新媒体情境下突发环境事件中的信息博弈研究
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摘要
[目的/意义]新媒体的兴起正在改变人类社会发展方式,深刻影响着社会管理的组织方式和政府运作方式。考虑新媒体对突发环境事件信息公开主体行为的影响,从演化博弈角度分析新媒体情境下突发环境事件信息公开行为的动态演化过程,对推动地方政府在突发环境事件中的信息公开具有重要的现实意义。[方法/过程]针对突发环境事件中地方政府的信息隐瞒行为,以委托—代理理论构建央地政府在突发环境事件中的信息公开演化博弈模型来探究新媒体监督对央地政府在突发环境事件信息公开过程中的行为策略产生的不同影响,进而剖析新媒体监督对突发环境事故中地方政府信息公开的作用机理。[结果/结论]研究表明:在新媒体情境下,信息公开演化博弈模型在不同的条件下会形成三种不同的行为演化路径,可以通过参数限制条件的调节来实现央地政府行为策略的目的;新媒体作为社会监管角色的介入,显著改善了央地信息博弈结果,使得央地政府均朝着有利于社会总体福利增大的博弈策略转变。
[Purpose/Significance]The emerging of social media is changing our human development model, and also has a profound impact on the organization of social management and the way of government work. Considering the impact on the behavior of information disclosure during emergency environmental accidents from social media, it is of great significance to investigate the dynamic evolutionary progress of information disclosure from the respective of evolutionary game, which will help advance the process of information disclosure during emergency environmental accidents.[Method/Process]Considering the behavior of concealing information by local government during emergency environmental accidents, this article uses the evolutionary game model of emergency environmental accidents between the central government and local government based on principal-agent theory to investigate how the new media affect their strategy selection, then analyzes the mechanism that how the new media affect local government's information disclosure in emergency environmental accidents.[Result/Conclusion]The findings indicate that three evolutionary paths are concluded from information disclosure evolutionary game model in social media context, which can change local government and the central government's strategic choices by adjusting parameters. Besides, the new media plays an active constructive role in the positive interaction among the central, local governments and the public under the current Chinese system.
[Purpose/Significance]The emerging of social media is changing our human development model, and also has a profound impact on the organization of social management and the way of government work. Considering the impact on the behavior of information disclosure during emergency environmental accidents from social media, it is of great significance to investigate the dynamic evolutionary progress of information disclosure from the respective of evolutionary game, which will help advance the process of information disclosure during emergency environmental accidents.[Method/Process]Considering the behavior of concealing information by local government during emergency environmental accidents, this article uses the evolutionary game model of emergency environmental accidents between the central government and local government based on principal-agent theory to investigate how the new media affect their strategy selection, then analyzes the mechanism that how the new media affect local government's information disclosure in emergency environmental accidents.[Result/Conclusion]The findings indicate that three evolutionary paths are concluded from information disclosure evolutionary game model in social media context, which can change local government and the central government's strategic choices by adjusting parameters. Besides, the new media plays an active constructive role in the positive interaction among the central, local governments and the public under the current Chinese system.
引文
[1] 2017年全国仅发生一起重大突发环境事件[EB/OL].[2018-03-24].http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0324/c1001-29886326.html.
[2] 铜矿公司违法排废水影响数万居民吃水赔偿八千万[EB/OL].[2017-12-24].http://www.xinhuanet.com/2017-12/24/c_ 1122159324.htm.
[3] 苟正金. 我国突发环境公共事件信息公开制度之检讨与完善——以兰州“4·11”自来水苯超标事件为中心[J]. 法商研究, 2017(1):14-23.
[4] 五问天津爆炸:被化工和恐慌围困的城市[EB/OL].[2015-08-13].http://business.sohu.com/20150813/n418754446.shtml.
[5] 王树义, 庄超. 突发环境事件信息公开的理念更新与制度完善[J]. 中州学刊, 2013(3):63-66.
[6] Xiao W. The improved information environment as a key rationale for freedom of information reform in China[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2010, 15(3):177-187.
[7] 赖诗攀.问责、惯性与公开:基于97个公共危机事件的地方政府行为研究[J].公共管理学报,2013,10(02): 18-27+138.
[8] 黄策, 邓燕华. 突发性责任事故的信息搜集与披露——基于央地信息沟通的视角[J]. 公共行政评论, 2016, 9(1):8-25.
[9] 陈思. 新媒体环境下公权力监督研究[J]. 湖北社会科学, 2014(7):44-48.
[10] 朱江丽.新媒体推动公民参与社会治理:现状、问题与对策[J].中国行政管理,2017(06):49-53.
[11] 杨瑞龙, 尹振东, 桂林. 上访与对地方官员问责:一个新政治经济学的视角[J]. 经济研究, 2010(12):60-69.
[12] 张琦,步丹璐,郁智.媒体关注、报道情绪与政府“三公”预算抑制[J].经济研究,2016,51(5):72-85.
[13] 王会金,马修林.政府透明度、媒体监督与政府审计绩效——基于省级面板数据的经验研究[J].南京审计大学学报,2017,14(3):86-94.
[14] Chongwoo Choe, Paul A. Raschky. Media, institutions, and government action:Prevention vs. palliation in the time of cholera[J]. European Journal of Political Economy, 2016, 41(1):75-93.
[15] Garcia-Sanchez I M, Cuadrado-Ballesteros B, Frias-Aceituno J V. Does media freedom improve government effectiveness? A comparative cross-country analysis[J]. European Journal of Law & Economics, 2016, 42(3):515-537.
[16] 张曼,喻志军,郑风田.媒体偏见还是媒体监管?——中国现行体制下媒体对食品安全监管作用机制分析[J].经济与管理研究,2015,36(11):106-114.
[17] Pi J. Media capture and local government accountability[J]. Prague Economic Papers, 2010, 2010(3):273-283.
[18] Chen D.''Supervision by public opinion'' or by government officials? Media criticism and central-local government relations in China[J]. Modern China, 2017, 43(6): 620-645.
[19] Friedman D. On economic applications of evolutionary game theory[J]. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1998, 8(1):15-43.
[2] 铜矿公司违法排废水影响数万居民吃水赔偿八千万[EB/OL].[2017-12-24].http://www.xinhuanet.com/2017-12/24/c_ 1122159324.htm.
[3] 苟正金. 我国突发环境公共事件信息公开制度之检讨与完善——以兰州“4·11”自来水苯超标事件为中心[J]. 法商研究, 2017(1):14-23.
[4] 五问天津爆炸:被化工和恐慌围困的城市[EB/OL].[2015-08-13].http://business.sohu.com/20150813/n418754446.shtml.
[5] 王树义, 庄超. 突发环境事件信息公开的理念更新与制度完善[J]. 中州学刊, 2013(3):63-66.
[6] Xiao W. The improved information environment as a key rationale for freedom of information reform in China[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2010, 15(3):177-187.
[7] 赖诗攀.问责、惯性与公开:基于97个公共危机事件的地方政府行为研究[J].公共管理学报,2013,10(02): 18-27+138.
[8] 黄策, 邓燕华. 突发性责任事故的信息搜集与披露——基于央地信息沟通的视角[J]. 公共行政评论, 2016, 9(1):8-25.
[9] 陈思. 新媒体环境下公权力监督研究[J]. 湖北社会科学, 2014(7):44-48.
[10] 朱江丽.新媒体推动公民参与社会治理:现状、问题与对策[J].中国行政管理,2017(06):49-53.
[11] 杨瑞龙, 尹振东, 桂林. 上访与对地方官员问责:一个新政治经济学的视角[J]. 经济研究, 2010(12):60-69.
[12] 张琦,步丹璐,郁智.媒体关注、报道情绪与政府“三公”预算抑制[J].经济研究,2016,51(5):72-85.
[13] 王会金,马修林.政府透明度、媒体监督与政府审计绩效——基于省级面板数据的经验研究[J].南京审计大学学报,2017,14(3):86-94.
[14] Chongwoo Choe, Paul A. Raschky. Media, institutions, and government action:Prevention vs. palliation in the time of cholera[J]. European Journal of Political Economy, 2016, 41(1):75-93.
[15] Garcia-Sanchez I M, Cuadrado-Ballesteros B, Frias-Aceituno J V. Does media freedom improve government effectiveness? A comparative cross-country analysis[J]. European Journal of Law & Economics, 2016, 42(3):515-537.
[16] 张曼,喻志军,郑风田.媒体偏见还是媒体监管?——中国现行体制下媒体对食品安全监管作用机制分析[J].经济与管理研究,2015,36(11):106-114.
[17] Pi J. Media capture and local government accountability[J]. Prague Economic Papers, 2010, 2010(3):273-283.
[18] Chen D.''Supervision by public opinion'' or by government officials? Media criticism and central-local government relations in China[J]. Modern China, 2017, 43(6): 620-645.
[19] Friedman D. On economic applications of evolutionary game theory[J]. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1998, 8(1):15-43.