业绩承诺增长率、并购溢价与股价崩盘风险
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摘要
对赌协议是对并购交易标的资产估值调整的契约。现有研究中,对赌协议的激励效应已在理论层面及实证层面得到初步验证。但过高的对赌目标是否反而会引起风险,需进一步研究。本文以2012～2017年6月A股上市公司签订了对赌协议的定增并购事件为样本,对业绩承诺增长率的经济后果进行了实证检验。研究发现,业绩承诺增长率越高,并购溢价与发行后的股价崩盘风险也越高。进一步分组检验表明,在现金支付比例较高时,业绩承诺增长率对并购溢价的影响更强;在股价高估时实施定增并购,较高的业绩承诺增长率更容易引发股价崩盘风险。结果表明,对赌协议有助于降低收购风险的前提是对赌目标具有合理性,当上市公司因过高的对赌目标而支付了过高的并购溢价,反而会加剧股价崩盘风险。建议监管部门加强对高承诺、高估值并购重组的监管,防止恶意承诺和忽悠式重组。
Value Adjustment Mechanism(VAM) is the contract to adjust the valuation of the target assets in M&A transaction. In the previous literature, the incentive effect of VAM has been preliminarily verified in the theoretical and empirical levels, but whether overly high target cause risk on the contrary is still left to be further analysis. This paper makes an empirical test on the economic consequences of the profit growth rate committed in VAM based on the example of A share listed companies which implemented M&A with Private Placement and signed VAM from 2012 to June 2017. The results show that the profit growth rate committed is positively related to the takeover premium and stock crash risk. In further tests, it is found that profit growth rate committed has a stronger impact on takeover premium when cash payment ratio is higher, and higher profit growth rate committed is more likely to lead to stock crash risk when M&A with Private Placement is issued in situation of stock overvaluation. These results mean the premise of VAM to reduce risk is that the target performance is reasonable. It will aggravate stock crash risk if bid firms pay too high premium in M&A for high target performance. In order to avoid these problems, regulation on M&A with high commitment and high valuation should be strengthened, which helps preventing malicious commitment and deceptive restructuring.
Value Adjustment Mechanism(VAM) is the contract to adjust the valuation of the target assets in M&A transaction. In the previous literature, the incentive effect of VAM has been preliminarily verified in the theoretical and empirical levels, but whether overly high target cause risk on the contrary is still left to be further analysis. This paper makes an empirical test on the economic consequences of the profit growth rate committed in VAM based on the example of A share listed companies which implemented M&A with Private Placement and signed VAM from 2012 to June 2017. The results show that the profit growth rate committed is positively related to the takeover premium and stock crash risk. In further tests, it is found that profit growth rate committed has a stronger impact on takeover premium when cash payment ratio is higher, and higher profit growth rate committed is more likely to lead to stock crash risk when M&A with Private Placement is issued in situation of stock overvaluation. These results mean the premise of VAM to reduce risk is that the target performance is reasonable. It will aggravate stock crash risk if bid firms pay too high premium in M&A for high target performance. In order to avoid these problems, regulation on M&A with high commitment and high valuation should be strengthened, which helps preventing malicious commitment and deceptive restructuring.
引文
[1]Chen J,Hong H,Stein J C.Forecasting crashes:trading volume,past returns,and conditional skewness in stock prices[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2001,61(3):345-381.
[2]Fu F,Lin L,Officer M S.Acquisitions driven by stock overvaluation:Are they good deals?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2013,109(1):24-39.
[3]Hertzel M G,Li Z.Behavioral and Rational Explanations of Stock Price Performance around SEOs:Evidence from a Decomposition of Market-to-Book Ratios[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2010,45(4):935-958.
[4]Rhodes-Kropf M,Robinson D T,Viswanathan S.Valuation waves and merger activity:The empirical evidence[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(3):561-603.
[5]陈仕华,卢昌崇.企业间高管联结与并购溢价决策——基于组织间模仿理论的实证研究[J].管理世界,2013,(05):144-156.
[6]高闯,孙宏英,胡可果.并购重组中大股东补偿承诺与中小股东权益保护——基于苏宁环球与世荣兆业的比较案例研究[J].经济管理,2010,(11):55-63.
[7]高榴,袁诗淼.上市公司并购重组商誉及其减值问题探析[J].证券市场导报,2017,(12):58-64.
[8]葛伟杰,张秋生,张自巧.支付方式、融资约束与并购溢价研究[J].证券市场导报,2014,(01):40-47.
[9]顾小龙,李天钰,辛宇.现金股利、控制权结构与股价崩盘风险[J].金融研究,2015,(07):152-169.
[10]郭菊娥.风险投资估值调整协议价值及最优业绩目标[C].社会经济发展转型与系统工程——中国系统工程学会第17届学术年会论文集.中国系统工程学会,2012:8.
[11]江虹,姜文静.2010~2016年我国影视内容产业并购估值方式研究[J].现代传播(中国传媒大学学报),2017,(06):130-135.
[12]李玉辰,费一文.对赌协议的信号与反信号均衡[J].统计与决策,2013,(14):50-55.
[13]刘娥平,关静怡.外延式扩张比内涵式增长更好吗?——基于定向增发募集资金投向的视角[J].证券市场导报,2018,(03):14-22.
[14]刘峰涛,赵袁军,刘玮.重复对赌协议机制下企业两阶段融资博弈[J].系统管理学报,2017,26(3):528-536.
[15]刘浩,杨尔稼,麻樟城.业绩承诺与上市公司盈余管理——以股权分置改革中的管制为例[J].财经研究,2011,37(10):58-69.
[16]罗进辉,杜兴强.媒体报道、制度环境与股价崩盘风险[J].会计研究,2014,(09):53-59.
[17]吕长江,韩慧博.业绩补偿承诺、协同效应与并购收益分配[J].审计与经济研究,2014,29(6):3-13.
[18]潘爱玲,邱金龙,杨洋.业绩补偿承诺对标的企业的激励效应研究——来自中小板和创业板上市公司的实证检验[J].会计研究,2017,(03):46-52.
[19]潘妙丽,张玮婷.上市公司并购重组资产评估相关问题研究[J].证券市场导报,2017,(09):12-18.
[20]沈华玉,林永坚.定向增发中利润承诺的市场反应及长期绩效研究[J].证券市场导报,2018,(01):64-71.
[21]王化成,曹丰,叶康涛.监督还是掏空:大股东持股比例与股价崩盘风险[J].管理世界,2015,(02):45-57.
[22]王竞达,范庆泉.上市公司并购重组中的业绩承诺及政策影响研究[J].会计研究,2017,(10):71-77.
[23]王文姣,傅超,傅代国.并购商誉是否为股价崩盘的事前信号?——基于会计功能和金融安全视角[J].财经研究,2017,43(9):76-87.
[24]项海容,李建军,刘星.基于激励视角的对赌合约研究[J].上海经济研究,2009,(03):92-98.
[25]辛宇,李天钰,吴雯敏.上市公司的并购、估值与股价崩盘风险研究[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),2015,55(3):200-212.
[26]许竹.对赌协议在企业融资中的作用及对策研究[J].金融经济,2016,(20):160-161.
[27]杨志强,曹鑫雨.业绩补偿承诺提高混合所有制改革的协同效应吗?——基于国有上市公司重大并购重组的经验证据[J].华东经济管理,2017,31(11):166-176.
[28]于成永,于金金.上市公司业绩承诺、公司治理质量与并购溢价[J].中国资产评估,2017,(01):39-44.
[29]袁知柱,宝乌云塔娜,王书光.股权价值高估、投资者保护与企业应计及真实盈余管理行为选择[J].南开管理评论,2014,17(5):136-150.
[30]张肖飞.资产误定价、机构投资者与股价崩盘风险[J].经济经纬,2018,35(2):143-150.
1.完整报道详见“重组标的承诺存兑现风险华鹏飞业绩预报前股价跌停”http://stock.hexun.com/2018-01-31/192359191.html
[2]Fu F,Lin L,Officer M S.Acquisitions driven by stock overvaluation:Are they good deals?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2013,109(1):24-39.
[3]Hertzel M G,Li Z.Behavioral and Rational Explanations of Stock Price Performance around SEOs:Evidence from a Decomposition of Market-to-Book Ratios[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2010,45(4):935-958.
[4]Rhodes-Kropf M,Robinson D T,Viswanathan S.Valuation waves and merger activity:The empirical evidence[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(3):561-603.
[5]陈仕华,卢昌崇.企业间高管联结与并购溢价决策——基于组织间模仿理论的实证研究[J].管理世界,2013,(05):144-156.
[6]高闯,孙宏英,胡可果.并购重组中大股东补偿承诺与中小股东权益保护——基于苏宁环球与世荣兆业的比较案例研究[J].经济管理,2010,(11):55-63.
[7]高榴,袁诗淼.上市公司并购重组商誉及其减值问题探析[J].证券市场导报,2017,(12):58-64.
[8]葛伟杰,张秋生,张自巧.支付方式、融资约束与并购溢价研究[J].证券市场导报,2014,(01):40-47.
[9]顾小龙,李天钰,辛宇.现金股利、控制权结构与股价崩盘风险[J].金融研究,2015,(07):152-169.
[10]郭菊娥.风险投资估值调整协议价值及最优业绩目标[C].社会经济发展转型与系统工程——中国系统工程学会第17届学术年会论文集.中国系统工程学会,2012:8.
[11]江虹,姜文静.2010~2016年我国影视内容产业并购估值方式研究[J].现代传播(中国传媒大学学报),2017,(06):130-135.
[12]李玉辰,费一文.对赌协议的信号与反信号均衡[J].统计与决策,2013,(14):50-55.
[13]刘娥平,关静怡.外延式扩张比内涵式增长更好吗?——基于定向增发募集资金投向的视角[J].证券市场导报,2018,(03):14-22.
[14]刘峰涛,赵袁军,刘玮.重复对赌协议机制下企业两阶段融资博弈[J].系统管理学报,2017,26(3):528-536.
[15]刘浩,杨尔稼,麻樟城.业绩承诺与上市公司盈余管理——以股权分置改革中的管制为例[J].财经研究,2011,37(10):58-69.
[16]罗进辉,杜兴强.媒体报道、制度环境与股价崩盘风险[J].会计研究,2014,(09):53-59.
[17]吕长江,韩慧博.业绩补偿承诺、协同效应与并购收益分配[J].审计与经济研究,2014,29(6):3-13.
[18]潘爱玲,邱金龙,杨洋.业绩补偿承诺对标的企业的激励效应研究——来自中小板和创业板上市公司的实证检验[J].会计研究,2017,(03):46-52.
[19]潘妙丽,张玮婷.上市公司并购重组资产评估相关问题研究[J].证券市场导报,2017,(09):12-18.
[20]沈华玉,林永坚.定向增发中利润承诺的市场反应及长期绩效研究[J].证券市场导报,2018,(01):64-71.
[21]王化成,曹丰,叶康涛.监督还是掏空:大股东持股比例与股价崩盘风险[J].管理世界,2015,(02):45-57.
[22]王竞达,范庆泉.上市公司并购重组中的业绩承诺及政策影响研究[J].会计研究,2017,(10):71-77.
[23]王文姣,傅超,傅代国.并购商誉是否为股价崩盘的事前信号?——基于会计功能和金融安全视角[J].财经研究,2017,43(9):76-87.
[24]项海容,李建军,刘星.基于激励视角的对赌合约研究[J].上海经济研究,2009,(03):92-98.
[25]辛宇,李天钰,吴雯敏.上市公司的并购、估值与股价崩盘风险研究[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),2015,55(3):200-212.
[26]许竹.对赌协议在企业融资中的作用及对策研究[J].金融经济,2016,(20):160-161.
[27]杨志强,曹鑫雨.业绩补偿承诺提高混合所有制改革的协同效应吗?——基于国有上市公司重大并购重组的经验证据[J].华东经济管理,2017,31(11):166-176.
[28]于成永,于金金.上市公司业绩承诺、公司治理质量与并购溢价[J].中国资产评估,2017,(01):39-44.
[29]袁知柱,宝乌云塔娜,王书光.股权价值高估、投资者保护与企业应计及真实盈余管理行为选择[J].南开管理评论,2014,17(5):136-150.
[30]张肖飞.资产误定价、机构投资者与股价崩盘风险[J].经济经纬,2018,35(2):143-150.
1.完整报道详见“重组标的承诺存兑现风险华鹏飞业绩预报前股价跌停”http://stock.hexun.com/2018-01-31/192359191.html