投资者保护、盈余管理方式与审计师风险感知
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摘要
以2007~2012年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,对投资者保护、盈余管理方式与审计师风险感知之间的关系进行了实证检验。研究发现,审计师不仅会关注公司的应计盈余管理行为,而且会关注公司的真实盈余管理行为,并对盈余管理产生的风险做出积极的策略反应;投资者保护水平会对盈余管理方式及审计师风险感知产生重要影响,投资者保护水平越高,审计师对真实盈余管理行为的风险感知就越敏感。
Earnings management has always been a hot topic in the research of capital market,it has an important impact on stakeholders,especially on the behavior of auditors. Using data from A-share firms listed on SHSE or SZSE for the period 2007-2012,this paper investigates the relationship among investor protection,earnings management and auditors' risk perception. We find that,auditors care about company's accrual and real earnings management activities,and make a positive response on risks arising from earnings management activities. Furthermore,our research show that investor protection has an enormous impact on earning management and auditors' risk perception,the higher the degree of investor protection,the more auditors are sensitive to risks arising from earnings management activities.
Earnings management has always been a hot topic in the research of capital market,it has an important impact on stakeholders,especially on the behavior of auditors. Using data from A-share firms listed on SHSE or SZSE for the period 2007-2012,this paper investigates the relationship among investor protection,earnings management and auditors' risk perception. We find that,auditors care about company's accrual and real earnings management activities,and make a positive response on risks arising from earnings management activities. Furthermore,our research show that investor protection has an enormous impact on earning management and auditors' risk perception,the higher the degree of investor protection,the more auditors are sensitive to risks arising from earnings management activities.
引文
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[24]李增福,董志强,连玉君.应计项目盈余管理还是真实活动盈余管理——基于我国2007年所得税改革的研究[J].管理世界,2011(01):121-134.
[25]Leuz C,Nanda D,Wysocki P D.Earnings Management and Investor Protection:An International Comparison[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,69(03):505-527.
[26]涂国前.审计师变更的原因:意见分歧[J].中大管理研究,2008(03):58-63.
[27]Bartov E,Gul F A,Tsui J S.Discretionary-Accruals Model and Audit Qualifications[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,30(03):421-452.
[28]Bedard J C,Johnstone K M.Earnings Manipulation Risk,Corporate Governance Risk,and Auditors’Planning and Pricing Decisions[J].The Accounting Review,2004,79(02):277-305.
[29]Kothari S,Leone A,Wasley C.Performance Matched Discretionary Accrual Measures[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,2005,39(01):163-197.
[30]Simunic D A.The Pricing of Audit Services:Theory and Evidence[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1980,18(01):161-190.
[31]朱小平,余谦.我国审计收费影响因素之实证研究[J].中国会计评论,2004(02):393-407.
[32]赵立三,张彩虹,康玲,袁国涛.风险因素对我国上市公司审计收费影响的实证研究[J].河北大学学报,2007(06):80-84.
[33]Sohn B C.Do Auditors Care about Real Earnings Management in Their Audit Fee Decisions[R].Working Paper,City University of Hong Kong,2011.
[34]沈烈,张西萍.新会计准则与盈余管理[J].会计研究,2007(02):52-58.
[35]程书强,杨娜.新会计准则下上市公司盈余管理存在的可能性及实施途径分析[J].管理世界,2010(12):178-179.
[36]陆正飞,王春飞,伍利娜.制度变迁、集团客户重要性与非标准审计意见[J].会计研究,2012(10):71-78.
[37]刘继红.国有股权、盈余管理与审计意见[J].审计研究,2009(02):32-39.
[38]陈杰平,苏锡嘉,吴溪.异常审计收费与不利审计结果的改善[J].中国会计与财务研究,2005(12):1-54.
[2]吴联生,王亚平.盈余管理程度的估计模型与经验证据:一个综述[J].经济研究,2007(08):143-152.
[3]Palmrose Z V,Richardson V J,Scholz S.Determinants of Market Reactions to Restatement Announcements[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2004,37(01):59-89.
[4]Dechow P M,Sloan R G.Executive Incentives and the Horizon Problem:An Empirical Investigation[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1991,14(01):51-89.
[5]Cohen D A,Zarowin P.Accrual-Based and Real Earnings Management Activities around Seasoned Equity Offerings[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,50(01):2-19.
[6]Defond M L,Subramanyam K R.The Effects of Audit Quality on Earnings Management[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,1998,15(01):1-24.
[7]夏立军,杨海斌.注册会计师对上市公司盈余管理的反应[J].审计研究,2001(04):28-34.
[8]徐浩萍.会计盈余管理与独立审计质量[J].会计研究,2004(01):44-49.
[9]刘霞.高质量审计能够抑制真实盈余管理吗[J].贵州财经大学学报,2015(04):54-62.
[10]杨志强.家族企业高管控制权收益:外部公平性与盈余管理行为——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].暨南学报,2013(09):43-48.
[11]Schipper K.Commentary on Earnings Management[J].Accounting Horizon,1989,3(04):91-102.
[12]Heninger W G.The Association between Auditor Litigation and Abnormal Accruals[J].The Accounting Review,2001,76(01):111-126.
[13]Roychowdhury S.Earnings Management through Real Activities Manipulation[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2006,42(03):335-370.
[14]Graham J R,Harvey C R,Rajgopal S.The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,40(01):3-73.
[15]Kim J,Sohn B.Real versus Accrual-Based Earnings Management and the Implied Cost of Equity Capita[lR].Working Paper,City University of Hong Kong,2010.
[16]Cohen D A,Dey A,Leys T Z.Real and Accrual Based Earnings Management in the Pre-and Post-Sarbanes Oxley Periods[J].The Accounting Review,2008,82(03):757-787.
[17]Zang A Y.Evidence on the Tradeoff between Real Manipulation and Accrual Manipulation[R].Working Paper,University of Rochester,2007.
[18]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数:各地区市场化相对进程2011年报告[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2011.
[19]Watts R L,Zimmerman J L.Positive Accounting Theory[M].New York:Prentice-Hall Inc,1986.
[20]蒋义宏.上市公司利润操纵的实证研究[N].中国证券报,1998-03-19.
[21]王艳艳.审计在投资者保护中的作用[J].财会月刊,2005(07):43-44.
[22]宋衍蘅,殷德全.会计师事务所变更、审计收费与审计质量[J].审计研究,2005(02):72-77.
[23]吴秋生,李通乾.内部控制自我评价报告质量测度研究[J].高等财经教育研究,2015(01):59-79.
[24]李增福,董志强,连玉君.应计项目盈余管理还是真实活动盈余管理——基于我国2007年所得税改革的研究[J].管理世界,2011(01):121-134.
[25]Leuz C,Nanda D,Wysocki P D.Earnings Management and Investor Protection:An International Comparison[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,69(03):505-527.
[26]涂国前.审计师变更的原因:意见分歧[J].中大管理研究,2008(03):58-63.
[27]Bartov E,Gul F A,Tsui J S.Discretionary-Accruals Model and Audit Qualifications[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,30(03):421-452.
[28]Bedard J C,Johnstone K M.Earnings Manipulation Risk,Corporate Governance Risk,and Auditors’Planning and Pricing Decisions[J].The Accounting Review,2004,79(02):277-305.
[29]Kothari S,Leone A,Wasley C.Performance Matched Discretionary Accrual Measures[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,2005,39(01):163-197.
[30]Simunic D A.The Pricing of Audit Services:Theory and Evidence[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1980,18(01):161-190.
[31]朱小平,余谦.我国审计收费影响因素之实证研究[J].中国会计评论,2004(02):393-407.
[32]赵立三,张彩虹,康玲,袁国涛.风险因素对我国上市公司审计收费影响的实证研究[J].河北大学学报,2007(06):80-84.
[33]Sohn B C.Do Auditors Care about Real Earnings Management in Their Audit Fee Decisions[R].Working Paper,City University of Hong Kong,2011.
[34]沈烈,张西萍.新会计准则与盈余管理[J].会计研究,2007(02):52-58.
[35]程书强,杨娜.新会计准则下上市公司盈余管理存在的可能性及实施途径分析[J].管理世界,2010(12):178-179.
[36]陆正飞,王春飞,伍利娜.制度变迁、集团客户重要性与非标准审计意见[J].会计研究,2012(10):71-78.
[37]刘继红.国有股权、盈余管理与审计意见[J].审计研究,2009(02):32-39.
[38]陈杰平,苏锡嘉,吴溪.异常审计收费与不利审计结果的改善[J].中国会计与财务研究,2005(12):1-54.