“言行一致”还是“投桃报李”?——企业社会责任信息披露与实际税负
|
摘要
目前关于企业社会责任(报告)的研究主要集中于利益相关者理论及其在中国企业中的运用,这些研究仅将政府作为一个获取税收收益的利益相关者纳入研究框架,忽视了政治经济体制对企业行为的影响。本文基于中国沪深A股上市公司的研究发现,企业社会责任信息披露及披露质量与企业实际税负均呈负相关,而且相比强制披露社会责任信息的企业而言,自愿披露社会责任信息的企业的社会责任信息披露质量与企业实际税负的负相关关系更强。这意味着企业明面上在积极主动地披露社会责任信息,暗地里却在从事避税行为。结合中国的转轨经济背景,本文采用寻租理论解释这种"言行不一"的行为:企业通过披露社会责任信息向地方政府寻租,地方政府则"投桃报李"地对企业在税收执法上放松,从而帮助企业降低实际税负。进一步结合中国的二元经济背景,研究发现:相比国有产权企业,私有产权企业寻租倾向更严重,通过社会责任信息披露显著降低了实际税负,即进行了更加激进的避税行为,而且政治关联的存在强化了这种关系。本文的研究提供了在转型经济国家中企业社会责任信息披露与避税行为并存的经验证据,对企业披露社会责任信息的动机与经济后果提供了新的解读。
The studies on corporate social responsibility( CSR) mainly focus on the stakeholder theory and its application in Chinese enterprises. These studies only put the government as a stakeholder who get the tax revenue,but neglect the influence of system of political and economic on the enterprise behavior. Using China's listed companies from 2009-2015 as research sample,we find that the CSR disclosure exerts a negative impact on the level of corporate actual tax burden,and improving the quality of the CSR disclosure is also conducive to the decrease of corporate actual tax burden,especially if the enterprises disclose the CSR voluntarily. We further find that compared with the state-owned enterprises,the private-owned enterprises decrease the actual tax burden more aggressively by disclosing the CSR,and the political connection enhances the effect of CSR disclosure on corporate actual tax burden.The results show that companies are ostensibly disclosing corporate social responsibility information actively,while secretly avoiding tax. This contradictory behavior means that companies ' disclosure of corporate social responsibility information is not entirely motivated by altruistic motives,but may be otherwise. The rent-seeking theory provides a reasonable explanation to this behavior. The rent-seeking theory holds that government's regulation and intervention in the market makes various forms of rent,which leads to enterprises' rent seeking( Krueger,1974). One of the most prominent features of China's institutional environment is that the government has a strong tendency and power to intervene in the market. Chinese companies are born in this institutional environment and are deeply influenced by government behavior. The Chinese government attaches great importance to corporate social responsibility. Since 2006 the government has carried out a series of CSR disclosure policies and regulations,the CSR disclosure is no longer the result of autonomic behavior at the enterprise level,and is the reflection of the will of the government. Enterprises can meet the government's demand by actively disclosing corporate social responsibility information,and the government will give back to the enterprise by relaxing tax law enforcement to reduce the actual tax burden of enterprises. Therefore,the CSR disclosure has become one of the tools for rentseeking,which helps enterprises to obtain rent which is the reduction of actual tax burden. Moreover,under the influence of China's dual ownership system,compared with state-owned enterprises,the private enterprises have a more serious rentseeking tendency in order to survive and develop. Compared with the enterprises without political connection,the enterprises with political connection also have a more serious rent-seeking tendency in order to maintain political connection.This paper proposes several implications as follows. First,it analyzed the motivation of CSR disclosure from the perspective of rent-seeking,and fully considering the influence of China 's political and economic system on corporate behavior. Second,it provides empirical evidence of the coexistence of CSR disclosure and tax avoidance in transition economics,and reveals the internal relations and mechanism of action between them. Thirdly,it has enriched the relevant research on the consequences of non-financial information disclosure. Fourth,this study provides theoretical support for the discussion of the importance of regulatory and motivation,which is increasingly taken seriously by the government.China's economy is still in a stage of transition economy,because of government intervention and control,CSR disclosure has gradually become a subtle means of rent-seeking,which partly explains the phenomenon of coexistence of CSR disclosure and tax avoidance behavior. This phenomenon distorts the original intention of CSR disclosure,undermines the fair competition in the market,and damages the level of public welfare. Only speeding up the pace of market-oriented reform and strengthening the supervision over local government and related departments,can make the CSR disclosure become the product of market-driven.
The studies on corporate social responsibility( CSR) mainly focus on the stakeholder theory and its application in Chinese enterprises. These studies only put the government as a stakeholder who get the tax revenue,but neglect the influence of system of political and economic on the enterprise behavior. Using China's listed companies from 2009-2015 as research sample,we find that the CSR disclosure exerts a negative impact on the level of corporate actual tax burden,and improving the quality of the CSR disclosure is also conducive to the decrease of corporate actual tax burden,especially if the enterprises disclose the CSR voluntarily. We further find that compared with the state-owned enterprises,the private-owned enterprises decrease the actual tax burden more aggressively by disclosing the CSR,and the political connection enhances the effect of CSR disclosure on corporate actual tax burden.The results show that companies are ostensibly disclosing corporate social responsibility information actively,while secretly avoiding tax. This contradictory behavior means that companies ' disclosure of corporate social responsibility information is not entirely motivated by altruistic motives,but may be otherwise. The rent-seeking theory provides a reasonable explanation to this behavior. The rent-seeking theory holds that government's regulation and intervention in the market makes various forms of rent,which leads to enterprises' rent seeking( Krueger,1974). One of the most prominent features of China's institutional environment is that the government has a strong tendency and power to intervene in the market. Chinese companies are born in this institutional environment and are deeply influenced by government behavior. The Chinese government attaches great importance to corporate social responsibility. Since 2006 the government has carried out a series of CSR disclosure policies and regulations,the CSR disclosure is no longer the result of autonomic behavior at the enterprise level,and is the reflection of the will of the government. Enterprises can meet the government's demand by actively disclosing corporate social responsibility information,and the government will give back to the enterprise by relaxing tax law enforcement to reduce the actual tax burden of enterprises. Therefore,the CSR disclosure has become one of the tools for rentseeking,which helps enterprises to obtain rent which is the reduction of actual tax burden. Moreover,under the influence of China's dual ownership system,compared with state-owned enterprises,the private enterprises have a more serious rentseeking tendency in order to survive and develop. Compared with the enterprises without political connection,the enterprises with political connection also have a more serious rent-seeking tendency in order to maintain political connection.This paper proposes several implications as follows. First,it analyzed the motivation of CSR disclosure from the perspective of rent-seeking,and fully considering the influence of China 's political and economic system on corporate behavior. Second,it provides empirical evidence of the coexistence of CSR disclosure and tax avoidance in transition economics,and reveals the internal relations and mechanism of action between them. Thirdly,it has enriched the relevant research on the consequences of non-financial information disclosure. Fourth,this study provides theoretical support for the discussion of the importance of regulatory and motivation,which is increasingly taken seriously by the government.China's economy is still in a stage of transition economy,because of government intervention and control,CSR disclosure has gradually become a subtle means of rent-seeking,which partly explains the phenomenon of coexistence of CSR disclosure and tax avoidance behavior. This phenomenon distorts the original intention of CSR disclosure,undermines the fair competition in the market,and damages the level of public welfare. Only speeding up the pace of market-oriented reform and strengthening the supervision over local government and related departments,can make the CSR disclosure become the product of market-driven.
引文
[1]Tullock.G.The Economics of Special Privilege and Rent Seeking[M].New York:Kluwer Academic Publishers,1989.
[2]Slemrod.J.,and S.Yitzhaki.Tax Avoidance,Evasion,and Administration[M].Handbook of Public Economic.North Holland:Elsevier,2002.
[3]Chen,S.,X.Chen,Q.Cheng.,and T.Shevlin.Are Family Firms More Tax Aggressive than Non-family Firms?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,95,(1):41-61.
[4]Hanlon,M.and S.Heitzman.A Review of Tax Research[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,50,(2-3):127-178.
[5]范子英,田彬彬.税收竞争,税收执法与企业避税[J].北京:经济研究,2013,(9):99-111.
[6]陈冬,孔墨奇,王红建.投我以桃,报之以李:经济周期与国企避税[J].北京:管理世界,2016,(5):46-63.
[7]李增福,汤旭东,连玉君.中国民营企业社会责任背离之谜[J].北京:管理世界,2016,(9):136-148.
[8]Lanis.R,and G.Richardson.Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Aggressiveness:An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2012,31,(1):86-108.
[9]Hoi.K.,Q.Wu.,and H.Zhang.Is Corporate Social Responsibility(CSR)Associated with Tax Avoidance?Evidence from Irresponsible CSR Activities[J].The Accounting Review,2013,88,(6):2025-2059.
[10]Krueger.A.The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society[J].American Economic Review,1974,64,(3):291-303.
[11]黎文靖.所有权类型,政治寻租与公司社会责任报告:一个分析性框架[J].北京:会计研究,2012,(1):81-88.
[12]Detomasi.D.The Political Roots of Corporate Social Responsibility[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2008,82,(4):807-819.
[13]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].北京:经济研究,2007,(7):36-50.
[14]Shleifer.A.,and R.Vishny.Politicians and Firms[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics.1994,109,(4):995-1025.
[15]周黎安,陶婧.政府规模,市场化与地区腐败问题研究[J].北京:经济研究,2009,(1):57-69.
[16]Fan.H.,J.Wong.,and T.Zhang.Institutions and Organizational Structure:The Case of State-owned Corporate Pyramids[J].Journal of Law,Economics and Organization,2013,29,(6):1217-1252.
[17]Qian,Y.,Roland G.Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint[J].American Economic Review,1998,88,(5):1143-1162.
[18]Jin.H.,Y.Qian.,and R.Weingast.Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives:Federalism,Chinese Style[J].Journal of Public Economics,2005,89,(9-10):1719-1742.
[19]Li.H.,and L.Zhou.Political Turnover and Economic Performance:The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China[J].Journal of Public Economics,2005,89,(9-10):1743-1762.
[20]王立彦,刘向前.IPO与非法定公司所得税收优惠[J].北京:经济学(季刊),2004,(2):457-474.
[21]Cremer,H.,and F.Gahvari.Tax Competition and Tax Evasion[J].Nordic Journal of Political Economy,1997,93,(11):89-104.
[22]郭杰,李涛.中国地方政府间税收竞争研究——基于中国省级面板数据的经验证据[J].北京:管理世界,2009,(11):54-64.
[23]Dubin.J.,M.Graetz.,and L.Wilde.The Effect of Audit Rates on the Federal Individual Income Tax,1977-1986[J].National Tax Journal,1990,43,(4):395-409.
[24]Slemrod.J.,M.Blumenthal.,and W.Christian.Tax Payer Response to an Increased Probability of Audit:Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota[J].Journal of Public Economics,2001,79,(3),455-483.
[25]张茵,刘明辉,彭红星.社会信任与公司避税[J].北京:会计研究,2017,(9):48-54.
[26]Reverte.C.Determinant of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Rating by Spanish Listed Firm[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2009,88,(2):351-366.
[27]宋林,王建玲,姚树洁.上市公司年报中社会责任信息披露的影响因素——基于合法性视角的研究[J].北京:经济管理,2012,(2):40-49.
[28]刘想,刘银国,社会责任信息披露与企业价值关系研究——基于公司治理视角的考察[J].北京:经济学动态,2014,(11):49-64.
[29]权小锋,吴世农,尹洪英.企业社会责任与股价崩盘风险:价值工具或自利工具?[J].北京:经济研究,2015,(11):89-97.
[30]Jenny.D.Corporate Responsibility:The Communication Challenge[J].Journal of Communication Management,2005,9,(2):108-119.
[31]宋献中,龚明晓.公司会计年报中社会责任信息的价值研究——基于内容的专家问卷分析[J].北京:管理世界,2006,(2):104-110.
[32]吴联生.国有股权、税收优惠与公司税负[J].北京:经济研究,2009,(10):109-120.
[33]邓建平,曾勇.金融关联能否缓解民营企业的融资约束[J].北京:金融研究,2011,(8):78-92.
[34]Godfrey.C.The Relationships between Corporate Philanthropy and Shareholder Wealth:A Risk Management Perspective[J].Academy of Management Review,2005,30,(4):777-798.
[35]李四海,李晓龙,宋献中.产权性质、市场竞争与企业社会责任行为——基于政治寻租视角的分析[J].济南:中国人口·资源与环境,2015,(1):162-169.
[36]Cai,H.,and Q.Liu.Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance:Evidence from Chinese Industrial Firms[J].Economic Journal,2009,119,(537):764-795.
[37]李元旭,宋渊洋.地方政府通过所得税优惠保护本地企业吗?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].北京:中国工业经济,2011,(5):149-159.
[38]吴文锋,吴冲锋,芮萌.中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠[J].北京:管理世界,2009,(3):134-142.
[39]田利辉,张伟.政治关联影响我国上市公司长期绩效的三大效应[J].北京:经济研究,2013,(11):71-86.
[40]李维安,徐业坤.政治身份的避税效应[J].北京:金融研究,2013,(3):114-129.
[41]Kim.F.,and L.Zhang.Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2016,33,(1):78-114.
[42]Dyreng.D.,M.Hanlon.,and L.Maydew.The Effects of Executives on Corporate Tax Avoidance[J].The Accounting Review,2010,85,(4):1163-1189.
[43]刘行,叶康涛.企业的避税活动会影响投资效率吗?[J].北京:会计研究,2013,(6):47-53.
[44]魏春燕.审计师行业专长于客户的避税程度[J],北京:审计研究,2014,(2):74-83.
[45]Clarkson.M.A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social Performance[J].The Academy of Management Review,1995,20,(1):92-117.
[46]刘慧龙,吴联生.法制环境,所有权性质与企业实际税率[J].北京:管理世界,2014,(4):42-52.
[47]王艳艳,于李胜,安然.非财务信息披露是否能够改善资本市场信息环境——基于社会责任报告披露的研究[J].北京:金融研究,2014,(8):178-191.
[48]贾明,张喆.高管的政治关联影响公司慈善行为吗?[J].北京:管理世界,2010,(4):99-113.
[49]罗党论,魏翥.政治关联与民营企业避税行为研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].广州:南方经济,2012,(11):29-39.
[50]李姝,谢晓嫣.民营企业的社会责任,政治关联与债务融资——来自中国资本市场的经验证据[J].天津:南开管理评论,2014,(6):30-40.
(1)避税和偷逃税的主要区别在于合法性,但是,在实证研究中,由于合法性的模糊,这两个概念经常是不进行区分的(Slemrod和Yitzhaki,2002;范子英、田彬彬,2013),在具体的衡量上,主流会计文献通常从企业实际税负的角度来探讨企业避税程度(Chen等,2010[3];Hanlon和Heitzman,2010[4];陈冬等,2016[6];李增福等,2016)[7],本文亦遵从该做法。
(1)中国审计署.2004年第4号:788户企业税收征管情况审计调查结果[EB/OL].中国审计署网站http://www.audit.gov.cn/n5/n25/c63506/content.html。
(2)解读《白皮书》:2014年企业社会责任报告八大发现[EB/OL].新华网:http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2015-01/15/c_127389654_2.htm。
(1)具体包括:是否经第三方机构审验;是否参照GRI《可持续发展报告指南》;是否披露股东权益保护;是否披露债权人权益保护;是否披露职工权益保护;是否披露供应商权益保护;是否披露客户及消费者权益保护;是否披露环境和可持续发展;是否披露公共关系和社会公益事业;是否披露社会责任制度建设和改善措施;是否披露安全生产内容;是否披露公司存在的不足。
(1)考虑到社会责任信息披露对企业价值的影响可能存在滞后效应,本文对社会责任信息披露变量做了滞后一期处理。
(2)具体计算方法为年末流通股市值、非流通股份占净资产的金额、长期负债以及短期负债之和除以企业总资产。
(1)换用其他变量也能得到相似的结果,如表10和表11所示。
[2]Slemrod.J.,and S.Yitzhaki.Tax Avoidance,Evasion,and Administration[M].Handbook of Public Economic.North Holland:Elsevier,2002.
[3]Chen,S.,X.Chen,Q.Cheng.,and T.Shevlin.Are Family Firms More Tax Aggressive than Non-family Firms?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,95,(1):41-61.
[4]Hanlon,M.and S.Heitzman.A Review of Tax Research[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,50,(2-3):127-178.
[5]范子英,田彬彬.税收竞争,税收执法与企业避税[J].北京:经济研究,2013,(9):99-111.
[6]陈冬,孔墨奇,王红建.投我以桃,报之以李:经济周期与国企避税[J].北京:管理世界,2016,(5):46-63.
[7]李增福,汤旭东,连玉君.中国民营企业社会责任背离之谜[J].北京:管理世界,2016,(9):136-148.
[8]Lanis.R,and G.Richardson.Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Aggressiveness:An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2012,31,(1):86-108.
[9]Hoi.K.,Q.Wu.,and H.Zhang.Is Corporate Social Responsibility(CSR)Associated with Tax Avoidance?Evidence from Irresponsible CSR Activities[J].The Accounting Review,2013,88,(6):2025-2059.
[10]Krueger.A.The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society[J].American Economic Review,1974,64,(3):291-303.
[11]黎文靖.所有权类型,政治寻租与公司社会责任报告:一个分析性框架[J].北京:会计研究,2012,(1):81-88.
[12]Detomasi.D.The Political Roots of Corporate Social Responsibility[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2008,82,(4):807-819.
[13]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].北京:经济研究,2007,(7):36-50.
[14]Shleifer.A.,and R.Vishny.Politicians and Firms[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics.1994,109,(4):995-1025.
[15]周黎安,陶婧.政府规模,市场化与地区腐败问题研究[J].北京:经济研究,2009,(1):57-69.
[16]Fan.H.,J.Wong.,and T.Zhang.Institutions and Organizational Structure:The Case of State-owned Corporate Pyramids[J].Journal of Law,Economics and Organization,2013,29,(6):1217-1252.
[17]Qian,Y.,Roland G.Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint[J].American Economic Review,1998,88,(5):1143-1162.
[18]Jin.H.,Y.Qian.,and R.Weingast.Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives:Federalism,Chinese Style[J].Journal of Public Economics,2005,89,(9-10):1719-1742.
[19]Li.H.,and L.Zhou.Political Turnover and Economic Performance:The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China[J].Journal of Public Economics,2005,89,(9-10):1743-1762.
[20]王立彦,刘向前.IPO与非法定公司所得税收优惠[J].北京:经济学(季刊),2004,(2):457-474.
[21]Cremer,H.,and F.Gahvari.Tax Competition and Tax Evasion[J].Nordic Journal of Political Economy,1997,93,(11):89-104.
[22]郭杰,李涛.中国地方政府间税收竞争研究——基于中国省级面板数据的经验证据[J].北京:管理世界,2009,(11):54-64.
[23]Dubin.J.,M.Graetz.,and L.Wilde.The Effect of Audit Rates on the Federal Individual Income Tax,1977-1986[J].National Tax Journal,1990,43,(4):395-409.
[24]Slemrod.J.,M.Blumenthal.,and W.Christian.Tax Payer Response to an Increased Probability of Audit:Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota[J].Journal of Public Economics,2001,79,(3),455-483.
[25]张茵,刘明辉,彭红星.社会信任与公司避税[J].北京:会计研究,2017,(9):48-54.
[26]Reverte.C.Determinant of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Rating by Spanish Listed Firm[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2009,88,(2):351-366.
[27]宋林,王建玲,姚树洁.上市公司年报中社会责任信息披露的影响因素——基于合法性视角的研究[J].北京:经济管理,2012,(2):40-49.
[28]刘想,刘银国,社会责任信息披露与企业价值关系研究——基于公司治理视角的考察[J].北京:经济学动态,2014,(11):49-64.
[29]权小锋,吴世农,尹洪英.企业社会责任与股价崩盘风险:价值工具或自利工具?[J].北京:经济研究,2015,(11):89-97.
[30]Jenny.D.Corporate Responsibility:The Communication Challenge[J].Journal of Communication Management,2005,9,(2):108-119.
[31]宋献中,龚明晓.公司会计年报中社会责任信息的价值研究——基于内容的专家问卷分析[J].北京:管理世界,2006,(2):104-110.
[32]吴联生.国有股权、税收优惠与公司税负[J].北京:经济研究,2009,(10):109-120.
[33]邓建平,曾勇.金融关联能否缓解民营企业的融资约束[J].北京:金融研究,2011,(8):78-92.
[34]Godfrey.C.The Relationships between Corporate Philanthropy and Shareholder Wealth:A Risk Management Perspective[J].Academy of Management Review,2005,30,(4):777-798.
[35]李四海,李晓龙,宋献中.产权性质、市场竞争与企业社会责任行为——基于政治寻租视角的分析[J].济南:中国人口·资源与环境,2015,(1):162-169.
[36]Cai,H.,and Q.Liu.Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance:Evidence from Chinese Industrial Firms[J].Economic Journal,2009,119,(537):764-795.
[37]李元旭,宋渊洋.地方政府通过所得税优惠保护本地企业吗?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].北京:中国工业经济,2011,(5):149-159.
[38]吴文锋,吴冲锋,芮萌.中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠[J].北京:管理世界,2009,(3):134-142.
[39]田利辉,张伟.政治关联影响我国上市公司长期绩效的三大效应[J].北京:经济研究,2013,(11):71-86.
[40]李维安,徐业坤.政治身份的避税效应[J].北京:金融研究,2013,(3):114-129.
[41]Kim.F.,and L.Zhang.Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2016,33,(1):78-114.
[42]Dyreng.D.,M.Hanlon.,and L.Maydew.The Effects of Executives on Corporate Tax Avoidance[J].The Accounting Review,2010,85,(4):1163-1189.
[43]刘行,叶康涛.企业的避税活动会影响投资效率吗?[J].北京:会计研究,2013,(6):47-53.
[44]魏春燕.审计师行业专长于客户的避税程度[J],北京:审计研究,2014,(2):74-83.
[45]Clarkson.M.A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social Performance[J].The Academy of Management Review,1995,20,(1):92-117.
[46]刘慧龙,吴联生.法制环境,所有权性质与企业实际税率[J].北京:管理世界,2014,(4):42-52.
[47]王艳艳,于李胜,安然.非财务信息披露是否能够改善资本市场信息环境——基于社会责任报告披露的研究[J].北京:金融研究,2014,(8):178-191.
[48]贾明,张喆.高管的政治关联影响公司慈善行为吗?[J].北京:管理世界,2010,(4):99-113.
[49]罗党论,魏翥.政治关联与民营企业避税行为研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].广州:南方经济,2012,(11):29-39.
[50]李姝,谢晓嫣.民营企业的社会责任,政治关联与债务融资——来自中国资本市场的经验证据[J].天津:南开管理评论,2014,(6):30-40.
(1)避税和偷逃税的主要区别在于合法性,但是,在实证研究中,由于合法性的模糊,这两个概念经常是不进行区分的(Slemrod和Yitzhaki,2002;范子英、田彬彬,2013),在具体的衡量上,主流会计文献通常从企业实际税负的角度来探讨企业避税程度(Chen等,2010[3];Hanlon和Heitzman,2010[4];陈冬等,2016[6];李增福等,2016)[7],本文亦遵从该做法。
(1)中国审计署.2004年第4号:788户企业税收征管情况审计调查结果[EB/OL].中国审计署网站http://www.audit.gov.cn/n5/n25/c63506/content.html。
(2)解读《白皮书》:2014年企业社会责任报告八大发现[EB/OL].新华网:http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2015-01/15/c_127389654_2.htm。
(1)具体包括:是否经第三方机构审验;是否参照GRI《可持续发展报告指南》;是否披露股东权益保护;是否披露债权人权益保护;是否披露职工权益保护;是否披露供应商权益保护;是否披露客户及消费者权益保护;是否披露环境和可持续发展;是否披露公共关系和社会公益事业;是否披露社会责任制度建设和改善措施;是否披露安全生产内容;是否披露公司存在的不足。
(1)考虑到社会责任信息披露对企业价值的影响可能存在滞后效应,本文对社会责任信息披露变量做了滞后一期处理。
(2)具体计算方法为年末流通股市值、非流通股份占净资产的金额、长期负债以及短期负债之和除以企业总资产。
(1)换用其他变量也能得到相似的结果,如表10和表11所示。