集中还是竞争——证券市场监管模式分流的考察与解释
|
摘要
因政府和市场力量对比差异及国家结构形式的不同,证券市场监管模式分为政府主导的集中型模式和以自律管理为主导的可竞争型模式。我国证券市场监管是自上而下的集中执法模式,中央政府、证监会的外部监管在其中居于强势地位,挤压了地方政府监管和证券交易所自律管理的空间,尤其是"全能型"证监会的存在模糊了市场监管和市场发展之间的边界,这种监管模式使得我国证券市场的产生与发展带有较强的行政干预色彩,市场创新受到一定影响,也增加了监管成本,影响了监管效率。为提高证券监管的质量,应建立联合监管的模式,鼓励地方政府、证券交易所及市场中的其他多元主体参与到监管规则制定的过程中,发挥各自的比较优势,形成差异化的监管规则体系。
Because of the difference between government and market power and the difference of state structure, the supervision mode of securities market can be divided into the centralized mode dominated by government and the competitive mode dominated by self-discipline management. China's securities market supervision is a top-down centralized law enforcement mode, in which the external supervision of the central government and the Securities Regulatory Commission occupies a strong position, squeezing the space for local government supervision and self-regulation of stock exchanges.Especially, the existence of the "omnipotent" Securities Regulatory Commission blurs the boundary between market supervision and market development. This mode of supervision makes the emergence and development of China's securities market have a strong color of administrative intervention. Market innovation is affected to a certain extent. It also increases the cost of supervision and affects the efficiency of supervision. In order to improve the quality of securities supervision, we should establish a joint supervision model, encourage local governments, stock exchanges and other multi-subjects in the market to participate in the process of formulating regulatory rules, give full play to their comparative advantages, and form a differentiated regulatory rules system.
Because of the difference between government and market power and the difference of state structure, the supervision mode of securities market can be divided into the centralized mode dominated by government and the competitive mode dominated by self-discipline management. China's securities market supervision is a top-down centralized law enforcement mode, in which the external supervision of the central government and the Securities Regulatory Commission occupies a strong position, squeezing the space for local government supervision and self-regulation of stock exchanges.Especially, the existence of the "omnipotent" Securities Regulatory Commission blurs the boundary between market supervision and market development. This mode of supervision makes the emergence and development of China's securities market have a strong color of administrative intervention. Market innovation is affected to a certain extent. It also increases the cost of supervision and affects the efficiency of supervision. In order to improve the quality of securities supervision, we should establish a joint supervision model, encourage local governments, stock exchanges and other multi-subjects in the market to participate in the process of formulating regulatory rules, give full play to their comparative advantages, and form a differentiated regulatory rules system.
引文
[1]ROMANO ROBERTA.The Genius of American Corporate Law[M].Washington:The AEI Press,1993:48.
[2]GANA A J,MICHAEL V.Blue Skies for America in the Securities Industry Except for New York:New York's Martin Act and the Private Right of Action[J].Fordham Journal of Corporate&Finance Law.2014(3):587-598.
[3]芭芭拉·米勒.加拿大金融制度[M].王海晔,译.北京:中国金融出版社,2005:38-39.
[4]BANNER S.Anglo-American Securities Regulation:Cultural and Political Roots,1690-1860[M].London:Cambridge University Press,2002:40.
[5]STRINGHAM E P.The Emergence of the London Stock Exchange as a Self-Policing Club[J].Journal of Private Enterprise,2002(2):1-19.
[6]MAHONEY P.The Exchange as Regulator[J].Virginia Law Review,1997(7):1453-1500.
[7]谈李荣.现代法治与民主宪政的金融解释[J].法学家,2010(6):9-16.
[8]FLECKNER A,KLAUS J.Stock Exchange Law:Concept,History,Challenges[J].Virginia Law&Business Review,2013(3):513-559.
[9]BURHOP C,LEHMANN-HASEMEYER.S.The Geography of Stock Exchanges in Imperial Germany[R].FZID Discussion Paper 89-2014,2014.
[10]中国证监会.退市制度访谈[EB/OL].(2014-05-28)[2018-09-09].http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/hdjl/zxft/lsonlyft/201405/t20140529_255149.html?randid=0.12460720074880294.
[11]民生证券股份有限公司.我国证券市场退市制度及机制研究[J].中国证券,2018(3):2-13.
[12]陆一.中国证券交易印花税的来龙去脉[EB/OL].(2011-10-18)[2018-09-09].http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001041217?full=y.
[13]张玮.自律管理是否可靠:人工智能参与证券监管的法律安排--以证券交易所的行动为视角[J].证券法律评论,2018:329-343.
(1)美国各州的证券监管法律“蓝天法”的历史要比联邦层面的证券法的历史长。1911年美国堪萨斯州颁布了第一部“蓝天法”。美国经济学家Stiglitz从经济学的视角研究了美国证券监管之中的联邦主义,并认为仅仅依靠SEC的监管是不够的,证券市场之中的监管应当有“联邦-州”“外部监管机构-市场监管机构”“国内监管-国际监管”三个层面的竞争。
(2)虽然法国的证券市场以巴黎证券交易所为主导,但是法国也出现过6个地区性的证券交易所。
(3)比如日本战后的证券市场便完全引入了美国的SEC模式。只不过日本很快废除了证券交易委员会,由大藏省直接监管证券交易市场。
(4)Mahoney,Paul G.The Exchange as Regulator.Virginia Law Review,Vol.83,No.7,1997.
(5)比如目前的小微企业数据库的建设是以地市政府为主力的。《中国人民银行关于加快小微企业和农村信用体系建设的意见》之中便提到了以地方试点先行的方式推动小微企业信用信息征集的工作,并确定了31个地方政府的试验区开展试点工作。山东省的17个地市建立了小微企业和农村地方的数据库。
(6)证监会成为专业性的监管机构的历史渊源在于其设立当初设立时的资金不足和编制有限。朱镕基总理也提出了“证监会的人要少而精“,此时的证监会体现的也是“专家治市”的思路。
[2]GANA A J,MICHAEL V.Blue Skies for America in the Securities Industry Except for New York:New York's Martin Act and the Private Right of Action[J].Fordham Journal of Corporate&Finance Law.2014(3):587-598.
[3]芭芭拉·米勒.加拿大金融制度[M].王海晔,译.北京:中国金融出版社,2005:38-39.
[4]BANNER S.Anglo-American Securities Regulation:Cultural and Political Roots,1690-1860[M].London:Cambridge University Press,2002:40.
[5]STRINGHAM E P.The Emergence of the London Stock Exchange as a Self-Policing Club[J].Journal of Private Enterprise,2002(2):1-19.
[6]MAHONEY P.The Exchange as Regulator[J].Virginia Law Review,1997(7):1453-1500.
[7]谈李荣.现代法治与民主宪政的金融解释[J].法学家,2010(6):9-16.
[8]FLECKNER A,KLAUS J.Stock Exchange Law:Concept,History,Challenges[J].Virginia Law&Business Review,2013(3):513-559.
[9]BURHOP C,LEHMANN-HASEMEYER.S.The Geography of Stock Exchanges in Imperial Germany[R].FZID Discussion Paper 89-2014,2014.
[10]中国证监会.退市制度访谈[EB/OL].(2014-05-28)[2018-09-09].http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/hdjl/zxft/lsonlyft/201405/t20140529_255149.html?randid=0.12460720074880294.
[11]民生证券股份有限公司.我国证券市场退市制度及机制研究[J].中国证券,2018(3):2-13.
[12]陆一.中国证券交易印花税的来龙去脉[EB/OL].(2011-10-18)[2018-09-09].http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001041217?full=y.
[13]张玮.自律管理是否可靠:人工智能参与证券监管的法律安排--以证券交易所的行动为视角[J].证券法律评论,2018:329-343.
(1)美国各州的证券监管法律“蓝天法”的历史要比联邦层面的证券法的历史长。1911年美国堪萨斯州颁布了第一部“蓝天法”。美国经济学家Stiglitz从经济学的视角研究了美国证券监管之中的联邦主义,并认为仅仅依靠SEC的监管是不够的,证券市场之中的监管应当有“联邦-州”“外部监管机构-市场监管机构”“国内监管-国际监管”三个层面的竞争。
(2)虽然法国的证券市场以巴黎证券交易所为主导,但是法国也出现过6个地区性的证券交易所。
(3)比如日本战后的证券市场便完全引入了美国的SEC模式。只不过日本很快废除了证券交易委员会,由大藏省直接监管证券交易市场。
(4)Mahoney,Paul G.The Exchange as Regulator.Virginia Law Review,Vol.83,No.7,1997.
(5)比如目前的小微企业数据库的建设是以地市政府为主力的。《中国人民银行关于加快小微企业和农村信用体系建设的意见》之中便提到了以地方试点先行的方式推动小微企业信用信息征集的工作,并确定了31个地方政府的试验区开展试点工作。山东省的17个地市建立了小微企业和农村地方的数据库。
(6)证监会成为专业性的监管机构的历史渊源在于其设立当初设立时的资金不足和编制有限。朱镕基总理也提出了“证监会的人要少而精“,此时的证监会体现的也是“专家治市”的思路。