买方势力对成本-价格传递率的影响
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摘要
研究了纵向产业链结构中成本传递的影响因素,将成本-价格传递率分解成批发和零售两个环节的价格传递率,分析在线性定价、两部收费制和收益分成三种纵向合约形式下,买方势力对两种价格传递率的影响.结果表明:买方势力和纵向合约形式均会对两种价格传递率产生影响.线性合约条件下,买方势力对零售价格传递率没有影响,对批发价格传递率的影响与需求曲率有关.两部收费制合约下,价格传递率与买方势力无关.收益分成合约下,零售价格传递率随买方势力增加而减小,批发价格传递率则随买方势力增加而升高.
The influencing factors of cost-price pass-through in the vertical industry chain were studied. The cost-price pass-through was decomposed into the wholesale pass-through and retail pass-through,and the effect of buyer power on the two kinds of pass-through was analyzed under three vertical contracts: linear pricing,two-part tariffs,and revenue-sharing. The results showed that both buyer power and vertical contract will affect the pass-through. Under linear contract,buyer power has no influence on the retail pass-through,but has an impact on the wholesale passthrough,and the influence is related to the demand curvature. Under the two-part tariff system,the wholesale pass-through and retail pass-through have nothing to do with buyer power. Under revenue-sharing contract,the retail pass-through decreases in buyer power,and the wholesale pass-through increases in buyer power.
The influencing factors of cost-price pass-through in the vertical industry chain were studied. The cost-price pass-through was decomposed into the wholesale pass-through and retail pass-through,and the effect of buyer power on the two kinds of pass-through was analyzed under three vertical contracts: linear pricing,two-part tariffs,and revenue-sharing. The results showed that both buyer power and vertical contract will affect the pass-through. Under linear contract,buyer power has no influence on the retail pass-through,but has an impact on the wholesale passthrough,and the influence is related to the demand curvature. Under the two-part tariff system,the wholesale pass-through and retail pass-through have nothing to do with buyer power. Under revenue-sharing contract,the retail pass-through decreases in buyer power,and the wholesale pass-through increases in buyer power.
引文
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[7] Inderst R. Leveraging buyer power[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2007,25(5):908-924.
[8] Wang H. Buyer power,transport cost and welfare[J].Journal of Industry,Competition and Trade,2010,10(1):41-53.
[9] Villas-Boas S B. Vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers:inference w ith limited data[J]. Review of Economic Studies,2007,74(2):625-652.
[10] Draganska M,Klapper D,Villas-Boas S B. A larger slice or a larger pie? an empirical investigation of bargaining pow er in the distribution channel[J]. Marketing Science,2010,29(1):57-74.
[11] Gaudin G. Pass-through,vertical contracts,and bargains[J].Economics Letters,2016,139:1-4.
[12] Bresnahan T F,Reiss P C. Dealer and manufacturer margins[J]. RAND Journal of Economics,1985,16(2):253-268.
[13] Mortimer J H. Vertical contracts in the video rental industry[J]. Review of Economic Studies,2008,75(1):165-199.
[14] Li J,Moul C C. Who should handle retail? vertical contracts,customer service,and social w elfare in a Chinese mobile phone market[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2015,39:29-43.
[15] Cachon G P,Lariviere M A. Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts:strengths and limitations[J].Management Science,2005,51(1):30-44.
[2] Goldberg P K,Hellerstein R. A structural approach to identifying the sources of local currency price stability[J].Review of Economic Studies,2012,80(1):175-210.
[3] Hellerstein R,Villas-Boas S B. Outsourcing and pass-through[J]. Journal of International Economics,2010,81(2):170-183.
[4] Nakamura E,Zerom D. Accounting for incomplete passthrough[J]. Review of Economic Studies,2010,77(3):1192-1230.
[5] Adachi T,Ebina T. Cost pass-through and inverse demand curvature in vertical relationships w ith upstream and dow nstream competition[J]. Economics Letters,2014,124(3):465-468.
[6] Hong G H,Li N. Market structure and cost pass-through in retail[J]. Review of Economics and Statistics,2017,99(1):151-166.
[7] Inderst R. Leveraging buyer power[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2007,25(5):908-924.
[8] Wang H. Buyer power,transport cost and welfare[J].Journal of Industry,Competition and Trade,2010,10(1):41-53.
[9] Villas-Boas S B. Vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers:inference w ith limited data[J]. Review of Economic Studies,2007,74(2):625-652.
[10] Draganska M,Klapper D,Villas-Boas S B. A larger slice or a larger pie? an empirical investigation of bargaining pow er in the distribution channel[J]. Marketing Science,2010,29(1):57-74.
[11] Gaudin G. Pass-through,vertical contracts,and bargains[J].Economics Letters,2016,139:1-4.
[12] Bresnahan T F,Reiss P C. Dealer and manufacturer margins[J]. RAND Journal of Economics,1985,16(2):253-268.
[13] Mortimer J H. Vertical contracts in the video rental industry[J]. Review of Economic Studies,2008,75(1):165-199.
[14] Li J,Moul C C. Who should handle retail? vertical contracts,customer service,and social w elfare in a Chinese mobile phone market[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2015,39:29-43.
[15] Cachon G P,Lariviere M A. Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts:strengths and limitations[J].Management Science,2005,51(1):30-44.