家族控制、风险投资和企业R&D投资
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摘要
本文以2007~2012年A股上市家族企业为样本,研究风险投资对家族控制企业R&D投资机制的影响。研究发现,家族控制的风险规避行为抑制了企业的R&D投资;有风投背景的家族企业能显著地增加R&D投资,并对家族控制权与R&D投资关系产生调节作用,但这种调节的有效性只在家族控制权较低的企业才成立。进一步研究发现,不同特征的风投对家族控制企业的R&D投资产生的影响不同。风投声誉越高和持股比例越多,对家族控制权与R&D的调节作用越强;国有风投和本地风投对家族控制权与R&D的调节作用更强,而联合风投与独立风投没有显著差别。
This paper relies upon the data from A-share listed family controlled companies between 2007 and 2012 as sample to study how VC affects the R&D investment. Our empirical analysis shows that the risk-averse behavior of the family controlled companies restrains R&D investment.VC-backed family enterprises signifi cantly increases R&D investment, and the relationship between the family control and R&D investment is adjusted. The effectiveness of this adjustment is based on the premise that the family control is loose. We further fi nd that different types of VCs have different impacts on the R&D investment of the family enterprises. Further analysis shows that the more visible and more shareholding of VC the more effective adjustment of family control and R&D investment. State-owned VC and local VC are also quite effective in constraining family control on R&D investment. However, there is no signifi cant difference between syndicated VC and Independent VC.
This paper relies upon the data from A-share listed family controlled companies between 2007 and 2012 as sample to study how VC affects the R&D investment. Our empirical analysis shows that the risk-averse behavior of the family controlled companies restrains R&D investment.VC-backed family enterprises signifi cantly increases R&D investment, and the relationship between the family control and R&D investment is adjusted. The effectiveness of this adjustment is based on the premise that the family control is loose. We further fi nd that different types of VCs have different impacts on the R&D investment of the family enterprises. Further analysis shows that the more visible and more shareholding of VC the more effective adjustment of family control and R&D investment. State-owned VC and local VC are also quite effective in constraining family control on R&D investment. However, there is no signifi cant difference between syndicated VC and Independent VC.
引文
[1]Anderson,R.C.,and Reeb,D.M..Founding-family ownership and firm performance:evidence from the S&P 500[J].Journal of Finance,2003,58:1301-1328.
[2]Chen,Hsiang-Lan and Wen-Tsung Hsu.Family Ownership,Board Independence,and R&D Investment[J].Family Business Review,2009,22(4):347-362.
[3]Hellmann,T.,and Puri,M..Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-up Firms:Empirical Evidence[J].Journal of Finance,2002,57(1):169-197.
[4]Kortum,S.,and Lerner,J..Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation[J].RAND Journal of Economics,2000,31:674-692.
[5]La Porta,Rafael,Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,and Andrei Shleifer.Corporate ownership around the World[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54:471-518.
[6]Marco Da Rin,and María Fabiana Penas.The Effect of Venture Capital on Innovation Strategies[Z]NBER Working Paper,No.13636,2007.
[7]Nahata,R..Venture capital reputation and investment performance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,90:127-151.
[8]Parhankangas,A.,and Landstrm,H..How Venture Capitalists Respond to Unmet Expectations:The Role of Social Environment[J].Journal of Business Venturing,2006,21(6):773-801.
[9]Weidenbaum,M..The Chinese Family Business Enterprise[J].California Management Review,1996,38(4):141-156.
[10]Wei,Z.,S.Wu,C.Li and W.Chen.Family Control,Institutional Environment and Cash Dividend Policy:Evidence from China[J].China Journal of Accounting Research,2011,4:29-46.
[11]陈创,刘天宇.创始经理人、管理层股权分散度和研发决策[J].金融研究,2012,(07):196-206.
[12]陈德球,钟昀珈.制度效率、家族化途径与家族投资偏好[J].财经研究,2011,(12):107-117.
[13]代吉林,李新春,李胜文.家族企业R&D投资决定机制研究——基于家族所有权和控制权视角[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2012,(12):118-126.
[14]冯旭南,李心愉,陈工孟.家族控制、治理环境和公司价值[J].金融研究,2011,(03):149-164.
[15]付雷鸣,万迪昉,张雅慧.VC是更积极的投资者吗[J].金融研究,2012,(10):125-138.
[16]解维敏,方红星.金融发展、融资约束与企业研发投资[J].金融研究,2011,(05):171-183.
[17]罗婷,朱青,李丹.解析R&D投入和公司价值之间的关系[J].金融研究,2009,(06):100-110.
[18]苏启林,朱文.上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究,2003,(08):36-91.
[19]吴超鹏,吴世农,程静雅,王璐.风险投资对上市公司投融资行为影响的实证研究[J].经济研究,2012,(01):105-119.
[20]甄丽明.IPO超募与创业企业R&D投资行为[J].证券市场导报,2013,(09):27-32.
1 .数据来源于2012年《福布斯》中文版“中国现代家族企业调查报告”。报告显示,A股民营上市公司1394家,其中家族企业684家。
2 .例如,深圳和而泰智能控制股份有限公司的董事朱方是深圳力合创业投资有限公司总裁,荷兰代尔夫特技术大学物理学博士,曾任荷兰伦瑟仪器有限公司技术负责人、荷兰博士蔓科技有限公司亚洲地区负责人、清华大学深圳研究院院长助理,同时也是深圳市科技专家委员会委员(从年报中整理)。
3 .表6列(4)中family*vcdum*famdum系数显著,说明表6列(2)和列(3)中family*vcdum的系数是显著不同的。此外,列(4)中family*vcdum+family*vcdum*famdum不显著异于0,说明高家族控制下风投不对R&D产生影响,结果和列(3)一致。
4 .我们也用风投的年龄作为声誉的代理变量,结果不变。
[2]Chen,Hsiang-Lan and Wen-Tsung Hsu.Family Ownership,Board Independence,and R&D Investment[J].Family Business Review,2009,22(4):347-362.
[3]Hellmann,T.,and Puri,M..Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-up Firms:Empirical Evidence[J].Journal of Finance,2002,57(1):169-197.
[4]Kortum,S.,and Lerner,J..Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation[J].RAND Journal of Economics,2000,31:674-692.
[5]La Porta,Rafael,Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,and Andrei Shleifer.Corporate ownership around the World[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54:471-518.
[6]Marco Da Rin,and María Fabiana Penas.The Effect of Venture Capital on Innovation Strategies[Z]NBER Working Paper,No.13636,2007.
[7]Nahata,R..Venture capital reputation and investment performance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,90:127-151.
[8]Parhankangas,A.,and Landstrm,H..How Venture Capitalists Respond to Unmet Expectations:The Role of Social Environment[J].Journal of Business Venturing,2006,21(6):773-801.
[9]Weidenbaum,M..The Chinese Family Business Enterprise[J].California Management Review,1996,38(4):141-156.
[10]Wei,Z.,S.Wu,C.Li and W.Chen.Family Control,Institutional Environment and Cash Dividend Policy:Evidence from China[J].China Journal of Accounting Research,2011,4:29-46.
[11]陈创,刘天宇.创始经理人、管理层股权分散度和研发决策[J].金融研究,2012,(07):196-206.
[12]陈德球,钟昀珈.制度效率、家族化途径与家族投资偏好[J].财经研究,2011,(12):107-117.
[13]代吉林,李新春,李胜文.家族企业R&D投资决定机制研究——基于家族所有权和控制权视角[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2012,(12):118-126.
[14]冯旭南,李心愉,陈工孟.家族控制、治理环境和公司价值[J].金融研究,2011,(03):149-164.
[15]付雷鸣,万迪昉,张雅慧.VC是更积极的投资者吗[J].金融研究,2012,(10):125-138.
[16]解维敏,方红星.金融发展、融资约束与企业研发投资[J].金融研究,2011,(05):171-183.
[17]罗婷,朱青,李丹.解析R&D投入和公司价值之间的关系[J].金融研究,2009,(06):100-110.
[18]苏启林,朱文.上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究,2003,(08):36-91.
[19]吴超鹏,吴世农,程静雅,王璐.风险投资对上市公司投融资行为影响的实证研究[J].经济研究,2012,(01):105-119.
[20]甄丽明.IPO超募与创业企业R&D投资行为[J].证券市场导报,2013,(09):27-32.
1 .数据来源于2012年《福布斯》中文版“中国现代家族企业调查报告”。报告显示,A股民营上市公司1394家,其中家族企业684家。
2 .例如,深圳和而泰智能控制股份有限公司的董事朱方是深圳力合创业投资有限公司总裁,荷兰代尔夫特技术大学物理学博士,曾任荷兰伦瑟仪器有限公司技术负责人、荷兰博士蔓科技有限公司亚洲地区负责人、清华大学深圳研究院院长助理,同时也是深圳市科技专家委员会委员(从年报中整理)。
3 .表6列(4)中family*vcdum*famdum系数显著,说明表6列(2)和列(3)中family*vcdum的系数是显著不同的。此外,列(4)中family*vcdum+family*vcdum*famdum不显著异于0,说明高家族控制下风投不对R&D产生影响,结果和列(3)一致。
4 .我们也用风投的年龄作为声誉的代理变量,结果不变。