role for the food business operators and producers to share the safety risk. It is of great significance for offering timely relief for the consumers and for dealing with the food security. By analyzing China's structural characteristic of food-producing enterprises, we can find that there are two main reasons that hinder the legal construction of food security compulsory liability insurance. One reason is that eighty percent of food business operators and producers are small and micro-operators. In view of cost and benefit, they are unwilling to cover the food security compulsory liability insurance. The other reason is that the insurance company holds a negative attitude towards the food security compulsory liability insurance because of the risk of huge compensation claims in the food security accident. The inadequate supervision of the government and the failure of market regulation in food production are two main obstacles for the system construction of food security compulsory liability insurance. In order to make full use of food security liability insurance, we should implement the food security compulsory liability insurance so that laws and regulations can be used to restrain the different parties concerning food security.
引文
[1]肖振宇,唐汇龙.食品安全责任强制保险设计研究[J].保险研究,2013(4):83-88.
[2]刘鹏,孙燕茹.中国食品安全责任强制保险的制度分析与流程设计[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2014(4):111-116.
[3]于海纯.我国食品安全责任强制保险的法律构造研究[J].中国法学,2015(3):244-264.
[4]董泽华.论我国食品安全责任强制保险法律制度的构建[J].法学杂志,2015(1):123-132.
[5][美]曼昆.经济学原理(微观经济学分册)[M].5版.梁小民,译.北京:北京大学出版社,2009:274.
(1)大规模侵权通常发生在恶意产品侵权领域,具有受害人数众多、赔偿数额巨大的特征。大规模侵权是指基于同一个侵权行为或者多个具有同质性的侵权行为,给为数众多的受害者造成人身、财产损害或者同时造成上述两种损害,须提供数额巨大的损害赔偿救济以及进行更好地预防和惩罚,以保障社会安全的特殊侵权行为。我国近些年发生的影响巨大且损害后果广泛的“三鹿奶粉事件”“大头娃娃假奶粉事件”等都是典型的大规模食物侵权事件。参见杨立新《〈侵权责任法〉应对大规模侵权的举措》,载《法学家》2011年第4期。
(1)参见林紫晓、万政《食品安全责任保险投保率不1%为何推行难?》,载中国经济网,http://finance.ce.cn/rolling/201310/10/t20131010_1595505.shtml。
(2)参见尚志文《沈阳两家企业投保食品安全责任险》,载新华网辽宁频道,http://www.ln.xinhuanet.com/jk/shipin/20161025/3500703_c.html。
(3)参见林紫晓、万政《“食品安全”该上保险了》,载凤凰网,http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20131010/10819073_0.shtml。
(1)参见张辉东《长沙试点食品安全责任强制险五种情况给予赔偿》,载人民网,http://hn.people.com.cn/n/2014/1211/c195194-23182376.html。
(2)参见程行欢《广大一年保费只收300万食品安全险为啥没人睬?》,载21CN财经,http://finance.21cn.com/newsdoc/zx/a/2015/0212/15/29055373.shtml。
[2]刘鹏,孙燕茹.中国食品安全责任强制保险的制度分析与流程设计[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2014(4):111-116.
[3]于海纯.我国食品安全责任强制保险的法律构造研究[J].中国法学,2015(3):244-264.
[4]董泽华.论我国食品安全责任强制保险法律制度的构建[J].法学杂志,2015(1):123-132.
[5][美]曼昆.经济学原理(微观经济学分册)[M].5版.梁小民,译.北京:北京大学出版社,2009:274.
(1)大规模侵权通常发生在恶意产品侵权领域,具有受害人数众多、赔偿数额巨大的特征。大规模侵权是指基于同一个侵权行为或者多个具有同质性的侵权行为,给为数众多的受害者造成人身、财产损害或者同时造成上述两种损害,须提供数额巨大的损害赔偿救济以及进行更好地预防和惩罚,以保障社会安全的特殊侵权行为。我国近些年发生的影响巨大且损害后果广泛的“三鹿奶粉事件”“大头娃娃假奶粉事件”等都是典型的大规模食物侵权事件。参见杨立新《〈侵权责任法〉应对大规模侵权的举措》,载《法学家》2011年第4期。
(1)参见林紫晓、万政《食品安全责任保险投保率不1%为何推行难?》,载中国经济网,http://finance.ce.cn/rolling/201310/10/t20131010_1595505.shtml。
(2)参见尚志文《沈阳两家企业投保食品安全责任险》,载新华网辽宁频道,http://www.ln.xinhuanet.com/jk/shipin/20161025/3500703_c.html。
(3)参见林紫晓、万政《“食品安全”该上保险了》,载凤凰网,http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20131010/10819073_0.shtml。
(1)参见张辉东《长沙试点食品安全责任强制险五种情况给予赔偿》,载人民网,http://hn.people.com.cn/n/2014/1211/c195194-23182376.html。
(2)参见程行欢《广大一年保费只收300万食品安全险为啥没人睬?》,载21CN财经,http://finance.21cn.com/newsdoc/zx/a/2015/0212/15/29055373.shtml。