国家治理现代化背景下的保险法理论新范式——以保险人作为私人监管者为中心的考察
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摘要
本文提出以及论证的命题"保险人可以作为支持和补充政府治理/监管风险的私人监管者"与国内目前主流的保险法研究范式——合同和监管两个维度——有较大的不同。本文意图藉此探索保险法理论的新范式,以回应国家治理现代化对于保险法理论研究带来的重大挑战。风险保障专业化、损害赔偿社会化和治理手段市场化的性质使保险成为构建公权与私权合作治理的机制。保险人以"治理"(govern/regulate)的方式支持、补充甚至替代政府对被保险人行为和风险的行政管制。"看不见的手"(商业保险)与"看的见的手"(政府)相互配合与支撑,在满足约束条件的情况下,政府应向保险人下放风险管理职能,从而实现国家治理现代化和社会福利最大化。
The proposition "The insurer can be a private regulator to support and supplement government's risk regulation/governance "is quite different from the current mainstream insurance law research paradigm—contract and supervision. This paper intends to explore a new paradigm of insurance law theory in response to the major challenges brought by the modernization of state governance to the theoretical study of insurance law. The specialization of risk coverage,the socialization of damage compensation and the market-oriented nature of governance mean that insurance has become a mechanism for building cooperative governance between public and private sectors. The insurer supports,supplements,and even replaces the government's administrative controls on the behavior and risks of the insured in a "govern/regulate "manner. The "invisible hand "( commercial insurance) and the "visible hand "( government) could cooperate with each other. Under certain conditions,the government should delegate the risk management function to the insurer,thus realizing the modernization of state governance,and maximum of social welfare.
The proposition "The insurer can be a private regulator to support and supplement government's risk regulation/governance "is quite different from the current mainstream insurance law research paradigm—contract and supervision. This paper intends to explore a new paradigm of insurance law theory in response to the major challenges brought by the modernization of state governance to the theoretical study of insurance law. The specialization of risk coverage,the socialization of damage compensation and the market-oriented nature of governance mean that insurance has become a mechanism for building cooperative governance between public and private sectors. The insurer supports,supplements,and even replaces the government's administrative controls on the behavior and risks of the insured in a "govern/regulate "manner. The "invisible hand "( commercial insurance) and the "visible hand "( government) could cooperate with each other. Under certain conditions,the government should delegate the risk management function to the insurer,thus realizing the modernization of state governance,and maximum of social welfare.
引文
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(1)党的十八届三中全会《关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定》指出:“全面深化改革的总目标是完善和发展中国特色社会主义制度,推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化。”
(1)保险合同不是一般的附和合同,而是“超级附和合同”,例如团体健康险,雇员作为被保险人一般仅持有一份保险凭证,保险合同原件一般由雇主保有。(参见:Todd D.Rakoff.Contracts of Adhesion:An Essay in Reconstruction.Harvard Law Review.1983.96:1173.)
(1)参见:卓志,孙正成.现代保险服务业:地位、功能与定位[J].保险研究,2014(11):21-32;张金林.现代保险功能:一般理论与中国特色[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2004(6):74-80;林宝清.论保险功能说研究的若干逻辑起点问题[J].金融研究,2004(9):19-24.但也有学者对保险三功能论持否定意见,参见:王竹,陈鹏军.浅议保险三功能论[J].经济研究导刊,2010(6):70-71.
(1)信息成本和惩罚实施是社会治理面对的两大基本问题。(参见:唐清利.公权与私权共治的法律机制[J].中国社会科学.2016(11):113.)
(1)The concept of“moral hazard”is one of the most important…,is a central part of the law and economics explanation of how things as they are came to be.(参见:Tom Baker.On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard.Texas Law Review.1996(75):126.).
(1)如我国《保险法》第十六条规定,“订立保险合同,保险人就保险标的或者被保险人的有关情况提出询问的,投保人应当如实告知。投保人故意或者因重大过失未履行前款规定的如实告知义务,足以影响保险人决定是否同意承保或者提高保险费率的,保险人有权解除合同。”
(2)对ISO更详细的了解请参见:Abraham KS.Insurance Law and Regulation(5th Edition).[M].St.Paul:Foundation Press.2010:34-36.
(1)中国人民保险(集团)在山东、辽宁、河北等地与政法部门合作开发的治安保险。治安保险实施以后,一些农村可发案件同比下降了37%,其中盗窃案件下降了61.4%。大幅提高当地治安风险防范的能力,弥补农村地区地方治安方面的薄弱环节,在提高社会运行效率的同时,为提高当地治安水平做出了贡献。这是保险业为服务国家治理体系和治理能力现代化做出的实际贡献。(参见:刘际平,孙哲军,杨晶晶.治安保险与社会治理体系建设探析---基于周口市治安保险的实践与思考[J].金融理论与实践,2016(4):107-109.)
(2)电梯每年20%的快速增长,监管力量不足的矛盾愈发突出,而且面对维保市场失灵问题,单靠行政监管难以有效发挥作用。“保险+服务”的新模式运用保险的市场约束和激励机制,以市场化机制和信息化手段破解维保监管的难题,构建社会共治新机制。目前,浙江宁波、杭州、福建福州、天津4个地区1051台电梯先行试点,电梯安全水平提升,平均故障率下降40%。(参见:质检报刊社.运用市场机制提升电梯维保服务质量[EB/OL].http://www.aqsiq.gov.cn/zjxw/dfzjxw/dfftpxw/201711/t20171107_501732.htm。)
(3)选择该险种进行分析也与笔者的个人经历有关系。2014年中国平安保险(集团)首席律师姚军先生即与笔者商讨该险种的开发,并与美国相关的Injunction Bond、Receiver Bonds以及Appeal/Supersedeas Bonds等进行比较。可以说笔者在一定程度上见证了该险种在中国的开发与发展的全过程。
(1)参见:《中国人民财产保险股份有限公司诉讼保全责任保险条款》第6条、第14条、第20条。
(1)参见:最高人民法院《关于适用〈中华人民共和国保险法〉若干问题的解释(四)》,法释[2018]13号(自2018年9月1日起施行)。第19条第2款规定,“被保险人与第三者就被保险人的赔偿责任达成和解协议,未经保险人认可,保险人主张对保险责任范围以及赔偿数额重新予以核定的,人民法院应予支持。”
(2)传统担保形式往往会给当事人带来沉重的经济眼里,因而较高的制度成本使得保全制度的实际效果受到限制。同时也给债务人违法转移、隐匿财产留有可乘之机,最终“执行难”问题依然无法破解。(参见:姚军,潘诗韵.诉讼保全担保引入责任保险的法律问题探讨[J].私法,2017(14):310-325.)
(1)长尾风险的特征是:1.从风险的角度来看,风险暴露开始与风险暴露造成的损失之间时间长;2.从负债的角度来看,产生责任的行为与承担责任之间的时间长。(参见:Michael Faure and P.Fenn.Retroactive Liability and the Insurability of Long-tail Risks.[J].International Review of Law&Economics.1999(19):487-500.)
[2]郑功成.社会保障与国家治理的历史逻辑及未来选择[J].社会保障评论,2017(1):25.
[3]马长山.国家、市民社会与法治[M].北京:商务印书馆,2002:283.
[4]唐清利.公权与私权共治的法律机制[J].中国社会科学,2016(11):111-128.
[5]David Rosenberg.The Causal Connection in Ma ss Exposure Cases:A“Public Law”Vision of the Tort System.Harvard Law Review,1984(97):849.
[6]施天涛.商事关系的重新发现与当今商法的使命[J].清华法学,2017(6):148-9.
[7]陈欣.保险法[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2010(3):3-4.
[8]邹海林.保险法学的新发展[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2015:527-529.
[9]Todd D.Rakoff.Contracts of Adhesion:An Essay in Reconstruction[J].Harvard Law Review,1983(96):1173.
[10]Spencer L.Kimball.The Purpose of Insurance Regulation:A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law[J].Minnesota Law Review,1961(45):471.
[11]42 U.S.C.§18001 et seq.2010.
[12]Tom Baker.Health Insurance,Risk,and Responsibility after the Affordable Care Act[J].University of Pennsylvania Law Review,2011(159):1577.
[13]唐应茂.金融法中的社会科学[J].北大法律评论,2016,17(2):5.
[14]袁宗蔚.保险学——危险与保险[M].北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社,2000(34版):57.
[15]Arrow,K.J..Insurance,Risk and Resource Allocation,in Foundations of Insurance Economics,1992:220-229;卓志.论保险职能与功能及其在我国的实现和创新[J].保险研究,2004(1):2-5.
[16]Kenneth S.Abraham,Four Conceptions of Insurance[J].University of Pennsylvania Law Review,2013(161):653.
[17]Ericson,R.V.,&Doyle,A.Uncertain Business:Risk,Insurance and the Limits of Knowledge[M].Toronto:University of Toronto Press,2004.
[18][美]奥姆瑞·本沙哈.保险在食品安全监管中的作用[J].法律和社会科学,2015(2):47-68.
[19]Tom Baker&Rick Swedloff.Regulation by Liability Insurance from Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability[J].UCLALaw Review,2014(60):1412.
[20]Haitao Yin,Howard Kunreuther and Matthew White.Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort:Does the Private Insurance Market Reduce Environmental Accidents?[J].Journal of Law and Economics,2011(54):325.
[21]Shauhin A.Talesh.Insurance Companies as Corporate Regulators:The Good,the Bad,and the Ugly[J].De Paul Law Review,2017(66):463.
[22]Peter Kochenburger.Liability Insurance and Gun Violence[J].Connecticut Law Review,2014(46):1265.
[23]John Rappaport.How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police[J].Harvard Law Review,2017(130):1539.
[24]樊启荣.保险法诸问题与新展望[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2014:2.
[25]Shauhin A.Talesh.A New Institutional Theory of Insurance[J].U.C.Irvine Law Review.2015(5):617;Marc Schneiberg.Combining New Institutionalisms:Explaining Institutional Change in American Property Insurance[J].Sociological Forum,2005(20):93-137;RICHARD V.ERICSON,AARON DOYLE&DEAN BARRY.INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE[M].Toronto:University of Toronto Press,2003:3-9.
[26]Tom Baker.Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation:Six Ways that Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action[J].Connecticut Insurance Law Journal,2005(12):1.
[27]刘南平.法学博士论文的“骨髓”和“皮囊”——兼论我国法学研究之流弊[J].中外法学,2000(1).
[28]苏力.也许正在发生——中国当代法学发展的一个概览[J].比较法研究,2001(3):1-9.
[29]何启豪.保险法的行为经济学分析[J].法律和社会科学,2017.16(2).
[30]Kenneth Abraham.Distributing Risk:Insurance,Legal Theory,and Public Policy[M].New Haven:Yale University Press,1986.
[31]Jesse A.Langer.Deciphering Posner’s Insurance Jurisprudence[J].7 Connecticut Insurance Law Journal1-6,2001.
[32]Affordable Care Act,§1501(a)(2)(I),as amended by§10106.
[33]席恒.公与私:公共事业运行机制研究[M].北京:商务印书馆,2003:113.
[34]张康之.合作治理是社会治理变革的归宿[J].社会科学研究,2012(3):35-42..
[35][美]奥姆瑞·本沙哈.保险在食品安全监管中的作用[J].法律和社会科学,2015(2):47-68.
[36]韩成卉,绰翔,郑苏晋.“行为定价保险”:车险定价与驾驶行为理论[J].金融发展研究,2015(8):68-74.
[37]杨磊.车联网时代保险公司开发UBI车险产品策略探析[J].保险研究,2014(7):33-35.
[38]Omri Ben-Shahar&Kyle D.Logue.Outsourcing Regulation:How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard[J].Michigan Law Review,2012(111):199.
[39]Abraham KS.Insurance Law and Regulation(5th Edition)[M].St.Paul:Foundation Press,2010:7.
[40]Bruggeman,V.Compensating Catastrophe Victims:A Comparative Law and Economics Approach[M].Alphen aan den Rijn:Kluwer Law International,2010:61-64.
[41]Stephen D.Sugarman.California’s Insurance Regulation Revolution:The First Two Years of Proposition 103[J].San Diego Law Review,1990(27):683.
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(1)党的十八届三中全会《关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定》指出:“全面深化改革的总目标是完善和发展中国特色社会主义制度,推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化。”
(1)保险合同不是一般的附和合同,而是“超级附和合同”,例如团体健康险,雇员作为被保险人一般仅持有一份保险凭证,保险合同原件一般由雇主保有。(参见:Todd D.Rakoff.Contracts of Adhesion:An Essay in Reconstruction.Harvard Law Review.1983.96:1173.)
(1)参见:卓志,孙正成.现代保险服务业:地位、功能与定位[J].保险研究,2014(11):21-32;张金林.现代保险功能:一般理论与中国特色[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2004(6):74-80;林宝清.论保险功能说研究的若干逻辑起点问题[J].金融研究,2004(9):19-24.但也有学者对保险三功能论持否定意见,参见:王竹,陈鹏军.浅议保险三功能论[J].经济研究导刊,2010(6):70-71.
(1)信息成本和惩罚实施是社会治理面对的两大基本问题。(参见:唐清利.公权与私权共治的法律机制[J].中国社会科学.2016(11):113.)
(1)The concept of“moral hazard”is one of the most important…,is a central part of the law and economics explanation of how things as they are came to be.(参见:Tom Baker.On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard.Texas Law Review.1996(75):126.).
(1)如我国《保险法》第十六条规定,“订立保险合同,保险人就保险标的或者被保险人的有关情况提出询问的,投保人应当如实告知。投保人故意或者因重大过失未履行前款规定的如实告知义务,足以影响保险人决定是否同意承保或者提高保险费率的,保险人有权解除合同。”
(2)对ISO更详细的了解请参见:Abraham KS.Insurance Law and Regulation(5th Edition).[M].St.Paul:Foundation Press.2010:34-36.
(1)中国人民保险(集团)在山东、辽宁、河北等地与政法部门合作开发的治安保险。治安保险实施以后,一些农村可发案件同比下降了37%,其中盗窃案件下降了61.4%。大幅提高当地治安风险防范的能力,弥补农村地区地方治安方面的薄弱环节,在提高社会运行效率的同时,为提高当地治安水平做出了贡献。这是保险业为服务国家治理体系和治理能力现代化做出的实际贡献。(参见:刘际平,孙哲军,杨晶晶.治安保险与社会治理体系建设探析---基于周口市治安保险的实践与思考[J].金融理论与实践,2016(4):107-109.)
(2)电梯每年20%的快速增长,监管力量不足的矛盾愈发突出,而且面对维保市场失灵问题,单靠行政监管难以有效发挥作用。“保险+服务”的新模式运用保险的市场约束和激励机制,以市场化机制和信息化手段破解维保监管的难题,构建社会共治新机制。目前,浙江宁波、杭州、福建福州、天津4个地区1051台电梯先行试点,电梯安全水平提升,平均故障率下降40%。(参见:质检报刊社.运用市场机制提升电梯维保服务质量[EB/OL].http://www.aqsiq.gov.cn/zjxw/dfzjxw/dfftpxw/201711/t20171107_501732.htm。)
(3)选择该险种进行分析也与笔者的个人经历有关系。2014年中国平安保险(集团)首席律师姚军先生即与笔者商讨该险种的开发,并与美国相关的Injunction Bond、Receiver Bonds以及Appeal/Supersedeas Bonds等进行比较。可以说笔者在一定程度上见证了该险种在中国的开发与发展的全过程。
(1)参见:《中国人民财产保险股份有限公司诉讼保全责任保险条款》第6条、第14条、第20条。
(1)参见:最高人民法院《关于适用〈中华人民共和国保险法〉若干问题的解释(四)》,法释[2018]13号(自2018年9月1日起施行)。第19条第2款规定,“被保险人与第三者就被保险人的赔偿责任达成和解协议,未经保险人认可,保险人主张对保险责任范围以及赔偿数额重新予以核定的,人民法院应予支持。”
(2)传统担保形式往往会给当事人带来沉重的经济眼里,因而较高的制度成本使得保全制度的实际效果受到限制。同时也给债务人违法转移、隐匿财产留有可乘之机,最终“执行难”问题依然无法破解。(参见:姚军,潘诗韵.诉讼保全担保引入责任保险的法律问题探讨[J].私法,2017(14):310-325.)
(1)长尾风险的特征是:1.从风险的角度来看,风险暴露开始与风险暴露造成的损失之间时间长;2.从负债的角度来看,产生责任的行为与承担责任之间的时间长。(参见:Michael Faure and P.Fenn.Retroactive Liability and the Insurability of Long-tail Risks.[J].International Review of Law&Economics.1999(19):487-500.)