政府补贴与产能过剩
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摘要
政府补贴为什么会导致行业产能过剩?本文构建博弈模型,从短期非稳定均衡和长期稳定均衡两层面依次分析生产补贴、投产补贴、购置补贴三种政府补贴模式引发行业产能过剩的内在机理。理论分析发现:(1)在短期,补贴激起在位企业的产能扩张并不造成行业产能过剩;在长期,只要补贴强度高达足以激励起新企业进入,行业就会出现产能过剩,且补贴强度越大,行业产能过剩越严重。(2)补贴所致的行业产能过剩其实是原已在位的老企业产能过剩,后续进入的新企业则产能适宜。(3)在不同补贴强度下,投产补贴比生产补贴和购置补贴在引发行业产能过剩方面更脆弱,但在相同的补贴强度下,后两者比前者引发行业产能过剩的程度更严重。现实案例表明,政府的补贴实践所引发的一对正负效应,促进行业发展壮大和造成行业产能过剩,确与理论分析大致吻合,即本文的理论框架能够揭示产能过剩的政府补贴之谜。基于三种补贴模式的正负效应异同性,进一步从理论上提出事前防范产能过剩的具体方案:(1)可以借助博弈树来相机选择不同补贴强度下的最优补贴策略,从而起到在事中使补贴政策极大促进行业发展壮大的同时尽量规避出现产能过剩。(2)能够借助量化手段来控制补贴强度,从而起到事前预知政府补贴促进行业发展壮大的正效应和造成行业产能过剩的负效应各有多大。
Why does government subsidy lead to excess capacity? From the two aspects of short-term unstable and long-term stable equilibrium,a game model is constructed to analyze the mechanisms of excess capacity led by three modes of government subsidy,such that production subsidies,establish subsidies and purchase subsidies. The theoretical analysis found that:( 1) in the short run,the expansion of capacity caused by subsidies does not result in excess capacity in the industry; in the long run,as long as the intensity of subsidies is high enough to encourage new enterprises to enter,the industry will have excess capacity,and the greater the intensity of subsidies,the more serious the excess capacity in the industry.( 2) The excess capacity of the industry caused by subsidies is the excess capacity of the existing old enterprises,while the capacity of the subsequent new enterprises is comfort capacity.( 3) Under different subsidy intensity,capacity subsidy is more vulnerable than production subsidy and purchase subsidy in inducing overcapacity,but under the same subsidy intensity,the latter two are more serious than the former in inducing overcapacity. The actual cases show that the industry development effect and the excess capacity effect caused by the government subsidy practice are in good agreement with the theoretical analysis,that is,the theoretical framework of ours can reveal the mystery of the government subsidy of excess capacity. Based on the similarities and differences of the positive and negative effects of the three subsidy modes,this paper further proposes a specific plan to prevent excess capacity in advance in theory:( 1) game tree can be used to choose the optimal subsidy strategy under different subsidy intensity,so as to make the subsidy policy greatly promote the development of the industry on the one hand,while avoiding excess capacity on the other hand.( 2) We can use quantitative means to control the intensity of subsidies,so as to predict in advance the positive effects of government subsidies to promote industry development and the negative effects of excess capacity.
Why does government subsidy lead to excess capacity? From the two aspects of short-term unstable and long-term stable equilibrium,a game model is constructed to analyze the mechanisms of excess capacity led by three modes of government subsidy,such that production subsidies,establish subsidies and purchase subsidies. The theoretical analysis found that:( 1) in the short run,the expansion of capacity caused by subsidies does not result in excess capacity in the industry; in the long run,as long as the intensity of subsidies is high enough to encourage new enterprises to enter,the industry will have excess capacity,and the greater the intensity of subsidies,the more serious the excess capacity in the industry.( 2) The excess capacity of the industry caused by subsidies is the excess capacity of the existing old enterprises,while the capacity of the subsequent new enterprises is comfort capacity.( 3) Under different subsidy intensity,capacity subsidy is more vulnerable than production subsidy and purchase subsidy in inducing overcapacity,but under the same subsidy intensity,the latter two are more serious than the former in inducing overcapacity. The actual cases show that the industry development effect and the excess capacity effect caused by the government subsidy practice are in good agreement with the theoretical analysis,that is,the theoretical framework of ours can reveal the mystery of the government subsidy of excess capacity. Based on the similarities and differences of the positive and negative effects of the three subsidy modes,this paper further proposes a specific plan to prevent excess capacity in advance in theory:( 1) game tree can be used to choose the optimal subsidy strategy under different subsidy intensity,so as to make the subsidy policy greatly promote the development of the industry on the one hand,while avoiding excess capacity on the other hand.( 2) We can use quantitative means to control the intensity of subsidies,so as to predict in advance the positive effects of government subsidies to promote industry development and the negative effects of excess capacity.
引文
[1] Chamberlin E H. Theory of MonopolisticCompetiton[M]. Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1933.
[2] Barzel Y. Excess Capacity in Monopolistic Competition[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1970,78(5):1142-49.
[3] Spence A M. Entry,Capacity,Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing[J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1977,8(2):534-544.
[4] Dixit A,Stiglitz J. Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity[J]. American Economic Review,1977,67(3):297-308.
[5] Eaton B C,Lipsey R G. The Theory of Market Pre-emption:The Persistence of Excess Capacity and Monopoly in Growing Spatial Markets[J]. Economica,1979,46(182):149-158.
[6] Dixit A. The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence[J]. Economic Journal,1980,90(90):95-106.
[7] Barham B,Ware R. A Sequential Entry Model with Strategic Use of Excess Capacity.[J]. Canadian Journal of Economics,1993,26(2):286-98.
[8] Janeba E. Tax Competition When Governments Lack Commitment:Excess Capacity as a Countervailing Threat[J]. American Economic Review,2000,90(5):1508-1519.
[9] Blonigen B A,Wilson W W. Foreign Subsidization and Excess Capacity[J]. Journal of International Economics,2010,80(2):200-211.
[10] Dixon P B,Rimmer M T. You Can’ t Have a CGE Recession without Excess Capacity[J]. Economic Modelling,2011,28(1-2):602-613.
[11] Murphy D. Excess Capacity in a Fixed-Cost Economy[J]. European Economic Review,2017,91(1):245-260.
[12]范林凯,李晓萍,应珊珊.渐进式改革背景下产能过剩的现实基础与形成机理[J].中国工业经济,2015(1):19-31.
[13]江飞涛,耿强,吕大国,李晓萍.地区竞争、体制扭曲与产能过剩的形成机理[J].中国工业经济,2012(6):44-56.
[14]林毅夫,巫和懋,邢亦青.“潮涌现象”与产能过剩的形成机制[J].经济研究,2010,45(10):4-19.
[15]向洪金.战略授权、软预算约束与中国国有企业产能过剩——基于混合寡占竞争模型的理论研究[J].广东社会科学,2015(1):17-25.
[16]徐齐利,聂新伟.资源软约束、环境硬约束与产能过剩[J].产业经济评论(山东大学),2017,16(2):82-144.
[17]徐齐利,王文举,聂新伟.行业前景、市场占先与产能过剩[J].产业经济评论,2018,6(2):10-34.
[18]徐齐利.企业家才能与产能过剩[J].北京社会科学,2018(9):92-109.
[19]徐齐利,范合君.产能过剩:概念界定、研究谱系与理论架构[J].当代经济科学,2018(6):49-59.
[20]徐齐利.中国产能过剩形成机理的数理分析[D].首都经济贸易大学,2018.
[21]朱希伟,沈璐敏,吴意云,罗德明.产能过剩异质性的形成机理[J].中国工业经济,2017(8):44-62.
[22]皮建才,黎静,管艺文.政策性补贴竞争、体制性产能过剩与福利效应[J].世界经济文汇,2015(3):19-31.
[23]耿强,江飞涛,傅坦.政策性补贴、产能过剩与中国的经济波动——引入产能利用率RBC模型的实证检验[J].中国工业经济,2011(5):27-36.
[24]王立国,鞠蕾.地方政府干预、企业过度投资与产能过剩:26个行业样本[J].改革,2012(12):52-62.
[25]王文甫,明娟,岳超云.企业规模、地方政府干预与产能过剩[J].管理世界,2014(10):17-36,46.
[26]吴春雅,吴照云.政府补贴、过度投资与新能源产能过剩——以光伏和风能上市企业为例[J].云南社会科学,2015(2):59-63.
[27]余东华,吕逸楠.政府不当干预与战略性新兴产业产能过剩——以中国光伏产业为例[J].中国工业经济,2015(10):53-68.
[28]李博,赵树宽,余海晴.政府补贴、过度投资与产能过剩——基于国有、非国有工业上市公司的实证研究[J].预测,2017,36(6):50-55.
[29]王宇,罗悦.外需引导与政府补贴下战略性新兴产业的产能过剩研究——以光伏产业为例[J].现代经济探讨,2018(3):78-87.
[30]张亚斌,朱虹,范子杰.地方补贴性竞争对我国产能过剩的影响——基于倾向匹配倍差法的经验分析[J].财经研究,2018(5):36-47,152.
(1)产能具有棘轮特征,易增不易减。因为资产专用性,一条生产线一旦建立,在使用寿命期内对应的产能就已给定,即便实际生产量低于产能的低负荷运营,产能也不会随着产量的下降而下调;反之,当实际产量高于产能的超负荷运营时,企业会追加生产线的投产,即产能将随着产量的增加而增加。
(1)因资产专用性,行业进退壁垒与市场进退壁垒并不等同,产能一旦进入行业,再想退出行业则壁垒高企;而产出进入和退出市场则相对灵活得多,市场进退壁垒相对行业进退壁垒要轻很多。
(1)处于运营阶段的企业,前期在投产阶段为变现产能发生的投资成本在运营阶段已经沉没,只要企业在运营阶段有正的运营利润,企业就不会退出市场,即便是企业净亏损。因为继续运营,还能够用全部的运营利润来弥补部分沉没成本,一旦退出市场,甚至是报废产能,则整个沉没成本完全得不到弥补。
(1)保守估算的方法为:假设1,一年365天中有150天(占比约40%)阳光明媚,适合正常光伏发电;假设2,每个正常光伏发电日的发电时长为8小时,即从8:30到16:30。在此假设下,一年的光伏发电时长为150×8=1 200小时;每年的装机容量乘以年发电时长即得每年的产能产出,如2017年累计装机容量13 025万千瓦乘以1 200小时,即13 025万千瓦×1 200小时=1 563亿千瓦时,从而估算出2017年光伏发电的生产能力为1 563亿千瓦时;相比于2017年的实际发电量,即实际产出1 182千瓦时,2017年光伏发电产能利用率大约为76%。
(2)补贴前2011年过剩水平最高,但也仅为20亿千瓦时,其余年份过剩水平皆未超过2012年4亿千瓦时的水平。
(1)百度百科:https://baike. baidu. com/item/无锡尚德太阳能电力有限公司/838163.
(2)百度百科:https://baike. baidu. com/item/江西赛维LDK太阳能高科技有限公司/8937460? fr=aladdin.
(3)中国行业研究网:http://www. chinairn. com/news/20111109/178753. html.
(1)根据投入-产出来估算产能通常有三种方法:参数回归的峰值法、非参数生产前沿面的数据包络法(DEA)、随机参数生产前沿面法(SPF)。峰值法最为常用; DEA也较为常用,但该法未考虑到经济数据是受随机扰动的结果; SPF操作较为复杂,并不常用。为此,本文采用参数回归的峰值法。
(2)由于版面所限,如需附录可向作者索要。下同。
(1)该产能利用率数据与案例1中光伏发电产能利用率比较接近但也有差异,原因主要是本案例的样本是整个光伏行业的A股企业,而案例1光伏发电业只是光伏行业的一个子行业。
[2] Barzel Y. Excess Capacity in Monopolistic Competition[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1970,78(5):1142-49.
[3] Spence A M. Entry,Capacity,Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing[J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1977,8(2):534-544.
[4] Dixit A,Stiglitz J. Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity[J]. American Economic Review,1977,67(3):297-308.
[5] Eaton B C,Lipsey R G. The Theory of Market Pre-emption:The Persistence of Excess Capacity and Monopoly in Growing Spatial Markets[J]. Economica,1979,46(182):149-158.
[6] Dixit A. The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence[J]. Economic Journal,1980,90(90):95-106.
[7] Barham B,Ware R. A Sequential Entry Model with Strategic Use of Excess Capacity.[J]. Canadian Journal of Economics,1993,26(2):286-98.
[8] Janeba E. Tax Competition When Governments Lack Commitment:Excess Capacity as a Countervailing Threat[J]. American Economic Review,2000,90(5):1508-1519.
[9] Blonigen B A,Wilson W W. Foreign Subsidization and Excess Capacity[J]. Journal of International Economics,2010,80(2):200-211.
[10] Dixon P B,Rimmer M T. You Can’ t Have a CGE Recession without Excess Capacity[J]. Economic Modelling,2011,28(1-2):602-613.
[11] Murphy D. Excess Capacity in a Fixed-Cost Economy[J]. European Economic Review,2017,91(1):245-260.
[12]范林凯,李晓萍,应珊珊.渐进式改革背景下产能过剩的现实基础与形成机理[J].中国工业经济,2015(1):19-31.
[13]江飞涛,耿强,吕大国,李晓萍.地区竞争、体制扭曲与产能过剩的形成机理[J].中国工业经济,2012(6):44-56.
[14]林毅夫,巫和懋,邢亦青.“潮涌现象”与产能过剩的形成机制[J].经济研究,2010,45(10):4-19.
[15]向洪金.战略授权、软预算约束与中国国有企业产能过剩——基于混合寡占竞争模型的理论研究[J].广东社会科学,2015(1):17-25.
[16]徐齐利,聂新伟.资源软约束、环境硬约束与产能过剩[J].产业经济评论(山东大学),2017,16(2):82-144.
[17]徐齐利,王文举,聂新伟.行业前景、市场占先与产能过剩[J].产业经济评论,2018,6(2):10-34.
[18]徐齐利.企业家才能与产能过剩[J].北京社会科学,2018(9):92-109.
[19]徐齐利,范合君.产能过剩:概念界定、研究谱系与理论架构[J].当代经济科学,2018(6):49-59.
[20]徐齐利.中国产能过剩形成机理的数理分析[D].首都经济贸易大学,2018.
[21]朱希伟,沈璐敏,吴意云,罗德明.产能过剩异质性的形成机理[J].中国工业经济,2017(8):44-62.
[22]皮建才,黎静,管艺文.政策性补贴竞争、体制性产能过剩与福利效应[J].世界经济文汇,2015(3):19-31.
[23]耿强,江飞涛,傅坦.政策性补贴、产能过剩与中国的经济波动——引入产能利用率RBC模型的实证检验[J].中国工业经济,2011(5):27-36.
[24]王立国,鞠蕾.地方政府干预、企业过度投资与产能过剩:26个行业样本[J].改革,2012(12):52-62.
[25]王文甫,明娟,岳超云.企业规模、地方政府干预与产能过剩[J].管理世界,2014(10):17-36,46.
[26]吴春雅,吴照云.政府补贴、过度投资与新能源产能过剩——以光伏和风能上市企业为例[J].云南社会科学,2015(2):59-63.
[27]余东华,吕逸楠.政府不当干预与战略性新兴产业产能过剩——以中国光伏产业为例[J].中国工业经济,2015(10):53-68.
[28]李博,赵树宽,余海晴.政府补贴、过度投资与产能过剩——基于国有、非国有工业上市公司的实证研究[J].预测,2017,36(6):50-55.
[29]王宇,罗悦.外需引导与政府补贴下战略性新兴产业的产能过剩研究——以光伏产业为例[J].现代经济探讨,2018(3):78-87.
[30]张亚斌,朱虹,范子杰.地方补贴性竞争对我国产能过剩的影响——基于倾向匹配倍差法的经验分析[J].财经研究,2018(5):36-47,152.
(1)产能具有棘轮特征,易增不易减。因为资产专用性,一条生产线一旦建立,在使用寿命期内对应的产能就已给定,即便实际生产量低于产能的低负荷运营,产能也不会随着产量的下降而下调;反之,当实际产量高于产能的超负荷运营时,企业会追加生产线的投产,即产能将随着产量的增加而增加。
(1)因资产专用性,行业进退壁垒与市场进退壁垒并不等同,产能一旦进入行业,再想退出行业则壁垒高企;而产出进入和退出市场则相对灵活得多,市场进退壁垒相对行业进退壁垒要轻很多。
(1)处于运营阶段的企业,前期在投产阶段为变现产能发生的投资成本在运营阶段已经沉没,只要企业在运营阶段有正的运营利润,企业就不会退出市场,即便是企业净亏损。因为继续运营,还能够用全部的运营利润来弥补部分沉没成本,一旦退出市场,甚至是报废产能,则整个沉没成本完全得不到弥补。
(1)保守估算的方法为:假设1,一年365天中有150天(占比约40%)阳光明媚,适合正常光伏发电;假设2,每个正常光伏发电日的发电时长为8小时,即从8:30到16:30。在此假设下,一年的光伏发电时长为150×8=1 200小时;每年的装机容量乘以年发电时长即得每年的产能产出,如2017年累计装机容量13 025万千瓦乘以1 200小时,即13 025万千瓦×1 200小时=1 563亿千瓦时,从而估算出2017年光伏发电的生产能力为1 563亿千瓦时;相比于2017年的实际发电量,即实际产出1 182千瓦时,2017年光伏发电产能利用率大约为76%。
(2)补贴前2011年过剩水平最高,但也仅为20亿千瓦时,其余年份过剩水平皆未超过2012年4亿千瓦时的水平。
(1)百度百科:https://baike. baidu. com/item/无锡尚德太阳能电力有限公司/838163.
(2)百度百科:https://baike. baidu. com/item/江西赛维LDK太阳能高科技有限公司/8937460? fr=aladdin.
(3)中国行业研究网:http://www. chinairn. com/news/20111109/178753. html.
(1)根据投入-产出来估算产能通常有三种方法:参数回归的峰值法、非参数生产前沿面的数据包络法(DEA)、随机参数生产前沿面法(SPF)。峰值法最为常用; DEA也较为常用,但该法未考虑到经济数据是受随机扰动的结果; SPF操作较为复杂,并不常用。为此,本文采用参数回归的峰值法。
(2)由于版面所限,如需附录可向作者索要。下同。
(1)该产能利用率数据与案例1中光伏发电产能利用率比较接近但也有差异,原因主要是本案例的样本是整个光伏行业的A股企业,而案例1光伏发电业只是光伏行业的一个子行业。